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ABSTRACT 
 
Three basic objectives are pursued in this thesis: (a) an analysis of the historical 
development of secularism and religious freedom across a number of jurisdictions, in 
the context of the theories regarding secular governance of the English thinker George 
Jacob Holyoake ; (b) analysis of various constitutional models regarding the 
relationship between organised religion and the state, through the examination by 
ultimate courts of issues that have arisen since the drafting of those constitutions; (c) 
an examination of how modern secular democracies have interpreted secular 
governance since the times and writing of Holyoake; and (d) recommendations for 
reform of secular government in light of this research.   
 
This thesis is developed through three parts.  Part I relates to the historical and 
contemporary philosophical development of secular government in England and 
Wales, in common law countries in the Americas and South Asia, including an 
examination of George Jacob Holyoake’s theories,  as well as civil law countries in 
Europe.  Part II deals with the constitutional law in these jurisdictions identifying areas 
where individual religious freedom rights clash with public policy of the secular state.  
Part III relates to reform of such states where efforts to keep a “separation of church 
and state” have resulted in artificial and impractical results, and a constitutional theory 
is developed offering a solution. 
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PREFACE 
 
This thesis developed from an interest I developed in constitutionally guaranteed 
religious freedom rights that originated with my Master degree studies.  I found it 
interesting that, whilst specific issues such as the wearing of headscarves in the public 
sphere in France were evaluated in that country’s context, no real comparison had been 
made across multiple jurisdictions to consider what issues other countries had in this 
area, and how they were addressed.  I was curious about not only how other secular 
democracies addressed this issue, but more broadly, how other expressions of religious 
activity that ran counter to public policy were handled by the state,1 whether the rights 
were extinguished, impaired, or accommodated, and what impact this had on other 
rights i.e. were religious rights advanced or given preference over other rights 
contained in the various constitutions. 
 
I have always had an interest in the rights of minority viewpoints in a modern secular 
democracy relative to the collective will of the majority.  The issue is often in the 
media, particularly when these views are made in the public square and for some 
reason cause conflicts with other individuals or the state.  I had noted however that 
often these views are expressed intra-jurisdictionally, and my literature review 
determined there is little comparison of the religious freedom provisions of diverse 
secular states, the exception being perhaps Jacobsohn’s Wheel of Law,2 which 
examined the USA, India and Israel. 
 
This thesis provides the opportunity to look at the treatment of religious pluralism in 
modern societies, particularly those where the changes have been gradual over perhaps 
the last half century, causing those communities to re-examine judicially the basic 
understanding and assumptions made about what the broad religious freedom 
provisions with their constitutions mean, and whether that meaning has changed over 
time in line with the increase in pluralism within those societies. 
 
In doing so I hope to add to the scholarship in this area, particularly that done in 
Australia, India and the United States.  I trust that the results of this thesis will show 
that the understandings of religious freedom have expanded to include a broader 
understanding of religion and religion and its role in society, as well as the increasing 
recognition of those who choose not to participate in religion, but who also have a role 
in the public sphere. 
 
I have based this thesis on the law available to me at Canberra on 28 February 2014. 
 
Tony Meacham 
Theodore, Australian Capital Territory 
28 February 2014. 
 
 
                                                 
1 By ‘state’, for the purposes of this thesis, I mean ‘sovereign state’. 
2Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, The Wheel of Law: India’s Secularism in Comparative Constitutional 
Context (Princeton University Press, 2003), which compared three countries (India, the United States 
and Israel). 
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PART I 
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE SECULAR 
STATE AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
BRIDGING THE WALL OF SEPARATION 
 
This thesis is multijurisdictional in scope.  Contemporary issues of religious liberty 
have reached a pronounced level in constitutional law, owing to the heightened 
prominence of religious liberty in contemporary jurisprudence in many jurisdictions.   
The transcendence of national barriers by religious doctrines and a greater pluralism 
of societies have made issues of secularism and religious freedom in constitutional 
democracies a complex matter of global scope.   
 
As many commentators observe,3 the issues and solutions in one jurisdiction influence 
and inform others.  The result is that more intra-jurisdictional analysis, as if the 
influences and pressures were home grown, is not in itself sufficient.  Many secular 
jurisdictions have domestic religious freedom issues that appear very similar to those 
found internationally, and some are superficially similar.  Some may be the same, but 
are described locally in different terms to the same issues elsewhere.  This thesis will 
compare the most prominent issues to analyse juridical responses to them, using 
national constitutions and case law from constitutional disputes as the source of 
contemporary authority. 
 
What has become also noteworthy over several decades, but in particular the last ten 
years, is that supreme and high courts all over the world are challenging previously 
unquestioned paradigms of national secular constitutional identity.  Previously 
unquestioned understandings of what national constitutions have said about the role 
of religion in public policy, laws supporting education and employment and limits on 
religious activity and traditions are being re-evaluated, together with an ascendancy of 
the assertion of rights to be non-religious or of a non-majority religious persuasion, 
and have those rights considered equal to those held by the majority rather than just 
tolerated. 
 
This is a thesis in constitutional law.  It necessarily implicates - by way of context - 
philosophy, history and sociology.  The issues of secularism and religious freedom 
will be viewed primarily through the lens of constitutional law.   
 
I OBJECTIVES OF THESIS 
 
The law has recorded encounters between organised religion and the state for 
centuries.  This has over time evoked a great deal of thought on the role of religion in 
modern society, especially through the Enlightenment in Europe and the incorporation 
of Enlightenment understandings in modern constitutions.  Enlightenment thought was 
disseminated across Europe, and to the European colonies established in other parts of 
the world, many of which continue to accept diasporas that continue to challenge the 
status quo regarding religion and state interaction in the public sphere. 
 
                                                 
3 See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Global Community of Courts’ (2003) 44 Harvard 
International Law Journal 191; Paul Schiff Berman, ‘Global Legal Pluralism’ (2007) 80 Southern 
California Review 1155 and Vicki C. Jackson, ‘Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, 
Resistance, Engagement’ (2005-06) 119 Harvard Law Review 109. 
 
4 
In recent years some of these issues have come to public attention and interest in high 
profile litigation that has come before the courts.  It has been as various as the crucifix 
cases in Italy and Germany,4 the headscarf issue in France and Germany,5 religious 
speech in public educational institutions in the United States,6 and the issues arising 
from temple entry7 and spousal maintenance in India.8 
 
Often the issues arise from a clash of absolutes: a belief by religious practitioners that 
their constitutional rights are protected without limit, and the state which provides 
elsewhere in the constitution other freedoms such as free speech and public health and 
safety.  Compromise is difficult.  Many secular states have attempted different 
permutations of ‘neutrality’, often having no position on an issue involving religion 
for fear of invoking religious freedom litigation.  Others have attempted to keep 
religion entirely out of the public sphere.  Both methods attempt to avoid conflict, but 
do not always provide societal benefits for the remainder of the community.   
 
In this thesis, I explore the middle ground, considering how religion in a secular 
liberal democracy may be accommodated without impacting upon broader state 
public policy objectives, yet allowing a role for religious and non-religious members 
of the community to make a contribution in the public space with minimal friction.  
The philosopher Robert Audi suggests a working hypothesis for a constitutional 
liberal democracy should include a “fidelity to essential premises standard” where 
democracy should incorporate, in its vision of a just society, enough to fulfil its 
essential underlying ideals, and include nothing inconsistent with them.9   
 
The theoretical basis for this analysis will be made by analysing the contributions of 
the thinker George Jacob Holyoake, who in the nineteenth century followed 
developments from post-Enlightenment and Utilitarian thinkers to develop a body of 
thought on a change from religiously-influenced government and society to 
government that ostensibly tried to keep religion and government at bay.  This he titled 
‘Secularism’. 
 
I have three objectives.  First, after explaining the development and nature of 
Holyoake’s views and those that have derived from them, I aim to develop a theoretical 
basis for a constitution which can address the various forms of religious pluralism 
found in the jurisdictions considered in this thesis, but which also potentially apply to 
those outside of its scope.  Secondly, I will outline where various models of 
‘secularism’ have failed to produce convincing and practical solutions to problems in 
religious pluralism.  Thirdly, I will highlight how reform may be achieved in secular 
constitutions in order to achieve a practical and workable solution to problems and 
issues currently attributed to keeping “church” and “state” apart. 
 
 
                                                 
4 Such as Lautsi v Italy, European Court of Human Rights (Application No. 30814/06) and 
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] May 16, 1995 (Kruzifix-Urteil), 93 Entschiedungen des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfG] 1 (F.R.G.). 
5 Conseil d’Etat, 20 octobre 1999, Epoux Aït Ahmad, and BVerfG, 2 BvR 1436/02. 
6 Rosenberger v Rector of the University of Virginia 515 US 819 (1995). 
7 Sri Venkataramana Devaru v State of Mysore AIR 1958 SC 895. 
8 Mohd. Ahmed Khan v Shah Bano Begum And Ors 1985 SCR (3) 844. 
9 Robert Audi, Religious Commitment and Secular Reason (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
UK, 2000) 31. 
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A What is Religion? – Recent discussion in law and philosophy 
 
In writing a thesis relating to the secular state, necessarily the issue of religion, its 
role in the public sphere, and its relationship to government will arise often.  This 
thesis looks at its influence upon the state, and efforts to keep it out of state 
deliberations and the drafting of laws, and at times efforts to do the reverse.   
 
Defining religion has always been problematic.  However, it will be necessary for 
the purposes of this thesis to have a working definition.  The lack of a definition of 
religion has led to difficulty when the state wishes to make accommodations (from 
laws of general applicability) to religion such as in the area of taxation or other 
benefits, exemptions from military service, or from penalties applied in relation to 
the usage of narcotics.  
 
In order to give religion and the religious such accommodations, and to apply some 
limits to the imposition of those limitations by the state, the highest courts in many 
jurisdictions have struggled to define what it is that they wish protected, or in order 
to maintain a secular state, what it is that the state must be separated from when 
separating “church and state”.   
 
It is helpful to briefly examine the scope of some efforts to do so to illustrate the 
difficulties that courts have in this area.  Defining religion in order to separate it out 
from other beliefs or philosophies in order to give it special protections is a problem 
in itself.  As the jurisprudence in a number of jurisdictions has shown,10 drafting 
legislation and constitutions to define religion is fraught with inconsistencies and 
confusion.  The drafters of these provisions usually did not define religion, as the 
meaning of religion presumably (at least to them) was self-evident at the time, and 
often was the predominant religious paradigm of the day.  Douglas Laycock has 
argued that such a definition must include “any set of answers to religious questions, 
including the negative and sceptical answers of atheists, agnostics, and secularists.”11 
 
Although such a definition may often be a philosophical exercise, it has a practical 
legal aspect.  For example asylum cases may be decided where there is a “well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of … religion”, even though the 1951 
Refugee Convention does not offer a definition for its purposes.12  In the Australian 
High Court in Church of the New Faith v Commissioner of Pay-Roll Tax (Vic)13 
Mason ACJ and Brennan J, considering whether the Church of Scientology was 
eligible for the concessional tax treatment available to religions, noted that  
 
The chief function in the law of a definition of religion is to mark out an area in which a 
person subject to the law is free to believe and act in accordance with his [or her] belief 
without legal constraint.  Such a definition affects the scope and operation of s 116 of the 
Constitution and identifies the subject-matters which other laws are presumed not to intend 
to affect.
14
 
                                                 
10 As will be discussed at length in subsequent chapters of this thesis, particularly in Chapters 5 and 6. 
11 Douglas Laycock, ‘Religious Liberty as Liberty’, (1996) 7 Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 
313, 326. 
12 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (July 28, 1951), articles 1 and 4, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 
U.N.T.S. 137. 
13 ("Scientology case") [1983] HCA 40; (1983) 154 CLR 120 (27 October 1983) 
14 (1983) 154 CLR 120, 133 (Mason ACJ and Brennan J). 
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Traditionally courts in Europe, Australia and North America have seen religion in 
Christian terms.  However, Mason ACJ and Brennan J in Church of the New Faith15 
held that the definition of religion went beyond theistic religions and that ‘the test of 
religious belief to be satisfied by belief in supernatural things or principles and not to 
be limited to belief in God or in a supernatural being otherwise described’.  Again in 
Australia, Latham CJ in Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses Incorporated v 
Commonwealth16 noted that there is a wide variance in how religion is perceived, 
explaining that   
 
There are those who regard religion as consisting principally in a system of beliefs or 
statements of doctrine.  So viewed religion may be either true or false.  Others are more 
inclined to regard religion as prescribing a code of conduct.  So viewed a religion may be 
good or bad.  There are others who pay greater attention to religion as involving some 
prescribed form of ritual or religious observance.
17
    
 
Finding any agreed indicia of religion is difficult.  George Freeman has offered that, 
"there simply is no essence of religion, no single feature or set of features that all 
religions have in common and that distinguishes religion from everything else."18  
Accordingly, a constitution usually does not make a definition of religion.19   
 
Each jurisdiction has its own religious traditions from which its understanding of 
religion derives.  As time progresses and demographics change so too may the 
definitions change, as explained when its meaning is important in litigation.   Often, 
as is illustrated in the United States Supreme Court by cases such as Gillette v United 
States,20 United States v Seeger,21 and Welsh v United States,22 long held definitions 
will evolve even within one jurisdiction with changes in society.  Other jurisdictions, 
Germany for example, have shied away from a comprehensive definition.23  In South 
Africa, in Christian Education South Africa v Minister for Education, 24 Sachs J held 
that “religion is not just a question of belief or doctrine.  It is a part of way of life, of 
a people’s temper and culture.”  In Singapore, in Nappalli Peter Williams v Institute 
of Technical Education,25 Chief Justice Yong thought that religion (in the context of 
Article 1526 of the Constitution of Singapore) was about a citizen's "[f]aith in a 
personal God" or "belief in a supernatural being", and the "State commands no 
                                                 
15 At 140. 
16 (Jehovah’s Witnesses Case) (1943) 67 CLR 116. 
17 (1943) 67 CLR 116, 123. 
18 George C. Freeman, III, ‘The Misguided Search for the Constitutional Definition of "Religion" 
(1983) 71(6) Georgetown Law Journal, 1519, 1565.  
19
 Such as in the USA, the United States Supreme Court, "[t]he word 'religion' is not defined in the 
Constitution.", Reynolds v United States, 98 US 145, 162 (1878). 
20 United States v Gillette, 401 US 437 (1971).  In this case requests for religious exemption became 
difficult because of a lack of definition of religion. 
21 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
22 398 U.S. 333 (1970). 
23 Gerhard Robbers, ‘Religious Freedom in Germany’ (2001) Brigham Young University Law Review 
643, 663. 
24 2000 (4) SA 757 (CC), [33]. 
25 Nappalli Peter Williams v Inst. of Technical Education, [1999] 2 SLR 569, 577, aff'g Peter 
Williams Nappalli v Inst. of Technical Educ., Singapore High Court 351, 352 (High Ct. 1998). 
26 Article 15 guarantees freedom of religion in Singapore, and states: "Every person has the right to 
profess and practice his religion and to propagate it." 
 
7 
supernatural existence in a citizen's personal belief system." 27  There is no 
fundamental agreement in provisions across jurisdictions. 
 
The constitutional cases exploring the nature of religion in order to permit 
exemptions or freedoms permitted have already filled many books and theses, and it 
is not my intention to restate them at length.  It is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
propose a comprehensive definition which would encompass all three, indeed a 
thesis in itself, but the words of the eminent sociologist Émile Durkheim work best 
for this thesis: 
 
A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, i.e., things set 
apart and forbidden--beliefs and practices which unite in one single moral community called 
a Church, all those who adhere to them.
28
 
 
This thesis in constitutional law would take the aspect therefore that religion is a 
communal activity that seeks to retain its traditions and practices in the public arena.  
Western society has long sought to preserve such traditions and practices against those 
who would alter or remove them.  Usually this has been against the state.  Accordingly 
there is a long history of the articulation and claims of religious freedom against the 
state. 
 
II SCOPE AND OUTLINE OF THESIS 
 
This thesis will examine the constitutional provisions of a number of modern secular 
democracies.  It will compare the issues addressed in Eastern constitutions such as that 
of India with often very similar issues encountered by Western democracies, such as 
the United States of America, Canada, Germany, France, Italy and, to some extent, 
Australia.  These will be contrasted with solutions or accommodations achieved by 
democracies that are not commonly regarded as having a purely secular law - such as 
in England and Denmark. 
 
Although there are many secular constitutions that may be incorporated into this study 
of older and newer democracies in Turkey, Southeast Asia, Africa and the Pacific, this 
thesis must necessarily limit itself to the regions outlined above for the purposes of 
clarity and brevity.  Although some passing reference may be made to those other 
secular states, they will not form an integral part of this study.   
 
The subject of the power of the state to regulate behaviour and practices, and the will 
of society to express its personal and community practices in a public forum (often 
against the wishes of a state wishing to maintain peace and good government between 
the wills of different communities) can fill volumes.  This thesis will use Holyoake’s 
philosophy as a basis for analysing this problem, and will discuss how Holyoake’s 
views on secular government and religious freedom have succeeded or failed.  
 
In Part I, I develop the theoretical basis for the contemporary constitutional provisions 
relating to religious freedom.  This part will outline the the development of the current 
                                                 
27 2 SLR 569, 576. 
28 Émile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, (London: Oxford University Press, 
2001), 46. 
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secular state from the nineteenth century thoughts of Holyoake and his books, 
including Principles of Secularism, through to more contemporary thoughts of 
American, British and Indian writers and theorists.  The development of the 
contemporary philosophical and legal underpinnings of secular government is 
explained.  This Part will begin with an examination of Holyoake’s principles, and the 
philosophical underpinnings of those views.  Chief among the latter are the Utilitarians 
such as Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill.  From the examination of the 
beginnings of philosophical thought considering an enduring role for religion in a 
constitutionally enshrined secular public sphere, this part finishes with an overview of 
the forms that such constitutions have evolved into in Europe, North America and 
South Asia, and how they currently adapt to modern challenges to the secular state, 
whether adaptive or resistant. 
 
Part II examines in more detail the contemporary models of the secular state that are 
commonly encountered, from the strict interpretations of French laïcité (that allow 
little of religion in the public sphere) through to a more relaxed interpretation in India 
(where all religions are claimed to have a place).    Of particular interest in this part 
will be the treatment of the state to overt religious symbols in public spaces, and efforts 
by the state to impose religious values under the guise of secular intent.  This part 
looks at much of the case law of the last half century that has explored and developed 
various issues where religion has intersected with public policy in areas such as 
religious dress and behaviour, as well as state imposed religiously inspired legislation 
mandating “days of rest”.  These cases will be evaluated for insights into the extent 
that religion seeks an influential role in the public sphere, and the limits and rationales 
that states place on it using their constitutional authority.  Some cases will also be 
considered where the state has imposed values that are deemed by it to be in the 
interests of the community, but are themselves questioned as being ultra vires the 
constitution.  Part II also considers the difficulties inherent in maintaining absolutes 
of interpretation of religious freedom provisions which are often themselves vague.   
 
Part III will evaluate how a middle path may be achieved where (rather than arguing 
constitutional ideals in the abstract) the ideals of both religion and the secular state 
may be met at the same time to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes.  This thesis will 
examine case law that has analysed matters involving the presence of religion in the 
public sphere, and will determine whether a strict separation of religion and 
government has proven to be an effective interpretation for that purpose.  Using case 
law from Europe and Asia to support this proposition, it will determine that strict 
separation has been counterproductive.  A limited role for religion in the public sphere 
where it can be shown to be in the public interest will be argued as a better model than 
‘strict’ separation. 
 
A normative theory of constitutional secularism will be advanced that will address the 
problems in finding an effective role for religion in the secular state by making 
reference to Holyoake’s philosophy and drawing together the cases that have been 
examined in this thesis that have illustrated how secularism may incorporate religion 
successfully into the public sphere.  This is of course a difficult task.   
 
In conclusion, this thesis will examine the development of Western secularism as 
originally articulated by George Jacob Holyoake in his writings and speeches in the 
mid-nineteenth century.  As secularism is a constitutional concept regarding the 
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relationship of the state with organised religion in the public sphere, this thesis will be 
examining the nature of this relationship from its theoretical underpinnings derived 
from the Enlightenment, commencing with the next chapter, through to the recent 
court cases that have examined this relationship in a number of jurisdictions, and will 
finish with an examination of contemporary trends and a normative theory that will 
encompass how best secularism may evolve across jurisdictions.  There are of course 
differing views on what secularism is in the various jurisdictions.  However, these 
arguments will be considered as the thesis progresses. 
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CHAPTER 2 
HOLYOAKE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECULARISM 
     
  
I GEORGE JACOB HOLYOAKE – A PRIMER 
 
George Jacob Holyoake was a man substantially of the nineteenth century.  He did not 
write any treatises that now grace bookshops and libraries as modern classics, nor is 
there identified with him a clear cut vision of the world and its people as he saw it.  
Indeed, his expressed views wandered as his interests and passions took him from 
being an advocate of workers’ co-operatives, to being a lecturer at the Birmingham 
Mechanics' Institute.  He had many roles in his life, primarily an avowed atheist, 
Owenite,29 and coiner of the term ‘Secularism’.30 
 
Modern secularism, at least in the Western sense, is usually attributed to Holyoake31 
after his use of the term first in his 1871 book The Principles of Secularism 
Illustrated,32 and in other writings.33   
 
The theoretical framework for this thesis draws on Holyoake’s thoughts and ideals, 
more than a century and a half ago, when Europe was beginning to evaluate how the 
Enlightenment impacted upon government.  Holyoake’s thought permeated the 
thinking of many in and outside of government at that time, and set the stage for 
modern secular constitutional government, articulating a solution to the unrest 
between the state and organised religion then extant in England.   
 
It is difficult to describe Holyoake’s theories with respect to the many matters on 
which he wrote, debated and made speeches,34 including secularism.  His published 
views and speeches on secularism were more about what secularism was not than what 
it was, as a result of having many public discussions with those who saw his views as 
contrary to established religion.35  It would nevertheless not be incorrect to say that 
Holyoake’s views on secularism are not a detailed and comprehensive argument.  It 
has gaps, but there is a consistent thread in his statements and writings on secularism 
- particularly in his later years - as he warmed to the topic and developed his views.  
In this thesis I intend to collate those views consistent with his position on secularism 
from the numerous publications that he wrote, or to which he contributed.   
                                                 
29 As a businessman, Owen sought to improve the lives of his employees.  He set up a textile factory 
in New Lanark in Scotland, an enterprise co-funded by his teacher Jeremy Bentham. 
30 Edward Royle, Selected Pamphlets by G.J. Holyoake, 1841-1904, Microform Academic Publishers 
<http://www.microform.co.uk/guides/R97234.pdf,>, 1. 
31 See T.N. Madan, ‘Secularism in Its Place’, (1987) 46 Journal of Asian Studies 747 and Nehaluddin 
Ahmad, ‘The Modern Concept of Secularism and Islamic Jurisprudence: A Comparative Analysis’, 
(2009) 15(1) Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law 75. 
32 George Jacob Holyoake, The Principles of Secularism Illustrated (London Book Store, London, 
1871). 
33 George Jacob Holyoake, Origin and Nature of Secularism (London: Watts & Co, 1896), 50. 
34 “The habit of my thoughts is to run into speeches, as the thoughts of a poet run into verse”, G.J. 
Holyoake, Bygones worth remembering (E.P. Dutton & Co, New York, 1905), 17. 
35 See generally Grant Brewin and George Jacob Holyoake, Christianity and Secularism Report of a 
Public Discussion between Rev. Brewin and G. J. Holyoake (London: Ward & co., 1853) 
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Holyoake’s views on secularism are important because of the structural elements of 
his views that have relevance to today.  In secularism he has provided a scaffold that 
is compatible with the structures of government that many, if not most, modern liberal 
democracies have chosen when developing a means for organised religion and the 
state to coexist in the same polity.  
 
II HOLYOAKE’S PATHWAY TO SECULARISM 
 
The thoughts of freethinkers36 and secularists of the nineteenth century such as 
Holyoake did not appear suddenly and from nowhere.  The eighteenth century had 
spawned a number of philosophers who challenged the accepted understanding of 
religious precepts, and science had begun to offer alternative and compelling views.  
As early as the late eighteenth century, the beginnings of a body of scientific and 
philosophical thinking that challenged long-held views were taking shape.  The early 
to middle years of the nineteenth century were full of post-Enlightenment discussions 
and debates about matters from the nature of the human mind to the nature of the 
universe.37  This conflict involved the cautious consideration of the new thinking by 
some theologians.38  
 
This review of prior thinking led to the understanding that humanity was the product 
of its own passions, and that those forces influencing the will of humankind were that 
of reason and rational thought.  The human was basically selfish, pursuing her own 
happiness and seeking the avoidance of pain.  This allowed for the development of a 
secular system of ethics that built upon the Enlightenment, and the development of 
Utilitarian thinking that it permitted and which followed on from it.39 
 
 
 
 
 A Post-Enlightenment, Utilitarianism and the public sphere 
 
                                                 
36 A philosophical viewpoint that holds opinions should be formed on the basis of logic, reason and 
empiricism and not authority, tradition, or other dogmas.  In the first half of the nineteenth century, 
freethought was very much a development of Enlightenment rationalism.  “Free thought being the 
precursor of Secularism, it is necessary first to describe its principles and their limitation. Free 
thought means independent self-thinking.” (George Jacob Holyoake, English Secularism: A 
Confession of Belief (The Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago, 1896), 9.); “Free thought means 
fearless thought. It is not deterred by legal penalties, nor by spiritual consequences. Dissent from the 
Bible does not alarm the true investigator, who takes truth for authority not authority for truth. The 
thinker who is really free, is independent; he is under no dread; he yields to no menace; he is not 
dismayed by law, nor custom, nor pulpits, nor society—whose opinion appals so many. He who has 
the manly passion of free thought, has no fear of anything, save the fear of error.”  (George Jacob 
Holyoake, English Secularism: A Confession of Belief (The Open Court Publishing Company, 
Chicago, 1896), 10.) 
37 Edward Royle, Victorian Infidels (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1974), 19-21. 
38 Thomas Burnett, a theologian, cautioned in 1690 that ‘tis a dangerous thing to ingage (sic) the 
authority of Scripture in disputes about the Natural World, in opposition to Reason, lest Time, which 
brings all things to light, should discover that to be evidently false which we had made Scripture to 
assert’. (T. Burnett, Telluris Theoria Sacra, or Sacred Theory of the Earth (1690), preface, cited in 
Edward Royle, Victorian Infidels (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1974), 16. 
39 Beginning with Jeremy Bentham.  Edward Royle, Victorian Infidels (Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 1974), 21-23. 
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Holyoake and the Utilitarians in the early nineteenth century operated in an intellectual 
environment influenced by the views of John Locke, an Enlightenment thinker who 
came before them.  Locke was not a Utilitarian, but his thoughts and empiricism laid 
the foundations for those whose views included a role for the state that did not include 
enforcing its precepts, but who rather saw the state supporting individual rights and 
Utilitarian ideals. 
 
Locke was one of the earliest modern theorists to consider a more secular public sphere 
in the West.  Although Hobbes before him had argued that a uniformity of religion in 
society led to its effective function, Locke felt that more religious groups would 
prevent civil unrest.  He considered the state to be limited in its coercive powers to 
protecting and enforcing religious rights.  Governments exist to defend the rights 
which individuals have over their persons such as lives, liberties and estates.  As long 
as someone’s religious beliefs and practices do not intrude upon or intersect the rights 
of others, the state has no authority to suppress those beliefs or practices.40  These 
views were very much based in Protestant theology.   
 
Locke’s thoughts were formed by the new perspectives of the Enlightenment, and he 
may be regarded as either an early Enlightenment thinker, or a progenitor of 
Enlightenment thinking.  Locke was careful to express his views of rationality in terms 
that spoke to the strong religious views of his times and which did not denigrate the 
religious establishment.  In the Letter Concerning Toleration,41 Locke writes: "The 
public good is the rule and measure of all law-making.”  A number of his views on 
ethics encompassed the view that the state can make law for the common benefit of 
all.  In particular, on the relationship between state and church, Locke considered that 
the role of government is limited to the protection of rights and the punishment of 
those who violate those rights.42  He held that “[f]or law in its true notion, is not so 
much the limitation as the direction of a free and intelligent agent to his proper interest, 
and prescribes no farther than is for the general good of those under that law”43 - a 
view that is consistent with John Stuart Mill’s Harm principle, of which more will be 
discussed later. 
 
The liberty of religion is then just an extension of the general right for individuals to 
be left alone.  Locke felt that as a church is a voluntary association of those joining of 
their own accord, following rules made for those members, then the state should not 
punish those who do not belong and have not submitted to the rules of such 
                                                 
40 “No one…neither single persons nor churches, nay, nor even commonwealths, have any just title to 
invade the civil rights or worldly goods of each other on pretence of religion.  Those that are of 
another opinion would do well to consider with themselves how pernicious a seed of discord and war, 
how powerful a provocation to endless hatreds, rapines, and slaughters they thereby furnish to 
mankind.  No peace and security, no, not so much as common friendship, can ever be established or 
preserved amongst men so long as this opinion prevails, that dominion is founded in grace and that 
religion is to be propagated by force of arms” (John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, trans. 
William Popple, Merchant Books, USA, 2011), 13. 
41 John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, trans. William Popple, (Merchant Books, USA, 
2011), 49. 
42 J.D. Mabbott, John Locke (London, Macmillan, 1973), 176. 
43 John Locke, C. B. Macpherson, The Second Treatise of Government (Hackett Publishing, 
Cambridge, USA, 1980), Chapter 6, Sec. 57. 
 
13 
association.44   Locke also made the important point that compelling religious belief 
by the state would simply drive those so oppressed into opposition or even sedition.  
Locke’s view, therefore, was that the role of government is the protection of individual 
rights without interference in the beliefs of its citizens or the administration of their 
institutions. 
 
However, Locke did believe that there were those whose views should not be accepted, 
that were excluded from toleration, and therefore should be suppressed by the civil 
administration.  Generally these were people whose opinions were contrary to the 
existence of human society, or to those moral rules which preserved human society.  
These therefore were those whose opinions, in his view, threatened national security 
and stability.  Locke’s position excluded atheists and Catholics from the public 
sphere45 - atheists as he felt that religion bound society, so those who were not 
religious in society were not bound to it,46 and Catholics because he believed that their 
loyalty lay with a foreign sovereign.47   
 
Holyoake drew on all these, Locke in the previous century for his views on the secular 
public space, and the later Utilitarians for their views on the common good, and how 
the common good could be exemplified by a secular public space. 
 
B Holyoake: the early years 
 
The nineteenth century into which Holyoake was born48 was a period of rapid 
urbanisation and industrialisation.  The intellectual and political climate was changing.  
New scientific ideas by those such as Charles Darwin, provoked thought as did new 
theological scholarship from Germany, examining the Gospel as historical documents, 
which influenced English thinking.49  Early socialist thought, in the form of the views 
of Henri de Saint-Simon and Robert Owen, influenced the working class, of which 
Holyoake was part. He spent his early years working in a foundry with his father.50   
 
                                                 
44 John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, trans. William Popple, (Merchant Books, USA, 
2011), 48. 
45 True pluralism of views in the public sphere was not advocated until later by John Stuart Mill in On 
Liberty (1859) discussed later in this chapter.   
46 “those are not at all to be tolerated who deny the being of a God. Promises, covenants, and oaths, 
which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an atheist. The taking away of God, 
though but even in thought, dissolves all; besides also, those that by their atheism undermine and 
destroy all religion, can have no pretence of religion whereupon to challenge the privilege of a 
toleration”.  (John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, trans. William Popple, Merchant Books, 
USA, 2011), 78. 
47 “That Church can have no right to be tolerated by the magistrate, which is constituted upon such a 
bottom, that all those who enter into it, do thereby ipso facto, deliver themselves up to the protection 
and service of another prince.... [B]y this means the magistrate would give way to the settling of a 
foreign jurisdiction in his own country, and suffer his own people to be listed, as it were, for soldiers 
against his own government.”  (John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, trans. William Popple, 
Merchant Books, USA, 2011), 77. 
48 In 1817. 
49 Edward Royle, Victorian Infidels (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1974), 14. 
50 Robert Owen (1771 –1858) was a Welsh social reformer and one of the founders of utopian 
socialism and the cooperative movement.  Owen’s views developed into the utopian socialist 
philosophy known as ‘Owenism’, a communitarian and co-operative view that is associated with the 
development of the British trade union movement.   
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Until his 20s, Holyoake was quite religious, a member of a local Baptist group, and 
preached with such as John Collins who became a founder of the Chartist51 church in 
Birmingham.  At 17 he was a student and later tutor at the Birmingham Mechanics’ 
Institute.  There he became influenced by the views of Robert Owen, and became a 
‘social missionary’52 for Owen’s Society of Rational Religionists.53  The Owenites 
aimed to raise the expectation of the working man, and preached the ‘gospel of 
redemption through science, co-operation and ‘community building’’.  This resulted 
in the Bishops in the House of Lords forcing limits on the Central Board of the Society.  
Holyoake, Charles Southwell and several others split from the Society as they did not 
wish to comply with the new regulations. They then commenced publication of an 
atheistic periodical, The Oracle of Reason.  
 
Southwell was imprisoned for blasphemy, and Holyoake too was imprisoned in 1842.  
In prison Holyoake met Richard Carlisle, a republican and freethought agitator whose 
views he did not entirely share, but he admired Carlisle for his method of fighting for 
freedom of speech and of the press.  After his six months in prison for blasphemy, 
Holyoake began to publish anti-theological pamphlets, beginning with Rationalism: A 
Treatise for the Times in 1845, a pamphlet that shows Holyoake’s views moving from 
Owenism towards an early position on secularism.54       
 
Robert Owen, as well as expressing views publicly on the alleviation of poverty and 
workers’ rights, also had strong views on religion, arguing that Christianity ought to 
be opposed, not on anti-clerical or similar grounds, but rather for rational reasons as 
he believed religion was a cause of disharmony in the world.  He was not, however, 
an advocate of the removal or replacement of religion, but sought respect for its 
views.55  Additionally his views also reflected those of Jeremy Bentham, whom he 
                                                 
51 Chartism was a Victorian era working class movement for political reform in Britain between 1838 
and 1848. Their churches included hymns that emphasised liberty and worker’s rights rather than 
traditional worship. Their dissatisfaction regarding the distribution of funds between the state and the 
Church of England, and its lack of support for the working class, caused a number of chartists to 
question the support of the state for established religion.(Harold Underwood Faulkner, Chartism and 
the churches: a study in democracy  (New York : The Columbia University Press, 1916), 59. 
52 A full-time paid position as a ‘professional Owenite’. John Fletcher Clews Harrison, Robert Owen 
and the Owenites in Britain and America: The Quest for the New Moral World (Taylor & Francis, 
London, 2009), 185. 
53 “The object of this Society, is, to arrange mankind universally into communities of a size to 
embrace all the necessary trades, arts and sciences, wherein there can be equitable exchange of all 
their products, without the intervention of the non-producing mercantile class; thus making property 
producers, as well as consumers of all; thereby producing the greatest degree of equality and virtue of 
which the peculiar organization of each man is susceptible.” Lewis Masquerier, “The Universal 
Community Society of Rational Religionists,” The Boston Investigator 9, no. 39 (December 4, 1839), 
1. 
54 Holyoake’s freethought was not of the same aggressive kind as Southwell’s, so after the failure of 
the Owenite community in 1845, Holyoake sought to follow the philosophical and ethical aspects of 
Owenism, known as Rationalism. (Edward Royle, Selected Pamphlets by G.J. Holyoake, 1841-1904, 
Microform Academic Publishers <http://www.microform.co.uk/guides/R97234.pdf>, 3.)  
55 “As there are a very great variety of religious sects in the world (and which are probably adapted to 
different constitutions under different circumstances, seeing there are many good and conscientious 
characters in each), it is particularly recommended, as a means of uniting the inhabitants of the village 
into one family, that while each faithfully adheres to the principles which he most approves, at the 
same time all shall think charitably of their neighbours respecting their religious opinions, and not 
presumptuously suppose that theirs alone are right.” Rules and Regulations for the Inhabitants of New 
Lanark (1800) cited in Frank Podmore, Robert Owen Vol. 1 (Haskell House, New York, 1907), 88. 
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followed, and of later Utilitarians.56  Holyoake was impressed with Owen’s views 
when he first saw him in the late 1830s, and joined the Owenites in 1840.  From 1850 
Holyoake launched a new movement called Secularism based on principles he adopted 
from Owenism and Chartism.57   
 
When Owenism began declining around 1845, Holyoake began reshaping that 
philosophy which had had a communal focus and began shaping it into a philosophy 
for individuals as well as society, advocating Rationalism and other positive aspects 
of the freethought movement.58 In a line of thought that clearly anticipates his 
development of Secularism, Holyoake argued that Rationalism was 
 
The science of material circumstances.  Rationalism advises what is useful to society without 
asking whether it is religious or not.  It makes morality the sole business of life, and declares 
that from the cradle to the grave man should be guided by reason and regulated by science.59   
 
By 1853 secularism and rationalism were doctrinally indistinguishable.  The 
Reasoner60 announced that year that “Secularism is the province of the real, the 
known, the useful, and the affirmative”.  Secularism had developed from what 
Holyoake had previously known as Naturalism, Rationalism and Cosmism, where 
their basic doctrines were much the same.61   
 
Holyoake was also impressed with the thoughts of F.W. Newman62 who, like him, had 
sought a universal morality grounded in human nature.  Holyoake took as his own the 
belief of Newman who wrote that 
 
The human mind is a moral existence, having within itself moral tendencies, and a moral law, 
which is developed by culture; and that in the long past of mankind numerous great moral 
truths have established themselves in the conscience of nations, and especially of the most 
unbiased and most cultivated of individuals.63 
 
In 1854 Holyoake spoke of secularism as “Conscience illustrated by common sense”.64  
He sought to reconcile this view with Utilitarianism by observing that each checked 
the other, and that a “belief in the good elevated crude utility; a demand for the greatest 
                                                 
56 “It is therefore, the interest of all, that every one, from birth, should be well educated, physically 
and mentally, that society may be improved in its character, — that everyone should be beneficially 
employed, physically and mentally, that the greatest amount of wealth may be created, and knowledge 
attained, — that everyone should be placed in the midst of those external circumstances that will 
produce the greatest number of pleasurable sensations, through the longest life, that man may be made 
truly intelligent, moral and happy, and be thus prepared to enter upon the coming Millennium.” 
(Robert Owen, A Development of the Principles & Plans on which to establish self-supporting Home 
Colonies (Home Colonization Society (London, 1841), 35) 
57 Edward Royle, Victorian Infidels (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1974), 100-101. 
58 Edward Royle, Victorian Infidels (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1974), 126. 
59 George Jacob Holyoake, Rationalism: a treatise for the times (J. Watson, London, 1845), 31. 
60 The Reasoner, 19 January 1853. 
61 ‘Justification by conduct and sincerity, study of the order rather than the origin of nature, trust in 
science as the providence of man, and belief in a morality guaranteed by human nature, utility and 
intelligence.”  Edward Royle, Victorian Infidels (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1974), 
150. 
62 Francis William Newman (27 June 1805 – 7 October 1897), English scholar and writer. 
63 The Reasoner, 12 October 1853. 
64 Grant Brewin and George Jacob Holyoake, Christianity and Secularism Report of a Public 
Discussion between Rev. Brewin and G. J. Holyoake (London: Ward & co., 1853), 105. 
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happiness controlled the elitist implications of ‘the most unbiased and most cultivated 
individuals’ ”.65 
 
Although generally not listed amongst classic Utilitarian philosophers such as 
Bentham and Mill, Holyoake drew upon the Utilitarian thinking that was prominent 
in the mid-nineteenth century, at a time where Bentham’s thought was well developed 
a generation before, and Mill was a friend and contemporary.  He formed his 
philosophy when Utilitarian thinking was the political and legal orthodoxy in England, 
a position it held until at least the 1870s.  The central core of Holyoake’s views on 
secularism and philosophical methodology can be derived from the premises of 
Utilitarian legal philosophy.  Holyoake’s views have been considered to be a particular 
form of their thought, as it is “is based solely on considerations of practical morality 
with a view to the physical, social and moral improvements of society. It neither 
affirms nor denies the theistic premises of religion, and is thus a particular variety of 
Utilitarianism.”66   
 
The development of Secularism owed a debt to Utilitarianism, largely due to the work 
of James Mill and others, notably John Stuart Mill, and the earlier work of Jeremy 
Bentham whose doctrine that all behaviour is moral which is conducive to "the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number" had been quite influential around the time of the 
founding of the Secularist Movement.67  Holyoake was one who felt its influence, as 
can be seen from 1846 to 1848 where he published a "Utilitarian Record" in connection 
with the Reasoner. In recognition of the debt of Secularism to Utilitarianism, 
Holyoake, at the end of 1851, referred to the persons composing the "Central Secular 
Society" as "Utilitarians."68  
 
Holyoake’s developed and refined views rested on Utilitarian ideals.69  On their 
concept of the good Holyoake said that70  
 
All pursuit of good objects with pure intent is religiousness in the best sense in which this term 
appears to be used. A "good object" is an object consistent with truth, honour, justice, love. A 
pure "intent" is the intent of serving humanity. Immediate service of humanity is not intended 
to mean instant gratification, but "immediate" in contradistinction to the interest of another 
life. The distinctive peculiarity of the Secularist is, that he seeks that good which is dictated 
by Nature, which is attainable by material means, and which is of immediate service to 
humanity—a religiousness to which the idea of God is not essential, nor the denial of the idea 
necessary.  
 
He developed this view in his major work English Secularism: A Confession of Belief71 
that pursuit of the good had a social focus: 
                                                 
65 Edward Royle, Victorian Infidels (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1974), 134. 
66 Encyclopedia Brittanica, Cambridge University Press, 11th ed., Cambridge, 1911, Vol. XXIV, p. 
573. 
67 ["Reasoner," 1846-1848 and January 14, 1852] cited in John Edwin McGee, A History of the British 
Secular Movement, Chapter 2 (Haldeman-Julius Publications, 1948). 
68 ["Reasoner," 1846-1848 and January 14, 1852] cited in John Edwin McGee, A History of the British 
Secular Movement, Chapter 2 (Haldeman-Julius Publications, 1948).  
http://onlinebooks.library.upenn.edu/webbin/book/lookupid?key=olbp23391. 
69 See generally Part III of this chapter. 
70 George Jacob Holyoake, The Principles of Secularism (3rd Ed., Austin & Co., London, 1870), 
Chapter III. 
71 George Jacob Holyoake, English Secularism: A Confession of Belief (The Open Court Publishing 
Company, Chicago, 1896), 42. 
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Goodness is the service of others with a view to their advantage. There is no higher human 
merit. Human welfare is the sanction of morality. The measure of a good action is its 
conduciveness to progress. The Utilitarian test of generous rightness in motive may be open 
to objection,--there is no test which is not,--but the Utilitarian rule is one comprehensible by 
every mind. It is the only rule which makes knowledge necessary, and becomes more luminous 
as knowledge increases. A fool may be a believer, but not a Utilitarian who seeks his ground 
of action in the largest field of relevant facts his mind is able to survey.  Utility in morals is 
measuring the good of one by its agreement with the good of many. 
These utilitarian principles were based primarily on the principles developed by 
Jeremy Bentham before his time, and John Stuart Mill, his contemporary. 
III HOLYOAKE’S UTILITARIAN ANTECEDENTS 
 
Holyoake was immersed in Utilitarianism.  Utilitarianism was a popular and 
influential philosophy from roughly the latter few decades of the eighteenth to the 
middle of the nineteenth centuries.  While it had adherents over Europe, its heartland 
was England, and constituted the largest contribution of the English to moral and 
political theory.72  The most influential Utilitarians remain, naturally, Jeremy Bentham 
and John Stuart Mill.   
 
Jeremy Bentham is credited with developing modern normative Utilitarianism, and 
although his main premises were published in the 1790s, Bentham’s philosophy led to 
the major social reforms of the 1830s and 1840s.  His last major work was his 
unfinished Constitutional Code, published posthumously,73 which allowed his work 
to continue to be felt during the period of the reforms.  John Stuart Mill’s most famous 
works were written at this time and published in England: On Liberty was written in 
1859, Considerations on Representative Government in 1861 and Utilitarianism in 
1863.   
 
In the West many thinkers such as Kant, Bentham and Mill have attempted to outline 
how one may exercise a perceived right to religious freedom in the public space, while 
sharing it with others wishing to exercise the same.  The Utilitarian thinkers were early 
proponents of solutions in this regard, and have contributed to thinking about the 
development of rights to religious freedom within a modern secular democracy where 
these rights have either been incorporated into national constitutions, or are compatible 
with them.  Holyoake’s views were influenced by and derived from these thinkers, 
particularly from Bentham’s Principles of Legislation,74 and were approved by John 
Stuart Mill with whom he corresponded a great deal.75  John Stuart Mill helped 
Holyoake financially, and sent him the first edition of his Principles of Political 
Economy.76  
 
As explained by Jeremy Bentham, Utilitarianism’s distinct position is that, as a 
"fundamental axiom, it is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the 
                                                 
72 John Plamenatz, The English Utilitarians (Blackwell, Oxford, 1958), 1-2. 
73 First published in The Pamphleteer, No.44, 1823. 
74 Bentham, Jeremy, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1907). Library of 
Economics and Liberty <http://www.econlib.org/library/Bentham/bnthPML1.html>.  
75 John Stuart Mill approved the term Secularism “as a useful departure from the theologic thought of 
the day, ever obstructive of secular improvement.” whom Holyoake notes in his memoir 54. 
76 John Eros, ‘The Rise of Organized Freethought in Mid-Victorian England’ (1954) 2(1) Sociological 
Review 98, 104-5. 
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measure of right and wrong".77  Utilitarians, in aiming to maximise the overall good, 
consider the good of others over oneself.  Bentham argued, “[t]hat which is 
conformable to the utility or the interests of the community is what tends to augment 
the total sum of the happiness of the individuals that compose it.”78  A necessary 
corollary then is that individual rights would then need to be subordinated to 
community needs, otherwise the total sum of happiness would not be maximised.79  In 
doing so, one is able to look beyond the benefits of bending society and its laws to 
meet the will of the majority to consider those who are not of the majority, and to 
consider that the maximum good is achieved when the overall good is met.  Only then 
is the chaos of competing interests and preferences minimised. 
 
The basic tenets of Utilitarianism vary according to who is asked and when, and have 
evolved over the years.  However, they can be basically limited to the following four 
propositions: that pleasure is alone good or desirable for its own sake; that the equal 
pleasures of any two or more men are equally good; that no action is right unless it 
appears to the agent to be the action most likely, under the circumstances , to produce 
the greatest happiness; and that people’s obligations to the government of the country 
in which they live, and that government’s duties to them, have nothing to do with the 
way in which the government first acquired power.80  Plamenatz quite reasonably 
states that these four propositions are, in “a definition of this kind ... like the great bed 
at Ware,81 that will hold all the members of a large family, though the limbs of one or 
two of them hangs over its sides.”82  What brings Utilitarianism into the context of 
constitutional law is in the Utilitarian view that one ought to maximise the overall 
good, to consider the good of others as well as one's own good.83 
 
Bentham’s views were informed by Hobbes’ views on human nature and David 
Hume’s on social utility.84  He sought to remove those laws that were of little utility, 
which led to unhappiness and achieved little or nothing.  Mill considered that we have 
a capacity to consider the welfare of others when we make decisions.  Regarding social 
policy, Mill considered rights were underwritten by utility, so that if a right or duty is 
harmful then that right is not genuine because it has little utility and works towards 
unhappiness.85 
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Bentham and Mill were mainly concerned with applying Utilitarian principles to legal 
and social reform, a project that some see as the fundamental motivation behind the 
development of classical Utilitarianism, and as a desire to see useless, corrupt laws 
and social practices changed. To achieve this, a normative ethical theory would need 
to be employed as a critical tool.  Developing the theory required strong views about 
what was wrong in society.  For example, determining that some laws are bad required 
an analysis of why they were bad. For Jeremy Bentham, what made them bad was 
“their lack of utility, their tendency to lead to unhappiness and misery without any 
compensating happiness.  If a law or an action doesn't do any good, then it isn't any 
good.”86 
 
Classical Utilitarianism has two basic features.  The first is that we are all driven 
through human nature by the desire to be happy, and to avoid all that would make us 
otherwise.  The second is that there is a principle of utility, of practicality in human 
nature, where people desire the greatest happiness possible.  People wish to be happy, 
but are reasonable in how they wish to achieve it.87  Mill’s Utilitarianism, his ‘greatest 
happiness principle’, then is a means for the reconciliation of the diverse and 
conflicting wishes of many individuals, so that people will reconcile conflicting wants 
so that they may achieve the greatest happiness.88  At a political level then the principle 
states that policy development in government must select that alternative which is 
likely to increase the general happiness. 
 
However, although strongly influenced by it, not all of Holyoake’s thinking was in 
concord with Utilitarian views.  Jeremy Bentham was certain that society could 
survive and prevail without the support of religious institutions or beliefs.  Bentham’s 
views on religion were such that he expressed his disdain of organised religion quite 
aggressively and was an atheist from an early age.  However, he also had “an 
irresistible urge to build a ‘system’ in which every discipline and science was to find 
its place and also to account for all aspects of social, political, and intellectual life.”89 
While Holyoake agreed with the need to build a public system where all thought had 
its place, he did not express such a distaste for organised religion.  This remains an 
important feature of Holyoakean secularism, and its capacity to accommodate the 
religious and non-religious. 
 
Holyoake, in considering the Utilitarian principle of “the greatest happiness of the 
greatest number” suggested that there could then be a conflict between religion and 
secularism.90  Holyoake did, however, differ with Mill at times about Utilitarian 
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principles.  He wrote that, “I differ with diffidence from Mr Mill as to the propriety of 
carrying the Utilitarian doctrine into the domain of morals.  Truth is higher than utility, 
and not utility the measure of truth.  Conscience is higher than consequence.  We are 
bound first to consider what is right.”91 
 
Mill’s philosophy was also strongly influenced by the French thought of the previous 
century, especially that of Comte and those who followed Saint-Simon.92  Mill was of 
the view that social change was possible and desirable but not necessarily inevitable.  
Like Tocqueville, Mill accepted that it was almost inevitable that society would move 
towards more and more democracy and equality of status.  He felt that this was not in 
itself progress, but rather the problem faced by those who wished to promote 
progress.93   
 
Mill found that of the possible forms of government, the most widely held view was 
that governments exist to preserve order and achieve progress in society.  His views 
improve upon those of Bentham in that he strove to update earlier versions of 
Utilitarianism.  Bentham saw Utilitarianism in simplistic terms that took a low view 
of human life, where Mill saw view that maximising pleasure to be a qualitative 
distinction between superior mental aspects relative to bodily pleasures.  Mill’s 
political philosophy of human progress then aligns the pursuit of superior pleasures 
with the advancement of human society.94   
 
The cultivation of superior pleasures also requires a social freedom so that, in Mill’s 
view, only a free society can be truly civilized.  Accordingly, the core of Mill’s 
Utilitarianism is that those actions, either by individuals or society, that produce the 
greatest happiness of the greatest number has transformed the original Utilitarianism 
to show that government does not exist merely to maximise the pleasure that citizens 
prefer.  Rather, some pleasures are better than others and government should prefer 
that citizens are educated to pursue those higher pleasures.  Such moral education then 
must be directed at man as a progressive being.95   
 
Mill saw that an active life is better than passive obedience, and that a government 
which encourages active participation by its citizens is better than one which 
encourages passive obedience.  Hence an individual, although coming before the state, 
may through education develop his special talents and make them available to the 
community.  A government which encourages its citizens to develop the higher 
pleasures and the skills consonant with them is then better than one which may be 
more orderly but in which citizens follow passively the commands of the ruling 
group.96  
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Mill’s Utilitarian views therefore saw a role for the state to improve its citizens through 
its higher ideals through education, and for both individuals and organisations to 
contribute as a result in turn to the community.  There is nothing in his thought which 
saw that such contribution should be a one way street or that one should exclusively 
serve the other.   
 
With respect to John Stuart Mill, Holyoake differed strongly in the area where 
Utilitarianism and religion intersected.  Particularly in the matter of compelling non-
believers to take an oath in court, Holyoake argued that97 
 
It was in connection with the controversy concerning the Oath that I received a letter from 
John Stuart Mill, which when published in the Daily News, excited much surprise. Mr Mill 
was of opinion, that the oath, being made the condition of obtaining justice, ordinary persons 
might take it.  But one who was known to disbelieve the terms of it, and had for years publicly 
written and spoken to that effect, had better not take it. This was the well-known Utilitarian 
doctrine that the consequences of an act are the justification of it. Francis Place had explained 
to me that Bentham's doctrine was that the sacrifice of liberty or life was justifiable only on 
the ground that the public gained by it. 
 
A disciple should have very strong convictions who differs from his master, and I differ with 
diffidence from Mr Mill as to the propriety of carrying the Utilitarian doctrine into the domain 
of morals. Truth is higher than utility, and goes before it. Truth is a measure of utility, and not 
utility the measure of truth. Conscience is higher than consequence. We are bound first to 
consider what is right. There may be in some cases, reasons which justify departure from the 
right. But these are exceptions. The general rule is—Truth has the first claim upon us. 
 
To take an oath when you do not believe in an avenging Deity who will enforce it, is to lie and 
know that you lie. This surely requires exceptional justification. It is nothing to the purpose to 
allege that the oath is binding upon you. The security of that are the terms of the oath. The law 
knows no other. To admit the terms to be unnecessary is to abolish the oath.98 
 
Holyoake was therefore bound to be more consistent in his views.  Mill’s position on 
secularism in general, however, was not much different from Holyoake’s, emphasising 
the physical world (as distinct from the religious).  On the “import of the word secular” 
he wrote that99  
 
There is no uncertainty about it. There is not a better defined word in the English language. 
Secular is whatever has reference to this life. Secular instruction is instruction respecting the 
concerns of this life. Secular subjects therefore are all subjects except religion. All the arts and 
sciences are secular knowledge. To say that secular means irreligious implies that all the arts 
and sciences are irreligious, and is very like saying that all professions except that of the law 
are illegal. There is a difference between irreligious and not religious, however it may suit the 
purposes of many persons to confound it. Now on the principles of religious freedom which 
we were led to believe that it was the purpose of this Association to accept, instruction on 
subjects not religious is as much the right of those who will not accept religious instruction as 
of those who will. To know the laws of the physical world, the properties of their own bodies 
and minds, the past history of their species, is as much a benefit to the Jew, the Mussulman, 
the Deist, the Atheist, as to the orthodox churchman; and it is as iniquitous to withhold it from 
them. Education provided by the public must be education for all, and to be education for all 
it must be purely secular education. 
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It has been suggested by Mill that some of his contemporaries saw Utilitarianism as 
‘godless’,100 implying that it is somehow without consideration of religious input.  Mill 
addressed this in Utilitarianism,101 where he argued that the presence of a deity 
depends on one’s perception.  Utilitarianism does not criticise organised religion, nor 
does it require it as a basis for its precepts.  Rather it acknowledges religion, but does 
not need it to formulate a view of the public good.  This serves as a basis for 
Holyoake’s views on secularism which see it as a policy for the public good, the 
morality and value of which does not need to draw on theological views of the same. 
 
Accordingly Utilitarianism is a secular philosophy, having its discourse set firmly in 
neither critiquing nor exhorting religion, but rather having a position on reform of the 
public space based on temporal values.  The social and legal reform of greatest utility 
to the state and religion together in the public has been the development of the secular 
constitution.  More importantly Mill saw that all may contribute to the betterment of 
society and not that elements of society should not be excluded from making their 
contribution.   
 
Holyoake became the last person convicted of blasphemy in a public lecture.  After 
his release he went onto enrol at University College London, and to continue to speak 
publicly. Although he was pleading for education, agitation and political action, he 
was held to be “[t]he mildest-mannered man in the ranks of public disputants,” 
according to the Northern Star.102  His harsh words at the time seem linked to the 
reasons for his gaoling.103   
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Some may find that some of Holyoake’s early statements on religion and its public 
role do not necessarily coincide with those made later.  Indeed, as Joseph McCabe has 
suggested, “[s]ome of his modern admirers may wonder if he had in those days all the 
refinement of his later years ...”104 Although Holyoake was known for moderation of 
thought, he was considered to have changed his thinking in the early 1850s to newer 
forms of freethought.105  His words appear thereafter to be the more measured and 
considered words for which he is better known.  He admitted in 1853 that he did not 
continue to hold strong views on the need to continue to argue the error and 
irrationality of religion.  He now went beyond simply advocating a form of atheism to 
replace religion.106  Holyoake acknowledged the inconsistency with his past positions, 
telling Southwell that “Perpetual consistency with past opinions would exclude a man 
from growing wiser.”107  New evidence had led to the origins of his new position on 
secularism.  
 
The Secular Society that he and Charles Bradlaugh established served a social and 
political purpose, and which advocated an end to privileges for the Anglican Church 
and for equal rights and freedoms for all religious and antireligious people and 
institutions.108  The secularists made it possible for a nonbeliever to hold office, and 
helped discredit blasphemy laws.  By the end of the nineteenth century, the aims of 
the secular societies had largely been achieved.109   
 
IV HOLYOAKE’S THEORY OF SECULARISM 
 
Holyoake organised the writings and lectures of the freethinkers with his first writings 
on secularism in The Organization of Free-Thinkers110 in 1852.111  These early 
writings tended to have an element of secularism as a moral system that was an 
alternative to the religious.112  He made clear that secularism was not a negation of 
religion, but rather that it provided that if religion did not interfere with the state to its 
detriment, he was prepared to disregard it.  Where religion was useful in the world he 
wished to engage with it.113   
 
Holyoake cited with approval the thoughts of the Rev. Joseph Parker who said that 
“The cry that so-called secular education is Atheistic is hardly worth notice. Cricket 
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is not theological; at the same time, it is not Atheistic."114  This is an important point 
that a constitutional system that is not for religion need not be against religion. 
 
He emphasised that his secular principles were not old ones served anew.  He stated 
that, regarding the word ‘secularism’: “At first, the term was taken to be a "mask" 
concealing sinister features - a "new name for an old thing" - or as a substitute term 
for scepticism or atheism. If impressions were always knowledge, men would be wise 
without inquiry, and explanations would be unnecessary.”115 
 
In an early article in the Reasoner, Holyoake wrote: 
 
We do not say every man ought to give an exclusive attention to this world, because that would 
be to commit the old sin of dogmatism, and exclude the possibility of another man walking by 
a different light than that by which alone we are able to walk.  But, as our knowledge is 
confined to this life, and testimony, conjecture, and probability are all that can be set forth with 
respect to another life, we think we are justified in giving the precedence to the duties of this 
state, and attaching primary importance to the morality of man to man.116 
 
His views were not dismissive of Christian thought, but were now a more mature 
acceptance of its contribution to society, Holyoake therefore determined to replace 
words then in use which had negative connotations such as atheist, infidel, freethinker, 
and unbeliever, as he wanted as his primary concern to encourage a positive culture.  
He wanted to use a term that described what he was, not what he declined to be.  He 
felt that the word ‘secular’ would encourage people to think of the problems of this 
world, and began to use the term from 1851. 
 
This new emphasis in secularism now separated Holyoake from those such as Owen 
and Bradlaugh who disparaged Christianity.  He saw that rather than denouncing or 
offering an alternative to religion, human activity could be applied to the improvement 
of the present life.117  The purpose of secularism was then “to attack obstructive error; 
to ignore all other speculation; to advance an alternative philosophy; and to encourage 
secular improvements, unhindered by secular labels”.118   
 
Holyoake had invented the term ‘secularism’ to describe a social order separate from 
religion, yet without at the same time denigrating or criticising religion.  To make his 
position distinct from those who continued to propose the abolition and denigration of 
Christianity, he argued that119  
 
[s]ecularism is not an argument against Christianity.  It is one independent of it.  It does not 
question the pretensions of Christianity; it advances others.  Secularism does not say there is 
no light or guidance elsewhere, but maintains that there is light and guidance in secular truth, 
whose conditions and sanctions exist independently, and act forever.  Secular knowledge is 
manifestly that kind of knowledge which is founded in this life, which relates to the conduct 
of this life, conduces to the welfare of this life, and is capable of being tested by the experience 
of this life. 
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On this Holyoake differed in his views from fellow secularists with whom he had 
associated and developed his thoughts, particularly Charles Bradlaugh.120 Holyoake 
held that secularism should not be taking a position on the question of the correctness 
or otherwise of religion, and should be distinguished from strong freethought and 
atheism.121  In English Secularism,122 he made this distinction, defining secularism as: 
 
… a code of duty pertaining to this life, founded on considerations purely human, and intended 
mainly for those who find theology indefinite or inadequate, unreliable or unbelievable. Its 
essential principles are three: (1) The improvement of this life by material means. (2) That 
science is the available Providence of man. (3) That it is good to do good. Whether there be 
other good or not, the good of the present life is good, and it is good to seek that good.123 
 
In particular Holyoake distinguished secularism from the extremes of atheism and 
theism, which some secularists like Bradlaugh did not. He explained that124 
 
Secularism neither asks nor gives any opinion upon (atheism or theism), confining itself to the 
entirely independent field of study – the order of the universe.  Neither asserting nor denying 
theism or a future life, having no sufficient reason to give if called upon; the fact remains that 
material influences exist, vast and available for good, as men have the will and wit to employ 
them.  …  Considerations which pertain to the general welfare, operate without the machinery 
of theological creeds, and over masses of men in every land to whom Christian incentives are 
alien, or disregarded.  
 
Holyoake also acknowledged the similarities of secularism and positivism, when from 
6 July 1856 to 30 December 1857 he used as a subtitle for the Reasoner, which he was 
then editing as a secularist periodical, the words "Journal of Freethought and Positive 
Philosophy."  He said that “[a] Secularist guides himself by maxims of Positivism, 
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seeking to discern what is in Nature—what ought to be in morals—selecting the 
affirmative in exposition, concerning himself with the real, the right, and the 
constructive. Positive principles are principles which are provable.”125 
 
Towards the end of his life, Holyoake published his memoirs, aptly titled Sixty Years 
of an Agitator’s Life.  In it, he put his last word on what he felt secularism to be.  He 
said that 
 
My argument was that a man could judge a house as to its suitability of situation, structure, 
surroundings, and general desirableness, without ever knowing who was the architect or 
landlord; and if as occupant he received no application for rent, he ought in gratitude to keep 
the place in good repair.  So it is with this world.  It is our dwelling place. We know the laws 
of sanitation, economy, and equity, upon which health, wealth, and security depend. All these 
things are quite independent of any knowledge of the origin of the universe or the owner of it.  
And as no demands are made upon us in consideration of our tenancy, the least we can do is 
to improve the estate as our acknowledgement of the advantage we enjoy.  This is 
Secularism.126 
 
What was Holyoake’s theory of Secularism?  Although he had much to say on a 
number of matters,127 he wrote specifically on secularism in several books.128  He did 
not address secularism’s application specifically to constitutional law, but he did 
address secularism’s role in public policy.  Holyoake made clear that secularism was 
Utilitarian in nature, with the benefit of the greater society in mind when he said that  
 
A man may be a shareholder in a gas company or a waterworks, a house owner, a landlord, a 
farmer, or a workman. All these are secular pursuits, and he who follows them may consult 
only his own interest. But if he be a Secularist, he will consider not only his own interest, 
but, as far as he can, the welfare of the community or the world, as his action or example 
may tell for the good of universal society.129 
 
and also 
 
A pure "intent" is the intent of serving humanity. Immediate service of humanity is not 
intended to mean instant gratification, but "immediate" in contradistinction to the interest of 
another life. The distinctive peculiarity of the Secularist is, that he seeks that good which is 
                                                 
125 GJ Holyoake, The Principles of Secularism (3rd Ed., Austin & Co, London, 1870), Chapter 3. 
126 George Jacob Holyoake, Sixty Years of an Agitator’s Life (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1900), 294.  
(Italics in the original.) 
127 These were writings spread throughout his thoughts on matters as diverse as reason (A Logic Of 
Facts Or, Everyday Reasoning), the co-operative movement (The History of Co-Operation in 
England - Its Literature and Its Advocates (London, F. Farrah, 1866.) ), biographies (John Stuart Mill 
as some of the working classes knew him (London : Trübner & Co., 1873), The life and character of 
Richard Carlile, (London, Austin & Co. 1870), Life and Last Days of Robert Owen, of New Lanark 
(London : Trübner & Co., 1871.), Life of Joseph Rayner Stephens, preacher and political orator 
(London, Williams and Norgate [1881]) and public speaking (Public speaking and debate (London : 
T.F. Unwin, [1895])). 
128 Holyoake wrote on many things in his journey through life as he compiled life experiences that 
culminated in his theory of secularism.  They included The Principles of Secularism Illustrated, 
London Book Store (1871), The Origin and Nature of Secularism: Showing that where Freethought 
Commonly Ends Secularism Begins (London: Watts & Co, 1896) and English Secularism: A 
Confession of Belief (The Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago, 1896). 
129 George Jacob Holyoake, English Secularism: A Confession of Belief ((The Open Court Publishing 
Company, Chicago, 1896)), 58.  See also The Principles of Secularism Illustrated (Austin & Co., 
London, 1871), 11) 
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dictated by Nature, which is attainable by material means, and which is of immediate service 
to humanity.130 
A number of principles can however be gleaned from his writings that are relevant to 
secularism in the context of constitutionalism.  These are: 
 
1 Secularism is not synonymous with atheism.131 
2 Secular principles do not offer an alternative to religious principles.132 
3 Secularism deals with matters of this life.133 
4 Secularism does not accept an external authority as its source or basis.134 
5 Secular principles are open to critique and debate in the public sphere.135 
 
These principles will be used in the analysis of contemporary constitutional 
provisions, and the laws derived from them, in chapters 4 to 8. 
 
 
V EVOLUTION OF THE MEANING OF ‘SECULARISM’ 
 
Harriet Martineau said shortly after Holyoake coined the term ‘secularism’ that  
 
The adoption of the term Secularism is justified by its including a large number of persons 
who are not Atheists, and uniting them for action which has Secularism for its object, and not 
                                                 
130 George Jacob Holyoake, The Principles of Secularism Illustrated (Austin & Co., London, 1871), 
12) 
131 “That this secular form of opinion implies Atheism is an error into which many fall.  Secularism, 
like mathematics, is independent of theistical or other doctrine.  Euclid did not ignore the gods of his 
day; he did not recognise them in geometry.  They were not included in it.  But if pagan theology 
undertook to contradict mathematical principle, Euclid might have joined issue thereupon.”  (George 
Jacob Holyoake, Sixty Years of an Agitator’s Life (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1900), 293.) 
132 “My argument was that a man could judge a house as to its suitability of situation, structure, 
surroundings, and general desirableness, without ever knowing who was the architect or landlord; and 
if as occupant he received no application for rent, he ought in gratitude to keep the place in good 
repair.  So it is with this world.  It is our dwelling place.  We know the laws of sanitation, economy, 
and equity, upon which health, wealth, and security depend.  All these things are quite' independent of 
any knowledge of the origin of the universe or the owner of it.  And as no demands are made upon us 
in consideration of our tenancy, the least we can do is to improve the estate as our acknowledgment of 
the advantage we enjoy.  This is Secularism.” (Sixty Years of an Agitator’s Life (London: T. Fisher 
Unwin, 1900), 294.)  See also “Since the principles of Secularism rest on grounds apart from Theism, 
Atheism, or Christianism, it is not logically necessary for Secularists to debate the truth of these 
subjects.” (The Principles of Secularism Illustrated (Austin & Co., London, 1871), 15). 
133 “Secularism is the study of promoting human welfare by material means; measuring human 
welfare by the utilitarian rule, and making the service of others a duty of life. Secularism relates to the 
present existence of man, and to action, the issues of which can be tested by the experience of this life 
— having for its objects the development of the physical, moral, and intellectual nature of man to the 
highest perceivable point, as the immediate duty of society: inculcating the practical sufficiency of 
natural morality apart from Atheism, Theism, or Christianity: engaging its adherents in the promotion 
of human improvement by material means, and making these agreements the ground of common unity 
for all who would regulate life by reason and ennoble it by service.” (The Principles of Secularism 
Illustrated (Austin & Co., London, 1871), 11) 
134 "Secularism accepts no authority but that of Nature, adopts no methods but those of science and 
philosophy, and respects in practice no rule but that of the conscience, illustrated by the common 
sense of mankind.” (The Principles of Secularism Illustrated (Austin & Co., London, 1871), 14). 
135 “The universal fair and open discussion of opinion is the highest guarantee of public truth—only 
that theory which is submitted to that ordeal is to be regarded, since only that which endures it can be 
trusted. Secularism encourages men to trust reason throughout, and to trust nothing that reason does 
not establish”. (The Principles of Secularism Illustrated (Austin & Co., London, 1871), 15). 
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theism. On this ground, and because, by the adoption of a new term, a vast amount of 
impediment from prejudice is got rid of, the use of the name secularism is found 
advantageous.136 
 
Holyoake’s more inclusive use of the word ‘secularism’ was seen as something 
different.  His use of the term changed its general usage and application after the break 
from those whose views had diverged so much from his own.  Originally secularism 
had had the meaning, after the Wars of Religion in Europe, to mean the removal of 
property or territory from ecclesiastical authorities. It also meant in Roman canon law 
the return to the outside world of a person who was in a religious order.  The word 
‘secular’ is derived from Middle English, from the Old French word seculer, which is 
itself derived from the Latin saecularis.  In Middle English it had the connotation of 
‘this world’ (as opposed to the divine).137  Before the mid-19th century, the term was 
sometimes used with contempt. For the clergy, it was almost synonymous with the 
uninitiated or "ignorant".138 
 
A Secularism and constitutionalism 
 
Much discussion on the nature of secularism139 as a constitutional concept underlying 
the nature of government and society has been made in the last few centuries.    It took 
time for the term ‘secular’ to be adopted, and its usage lagged behind the formation of 
nation-states. When more democratic forms of government came to be established the 
political usage correspondingly increased.  It has been described as a civil recognition 
of religious freedom.140  It had the connotation of being anti-religious, but also non-
religious.  It meant liberation from religious tutelage or, in more traditional circles, to 
mean public and legal ‘de-Christianisation’.141 
 
There are many points of commonality between the Western and the Eastern traditions 
of secularism.  There are of course many differences, given that many constitutions 
were drafted centuries apart and are also inheritors of very different cultural heritages.  
The migrants to the United States for example brought with them a European cultural 
history, and with that laws based on a long tradition of conflict between leaders of 
states and organised religion, where secularism developed in modern democracies as 
a solution to that conflict.   
 
1 Eastern traditions 
 
India however never had religion in a comparably organised form in the shape of the 
Brahmanical order sufficiently organised that it posed a threat to government, where 
                                                 
136 Harriet Martineau, Boston Liberator — Letter to Lloyd Garrison, November, 1853, cited in 
Chapter 2, The Principles of Secularism Illustrated (Austin & Co., London, 1871), 8. 
137 Nikki R. Keddie, “Secularism & Its Discontents” (2003) 132 Daedalus 14. 
138 Anil Nauriya, “Gandhi on Secular Law and State”, The Hindu, Wednesday, Oct 22, 2003. 
139
 Secularism is distinguished in this paper from secularisation as a concept.  The latter pertains to 
the decrease of political and social influence of religion in contemporary times, and is a sociological 
issue of marginal relevance to this paper, and will be distinguished briefly in this thesis to prevent 
confusion. (see generally David Martin, A General Theory of Secularization (Harper & Row, USA, 
1979) and Steve Bruce, God is Dead: Secularization in the West (Wiley, Malden, 2002)). 
140 David M. Brown, ‘Freedom From Or Freedom For?: Religion As A Case Study In Defining The 
Content Of Charter Rights’ (2000) 33 University of British Columbia Law Review 551 
141 Peter L. Berger, The Sacred Canopy – Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion, (Doubleday, 
New York, 1967) 106. 
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religion needed to be pressed out of the public sphere.142  In ancient India the 
government never sought to press any particular school of religious thought upon the 
population, but rather permitted the teachings of Jainism, Buddhism, and later 
Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Islam and Christianity, as well as doctrines of agnosticism, 
atheism and materialism. In Europe and later in North America, no such freedom of 
religion developed. 143   
 
In more recent times, the Indian Supreme Court noted shortly after the drafting and 
ratification of the Indian Constitution that in the constitutions of the United States and 
Australia, freedom of religion was provided in absolute terms, leaving the courts to 
derive exceptions and limitations to those freedoms.  However, Articles 25 and 26 of 
the Indian Constitution contain limits to the freedoms contained therein144. 
 
Marc Galanter, writing forty years ago,145 discussed the then state of American and 
Indian secularism.  
 
In discussing the identification of secularism with formal religious neutrality or impartiality 
on the part of the state he said, in respect of India, that we avoid equating secularism with 
formal standard of religious neutrality or impartiality on the part of the state.  No secular state 
is or can be merely neutral or impartial among religions, for the state defines the boundaries 
within which neutrality must operate. 
 
Indeed, H.V. Kamath said146 that 
 
When I say that a state should not identify itself with any particular religion, I do not mean to 
say that a state should be anti-religious or irreligious.  We have certainly declared India to be 
a secular state.  But to my mind, a secular state is neither a God-less state nor an irreligious 
state. 
 
a view endorsed by former judge on the Indian Supreme Court, Justice 
Gajendragadkar, who considered that “secularism would be a purely passive force if 
it was content to base itself on the negative aspect of being anti-religion, anti-God, or 
anti-spiritual quest.”147 
 
It is often forgotten how the concept of secularism has changed most Western 
societies.  For example:148 
 
                                                 
142 U.N. Ghoshal noted “the striking fact that this class (the Brahmans) throughout our history failed 
to assert (except in theory and in legend) its claim to control kings and emperors.”  U.N. Ghoshal, A 
History of Indian Political Ideas (1959), 32-33. 
143 U.N. Ghoshal noted “the striking fact that this class (the Brahmans) throughout our history failed 
to assert (except in theory and in legend) its claim to control kings and emperors.”  U.N. Ghoshal, A 
History of Indian Political Ideas (Bombay, 1959), 32-33. 
144 Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v Sri Lakshmindra Tirtha Swamiar of Sri 
Srirur Math (1954) S.C.R.1005, 1028-29. 
145 Marc Galanter, ‘Hinduism, Secularism, and the Indian Judiciary’, (1971) 21(4) Philosophy East & 
West 466, 479. 
146 C.A.D. VII, 825-6. 
147 Cited in Gurmukh Nihal Singh, Land Marks in Indian Constitutional and National Development 
(Atma Ram & Sons, Delhi, 2nd Ed. 1952), 175. 
148 Chris McGillion, “Secularism is simply respecting differences”, Sydney Morning Herald, 24 
November 2004. <http://www.smh.com.au/news/Chris-McGillion/Secularism-is-simply-respecting-
differences/2004/11/23/1100972395081.html> on 24 November 2004. 
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Until 1828 in Britain, public office was denied to any man who refused to assent to the 
doctrines of the Church of England. Until 1836 no couple (of whatever religion) could be 
married except before an Anglican clergyman. Until the late 1800s all teaching posts at Oxford 
and Cambridge were reserved for practising Anglicans, and even the mildest blasphemy could 
carry a six-month prison term. 
 
Secularism today is not only a Western concept.  It has also been considered by 
Muslim theorists, such as Shaikh Ali Abd al-Raziq,149 a Sunni thinker, in his book al-
Islam wa Usul al-Hukm which was written in 1925.  In attempting to prove that Islam 
had no claim over politics he maintained that 
 
Muhammad … was no more than a messenger of a purely religious call that is, not coloured 
by any inclination to govern or by any claim for a state.  The Prophet had no rule or 
government, nor did he establish a kingdom in the political sense of the word or its synonyms.  
He was none but a messenger like those preceding him: not a king or a builder of a State or a 
proponent of Monarchy. 
 
He did however incur a great deal of criticism from his contemporaries for his 
controversial views.150   
 
Secularism, however, in most Islamic countries is a fairly modern concept.  
Traditionally, it has been difficult in Islam to consider a separation of church and state 
as it is conceived of in Christianity.  Christianity has a history of an elaborate 
ecclesiastical hierarchy that has competed with the political hierarchy in the Christian 
world.  Much of the stagnation of Europe in medieval times is said to be as a result of 
competition between the church and state for control of land and of learning.151  
Secularism has been often confused in the Arabic speaking Muslim world with 
atheism, which has led to secularism as being part of a constitutional democratic 
model.152  Abdou Filali-Ansary has said that “[t]o be a secularist has meant to abandon 
Islam, to reject altogether not only the religious faith but also its attendant morality 
and the traditions and rules that operate within Muslim societies.”153 
 
 
VI CONSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY 
 
The role of the Courts in interpreting the Constitution can be difficult.  As John Locke 
said in his Letter Concerning Toleration154  
 
                                                 
149 Nazih Ayubi, Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World (Routledge, Oxford, 1993), 
54. 
150 He was condemned and isolated by the Egyptian ulama council, and dismissed from his position as 
a judge.  See also Richard Mohr and Nadirsyah Hosen, ‘Da Capo: law and religion from the top 
down’ in Richard Mohr and Nadirsyah Hosen, Law and Religion in Public Life: The contemporary 
debate, (Routledge, Oxford, 2011), 1, 5. 
151 Ibid 50. 
152 Gerhard Hoffstaedter, ‘Secular State, Religious Lives: Islam and the state in Malaysia’ (2013) 
Asian Ethnicity 1, 2. 
153 Abdou Filali-Ansary, ‘Muslims and Democracy’ (1999) 10(3) Journal of Democracy 18, 20 cited 
in Gerhard Hoffstaedter, ‘Secular State, religious lives: Islam and the state in Malaysia’ (2013) 14(4) 
Asian Ethnicity 1, 2. 
154 John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration ((first published 1689), Rough Draft Printing (2011)), 
17. 
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It may indeed be alleged that the magistrate may make use of arguments, and, thereby draw 
the heterodox into the way of truth, and procure their salvation.  I grant it; but this is common 
to him with other men. In teaching, instructing, and redressing the erroneous by reason, he 
may certainly do what becomes any good man to do.  Magistracy does not oblige him to put 
off either humanity or Christianity; but it is one thing to persuade, another to command; one 
thing to press with arguments, another with penalties. 
 
This thesis considers both the legal battles fought in the supreme and high courts of 
many countries, in order to compare them with the secular ideals and religious 
freedoms contained within their constitutions, and the legal history and philosophy 
that inform their creation and their contemporary understanding.  Holyoake’s work is 
the filter through which I evaluate the present and the recent past. 
 
Legal philosophers provided a philosophical basis for Holyoake’s views on conflict in 
the public arena, and while lawyers and judges sought the solution to problems through 
legal theory, the solution of how to address conflicting interests in the public sphere 
was generally addressed by neither lawyers nor legal philosophers, but by those who 
drew on their experience.  Holyoake was not a constitutional lawyer, but contributed 
greatly like the legal philosophers of his time to solutions to problems of social policy 
and, of direct importance to this thesis, to the conception of the modern secular state 
in constitutional law.  
 
Secularism as considered by Holyoake as a means of structuring the public sphere in 
secular democracies has long been incorporated into the development of constitutional 
thinking.  In the eighteenth century the English politician and philosopher Viscount 
Bolingbroke155 offered the following definition of a constitution156 
 
By constitution we mean … that assemblage of laws, institutions and customs, derived from 
certain fixed principles of reason, directed to certain fixed objects of public good, that compose 
the general system, according to which the community hath agreed to be governed. 
 
Herman Finer looked at it more in terms of the individual and the state.  He looked at 
it more in terms of a system that contains fundamental institutions containing the 
power relationships between the individual and associate constituents within a state.  
In his view, a “constitution is the autobiography of a power relationship”, by which 
he meant the “spiritual values, awake or habitual, prevailing among the various 
groups which dwell together within a single nation”.157   
 
Not much has changed in general since then.  Modern constitutionalism can be broadly 
said to involve limits on the powers of government, adherence to the rule of law, and 
the protection of fundamental rights.158  All of these are examined but emphasis is 
                                                 
155 Oliver Goldsmith, The works of the late Right Honourable Henry St. John, Lord Viscount 
Bolingbroke, Volume 3, (J. Johnson, London, 1809) Letter X, 157. 
156 Sharada Rath, ‘Constitution and Constitutionalism’, in Surya Narayan Misra et al (eds.), 
Constitution and Constitutionalism in India (APH Pub. Corp., Michigan, 1999), 12. 
157 Sharada Rath, “Constitution and Constitutionalism”, in Surya Narayan Misra, Subas Chandra 
Hazary and Amareswar Mishra (eds.), Constitution and Constitutionalism in India APH Pub. Corp., 
Michigan, 1999) 12. 
158 Michel Rosenfeld, ‘Modern Constitutionalism as Interplay between Identity and Diversity’, in 
Michel Rosenfeld (Ed.), Constitutionalism, Identity, Difference, and Legitimacy: Theoretical 
Perspectives (Duke University Press, Durham, 1994), 3. 
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given to the last, the constitutional law that addresses fundamental rights in national 
constitutions, particularly those that relate to freedom of religion.   
 
Often constitutional law will examine matters arising from clashes between the nature 
of national identity and values as articulated in a national constitution (often set long 
ago and rarely amended), and often in contrast with the ideals and values of a modern 
diversified society.  Many modern constitutional law cases derive from communities 
which feel that their constitutions do not represent adequately their values.  As Michel 
Rosenfeld notes,159  
 
[t]he clash between constitutional identity and other relevant identities, such as, national, 
ethnic, religious, or cultural identity, is made inevitable by the confrontation between 
contemporary constitutionalism’s inherent pluralism, and tradition. …  in a country with a 
strong constitutional commitment to religious pluralism, constitutional identity must not only 
be distinct from any religious identity, but also stand as a barrier against national identity 
becoming subservient to the fundamental tenets of any religion.   
 
Rosenfeld points out that a working constitutional order must have at its base a 
predominant identity, where constitutional protection is usually accorded to the 
predominant identity, noting that “constitutional identity emerges as complex, 
fragmented, partial and incomplete.  In the context of a living constitution, moreover, 
constitutional identity is the product of a dynamic process”.  Indeed, Thomas Jefferson 
made a similar point,160 considering that periodic constitutional amendment and 
review was necessary for a well-functioning democracy, as “[e]ach generation is as 
independent of the one preceding, as that was of all which had gone before.  It has 
then, like them, a right to choose for itself the form of government it believes most 
promotive of its own happiness …”    
 
VII HOLYOAKE’S LEGACY 
 
Holyoake was known by his contemporaries as a man who “was a shrewd observer 
and had a dry wit, but his thin, high-pitched voice made him a poor orator.”161  He had 
views that he spent his life defending and advocating, despite a society which, for the 
most part, he had difficulty convincing that there was another way of doing things.  He 
advocated that people should have the right to hold views contrary to the majority, that 
they may hold office and succeed in court actions, and other have other dealings with 
the state without having to assert their belief in the religious views of the majority.   
 
His views of secularism were not, when fully formed, that those who believed in 
religion should convert to a new way of thinking.  He did not offer secularism as an 
alternative to the belief systems of others.  He asked simply that those who chose to 
hold different views not be forced to assert unwillingly that they held the views of the 
majority, although knowing full well that the contrary was true.   
 
                                                 
159 Michel Rosenfeld, ‘Law and the Postmodern Mind: The Identity of the Constitutional Subject’ 
(1995) 16 Cardozo Law Review 1049.   
160 Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval, Monticello, July 12, 1816. 
<http://www.public.iastate.edu/~jwcwolf/Papers/Jefferson.html accessed on 12 August, 2013> 
161 Edward Royle, ‘Holyoake, George Jacob (1817–1906)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
Oxford University Press, 2004 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/33964] 
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As a youth he felt that to hold that a lack of belief to be manifested by an individual 
freely, religion would be dismantled by appeals to reason and logic, thereby allowing 
a freedom to hold his own views without censure.  In his thirties, after 1850, he had 
sufficient life experience, having met many lower and upper class people, the strongly 
religious and those who denounced them, to feel that the best way forward was to 
advocate that there was a place in the public sphere for both.  He acknowledged that 
the religious wanted their values to be recognised in public policy, and also recognised 
that excesses in that regard were held by many to be contrary to the public interest.   
 
Holyoake recognised that the solution was not for both parties to seek the removal of 
the other through rhetoric and legislation, but rather for the public space and the 
development of public policy to recognise and value all positions, with a view to 
meeting the needs of all.  The modern world was changing and there needed to be a 
place for both ideas and their dissent to be accepted. 
 
This chapter has described briefly Holyoake’s life and the influences which brought 
him to his views on secularism that are associated with him today.  His position was 
built not only on his experiences as a labourer, chartist and other roles in his youth, 
but also on the Utilitarian philosophy prevalent in his time that accorded much with 
what he felt was right, and upon which he built in his mature years. 
 
Holyoake’s views on secularism have been summarised in this chapter, and the sense 
of what he advocated has been adopted by many countries as the best way to give a 
place in the public sphere to speak by those who are members of what, in most 
countries, are pluralistic societies.  What was an interesting idea many years ago in the 
mid-nineteenth century has is now even more relevant for constitutional drafting and 
interpretation.  While some of the modern democracies such as France and the United 
States have constitutions created at the time of the Enlightenment, they and many other 
democracies which have developed constitutions since Holyoake have seen that 
modern pluralistic societies cannot function effectively for all its citizens if many are 
denied equal status and an equal voice.  
 
Over more than a century and a half these democracies have formed constitutions 
broadly described as ‘secular’, often very different to each other to address local 
circumstances as has democracy itself.  These modern ‘secular’ constitutions will be 
considered in Chapter 3 to see how consistent they are with Holyoake’s original ideals. 
 
In conclusion, it is fair to say that Holyoake draw upon the contemporary thinking of 
his times to slowly formulate his own views.  The Enlightenment encouraged the 
development of principles regarding a new paradigm for organised religion and the 
state in the public space, and this allowed a variety of views to be considered and 
explored.  Holyoake engaged with a number of these in his early years in matters such 
as new roles for unions and the working class and new business structures such as co-
operatives.  These were novel times where new forms of thinking were given space to 
grow or to fail.  Holyoake tried a number of these.  Initially he was swept up with 
others such as Southwell and Bradlaugh to simply oppose the status quo where it did 
not accord with reason.  With more mature years he refined his thoughts as he broke 
from those with whom he was no longer in accord, seeing a less confrontationist 
pathway to social reform.  Those thoughts fit most closely with the Utilitarian 
philosophies of Bentham and Mill, the latter whom he knew well.   
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Utilitarian thought fit better with the older Holyoake where it did not seek to destroy 
or vehemently oppose the religion that was seen by many at the time to be part of the 
problems of the working class, but rather it had at its heart a practical aspect that for 
the first time public policy could be made, not with religion excised from the public 
sphere as some would have it, but rather with it remaining in place contributing its 
views with all others for the common good. 
 
Holyoake’s principles of secularism developed from there to be useful in social and 
legal reform.  In the area of constitutionalism these ideas allowed government to 
embrace all ideas in the laws it developed with a freer debate in its formulation and 
without the necessity for an external basis for its authority.  Yet by not being in 
opposition to any religious orthodoxy but accepting its contribution Holyoake’s 
secular principles have served as an effective basis for many modern constitutions and 
a lens through which to view those that came before him.  The consideration of secular 
principles in constitutional development is examined in more detail in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3 
SECULARISM AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 
I MODERN INTERPRETATIONS OF WHAT IS A SECULAR STATE 
 
This chapter examines contemporary constitutions considered ‘secular’ to see how 
closely they conform to the original Holyoakean definition of the word, and how well 
religious freedoms may be preserved within them.  Modern constitutions can be found 
in forms often described as ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ addressing religious pluralism differently.  
These forms will be examined in detail. 
 
Defining what is “secular” has always been difficult whenever there is an intersection 
of law and religion, and goes back as far as Locke.  In Locke’s Letter Concerning 
Toleration he sought to distinguish the jurisdictions of organised Christianity from 
that of the government when he wrote: 1 
 
[T]he church itself is a thing absolutely separate and distinct from the commonwealth. The 
boundaries on both sides are fixed and immovable. He jumbles heaven and earth together, the 
things most remote and opposite, who mixes these two societies, which are in their original, 
end, business, and in everything perfectly distinct and infinitely different from each other. 
 
A common modern definition of secularism as a constitutional concept that clearly 
draws on Holyoake’s work is the political separation of government and its institutions 
from religious institutions and its representatives, sustained and upheld in a national2 
constitution.  The purpose is both to keep government free of religious influence or 
bias, as well as free of the imposition of government upon religion.      
 
Thomas Jefferson said that “[e]ach generation is as independent of the one preceding, 
as that was of all which had gone before.  It has then, like them, a right to choose for 
itself the form of government it believes most promotive of its own happiness …”3  
Many contemporary democracies differ in their constitutional arrangements, finding 
domestically acceptable paradigms for the roles of religion and government in the 
public sphere.  Generally such models fall into one of two4 descriptors.5  The first is 
that secularism requires that the state be equidistant from all religions, not supporting 
any religion, and being neutral with respect to all.  The second requires that the state 
have no relationship with any religion, and be equally distanced from all religions. 
 
                                                 
1 John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689), trans. William Popple, (Merchant Books, USA, 
2011), 24. 
2 or State/provincial constitutions. 
3 Letter to Samuel Kercheval, Monticello, July 12, 1816 (The Letters of Thomas Jefferson 1743-1826) 
< http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/presidents/thomas-jefferson/letters-of-thomas-jefferson/jefl246.php >. 
4 There are many shades of difference.  With an emphasis on Europe, David Martin sees a number of 
regional variations across the continent.  See generally David Martin, On Secularization: Towards a 
Revised General Theory (Ashgate Publishing Ltd., Farnham, 2005) (Chapter 5 – ‘Religion, Secularity, 
Secularism and European Integration’). 
5 Amartya Sen, The Argumentative Indian (Penguin UK, Colchester, 2006), 295-296. 
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Both views have in common that secularism is intended to prevent any religion having 
a privileged place in the activities of the state.  In the first view there is no preclusion 
of the state from association with religion, only that there is an equal association with 
all religions.  The relationship must be symmetrical, either in distance or in 
association.  This first approach is that which has been dominant in many countries 
such as India, and is often titled ‘soft’ secularism.  The second sense, ‘hard’ 
secularism, or ‘mainstream secularism’ denies any relationship with religion, dealing 
with it only incidentally.   
 
The differences between many countries that now label themselves as secular, some 
overtly,6  through their constitutions, lie in exactly how liberal they are and how that 
democracy operates.   
 
The highest courts of many countries with modern secular constitutions have often 
been asked in recent years to review their underlying secular ideals in their 
constitutions, and whether contemporary views remain consistent with previous 
thinking, as well as whether they accord with modern concepts of constitutionalism.  
They are considering issues that have not been raised in the past, such as religious 
clothing in the public sphere in France, and the role of an increasingly assertive 
religious presence in politics in India and the United States.   
 
The nature of changing demographics in many societies owing to migration or other 
changes, means that this is increasingly more difficult.  Supreme courts must consider 
matters of religious freedom in newer contexts, considering the application of 
constitutional principles to novel circumstances.  The courts often find it difficult to 
consider the demands of a modern plurality of religious views in the public sphere 
where “church” and “state” collide. 
 
Some jurisdictions use an ‘extremist secularism’7 or ‘militant secularism’8 
constitutional model that has a severe interpretation of what a secular state means, and 
which operates more as an anti-religion platform, than as a serious attempt to 
accommodate religious pluralism (as Holyoake proposed).  Such models result in very 
stark treatments of religious difference where minority views receive very little 
accommodation.  Indeed, it is difficult to find a reference to Holyoake and his thinking 
in the history of secularism of these states.9  Accordingly, in identifying the outlier 
views of ‘secularism’ as being the only means of treating religion in the public sphere, 
these commentators have dismissed the majority of secular reasoning and secular 
states that are more compatible with the original thoughts of Holyoake. 
Constitutionalism that resonates with his moderate views is seen as the exception, 
rather than the rule. 
                                                 
6 For example, the word ‘secular’ was inserted into the preamble of the Indian constitution by the 
42nd Amendment (1976). 
7 This term tends to have many meanings such as the opposite of ‘religious extremism’ with 
connotations of intolerance of religion, or even association with governments that have had a strong 
anti-religious agenda: BBC News UK, Row after Pope’s remarks on Atheism and Nazis, 16 
September 2010 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11332515 > 
8 The terms occur often in the media in the context of the state being perceived as actively working to 
remove religion from the public space such as in an article in 2012: BBC News UK, Militant 
secularisation threat to religion, says Warsi, 14 February 2012 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
17021831>. 
9 Take for example generally Susan Jacoby, Freethinkers (Metropolitan Books, New York, 2004). 
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A Paradigms of secular constitutionalism 
 
Robert Audi10 has asked the question of “how a free and democratic society can 
achieve an appropriate harmony between religion and politics.”  He argues that the 
most direct path to a freedom of religion is through a liberal democracy, whilst at the 
same time acknowledging that religion can be a “divisive force in democratic 
politics.”   
 
Yet governments must also govern in accordance with what is usually a written 
constitution, a document that defines the basis of authority for laws that are passed by 
the state.  In contemporary Europe, recent court cases and demographic changes have 
brought the issues of the constitutional identity of a secular state, and what 
contemporary form it should have, to the fore.  Dominick McGoldrick describes it as  
a spectrum with a religion-free public sphere “as the only solution to ensuring genuine 
equality between members of majority and minority churches, agnostics, atheists or 
non-theists and eliminating religious and anti-religious tensions”11 at one end.  He 
argues that France and Turkey lie at the other end of the spectrum, describing their 
constitutional position as “militant secularism or, less pejoratively, as fundamentalist 
secularism. Religion is perceived as a threat to secularism and so must be kept at a 
distance from the state”.12  This is a useful tool to view these issues, as there are no 
clear models, no way to say there only a fixed number of ways to structure a secular 
state. 
 
Midrange it can be said are countries such as Germany and Italy which are perceived 
to be much more accommodating to religion in the public sphere, and at the other end 
are countries with an established religion such as Denmark, Greece, England and 
Scotland, which have complex relationships with religion.  They are essentially 
secular in practice in that, while religion is established, it is considered to have an 
influential but not controlling role.  McGoldrick discusses the role of secularism in 
Europe13 as “[t]here can be positive secularism where the state is regularly involved 
with accommodating religions but emphasises its neutrality as between them. Or there 
can be a more negative form of secularism whereby religion is protected from 
government establishment and state interference”.14   
 
                                                 
10 Robert Audi, Religious Commitment and Secular Reason (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2000) 3. 
11 Dominic McGoldrick, ‘Religion in the European Public Square and in European Public 
Life - Crucifixes in the Classroom?’ [2011] 11(3) Human Rights Law Review 451, 454. 
12 Dominic McGoldrick, ‘Religion in the European Public Square and in European Public 
Life - Crucifixes in the Classroom?’ [2011] 11(3) Human Rights Law Review 451, 454. 
13 Dominic McGoldrick, ‘Religion in the European Public Square and in European Public Life - 
Crucifixes in the Classroom?’, (2011) 11 Human Rights Law Review 451, 454 
14 This last shows a clear partisan position regarding secularism where there is a labelling of “good” 
and “bad” secularism, with McGoldrick holding the view that a good deal of public accommodation 
in the public sphere is judged as positive and beneficial.  He feels that secularism is not a neutral 
constitutional position, and that “[t]he principle of state neutrality, as part of a doctrine of toleration, 
has been attacked by communitarians as being implausible, unrealistic, utopian, founded on a 
particular liberal theory and fundamentally insensitive to difference.”  The point of state neutrality 
would to my mind be intended to remove difference, otherwise the state would adopt a non-neutral 
and specific position constitutionally. 
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II CONSTITUTIONAL SECULARISM 
 
A ‘Mainstream secularism’ 
 
The “separation of church and state”15 is generally considered to be an aspect of a 
modern liberal democracy, usually identified with the United States of America, and 
considered ‘mainstream’.  This is because it is the paradigm most often associated 
with secularism in the public eye.  The topic is always difficult to define.  One 
commentator has argued in the American context that 
 
‘Church and State’ … is a profoundly misleading rubric.  The title triply misleads.  It suggests 
that there is a single church. But in America there are myriad ways in which religious belief is 
organised.  It suggests that there is a single state.  But in America there is the federal 
government, fifty state governments, myriad municipalities, and a division of power among 
executive, legislative, administrative, and judicial entities, each of whom embodies state 
power.  Worst of all, ‘Church and State’ suggests that there are two distinct bodies set apart 
from each other in contrast if not in conflict.  But everywhere neither churches nor states exist 
except as they are incorporated into actual individuals.  These individuals are believers and 
unbelievers, citizens and officials.  In one aspect of their activities, if they are religious, they 
usually form churches.  In another aspect they form governments.  Religious and governmental 
bodies not only coexist but overlap. The same persons, much of the time, are both believers 
and wielders of power.16 
 
These sentiments can be applied in varying, but certainly substantial, degrees in most 
jurisdictions.  Church and state may overlap in some nations, such as in Germany 
where there is no real separation between the domains of the churches and the states 
(Länder) or in England where Christianity in the form of Anglicanism is established.  
In other nations such as Italy and Greece, the dominant religion will intervene in many 
aspects of secular life.17 
 
As secular democracies review the role of religion in the state, religion finds itself at 
times becoming marginalised.  Religion in general feels that its voice in the public 
sphere is no longer being heard, or has less influence than once it had.  Cardinal 
Joseph Ratzinger (later Pope Benedict XVI) described secularism as a liberal 
consensus that had now evolved into a “worrying and aggressive” ideology.18  He 
went on to say that 
 
Secularism is no longer that element of neutrality, which opens up space for freedom for all. 
It is beginning to change into an ideology which, through politics, is being imposed. … It 
concedes no public space to the Catholic and Christian vision, which, as a result, runs the 
risk of turning into a purely private matter, so that deep down it is no longer the same. …In 
this sense, a struggle exists and so we must defend religious freedom against an ideology 
which is held up as if it were the only voice of rationality, when instead it is only an 
expression of a 'certain' rationalism. 
 
                                                 
15 This will be examined in detail later in this chapter. 
16 John Noonan, The Believer and the Powers That Are, (1987), cited in Harold Berman, “Religious 
Freedom and the Challenge of the Modern State” (1990) 39 Emory Law Journal 149, 150. 
17 Ibid 272. 
18 “Papal contender attacks secularism”, Sydney Morning Herald, 22 November 2004 
http://www.smh.com.au/news/World/Papal-contender-attacks-
securalism/2004/11/21/1100972262966.html. 
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In suggesting that religion had been very much marginalised in the public sphere he 
noted that19 
 
In politics, it seems to be almost indecent to speak about God, almost as it were an attack on 
the freedom of someone who doesn't believe. A secularism which is just, is a freedom of 
religion. The state does not impose a religion, but rather provides free space to those 
religions with a responsibility to civil society. 
 
Clearly, then, religion seeks a place in the modern secular state in the public sphere.  
 
B Characteristics of the secular state 
 
Partha Chatterjee asked the question “What are the characteristics of the secular 
state?” and offered in response that “three principles are usually mentioned in the 
liberal-democratic doctrine on this subject.”20  These he says are liberty (where the 
state permits the practice of any religion), equality (where the state will not favour one 
religion over another), and neutrality (which requires the state not to prefer the 
religious to the non-religious).  These elements appear in different degrees in the 
various models that are often considered. 
 
Tariq Modood,21 however, argues that while one understanding of contemporary 
secularism is that of a complete separation of religion and the state (or politics), it is 
not a sensible view given historical accuracy and contemporary reality.  He gives the 
example of the writings of the Indian writer and political theorist Rajeev Bhargava.22  
Bhargava considers that “in a secular state, a formal or legal union or alliance between 
state and religion is impermissible” and that for mainstream western secularism, 
separation means mutual exclusion”.23  Bhargava’s argument is that the best modern 
development of secularism in the West has been developed in the USA and France.  
Modood designates these as the “mainstream conception of secularism”,24 a term I 
shall adopt for the moment for the purposes of discussion below. 
 
C What is a non-secular state? 
 
Just as there are many views on how much separation is necessary to achieve that 
separation of the state from the influence of organised religion, there are also a number 
of different models currently being used to achieve that in varying degrees that will be 
examined in more detail later in this thesis.  In doing so, the will necessarily be some 
contrast with those states not usually considered ‘secular’. 
                                                 
19 “Papal contender attacks secularism”, Sydney Morning Herald, 22 November 2004 
http://www.smh.com.au/news/World/Papal-contender-attacks-
securalism/2004/11/21/1100972262966.html>. 
20 Partha Chatterjee, ‘Secularism and Tolerance’, in Rajeev Bhargava (ed.), Secularism and its Critics 
(Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 358. 
21 Tariq Modood, ‘Moderate Secularism, Religion as Identity and Respect for Religion’ (2010) 81 (1) 
The Political Quarterly 4, 5. 
22 Currently Senior Fellow and Director at the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), 
Delhi, and previously Professor of Political Theory at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi 
(http://www.csds.in/faculty_rajeev_bhargava.htm). 
23 R. Bhargava, ‘Political secularism’, in G. Levey and T. Modood, eds, Secularism, Religion and 
Multicultural Citizenship (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009), 88, 103. 
24 Tariq Modood, ‘Moderate Secularism, Religion as Identity and Respect for Religion’, (2010) 81 (1) 
The Political Quarterly 4, 5. 
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A state religion (also called an official religion, established church or state church) is 
a religious body officially endorsed by the state. Practically, a state without a state 
religion is a secular state. State religions are examples of the official or government-
sanctioned establishment of religion, as distinct from theocracy. It is also possible for 
a national religion to become established without being under state control. 
 
These are not however diametric opposites.  There are shades of grey in between.  The 
degree and nature of state backing for denomination or creed designated as a state 
religion can vary. It can range from mere endorsement by the state and financial 
support, with freedom for other religions to practise, to prohibiting any competing 
religious body from operating and to persecuting the followers of other sects.  
In some cases, a state may have a set of state-sponsored religious denominations that 
it funds; such is the case in Alsace-Moselle in France under its local law,25 following 
the pattern in Germany. 
There are a number of countries where the official religion has an institutionalised 
tolerance for minority religions, and often whilst an officially recognised religion, 
often has little day to day influence in state policy may be grouped together.  Although 
in the UK for example the Church of England is the officially established religion in 
England (with the Church of Scotland recognised as officially established in 
Scotland),26 there is little policy influence upon the secular government.  The main 
political parties are secular, but the upper House of the UK Parliament has the Church 
of England represented by twenty-six bishops (the Lords Spiritual).27  By contrast, in 
Greece, the established religion can have a much more dominant role, tending to 
relegate minority religions close to the status of being merely tolerated. 28 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, those constitutions that have state churches or religions 
where the religion has no formal control of the state are considered secular.  Non-
secular states are then those where the endorsed religion has some formal control over 
the state.  
 
D Do Non-secular states make space for other faiths? 
 
As noted above, determining the level of control of religion over the state is often 
difficult to determine.  Often religion will have some control, such as in Finland where 
the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland and the Finnish Orthodox Church have 
                                                 
25 The 1905 French law on the separation of the churches and state (Loi du 9 décembre 1905 
concernant la séparation des Églises et de l'État), established state secularism in France and ceased 
all state funding of religion.  Because Alsace-Lorraine, now known as Alsace-Moselle, was at that 
time part of Germany, the 1905 law did not apply. 
26 In the early part of the 20th Century the Church of Wales split from the Church of England and 
became disestablished.  The Welsh Church Act 1914 (UK) provided for the separation of the Church 
in Wales) from the rest of the Anglican Church, and for the simultaneous disestablishment of the 
Church in 1920. 
27 The Church of Scotland is not represented.  The Churches of Wales and Ireland, being 
disestablished (Ireland in 1871), are also not represented. 
28 Michael Rosenfeld, ‘Can Constitutionalism, Secularism and Religion be reconciled in an Era of 
Globalization and Religious Revival?’ (2009) 30 Cardozo Law Review 2333, 2350. 
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the right to collect church tax from their members,29 with the assistance of the state, 
when the state collects its own tax. In addition to membership tax, businesses also 
participate by a way of taxation in contributing financially to the church.   
 
However, formal control is usually stipulated in the national constitution.  A number 
of constitutions show some formal acknowledgement of the place of religion in 
society, or the historical contribution it has made.   
 
For example, section 2 of the Constitution of Argentina, states that "[t]he Federal 
Government supports the Roman Catholic Apostolic religion", yet does not establish 
that religion nor separate it from the state.  In Myanmar article 19, of the constitution 
states that "The State recognizes the special position of Buddhism as the faith 
professed by the great majority of the citizens of the State”, while stating in article 20 
that the state recognises Christianity, Islam, Hinduism and Animism as the religions 
existing in the Union on the date on which the State Constitution comes into force.  
Norway removed its state church in 2012, yet the Norwegian King is required to be a 
member of the Church of Norway.  The amended Article 2 of the constitution now 
says simply that Norway's values are based on its Christian and humanist heritage, 
together with a right to freedom of religion.30   
 
However, there are still countries where the constitution clearly shows that organised 
religion has a formal controlling influence.  While there are many countries with 
varying religious affiliations, most provide for an established religion, yet at the same 
time provide for freedom of religion.  For example, the Principality of Liechtenstein 
in Europe, provides in Article 37 of their 1921 constitution31 that  
 
1) Freedom of religion and conscience shall be guaranteed for all. 
2) The Roman Catholic Church is the National Church and as such shall enjoy the full 
protection of the State; other denominations shall be entitled to practice their creeds and to 
hold religious services within the limits of morality and public order.  
 
Denmark’s Constitution of 1953 provides that a member of the royal family32 must be 
a part of the established religion,33 the Church of Denmark - which is Lutheran.  There 
are however no restrictions on other members of the population.34   
 
Many Muslim-majority countries recognise Islam as their state religion.  There are too 
many of these states to examine in detail, but a number of general principles may be 
established.  Nehaluddin Ahmad recently examined the concept of secularism in the 
                                                 
29 Members of the church pay an income-based church tax of between 1% and 2%, depending on the 
municipality. (http://www.vero.fi/en-
US/Tax_Administration/Taxation_in_Finland/Taxation_in_Finland (26824)).  
30 http://www.lovdata.no/all/tl-18140517-000-002.html#2.  
31 http://www.llv.li/verfassung-e-01-02-09.doc.pdf.  
32 “The King shall be a member of the Evangelical Lutheran Church.” (Constitution of Denmark, 
Section 6). 
33 “The Evangelical Lutheran Church shall be the Established Church of Denmark, and, as such, it 
shall be supported by the State.” (Constitution of Denmark, Section 4). 
34 “The citizens shall be entitled to form congregations for the worship of God in a manner consistent 
with their convictions, provided that nothing at variance with good morals or public order shall be 
taught or done.” and “No person shall for reasons of his creed or descent be deprived of access to 
complete enjoyment of his civic and political rights, nor shall he for such reasons evade compliance 
with any common civic duty.” (Constitution of Denmark, Sections 67 and 70). 
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Muslim world and acknowledged that just as there are many perceptions of secularism 
in the Western world, there are many views on what that concept means to Islamic 
government.35  However, as general principles, he explains that  
 
Islam has … laid down certain rights for non-Muslims who may be living within the 
boundaries of an Islamic state and these rights necessarily form part of the Islamic constitution.  
In Islamic terminology, such non-Muslims are called Zimmis (the covenanted), implying that 
the Islamic state has entered into a covenant with them and guaranteed their protection.  The 
life, property and honour of a Zimmis is to be respected and protected in exactly the same way 
as that of a Muslim citizen.36 
 
In particular he notes that “[t]he Islamic state should not interfere with the personal 
rights of non-Muslims, who have full freedom of conscience and belief and are at 
liberty to perform their religious rites and ceremonies in their own way.  They may 
propagate their religion.  These rights are irrevocable.” 
 
There are therefore perceptions of the modern state that broadly include both secular, 
and non-secular states.  Of the former, it has been noted that there is not one clear 
constitutional structure of such a state.  Rather there have been models that have 
evolved to meet domestic circumstances.  
 
III FORMS OF THE ‘SECULAR’ STATE 
 
In the previous chapter, Holyoake’s views on a post-Enlightenment model of 
government that removed a privileged position for religion in matters of state was 
examined, noting that these broad principles are compatible with those adopted by 
many modern democracies over the last two centuries.  These principles are adapted 
to local conditions, rather than uniformly aiming to fit all.  The need for a role for 
religion, although unprivileged, in the public sphere has been judged in various 
jurisdictions to be in the spectrum from marginal to none, through to strongly 
influential.  Although not privileged in most major constitutions there are wide 
variations.  
 
The terms ‘secularism’ and ‘laïcité’ are often used as synonyms in describing 
constitutions where religion has no official public role.  However, they are not the 
same.  The former describes where the state accommodates religious pluralism, but 
the latter describes the rather unique situation of France from where the term derives, 
where there is little tolerance for religion in the public sphere.  There is no real term 
for the circumstance where the state’s treatment of religion does not accommodate 
religious pluralism, yet is not as extreme in its treatment of religion as that of France.  
Although not compatible with the model as proposed by Holyoake, the term 
‘secularism’ is also used in such countries as the United States, and where secularism 
is understood to mean the active separation of the state from religion, where it may be 
                                                 
35 Nehaluddin Ahmad, ‘The Modern Concept of Secularism and Islamic Jurisprudence: A 
Comparative Analysis’, [Vol. XV, 2009] Annual Survey of International and Comparative Law 75. 
36 Nehaluddin Ahmad, ‘The Modern Concept of Secularism and Islamic Jurisprudence: A 
Comparative Analysis’, [Vol. XV, 2009] Annual Survey of International and Comparative Law 75, 
98. 
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inferred that without such separation religion may be seen to be favoured.37 This will 
be examined further and in more detail in Chapter 10 of this thesis.   
 
Models separating religion and the state in the public sphere can be classified may 
ways and by many writers, depending on their perspective.  Susanna Mancini in Italy 
sees the different secular models as representing “radically different models for 
managing the relationship between the state and religion and for accommodating 
religious diversity.”38  Michel Rosenfeld offers five39 and Veit Bader of the 
Netherlands offers twelve distinct ‘secularisms’.40 Mancini uses four in her analyses,41 
a method which is quite common.  What is remarkable is that there is no consideration 
of the constitutions of secular democracies in these models anywhere else, outside the 
USA and Europe, in the writings of these and similar commentators.  
 
Almost all of the commentators write of a ‘Western’ perspective of secularism.  Most 
of them use the American ‘separation of church and state’ perspective derived 
originally from the writings of Thomas Jefferson, and taken up later by the US 
Supreme Court,42 as the only reasonable and contemporary lens through which to view 
all other methods and to judge them.43   
 
More contemporary theorists have then considered how competing rights in the 
secular public sphere may be examined and measured against the rights of others.  
Contemporary thinking is leaning now in the direction as suggested by Slavica 
Jakelić44 
                                                 
37 Such was the case recently in the USA when the House of Representatives approved legislation 
permitting federal money to rebuild churches and synagogues damaged by Hurricane Sandy, “despite 
concern that such aid could violate the doctrine of separation of church and state”.  (For example New 
York Times, “House Approves Storm Aid for Religious Institutions”, 18 February 2013 < 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/nyregion/house-approves-federal-aid-for-churches-damaged-by-
hurricane-sandy.html?emc=tnt&tntemail1=y&_r=0 >.) 
38 Susanna Mancini, ‘Religious Symbols in the Public Space: The Power of Symbols and Symbols as 
Power: Secularism and Religion as Guarantors of Cultural Convergence’, (2009) 30 Cardozo Law 
Review 2629, 2642. 
39 Michael Rosenfeld, ‘Can Constitutionalism, Secularism and Religion be reconciled in an Era of 
Globalization and Religious Revival? (2009) 30 Cardozo Law Review 2333, 2348-9.  He offers a 
militant secularist model (France and Turkey); agnostic secularist model (USA); confessional secular 
model (Italy and Germany); the official religion with institutionalised tolerance for minority religions 
(UK, Scandinavia, Greece); and the millet based model, with collective self-government for each 
religious community (Israel). 
40 Veit Bader, ‘Constitutionalizing Secularism, Alternative Secularisms or Liberal-Democratic 
Constitutionalism? A Critical Reading of Some Turkish, ECtHR and Indian Supreme Court Cases on 
“secularism” ’ (2010) 6(3) Utrecht Law Review 8, 14. 
41 Susanna Mancini, ‘Religious Symbols in the Public Space: The Power of Symbols and Symbols as 
Power: Secularism and Religion as Guarantors of Cultural Convergence’, (2009) 30 Cardozo Law 
Review 2629, 2642. 
42 First seen in Reynolds v United States, 98 US (8 Otto.) 145 (1878) where the Court considered that 
Jefferson's comments "may be accepted almost as an authoritative declaration of the scope and effect 
of the [First] Amendment" (Waite CJ), and later in Everson v Board of Education 330 US 1 (1947), 
"[i]n the words of Thomas Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended 
to erect a wall of separation between church and state." (Black J). 
43 See generally Matthew Scherer, ‘Landmarks in the Critical Study of Secularism’, (2011) 26(4) 
Cultural Anthropology 621, and William E. Connolly, Why I am not a Secularist (University of 
Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1999). 
44 Slavica Jakelić, ‘Secularism: A Bibliographic Essay’ (2010) 12(3) The Hedgehog Review 49 
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Secularism has origins in the West but has long ceased to be its property. It is a global 
phenomenon with an equally global crisis. For theoretical and empirical purposes, therefore, 
secularism should be thought of in the plural rather than in the singular. Similarly, while 
secularism has been a source of marginalization and sometimes even a hostile negation of 
religions, it cannot be reduced to antireligiousness. It is also a moral orientation toward the 
world and in the world, often guided by a vision of a just society for all or developed as a 
strategy that should mitigate the challenges of religious pluralism. Secularism may indicate a 
worldview, an ideology, a political doctrine, a form of political governance, a type of moral 
philosophy, or a belief that the scientific method is sufficient to understanding the world in 
which we live. 
 
The modern secular state attempts to address these competing rights, measuring up the 
secular ideals of the constitution and the government that draws its laws from it, 
against the wishes of members of the public to exercise their religion in the public 
sphere, without those rights being curtailed unnecessarily, and the state not being 
perceived as being bent to their wishes.   
 
The standard paradigms of “separation of church and state” and “laïcité” are often 
presented as the ideal, the standard, that secularism is and that governments aim to 
achieve.  Yet in Asia and the Indian subcontinent, there are constitutions underlying 
secular democracies that find local (and different) solutions to the role of the state 
and religion in the public sphere, and that do not find their way into classic analysis.  
India even today, works to find a working model that is unlike that of Europe or the 
USA, yet is influenced by legal commentary and discourse on the paradigms 
mentioned above.  In 1947, shortly before Independence, Mahatma Gandhi was 
reported in Harijan45:  
 
Gandhiji expressed the opinion that the state should undoubtedly be secular. It could never 
promote denominational education out of public funds. Everyone living in it should be 
entitled to profess his religion without let or hindrance, so long as the citizen obeyed the 
common law of the land. There should be no interference with missionary effort, but no 
mission could enjoy the patronage of the state as it did during the foreign regime."  
 
Justice Chinnappa Reddy explained the contemporary Indian position when he 
explained that “[o]ur tradition teaches tolerance; our philosophy preaches tolerance; 
our Constitution practices tolerance; let us not dilute it”.46   
 
For the purposes of later analysis I shall examine briefly common descriptions or 
groupings of those models considered to be exemplars of secularism by many who 
comment on this field.   
 
IV HARD AND SOFT ‘SECULARISM’ 
 
Many commentaries work from the premise that there are only two contemporary 
exemplars of secularism.  This much discussed model - perhaps because of its 
dogmatic positions - may well be titled “extreme secularism” or “militant secularism” 
in the sense that its extremism or militancy is decidedly against religion having a role 
in the public sphere.  However, there is a case for denying that it is a model exemplar; 
rather that it is not secularism at all in the manner that Holyoake envisaged. 
 
                                                 
45 Anil Nauriya,“Gandhi on secular law and state”, The Hindu, Wednesday, Oct 22, 2003. 
46 Bijoe Emmanuel v State of Kerala (1986) 3 SCC 615. 
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A ‘Hard’ secularism 
 
‘Hard’ secularism has been variously described as ‘exclusive’, ‘assertive’, 
‘aggressive’, ‘strong’, ‘intolerant’, ‘statist’, or ‘malevolent’ secularism. 47  
 
Charles Taylor has illustrated a not uncommon representation of secularism that “[t]o 
put it briefly, there are two important founding contexts for this kind of regime, the 
US and France”48 where the development of the secular state has had but two 
pathways, that of these two countries.  Some views have also been inclusive of Turkey, 
with France being similar.49  Many commentaries work from this premise that there 
are only two contemporary exemplars of secularism.  The adoption of secularism by 
many other world liberal democracies is rarely discussed.   
 
This much discussed model perhaps because of its dogmatic positions held may well 
be titled “extreme secularism” or “militant secularism” in the sense that their 
extremism or militancy is decidedly against religion having a role in the public sphere.  
However, there is a case for denying that they are exemplars; rather that they are not 
secularism at all in the manner that Holyoake envisaged. 
 
Holyoake considered that the term ‘secularism’ was not an apt description of 
constitutions that are critical of religion in general and of religion in the public 
sphere in particular.  He observed that50 
 
Some societies, simply anti-theological, have taken the secular name, which leads many 
unobservant persons to consider the term Secularism as synonymous with atheism and 
general church-fighting; whereas Secularism is a new name implying a new principle and a 
new policy.  It would be an imposter term were it merely a new name intended to disguise an 
old thing. 
 
                                                 
47 See generally Veit Bader, ‘Constitutionalizing Secularism, Alternative Secularisms or Liberal-
Democratic Constitutionalism?  A Critical Reading of Some Turkish, ECtHR and Indian Supreme 
Court Cases on “secularism” ’ (2010) 6(3) Utrecht Law Review 8, 9.  However, there are differing 
views on which countries are included in this description.  On this see also Richard Mohr and 
Nadirsyah Hosen, ‘Da Capo: law and religion from the top down’ in Richard Mohr and Nadirsyah 
Hosen, Law and Religion in Public Life: The contemporary debate, (Routledge, Oxford, 2011), 1, 8 
where such countries see secularism almost as a civic religion, consistent with their revolutionary 
origins, including also Turkey and where ‘secular forces’ resist the spread of religious influences.   
48 Charles Taylor, ‘The Meaning of Secularism’, (2010) 12(3) The Hedgehog Review,  23, 26.  Taylor 
also in ‘Why we need a radical redefinition of secularism’ (in Eduardo Mendieta and Jonathan Van 
Antwerpen (eds), The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere (Columbia University Press, New York, 
2011, 38-39) expands on this point suggesting the U.S. model of ‘secularism ‘through the First 
Amendment was intended (in the words of Judge Joseph Story) to “exclude all rivalry among 
Christian sects” and that “Christianity ought to receive encouragement from the state”.  In the 
alternative Taylor points at the rise of French laïcité as a struggle and stand for independence against 
a powerful church.  Other writers using only the US and France as exemplars of secularism include 
Sarah Nirenberg, ‘The Resurgence of Secularism: Hostility towards Religion in The United States and 
France’ (2012) 5 Washington University Jurisprudence Review 131. 
49 See generally Ahmet T. Kuru, Secularism and State Policies toward Religion: The United States, 
France, and Turkey (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009), Amélie Barras, ‘Using Rights to 
Re-invent Secularism in France and Turkey’, (2008) EUI RSCAS; 2008/20; Mediterranean 
Programme Series, European University Institute (http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/8870), Pierre 
Birnbaum, ‘On the Secularization of the Public Square: Jews in France and in the United States’ 
(2008-2009) 30 Cardozo Law Review 2431. 
50 George Jacob Holyoake, Sixty Years of an Agitator’s Life (London : T. Fisher Unwin, 1900), 294. 
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The number of countries falling into this category include France and the United 
States, and will serve as illustrative of this category. 
 
1 France 
 
This ‘hard’ approach is the dominant paradigm in France, with its national policy of 
Laïcité.  The French paradigm of treatment of religion has a long pedigree, although 
the recent controversies regarding the wearing of scarves by schoolchildren have 
polarised opinion in France more than any other issue on recent times.  Some have 
seen it as a “clash of civilisations”51 and others as “part of Europe’s own identity 
crisis”.52   
 
France has made for itself a separation of church and state stricter than most other 
nations.  This legal structure has been a fundamental distinguishing feature of all 
constitutions since Napoleonic times.  The French Constitution makes it firmly clear 
that no religion may be established as the legal state religion, that religion is part of 
the private sector, and that no state funding may be used to fund religion (other than 
Haut-Rhin, Bas-Rhin, and Moselle, which were not part of France at the time of the 
making of the 1905 Constitution).53 
 
This separation of church and state dates back to the French Revolution when control 
of France’s social and political order was fought between the state and the Roman 
Catholic Church.  The 1801 concordat signed between Napoleon and the Vatican re-
established church control over its own internal affairs, and the restoration of the 
monarchy in 1814 strengthened those ties.  However, the Republican victory in 1876 
brought back anticlerical attacks by the state, which resulted in the 1905 constitution 
that formally separated church and state.54 
 
2 United States of America 
 
The United States, with a publicly stated position of strict separation of religion and 
state from the time of Thomas Jefferson as a ‘wall of separation’,55 is often 
considered to have a more moderate position.  Thomas Jefferson’s wall paradigm 
was first taken up by the Supreme Court in Reynolds v United States56 with the Court 
                                                 
51 ‘Opinion divided on wearing headscarf’, The Hindu, March 27, 2004 
http://www.hindu.com/2004/03/27/stories/2004032700830500.htm; Shada Islam, ‘Debating French 
Islam’, Outlook India, 3 February, 2004 <http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?222842.> 
52 Peter Frey, ‘Continental Divide’, 19 April, 2004, Sydney Morning Herald 
<http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/04/18/1082226632822.html>. 
53 J. Christopher Soper and Joel S. Fetzer, ‘Explaining the Accommodation of Muslim Religious 
Practices in France, Britain, and Germany’ (2003) 1 French Politics 39, 46. 
54 J. Christopher Soper and Joel S. Fetzer, ‘Explaining the Accommodation of Muslim Religious 
Practices in France, Britain, and Germany’ (2003) 1 French Politics 39, 47. 
55 The metaphor of a "wall of separation between church and state" was written by Thomas Jefferson 
in a letter to the Danbury Baptist Association in 1802. He discussed in that letter the First Amendment 
to the United States Constitution, writing "Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies 
solely between Man and his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, that 
the legitimate powers of government reach actions only, and not opinions, I contemplate with 
sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature 
should 'make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,' 
thus building a wall of separation between Church and State." 
56 98 US 145, 164 
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observing "that it may be accepted almost as an authoritative declaration of the scope 
and effect of the [first] amendment.”57  However, over the last 60 years it has had 
difficulty being true to this ideal and the US Supreme Court decisions are becoming 
more hostile to organised religion.58     
 
Black J expanded on the ‘wall’ metaphor by stating that “[t]he First Amendment has 
erected a wall between church and state.  That wall must be kept high and 
impregnable.  We could not approve the slightest breach.”   However, whether the 
wall could be breached and by how much, have been tests of the secular59 
constitution, illustrated by a number of significant constitutional cases which have 
reached the US Supreme Court, to be evaluated in Part II.60   
 
The United States Supreme Court, through Black J, expanded upon the Court’s 
understanding of the Jeffersonian metaphor61: 
 
Neither a State nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which 
aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor 
influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to 
profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or 
professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in 
any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, 
whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. 
Neither a State nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs 
of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa.  
 
The United States Constitution’s First Amendment Religion Clause contains two 
provisions relating to freedom of religion known as the Free Exercise and 
                                                 
57 Reynolds v United States (1878) 98 US 145, 164 (Waite CJ).  He went on to note that “Congress 
was deprived of all legislative power over mere [religious] opinion, but was left free to reach [only 
those religious] actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order.” 
58 Cases such as Sherbert v Verner, 374 US 398 (1963) (denying unemployment compensation to 
someone who lost their job because it conflicted with her religion), Wisconsin v Yoder, 406 US 205 
(1972) (state required attendance at school beyond 8th grade, but parents argued breach of religious 
freedom), Oregon v Smith, 494 US 872 (1990) (religious use of illegal drugs not permitted despite 
religious freedom argument), Lemon v Kurtzman, 403 US 602 (law must have a legitimate secular 
purpose, with no primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion); Lee v Weisman, 505 US 577 
(prayers led by religious authorities in public schools at graduation ceremony), Van Orden v Perry, 
(545 US 677 (2005) and McCreary County v ACLU of Kentucky, 545 US 844 (displays of Christian 
religious text in and outside legislature and courts). 
59 The United States Constitution is a secular document for several reasons.  Article 6, section 3 states 
that federally elected and appointed officials “shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this 
Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a qualification to any Office or public 
trust under the United States.  There are two significant elements of this provision.  First, this 
establishes no religious test for public office, an unusual provision in that country and outside at the 
time.  Second, the section provides for affirmation, which meant that the framers of the constitution 
did not wish to have a religious oath to enable someone to take office.  The second provision is the 
First Amendment to the Bill of Rights, ratified in 1791. (The Bill of Rights is a term used to describe 
the first ten amendments to the US Constitution). 
60 The first 150 years of US history did not present many opportunities for such cases, as the First 
Amendment to the US Constitution had not yet been applied to the states.  Initially, the First 
Amendment applied only to Congress and the federal government.  However, following the US Civil 
War, the adoption of the 14th Amendment (due-process clause) required that “no state shall … deprive 
any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law ….”   In Everson v Board of 
Education in 1947 it was established that the establishment clause is one of the “liberties” protected 
by the due-process clause.   
61 330 US 1 (1947), 16. 
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Establishment Clauses.  The Religion Clause states that: “Congress shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the Free Exercise thereof”, 
known respectively as the establishment and Free Exercise clauses.62  
 
There is an ongoing battle between organised religion and advocates of the secular 
model for many years.  In her recent book, “Freethinkers”, Susan Jacoby goes so far 
as saying that “[d]uring the past two decades, cultural and religious conservatives have 
worked ceaselessly to delegitimize American secularism and relegate its heroes to a 
kook’s corner of American history”.63  Of today, she says that “[s]ince the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, America’s secularist tradition has been further 
denigrated by unremitting political propaganda equating patriotism with religious 
faith.” 64  In Jacoby’s view, the introduction of a secularist government and 
constitution following the American Revolution has been sorely tested over the last 
two centuries and continues to be so again. 
 
The USA may nevertheless still be included in this grouping of militantly secular 
states.  To be so, as is the case with France, is not necessarily to show an active state 
antagonism to religion, but rather to deny a place for religion in the public sphere.  
There can be a number of reasons for this, such as a fear that the state by 
acknowledging religion in its public policy may be in some form favouring religion or 
impairing religious freedom.  These issues will be examined in detail in later chapters 
of this thesis. 
 
However, whilst the Supreme Court endeavours to separate church and state, and 
follows a broad view of best leaving religion in the personal sphere, organised religion 
continues to bristle at being treated neutrally, to be just another organisation or 
institution with an opinion in the public sphere, or worse.65  Accordingly, the US 
Supreme Court continues to deal with cases where religion continues to object to its 
limitation to the private sphere.  Indeed, it has at times been annoyed at being so 
constantly tested, as illustrated in Abingdon Township School District v Schempp:66 
 
While none of the parties to either of these cases has questioned these basic conclusions of the 
Court [relating to the meaning and applicability of the Establishment Clause], both of which 
have been long established, recognized and consistently reaffirmed, others continue to question 
                                                 
62 Some are of the view that the two provisions should be considered separately, looking at the 
establishment provision in isolation to the free exercise of religion provision.  Beschle suggests that 
the lack of a specific establishment provision in the constitutions of many countries, whilst still 
having free exercise of religion provisions, suggests that they may be considered separately when 
being considered in the United States.  Having said that, he also notes that the United States Supreme 
Court is also disinclined to use international jurisprudence when looking for solutions to interpretation 
of their own constitution): Donald L. Beschle, “Does the Establishment Clause Matter?  Non-
establishment Principles in the United States and Canada” (2002) 4 University of Pennsylvania 
Journal of Constitutional Law 451. 
63 Susan Jacoby, Freethinkers: A History of American Secularism (New Metropolitan Books, New 
York, 2004), 1. 
64 Susan Jacoby, Freethinkers: A History of American Secularism (New Metropolitan Books, New 
York, 2004), 50. 
65 See generally Stephen L. Carter, ‘Evolutionism, Creationism, and Treating Religion As a Hobby’ 
(1987) Duke Law Journal 977, Frederick Mark Gedicks, ‘Public Life and Hostility to Religion’ 
(1992) 78 Virginia Law Review 671, Richard S. Myers, ‘The United States Supreme Court and the 
Privatization of Religion’ (2001) 6 Catholic Social Science Review 223, Richard John Neuhaus, The 
Naked Public Square (Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co, Grand Rapids, 1984), Chapter 5. 
66 374 US 203 (1963), 217.  
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their history, logic and efficacy.  Such contentions in the light of the consistent interpretation 
of the cases of this Court, seem entirely untenable and of value only as academic exercises.   
 
In the USA, the ‘wall of separation’ mentioned earlier by Justice Black, has been for 
some years slowly dismantled, through constant exemptions and inconsistency of 
treatment.  Religion has been acknowledged more overtly in recent years and 
continues to be so.  In Walz v Tax Commission,67 the Supreme Court held the practice 
of granting churches exemptions from property tax constitutional.  Brennan J found 
“secular purposes” for the church exemptions in this case, finding churches 
“contribute to the well-being of the community in a variety of non-religious ways,”68 
and that they “contribute to the pluralism of American society.”69   
 
This view was formalised in Lemon v Kurzman70 the next year, where the court 
emphasised that to avoid clashing with the Establishment Clause a statute must have 
a secular purpose, it must neither advance nor inhibit religion, and must not foster an 
excessive government entanglement with religion.  Whilst Lemon has not been 
formally repudiated by the Supreme Court, “it has not been relied upon by a majority 
to invalidate any practice since 1985”, and “a majority of the justices sitting in 2011 
have criticized it”.71  By 1997 the entanglement aspect of Lemon had become 
noticeably unworkable, as it was acknowledged by the Supreme Court in Agostini v 
Felton72 that “[n]ot all entanglements [have] the effect of advancing or inhibiting 
religion.  Interaction between church and state is inevitable, and we have always 
tolerated some level of involvement between the two.”73   
 
Accordingly, the outcome, whatever the reasons given, is the same as that for France: 
the state’s interpretation of its religious freedom provisions of its constitution is that 
there can be no official acknowledgement by the state of religion in any public space 
whether it is in government support,74 public education75 or even symbols found on 
government land.76  These contradictions will be examined in detail in later chapters 
in this thesis. 
 
Some of the discourse in this area can be quite assertive against the role of religion in 
the public sphere in these countries.  Take for example Elisabeth Zoller, a France based 
academic, who argues77 that the  
                                                 
67 397 US 664 (1970). 
68 Walz v Tax Commission, 397 US 664 (1970), 687. 
69 Walz v Tax Commission, 397 US 664 (1970), 689. 
70 Known as the ‘Lemon Test’: ‘Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the 
cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many years.  Three such tests may be gleaned from 
our cases. First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary 
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, Board of Education v Allen, 392 US 
236, 243 (1968); finally, the statute must not foster "an excessive government entanglement with 
religion.” (403 US 602 (1971)). 
71 Geoffrey R. Stone et al, The First Amendment (4th Ed., Aspen Publishers, New York, 2012), 671. 
72 Agostini v Felton, 521 US 203 (1997). 
73 Agostini v Felton, 521 US 203, 232 (1997). 
74 Zelman v Simmons-Harris, 536 US 639 (2002). 
75 Engel v Vitale 370 US 421 (1962), and Abington School District v Schempp 374 US 203 (1963). 
76 Van Orden v Perry, 545 US 677 (2005), McCreary County v ACLU, 545 US 844 (2005) and 
Salazar v Buono 559 US 700 (2010). 
77 Elisabeth Zoller, ‘Laïcité in the United States or The Separation of Church and State in a Pluralist 
Society’ (2006) 13 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 561, 564. 
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secular cultures of France and the United States share an explanation for this secularism: the 
same Enlightenment philosophy nourished their respective revolutions.  France is the daughter 
of Jefferson, as the United States is the heir of Voltaire.  The essential teaching of these 
philosophers on the relationship between church and state is that religion is a private affair and 
must remain such, and that religion cannot expect from the state anything other than perfect 
neutrality. 
 
On separation of religion from the state she states that “[t]he separation between 
religion and politics is a fundamental criterion that distinguishes a modern democracy 
from an ancient one”78 and that  
 
[m]odern democracy does not chase religion from civic life, but rather obligates it to be a 
personal affair, distinct and separate from public affairs.  In this sense, modern democracy 
requires the separation of church and state because it must, in order to survive and achieve, 
drive religion out of the sphere reserved for politics in the city: that is to say, the public 
sphere.79 
 
This particular position implies a number of things.  The first is that other modern 
democracies are excluded from that definition if they do not drive out religion, or that 
in some fashion they remain backward by retaining or inviting religion into public 
discourse.  Ancient democracies appear then to have remained in a pre-Enlightenment 
state, somehow still at the bidding and direction of organised religion.  Also, she infers 
that religion is somehow toxic and must be driven out for modern democracy to 
survive.   
 
What makes this history interesting is that France too declared its secular government 
and constitution immediately after their revolution, for many of the same reasons as 
the US did.  Whilst the US did not suffer from the same internal religious problems as 
France, many of the first migrants to the US were escaping the religious dominance of 
the Church of England.  As in France, the new constitution was not intending to abolish 
religion, but rather protect the religious rights of all by not installing one to the 
detriment of others, at least at the federal level in the beginning. 
 
B ‘Soft’ secularism 
 
Charles Taylor has argued that “[s]ome kind of distancing is obviously required by the 
very principle of equidistance and inclusion which is the essence of secularism.  But 
there is more than one formula that can satisfy this.  Complete disentanglement of 
government from any religious institutions is one such, but far from the only one.”80   
 
This view has been sometimes characterised as ‘soft’ secularism, presumably because 
of its lack of a harsh treatment of organised religion.  Other descriptors have included 
‘inclusive’, ‘passive’, ‘moderate’, ‘evolutionary’, ‘weak’, ‘tolerant’, ‘liberal’, 
                                                 
78 Elisabeth Zoller, ‘Laïcité in the United States or The Separation of Church and State in a Pluralist 
Society’ (2006) 13 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 561, 564. 
79 Elisabeth Zoller, ‘Laïcité in the United States or The Separation of Church and State in a Pluralist 
Society’ (2006) 13 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 561, 564. 
80 Charles Taylor, “Modes of Secularism”, in Rajeev Bhargava (ed.) Secularism and its Critics (Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), 52. 
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‘benevolent’ or ‘ameliorative’ secularism, laïcité plurielle, positive, de gestion, and 
bien entendue.81 
 
In the democratic systems discussed above as ‘hard secularism’, the model is an 
absence of religion from the public sphere and in public discourse.  The presence of 
religion as a symbol endorsed by the state or as a policy position based on its premises 
is seen as anathema to the model of neutrality advocated by the state. 
 
However, these models of a strict separation of church and state are not the only ones 
viable for a secular state. Given the absence of an inflexible paradigm, many models 
have evolved in the last century or so that have met local needs.   
 
Many countries have adapted secularism in a form that, as Mehta suggests, becomes 
suited to local circumstances and political realities.  A number of countries have 
recently been contesting constitutional cases to determine the contemporary 
understanding of the role of religion in the public sphere.  These ‘soft’ secular 
constitutional provisions are secular states in the Holyoakean sense.  Although each is 
different in structure, a common feature is an accommodation of religion in the public 
sphere, and a recognition of religious diversity.   
  
1 Europe other than France 
 
The ‘Confessional Secular’ paradigm is common in central European regions such as 
Bavaria in Germany, and in Italy.  These countries in particular have had significant 
and long historical religious influences.  Accordingly in recent times, even when 
nominally becoming constitutionally secular, they still identify politically with the 
majority religion even though they do not officially favour it. The majority religion is 
often the legal vestige of an earlier established religion.   
 
For instance, the crucifix is sometimes seen as a symbol of national or state identity.  
This has been borne out by recent decisions in constitutional courts and the European 
Court of Human Rights, where religious symbols in public schools have been held to 
be cultural icons.82  Rosenfeld acknowledges, however, that there are significant 
variances within this model, depending on whether for example there is one dominant 
religion, such as Catholicism in Italy, or whether there is more than one in the country, 
such as either Protestantism or Catholicism in some regions of Germany.83 
 
(a) Germany 
 
The church-state provisions of the German Constitution as they presently stand derive 
from a compromise between the inability of the framers of the Constitution to agree 
on new proposals regarding that relationship.  Article 140 of the Basic Law 
incorporates Articles 136, 137, 138, 139 and 141 of the Weimar Constitution. These 
articles of the Basic Law and the Weimar Constitution loosely collected form the “Free 
                                                 
81 Veit Bader, ‘Constitutionalizing Secularism, Alternative Secularisms or Liberal-Democratic 
Constitutionalism?  A Critical Reading of Some Turkish, ECtHR and Indian Supreme Court Cases on 
“secularism” ’ (2010) 6(3) Utrecht Law Review 8, 9. 
82 See in Chapter 8 of this thesis: “Religious Displays in State Schools”. 
83 Michael Rosenfeld, Law, Justice, Democracy and the Clash of Cultures: A Pluralist Account 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011), 155. 
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Exercise of religion” and “no establishment of official religion” provisions, reflecting 
broadly those provisions of the United States First Amendment to its Constitution.  
The Free Exercise of religion in Germany is articulated in Article 4.84   
 
The freedom of faith (Freiheit des Glaubens) in German law, whilst broadly relating 
to the principle of religious and ideological freedom, has not historically meant a 
universal right to express religious convictions.  There has been a distinction 
constitutionally between the dominant Catholic, Evangelical (ie Lutheran)and 
Reformed churches relative to minor religious sects.  The right to public expression of 
religion prior to 1848 was limited to the major religious groups.  Following the 
Frankfurt and Weimar Constitutions, Article 4 has provided for the protection of all 
belief systems.   
 
Discrimination based on religious belief or association is prohibited under Article 3(3), 
which states that persons may not be favoured or disfavoured based on “faith” or 
religious opinions”.  Article 33(3), which incorporated Article 136 of the Weimar 
constitution, gives equal civil and political rights on all Germans.  They are also not 
precluded from public office and the civil service based on “religious affiliation”.  This 
Article also ensures that Germans do not have to disclose their religious convictions, 
participation in a religious exercise, or have to take a religious oath. Whilst Article 56 
contains a reference to God in the oath of office for the federal president, the oath may 
be taken “without a religious affirmation”.85 
 
Germany’s Article 137 is analogous to the common secular constitutional clause found 
in constitutions such as the US and Australia86 that “there shall be no establishment of 
any official religion”.  Whilst that article recognises churches as “religious bodies”, 
and gives them corporate privileges and rights, the Weimar Constitution provision that 
“[t]here shall be no state church” is specifically provided for in Article 137(1) of the 
Basic Law.     
 
(b) India 
 
Pratap Bhanu Mehta once suggested in respect of the Indian understanding of the 
secular state that “secularism, like cricket and democracy, is a quintessentially Indian 
game that just happens to have been invented elsewhere.”87  The Vice-President of 
India added to the argument that secularism has a long pedigree in India, when S. 
Radakrishnan stated that, “[t]he religious impartiality of the Indian state is not to be 
confused with secularism or atheism.  Secularism as here defined is in accordance with 
the ancient religious tradition of India.”88 
                                                 
84 It provides: 
(1) Freedom of faith, of conscience, and freedom of creed, religious or ideological 
(weltanschaulich), shall be inviolable. 
(2)  The undisturbed practice of religion is guaranteed. 
(3)  No one may be compelled to take up arms against his conscience.  Details shall be 
regulated by federal law. 
85 Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany, (Duke 
University Press, London, 1989), 445. 
86 Australian Constitution, s116. 
87 Pratap Bhanu Mehta, ‘Hinduism and Self Rule’, in Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner and Philip J. 
Costopoulos (eds), World Religions and Democracy (JHU Press, Baltimore, 2005), 64. 
88Dr S. Radakrishnan, Vice-President of India, 1952-1962. 
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Outside Europe and North America, which have been strongly influenced by Western 
secular thought, India has consciously sought to create a modern secular democracy 
designed for its particular needs and demography.  From the Independence of India in 
the late 1940s, there have been two broad perceptions of India.  The first was that of 
the first Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru.  His view – ‘dharma nirapeksata’ 
– was based on a separation of religion from politics, first noted in the Karachi 
Resolution of the Congress on Fundamental Rights (1931) which provided “that the 
state shall observe neutrality in regard to all religions”.  The contrary position was 
advocated at that time by Mohandas K. Gandhi - ‘sarva dharma sambhava’ – which 
was based on an equal respect of all religions.  He rejected the idea of a separation of 
religion and politics,89 after he saw that communalists were using religion to divide 
the Indian people, and began to advocate the separation of religion from politics, 
saying in 1942 that ‘Religion is a personal matter that should have no place in 
politics.”90 
 
Jitendra Dash expanded on this noting that  
 
the Gandhian concept of Secularism, Sarva Dharma Samabhava (equal respect of all religions) 
… is better suited to our multi-religious, multi-ethnic polity.  This is a progressive concept: 
the polity not only respects all religions but also accommodates and recognises the importance 
of religion in the shaping of politics.  There is a difference between the concepts of Sarva 
Dharma Nira Pekshata and Sarva Dharma Samabhava: the former sees religion as something 
that would ultimately fade away with modernization; the latter sees religion as something vital 
in the functioning of a polity.
91 
 
Provisions for religious freedom in India in its constitution make clear that religion is 
a personal concern, and not a concern of the state.  The state need only interfere where 
the religious affairs of the individual interfere with public order, morality and health.  
M. Ayanthsayanam Ayyangar, a member of the Constituent Assembly said, “we are 
pledged to make the state a secular one.  I do not, by the word ‘secular’ mean that we 
do not believe in any religion and that we have nothing to do with it in our day-to-day 
life.  It only means that the states cannot aid one religion or give preference to one 
religion against another.” 92 
 
Secularism then, in the sense of a conflict between church and state, has not been 
debated in India, in the way it has in Europe and the US.  There has never been a 
church and state conflict in India as none of the religions have ever developed an 
autonomous corporate institution of “church” as did Christianity.  Religion in India 
has been organisationally dispersed, and accordingly leaders of the Indian community 
have come from the middle classes who were broadly secular in their orientation.  In 
the history of India, whilst the various religious traditions have founded some states 
they were not ruled by a theocracy.  Accordingly, the state institutions, and their laws 
                                                 
89 Brenda Cossman and Ratna Kapur, ‘Secularism: Bench-Marked by Hindu Right’, Economic and 
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90 Cited in  
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and policies, have not derived their policies and laws from any one political tradition. 
93 
 
India’s leaders even prior to independence, whilst not yet in political control of the 
future independent India, were still quite clear on what they understood secularism to 
mean, well before the constitution had been drafted.  Jawaharlal Nehru (India’s first 
Prime Minister) noted, “Some people think it means something opposed to religion. 
That obviously is not correct. What it means is that it is state which honours all faiths 
equally and gives them equal opportunities; that, as a state, it does not allow itself to 
be attached to one faith or religion, which then becomes the state religion.”94  He went 
on to say that secularism puts “religion on a different plane from that of normal 
political and social life.  Any other approach in India would mean the break-up of 
India.”95  Later, his daughter, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi expanded on that saying 
“[s]ecularism is neither a religion nor indifference to religion but equal respect for all 
religions; not mere tolerance but positive respect – without it there is no future for the 
nation”.96   
 
In this model typified by India, rather than attempting to keep a strict separation of the 
state from perceptions of religious favouritism, the government acknowledges 
politically all major religious groupings, while discouraging partisan political 
acknowledgement of any one group.  For example, Rajeev Bhargava emphasises 
India’s distinctiveness to classic European notions of secularism.97  He argues that 
 
Seven features of Indian secularism make it distinctive. First, its multi-value character. … 
Second, because it was born in a deeply multi-religious society, it is concerned as much with 
inter-religious domination as it is with intra-religious domination. … Third, it is committed 
to the idea of principled distance, poles apart from one-sided exclusion, mutual exclusion 
and strict neutrality or equidistance. Fourth, it admits a distinction between depublicization 
and depoliticization as well between different kinds of depoliticization. … Fifth, it is marked 
by a unique combination of active hostility to some aspects of religion (a ban on 
unsociability and a commitment to make religiously grounded personal laws more gender-
just) with active respect for its other dimensions (religious groups are officially recognized, 
state-aid is available non-preferentially to educational institutions run by religious 
communities, no blanket exclusion of religion as mandated by western liberalism). Sixth, it is 
committed to a different model of moral reasoning that is highly contextual and opens up the 
possibility of different societies working out their own secularisms. … Seventh, it breaks out 
of the rigid interpretative grid that divides our social world into the western modern and 
                                                 
93 Mahendra Prasad Singh, “Secularism and Communalism in India: Dialectics and Dilemmas” in 
Verinder Grover (Ed.), Foundations of Political System and Sociological Aspects: (Vol 7) The 
Constitution of India (Deep & Deep, New Delhi, 1999), 635.   The modernising of India evolved as a 
reaction against the British Raj, which developed a form of secularism, based on a common focus 
towards nation building, and a common citizenship and law.  This focus on the creation of the Indian 
state did not consider a state that would require a strict separation between the state and organised 
religion, because of the lack of an autonomous and corporate theological identity.  There was also a 
feeling at the time of the creation of India not to create rifts between religious communities. 
94 Sarvepalli Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: An Anthology (Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1980), 
330. 
95 Sarvepalli Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: An Anthology (Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1980), 
330-331. 
96 Ipseeta Satpathy, ‘Secularism: The Key to Unity and Integrity in India’, in Surya Narayan Misra, 
Subas Chandra Hazary and Amareswar Mishra (eds.), Constitution and Constitutionalism in India 
(APH Publishing Corporation, New Delhi, India, 1999), 90-91. 
97 Rajeev Bhargava, ‘The Distinctiveness of Indian Secularism’, in T.N. Srinivasan (ed.) The Future 
of Secularism (Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2006), 27. 
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traditional, indigenous non-western.  Indian secularism is modern but departs significantly 
from mainstream conceptions of western secularism.98 
 
(d) Australia 
 
Australia’s constitution was influenced in its design by both the UK and the US, 
creating a political structure known as the ‘Washminster” system with an upper house, 
the Senate, representing state interests, and a written constitution.99  However, with 
respect to secularism, the Australian Constitution reflects much more of its British 
forebears as it gives effect to that system much more than the American.  Despite 
Australia’s Constitution having an analogue of the American Establishment Clause,100 
Australia’s government has a willingness to incorporate religion into public policy and 
service delivery - such as welfare and social welfare.  It is untrammelled by the US 
Lemon test concept of an inappropriate entangling of government with religion.   
 
The modern secular state is often defined, as noted earlier, in terms of Thomas 
Jefferson’s famous “wall of separation” model, and places the state and religion’s 
public policies into two distinct camps - neither influencing the other, but each having 
its place.  In Australia this model is acknowledged but distinguished, where it has been 
observed that101   
 
Whilst there may be a ‘wall of separation’ between Church and State [in the United States] 
this wall has only increased the desire of these neighbours to look over the wall into each 
other’s yard, constantly paranoid that the other is silently shifting the wall during the night.  In 
contrast, the less distinct division between Church and State in Australia seems to have 
facilitated a more peaceful, more reasonable, and ironically arguably more separate 
cohabitation. 
 
Reid Mortensen examined appeals to the concept of ‘the separation of church and 
state’ in Australia in such diverse areas of public discourse as the delivery of welfare, 
stem cell research and the former religious office of an appointed Governor-
General.102  Mortensen describes Australia’s government as being “soft secular”,103 as 
judges have been inactive in failing to flesh out the ‘Establishment Clause’ of section 
116 of the Australian Constitution,104  determining that it places no real restrictions on 
the Commonwealth and that there is an absence in the constitutions of the various 
Australian states to describe the relationship between them and religion.105    
 
                                                 
98 Rajeev Bhargava, ‘Political Secularism’, in J. Dryzek, B. Honig, and A. Phillips (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Political Theory (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006), 636. 
99 Elaine Thompson, ‘The "Washminster" Mutation’, in Responsible Government in Australia (Patrick 
Moray Weller & Dean Jaensch eds., Drummond, Melbourne, 1980) 32, 32  
100 Australian Constitution, s 116. 
101 J. Puls, ‘The Wall of Separation: Section 116, The First Amendment and Constitutional Religious 
Guarantees’ (1998) 26 Federal Law Review 139, 163. 
102 Reid Mortensen, ‘Judicial (In)Activism in Australia's Secular Commonwealth’ (2005) 8(1) 
Interface 52. 
103 Reid Mortensen, ‘Judicial (In)Activism in Australia's Secular Commonwealth’ (2005) 8(1) 
Interface 52, 53. 
104 “The Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing any religion …” 
105 Reid Mortensen, ‘Judicial (In)Activism in Australia's Secular Commonwealth’ (2005) 8(1) 
Interface 52, 68. 
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He notes that the ‘hard secularism’ of constitutional governance of the US has been 
forged over the last sixty years,106 but a lack of enthusiasm for it in Australian political 
debate means that the concept of separation “lacks persuasive power”.   He considers 
Australian courts are unlikely to move in a direction comparable to the US approach 
to separation,107 particularly since Agostini v Felton.108  
 
Despite appeals to keep religion out of the public sphere, Mortensen acknowledges 
the often overlooked contribution of religion in areas such as education, hospitals and 
the delivery of welfare services in Australia.109  However, there have been few 
constitutional cases before the Australian High Court that would have permitted 
judicial activism on the role of organised religion in the Australian public sphere.110 
 
V SECULARISM AND RELIGIOUS PLURALISM 
 
Some jurisdictions such as India have implemented a secular constitution not so much 
as to remove discrimination against religion, but rather to foster good relations with 
religion by deliberately not establishing any religion in a multi-religious community.  
However, some consider secular that constitutions are meant to quell community 
disharmony, rather than aspiring in Holyoakean terms to preserve a place for religion 
in the public sphere. 
 
Pluralism is generally understood to be fundamentally “an ethic of respect that values 
human diversity.  … In contrast to multiculturalism … pluralism emphasises 
individual choices as well as collective compromise and mutual obligation as routes 
to peace, stability and human development.”111  This concept differs from mere 
tolerance in that differences are embraced. 
 
In 2010 the question was asked in The Hedgehog: “Does religious pluralism need 
secularism?”112  Jennifer Geddes suggested that secularism might be part of the 
answer.113  Rajiv Bhargava  contributes that “[i]t is time we shifted focus away from 
doctrines underpinning some western secular states and towards the normative 
practices of a wide variety of states, including the best practices of non-Western states 
such as India. … Of all available alternatives, secularism remains our best bet to help 
us deal with ever deepening religious diversity and the problems endemic to it.” 114  
                                                 
106 Reid Mortensen, ‘Judicial (In)Activism in Australia's Secular Commonwealth’ (2005) 8(1) 
Interface 52, 54. 
107 Reid Mortensen, ‘Judicial (In)Activism in Australia's Secular Commonwealth’ (2005) 8(1) 
Interface 52, 69. 
108 521 US 203 (1997). 
109 Reid Mortensen, ‘Judicial (In)Activism in Australia's Secular Commonwealth’ (2005) 8(1) 
Interface 52, 54. 
110 See Williams v The Commonwealth of Australia & Ors [2012] HCA 23.  Known as the ‘School 
Chaplains Case’, the Australian High Court did not make a determination on whether the appointing 
of religious workers, in the role of ‘school chaplain’ was prohibited by s 116 of the Constitution, as 
the Court held that the school chaplain engaged by third party to provide services at a school did not 
hold office under the Commonwealth.  The s116 question was therefore not addressed. 
111 Beverly Boutilier, Defining Pluralism, Pluralism papers No. 1, Global Centre for Pluralism 
(www.pluralism.ca). 
112 The Hedgehog Review (Vol. 12 no. 3, 2010). 
113 The Hedgehog Review (Vol. 12 no. 3, 2010), Editorial. 
114 Rajeev Bhargava, ‘States, Religious Diversity, and the Crisis of Secularism’, (2010) 12(3) The 
Hedgehog Review 8. 
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On the subject of Religious pluralism, Jürgen Habermas has argued that115 
 
The constitutional freedom of religion is the appropriate political answer to the challenges of 
religious pluralism. In this way, the potential for conflict at the level of citizens’ social 
interaction can be restrained, while at the cognitive level deep reaching conflicts may well 
continue to exist between the existentially relevant convictions of believers, believers of other 
denominations, and non-believers.  
 
A Secularism as a political solution in a pluralistic society 
 
Some have seen secularism as not just a constitutional concept to be appreciated in the 
abstract, but also as a political policy to be used as a means of state policy, particularly 
in India.   
 
Some have seen the role of secularism as being an enforced buffer between religious 
communities in a pluralistic society.  In India the term ‘secularism’ is often used to 
mean communal harmony and the absence of religious divisiveness.  However, as 
K.N. Panikkar has argued,116  
 
… communal harmony … is not secularism, which is a condition in which religion … is a 
purely personal affair of the individual.  It should not intervene in interpersonal relationships 
or institutional functioning.  If secularism is to be a reality, therefore, it is not sufficient to have 
a secular state, there must also be a secular society.  If the society is not secular the state is 
likely to depart from secular principles … 
 
He concluded that “the greatest success of communalism has been to vitiate human 
interpersonal relations in society into a religious relationship, which affected the 
secular ethos adversely.  Social relations thus came to be guided not by secular 
considerations but by religious identity.” 117 
 
VI DOES IT MATTER WHAT FORM THE SECULAR STATE TAKES? 
 
Since the Enlightenment, and certainly since the days of Holyoake, modern states have 
drafted constitutions and interpreted the laws drawn from them in terms of what they 
perceive to be the proper relationship of religion and the state in the public sphere.  
Some have declared overtly, like India, that the state is secular, and that the state deals 
with religion equably accordingly to constitutional provisions.  Some such as France 
declare that religion has little public role.  Other permutations, all deemed secular by 
the countries that have adopted them occur around the world. 
 
This chapter has identified that the secular concepts developed by Holyoake, and 
identified in Chapter 2 of this thesis, can now be seen in many forms.  Many generally 
conform to the ideals expounded by Holyoake.  Others, particularly models of hard 
secularism, take the name of ‘secular’ but are difficult to see as having as inclusive a 
role for religion in public affairs than had been envisaged by him.  However, 
Holyoakean thought does not prescribe just one way of doing things, but allows a 
                                                 
115 Jürgen Habermas, “Religion in the Public Sphere” (2006) 14(1) European Journal of Philosophy 
1, 4. 
116 K.N. Panikkar, ‘Short on Secularism’, Frontline February 13-26, 2010. (www.frontline.in)  
117 K.N. Panikkar, ‘Short on Secularism’, Frontline February 13-26, 2010. (www.frontline.in)  
 
58 
range of ‘church-state models’ that aim to include both the religious and non-religious 
in the public sphere. 
 
Part I of this thesis has analysed the rise and development of secularism as envisaged 
by George Jacob Holyoake.  His ideas are compatible with modern thinking of an 
inclusive public environment for modern pluralistic communities.  However, not all 
communities have been comfortable with the idea of secularism, and the courts in 
many countries today deliberate over how matters such as government funding, 
education, or even overt religious symbolism fit into a modern world where secular 
principles are not seen as a good fit. 
 
Part II of this thesis, in Chapters 4 through 8, examines some of these issues through 
the decisions of supreme courts in interpreting novel circumstances in the light of 
secular constitutional principles, and evaluates some of the modern solutions and 
trends that seek to address the needs of modern complex societies to address the needs 
of contemporary religious communities within a secular constitutional environment.   
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PART II:  CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE STATE AND 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
In Part I of this thesis I examined the history of the secular state, and in particular the 
philosophies of George Jacob Holyoake who articulated in detail a view on how 
religion and the state could occupy the public sphere to the benefit of both.  Part II, 
commencing with this chapter, will look at contemporary and ongoing issues that have 
challenged long held positions on the role of religion in the public sphere.  These issues 
will be examined in detail in subsequent chapters of this Part.  This chapter will 
examine these issues in overview. 
 
Holyoake advocated a public space where both religion and the state could meet their 
respective ideals without rancour.  This does not mean that each may operate without 
limit.  The secular constitutions of the various nations generally each have provisions 
for the protection of religious freedoms.  Often these will come with some limitations, 
either explicit or implied, that the state may impose for the common good.  This Part 
will consider in the next chapter limitations to religious expression by individuals in 
the context of enabling both religion and the state to occupy the public sphere in a 
manner that permits both to achieve their core objectives.  In this Part this will involve 
an analysis of those objectives, such as the need for limitations on religion for the 
purposes of matters such as public safety or advancing disadvantaged religious groups, 
and limitations on the state to prevent state bias towards religion in its public policy 
positions.  Part II will conclude with the efforts in some countries to direct religion 
beneficially to achieve outcomes that the state believes is for the common good rather 
than anti-religious motives. 
 
I will examine and illustrate issues where the secular state, with its model of secular 
government based on concepts of religious freedom outlined in its constitutional 
framework, meets with expressions of dissatisfaction by elements of the community.  
These may be individuals who feel that their mode of chosen or inherited religious 
activity, expression or dress has been impaired by laws drawn by the state, or those 
who feel that the state has been too accommodating to such individuals and bring the 
state to account to provisions in their constitutions which provide for the role of 
religion in that state. 
 
A Rights in conflict 
 
Holyoake argued that religion and the state could co-exist in the public space, and that 
in a liberal democratic state neither should seek to deny the other, and should not be 
in conflict. Yet both the state and other players in the public space cannot co-exist 
unlimited without conflict. 
 
In a liberal democracy there is the premise of popular sovereignty, and the 
institutionalisation of citizens’ rights, generally through the mechanism of a written 
constitution.  Hobbes, in Leviathan, considered that a free man is a person “in those 
things, which by his strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindered to doe what he 
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has a will to” and who freely performs his actions so that he “may refuse to do it if he 
will”.1  Locke, in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, said that “Liberty, ‘tis 
plain, consists in a power to do or not to do; to do or forbear doing as we will.  This 
cannot be denied.”2   Therefore, according to Locke, men enjoy equal rights under the 
law of nature.3  And no one may exercise authority in a liberal polity unless by that 
person’s consent.  Political authority in a liberal polity then rests in the consent of the 
governed, given freely.  Governments are created by popular consent in order to 
protect life, liberty and property. 
 
These Hobbesian and Lockean concepts, developed before the Enlightenment, also 
found prominence in Utilitarian thought.  Freedom, according to John Stuart Mill’s 
On Liberty, is that only self-protection permits society to restrict liberty, and hence for 
only the probable harm to others is adequate grounds for coercion. 
 
The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely 
the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control … That 
principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in 
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection … to prevent 
harm to others.4 
 
Ronald Dworkin acknowledges this argument5 stating that 
 
Of course we can define the various political virtues in such a way that conflict is indeed 
inevitable. Suppose we define equality in the way that certain socialists did: equality means 
everyone having the same wealth no matter what choices he makes about work or leisure or 
consumption or investment. We can define liberty in the way that John Stuart Mill and Isaiah 
Berlin have: someone's liberty is his freedom to do whatever he might wish to do free from 
the interference of others. Then we will certainly have a conflict between liberty and equality. 
In order to protect the equal distribution of wealth, we will have to prohibit theft, which is a 
denial of liberty. 
 
However, Dworkin finds the conceptions of liberty and equality to be twofold.  He 
acknowledges the classic approach of conflict, the first of which he calls the flat 
conception, and the latter the dynamic.  Whether there is conflict he says depends on 
how they are conceived,  suggesting that one cannot say that one's liberty is infringed 
when one is prevented from committing murder. Liberty cannot be said to have been 
infringed when no wrong has been done. Put in this way, liberty is only liberty to do 
whatever we wish so long as we do not infringe upon the rights of others.  Not all 
conflicts are necessarily a conflict that causes harm to others.6 
 
In a secular state as envisioned by Holyoake, therefore, a religious freedom should be 
recognised by the state as a public expression.  In a democracy, including the majority 
of those countries studied in this thesis, it is acknowledged that there must be some 
                                                 
1 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Oxford at the Clarendon Press, London, 1651), Chapter XXI. 
2 John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), II XXI 15. 
3 See also John Locke, Second Treatise on Civil Government (1690), Chapter 4, §22. The natural 
liberty of man is to be free from any superior power on earth, and not to be under the will or 
legislative authority of man, but to have only the law of nature for his rule.” 
4 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (1863), 13; see also Robert Audi, Religious Commitment and Secular 
Reason (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000), 28. 
5 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Do Values Conflict? A Hedgehog's Approach’, (2001) 43 Arizona Law 
Review251, 253. 
6 Ibid, 256. 
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limitation to personal freedoms, in the interests of all, with those limitations being 
accepted as a limit on government power in the interests of all.  Constitutions therefore 
must somehow support personal freedoms and rights, whilst acknowledging some 
level of limitation.  This is particularly the case where religious freedoms must be 
recognised.  However the right of others not to have their own rights infringed by those 
freedoms also needs to be recognised.  Habermas has argued that in conflicts between 
rights in the public sphere, the parties themselves must reach agreement on the positive 
liberty to practise a religion of one’s own and the negative liberty to remain spared 
from the religious practices of the others.7 
 
A freedom of religion is a bundle of rights often at odds with each other.  Isaiah Berlin 
said of this conflict: 
 
If the claims of two (or more than two) types of liberty prove incompatible in a particular case, 
and this is an instance of the clash of values at once absolute and incommensurable, it is better 
to face this intellectually uncomfortable fact than to ignore it, or automatically attribute it to 
some deficiency on our part which could be eliminated by an increase in skill or knowledge, 
or, what is worse still, suppress one of the competing values altogether by pretending it is 
identical with its rival – and so end by distorting both.8 
 
This statement illustrates both sides of the argument.  One, that a freedom is unfettered 
otherwise it is not a freedom at all; the other, that to limit where two freedoms clash 
to prevent that clash, the limitations change the nature of what is being ostensively 
protected.  Deciding where to draw this line is the subject of a number of cases 
examined in the following chapters.  These rights in conflict often relate to state 
imposed limitations to religious expression. 
 
II LIMITS TO RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION 
 
Those who seek to express their religion publicly must, to be consistent with 
Holyoake’s views, be able to have this expression to be recognised by the state, or at 
least disregarded.   However, some limitation imposed by the state in order to coexist 
with it is also necessary should that expression come into conflict with the state’s 
administration.  The state often will generally only consider limitations that are 
intended to benefit the whole community. 
 
In most, if not all, jurisdictions religious freedom is not an absolute right.  Some 
constitutions expressly limit the right, such as the Constitution of India for public 
order,9 and some like the United States are open ended.  Religious expression can be 
made by religious individuals or organisations, or it may be made by the state. 
 
There is a long history of the state imposing its will, ostensibly for the greater good, 
upon citizens with the intention of limiting some liberties in order to maximise the 
good of all.  When this rationale is not accepted there are often those who wish to test 
the veracity and legal basis of the state to do so through actions that often end up in 
supreme courts through a mixture of the novel nature of the litigation and the 
theretofore vaguely defined constitutional provisions. 
                                                 
7 Jürgen Habermas, “Religion in the Public Sphere” (2006) 14(1) European Journal of Philosophy 1, 
4. 
8 Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1969), 1. 
9 Article 19 in the Constitution of India 1949. 
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The issues involved, and the decisions held by various supreme courts, are examined 
in the next chapter, Chapter 5. 
 
III PERCEPTIONS OF STATE BIAS TOWARDS RELIGION 
 
Whilst many constitutional cases that reach the ultimate courts on religious rights often 
consider claims by individuals that the state has infringed their rights 
unconstitutionally, there are a number of occurrences where the state has passed 
legislation, or has undertaken action, that has been considered unconstitutional 
because of its religious purpose or content.  In these cases the state has been brought 
to account by individuals rather than the reverse. 
 
Holyoake’s secularism principles required that religion and the state co-exist amicably 
in the public sphere.  Accordingly, while there ought to be limitations on religion to 
do so, so should an equal obligation apply to the state.  In this the state should not 
apply unreasonable or unwarranted limitations on religion, and should not itself 
advocate a religious position not shared by all.  If the state is constitutionally secular, 
it should not be overtly favouring a religious community in its actions.  This is not to 
be confused with incidental actions, such as when the state supports education through 
transport concessions.10 
 
The understanding that the state will as best as possible remain neutral in religious 
matters can often be strained, with the state being sometimes perceived as supporting 
religion in some way, contrary to its constitutional responsibilities.  This perception is 
not always warranted, but the popular understanding of that obligation by those who 
wish to keep it to account changes over time,  and is not always helped by inconsistent 
decision making in this area by some courts.  On this more will be said later, 
particularly in respect of the US Supreme Court over the last ten years. 
 
Most cases of this nature are unusual because, in a secular state, support by the state 
for an overtly religious purpose appear on the surface to be obviously ultra vires.  The 
rationale often offered is that the primary purpose for the legislation is of a ‘secular’, 
ie non-religiously motivated purpose, and that the fact that the legislation used to affect 
public policy is in accord with religious doctrine is merely incidental.  Sometimes 
issues will occur when a teacher or other employee of the state acts with its authority.  
If the state supports such an individual in his or her actions, the matter becomes a 
debate in the courts on public policy. 
 
The public objectives of religion and the state may often be entwined, often because 
they may be seeking the same objectives through separate paths, such as in education 
or social work.  At times the state may appear to be working to achieve religious ideals 
rather than secular ones. Often overt religious behaviour by servants of the state, or by 
state institutions, will be considered by observers as an implied or overt endorsement 
of religion by the state.  In a secular state this causes a clash between a public body 
                                                 
10 Such as in the US case of Everson v Board of Education, 330 US 1 (1947), where the Supreme 
Court held that public subsidies towards transport of school children in the case of private religious 
schools supported religion.  The Court held that the support applied to all school children equally and 
was not a direct support or endorsement of religion. 
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and a religious practitioner’s wish to display religious community affiliation through 
religious clothing or static displays. 
 
Although the state may have reason to limit the religious expressions and practices of 
individuals, the state too may wish to express religious ideals, ostensibly on behalf of 
the community as a whole.  This activity by the state clearly works against Holyoakean 
ideals, which even for benign purposes, do not permit religion to work as an unfettered 
player in the public arena.  The ideal is for the state to be neutral towards religion, 
neither supporting it nor identifying it for specific impediment.11  Some jurisdictions 
have gone so far as to argue that the state should also treat all religions equally.12 
 
Yet, many states, despite their official secular constitutional position, overtly legislate 
in favour of the majoritarian religious position for partisan political reasons, rather 
than taking the more difficult neutral or inclusive position suggested by Holyoake’s 
views.  Such legislation runs the obvious risk of being seen to have a bias in all things 
in favour of the majority, and consequently of being seen as treating all other members 
of the community less favourably. 
 
Religion pervades the public sphere and it is not reasonable to suggest it can or should 
be excised.  For the most part this presence is incidental, and understood by the public 
to be so.  Where difficulties arise is usually when deliberative action is taken by 
government through its actions, its speech or its legislation and these have a religious 
context or content. 
 
These cases of state religious activity in the public sphere usually fall into one of two 
types.  Depending on one’s perspective, there are actions that have a general intent 
and purpose such as support of education13 where the support of religion is generally 
considered incidental, and those that are specific in purpose such as directed 
behaviours in the public arena such as school prayers,14 flag salutes15 or oaths,16 which 
are generally argued to have a social and educative benefit.17 
 
However, broad based policies of any legislature will, as is the nature of politics, have 
an agenda meant to reflect the majority cultural view, often informed by a religious 
                                                 
11  The Quebec government in Canada in 2008 endorsed this, noting in a report on cultural differences 
that “it is widely acknowledged that the secular State must be neutral in respect of all religions. To 
this we must add that the State must not take sides as regards religion and non-religion.”  Gérard 
Bouchard & Charles Taylor, Building the Future: A Time for Reconciliation, Report of the 
Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Differences (Quebec: 
Gouvernement du Québec, 2008), 44. 
12 In the US case of Larson v Valente, 456 US 228, 244-45 (1982).  The US Supreme Court held that a 
Minnesota law placed a disproportionate burden on certain religions that obtained most of their 
funding from member contributions. 
13 These will necessarily include religious schools. 
14 To be examined further in Chapter 8 of this thesis. 
15 To be examined further in Chapter 9 of this thesis. 
16 Such as test oaths (an oath required of an applicant or candidate for public employment or political 
office to determine his fitness. ("Test Oath." Merriam-Webster.com. Merriam-Webster, n.d. Web. 29 
Sept. 2013. <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/test oath>.)).  See also generally Charles 
Herbermann, ed. "English Post-Reformation Oaths". Catholic Encyclopedia (Robert Appleton 
Company, New York,  19131913). 
17 Michael E. Smith, ‘The Special Place of Religion in the Constitution’, (1983) Vol. 1983, The 
Supreme Court Review 83, 100. 
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perspective.  Members of the majority will naturally see the policy as coincident with 
their own views, think it reasonable and often think nothing more of it.  As societies 
become less homogenous, creating such broad based programs will not always be 
perceived by all as being socially beneficial, and at times even coercive to the majority 
view.  Many of the cases examined have polarised society because the means taken by 
the state in its practices and legislation have not met the support of all, and indeed, 
been found by the appellants to be either personally harmful, or argued to be counter 
to the state’s application of its powers under the national constitution. 
 
Some of these issues will be explored in a number of areas in this thesis, such as 
Chapter 6, where this thesis looks at jurisprudence related to government sponsored 
religious symbols, Chapter 7 where issues arise when the state either supports schools 
through funding, or legislates for religious practices in public school systems, and in 
Chapter 8 where some government policies, such as mandated ‘days of rest’ have had 
a clear religious purpose. 
 
IV RELIGIOUS SYMBOLISM 
 
Cultures with a strong religious history, although constitutionally secular, may have a 
great deal of religious symbolism pervading both the private and public sectors.  In 
the private sphere, religious individuals may wear religious symbols either because it 
is obligatory, or where it is not do so as a form of identification with the community 
from which their family derives, or even when the individual has recently joined.18  
The state may, although secular, be pressed by or feel an obligation to a largely 
religious community to enact legislation or take actions that have at their heart 
religious ideals.  These states attempt to meet the Holyoake ideals of an inclusive 
religious polity, but are also cognisant of their constitutions that may not permit an 
overt support of religion.  There is often a fine line between achieving public benefit 
through secular means, and meeting public benefit through religious dictate. 
 
Many states in last ten years have followed a hard line on private religious symbolism 
exhibited by their agents, such as teachers,19 for fear that their acquiescence of such 
symbols implies a support by the state for the underlying religious ideals.  Some have 
occurred in very ordered state institutions such as prisons20 or the military,21 or in 
schools where the state fears the practices upset the reasons for the uniformity.22 
 
Susanna Mancini has observed, in the wake of the 2009 case of Lautsi v Italy,23 
decided by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), that court decisions 
involving religious symbols have complex implications.  She notes that this case 
highlighted the difficulty that constitutional democracies are experiencing in 
                                                 
18 See generally Laura Barnett, Freedom of religion and religious symbols in the public sphere 
(Government of Canada Publications, 13 October 2004). 
19 e.g. Kaya v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 45. 
20 Malcolm David Evans, Manual on the Wearing of Religious Symbols in Public Areas (Council of 
Europe, 2009), 114. 
21 Goldman v Weinberger, 475 US 503 (1986). 
22 Such as in France: Conseil d’Etat, 27 November 1996, Ligue islamique du Nord et autres; M. et 
mme Wissaadane et autres; M. et mme Jeouit. 
23 Lautsi and Others v. Italy [GC] - 30814/06 Judgment 18.3.2011 [GC] (18 March 2011). 
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attempting to reconcile religion and constitutionalism in the secular public place.  
Additionally she noted that religion and the state’s core identity in such societies 
become increasingly entangled when such decisions threaten the state’s core identity, 
especially in a modern environment of globalisation and large scale migration.  
Solutions for such come in the form of calls for social cohesion and reinforcement of 
a collective social identity, usually behind familiar religious symbols.  In the European 
context, such cases call into question the role European courts play in reconciling 
disputes between religious majorities and minorities in constituent states.24 
 
Mancini has also suggested that the claims of even-handedness in these issues are 
superficial: 
 
In both conflicts over majority as well as over minority symbols, courts and legislators tend to 
secularize the meaning of religious symbols and interpret them according to the sensitivities, 
prejudices, and claims of the majority. On the one hand, the religious significance of majority 
(Christian) symbols is watered down and interpreted in "cultural" terms, not as the symbols of 
a given religion, but rather as indicia of the historical and cultural dimensions of national 
identity. On the other hand, minority-and particularly Islamic-symbols are interpreted as 
expressions of cultural and political values and practices which are at odds with liberal and 
democratic ones. The wearing of traditional female Islamic clothing, for example, is often 
prohibited or limited because it supposedly clashes with gender equality. The practical result 
of this attitude is that crucifixes may be displayed in the public schools because secularized 
Christianity represents a structural element of the western constitutional identity, while the 
wearing of Islamic symbols is either banned or restricted because it represents values and 
practices that are cast as illiberal and undemocratic.25 
 
A Religious dress 
 
On many occasions the religious obligation felt by many to wear a conspicuous item 
of clothing as a display of religious identity in the public arena has given rise to 
litigation.  These items have commonly been headdress such as skullcaps or scarves, 
pendants or even weapons.26  These cases are not limited to one particular religious 
persuasion.  A Jewish Air Force Officer for example, was the subject of the American 
case of Goldman v Weinberger,27 regarding military dress codes, and a Sikh teacher 
wearing a ceremonial knife in Canada in Peel Board of Education v Ontario Human 
Rights Commission.28 
 
Islamic headdress, however, is the source of the majority of these cases.  Cases of 
objection to Islamic headdress in public places have occurred in Canada, such as the 
teacher29 in Kaya v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration,30 and cases in 
                                                 
24 Susanna Mancini, ‘The Crucifix Rage: Supranational Constitutionalism Bumps Against the 
Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty’, (2010) 6 European Constitutional Law Review 6, 7. 
25 Susanna Mancini, ‘The Power of Symbols and Symbols as Power: Secularism and Religion as 
Guarantors of Cultural Convergence’, (2008-09) 30 Cardozo Law Review 2629, 2631.) 
26 Vinay Lal, ‘Sikh Kirpans in California Schools: The Social Construction of Symbols, Legal 
Pluralism, and the Politics of Diversity’ (1996) 22(1) Amerasia Journal 57. 
27 Goldman v Weinberger, 475 US 503 (1986).  This case is assessed in more detail in Chapter 6. 
28 Peel Board of Education v Ontario Human Rights Commission, Court File #1170/89 (Supreme 
Court of Ontario - Divisional Court. 
29 to be discussed in detail later in Chapter 7 
30 2004 FC 45. 
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France,31 Switzerland,32 Germany,33 and Turkey34 and, recently, in the United 
Kingdom regarding how people with their face completely covered may be witnesses 
in court.35  Many of these cases have been adjudicated in extra-national judiciaries 
such as Şahin v Turkey,36 which was decided in the European Court of Human Rights. 
 
Related cases have involved the display of religious symbols by the state.  Cases such 
as those mentioned above have involved a secular ideal to which religious individuals 
have been expected to conform.  The reverse may often happen, even in secular states, 
such as Italy37 and the USA.38  Although the dominant religion in those states may not 
have an official or established constitutional role, politically it can wield a great deal 
of influence.39  This often manifests as religious symbolism or educational policies 
which are overtly religious, such as crucifixes in religious schools or public school 
curricula with religious content outside of classes set aside for religious instruction. 
 
As well as state imposed religious symbolism, there have also been examples of public 
legislation passed to impose religiously based ideals, such as that to enforce a religious 
day of rest, as in the United States and Canada.40  Often this legislation is couched in 
secular terms, such as the need for a uniform ‘day of rest’, where none has been 
popularly requested or advocated, but which happens to coincide with religious 
doctrine and lobbying.  These cases will be reviewed in Chapter 8, together with other 
cases illustrating efforts by the state to change religious freedom and practices through 
its own imprimatur, often being seen to be both unconstitutional and unhelpful to the 
religion being advocated. 
 
V EFFORTS TO MOULD A PUBLIC CULTURE – CLASHES WITH RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
 
Some governments have subtly sought to create and shape the culture of their nations 
through their treatment of religion.  Some methods have been benign and have sought 
to build community harmony and solidarity, as the government through key 
                                                 
31 Conseil d’Etat, 27 November 1996, Ligue islamique du Nord et autres; M. et mme Wissaadane et 
autres; M. et mme Jeouit. 
32 Dahlab v Switzerland, February 15, 2001 – Application No. 42393/98 
33 BVerfGE 93, 1 1 BvR 1087/91”Kruzifix-Urteil”. 
34 Şahin v Turkey ECHR no. 44774/98. 
35 The Queen v D(R) [2013] Blackfriars Crown Court (H.H. Judge Peter Murphy) (September 18, 
2013).  Expressing  a "pressing need for a court to provide a clear statement of law for trial judges 
who have to deal with cases in which a woman wearing the niqaab attends Court as a defendant”, the 
judge explained: “I accept that there are different considerations in these instances.   For example, the 
public has a strong interest in encouraging women who may be the victims of crime from coming 
forward, without the fear that the court process may compromise their religious beliefs and 
practices.  On the other hand, the rights of the defendant in any resulting criminal proceedings must 
also be protected. So there is a potential for a challenging conflict of competing public interests.  A 
defendant may, of course, be a witness; but this does not define her role in the proceedings.  As a 
defendant, she plays the central role throughout proceedings, and unlike a witness, she is brought 
before the court under compulsion and does not appear as a matter of choice.” 
< http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Judgments/The%20Queen%20-v-
%20D%20(R).pdf >  
36 Şahin v Turkey ECHR no. 44774/98. 
37 TAR, Mar.17, 2005, n. 1110, para 16.1. 
38 Salazar v Buono, 130 S. Ct 1803 (2010) 
39 Geoffrey C. Layman, ‘Religion and Political Behavior in the United States: The Impact of Beliefs, 
Affiliations, and Commitment from 1980 to 1994’, 61(2) 1997 The Public Opinion Quarterly 288. 
40 This type of legislation has often been labelled ‘blue laws’. 
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institutions such as schools and the courts and other methods of communication and 
information dissemination determines what is consistent and contrary to the public 
ethos. 
 
Some methods may be overt, such as those in the Constitution of India which seek to 
smooth over the errors and conflicts of the past with the banning of untouchability and 
a common civil code.41  Some are still seeking a voice, such as the United States 
Supreme Court, analysing government speech and actions in relation to old issues, 
such as the Theory of Evolution or new, such as whether to share in holiday 
celebrations, and which holidays, which over time may reflect a differently constituted 
populace from that which first drafted the Constitution.42 
 
These issues will be examined in depth in Chapter 8 of this thesis. 
 
VI RELIGIOUS IDENTITY AND SECULARISM 
 
This thesis in later chapters will explore the interpretation of national secular 
constitutions when coming across issues of religious identity.  These cases may 
involve religious symbols worn by individuals or displayed on public lands.  The state 
will do so whether from political expedience or to foster a sense of community.  
Individuals often do so either out of a sense of religious obligation, or to show that 
religion is a strong part of their identity. 
 
These symbols often create two types of conflict.  The first can arise with individuals 
when measured against other constitutional rights where the state may consider that 
limits for reasons such as public safety or harmony may be required.  This is 
particularly so in France since 2004.43  The second source of conflict arises when 
religion is used as a public identity, demonstrated through displays by the state (or 
endorsed by the state) of crucifixes or other overt symbols in public areas or schools.44  
These issues and their resolution will be addressed later in this Part, particularly in 
Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
 
In many states the courts struggle with religious identity.  This is not a philosophical 
issue as the determination of religious identity of an individual or organisation is often 
necessary in order to avoid inadvertent establishment, to permit statutory 
                                                 
41 Article 15 of the Indian Constitution was enacted in 1950 and prohibits any discrimination based on 
caste. Article 17 enacted at the same time declared any practice of untouchability as illegal.  Article 
16 forbids discrimination with regard to employment, but permits preferable treatment for the 
‘backward classes’. 
42 See generally Gene Shreve, ‘Religion, Science and the Secular State: Creationism in American 
Public Schools’ (2010) 58 The American Journal of Comparative Law 51. 
43 Since the introduction of legislation banning the wearing in public spaces of overt religious 
symbols. (Loi no 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le port 
de signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, collèges et lycées 
publics" ("Law #2004-228 of March 15, 2004 concerning, as an application of the principle of the 
separation of church and state, the wearing of symbols or garb which show religious affiliation in 
public primary and secondary schools"). 
44 Susanna Mancini, ‘Religious Symbols in the Public Space: The Power of Symbols and Symbols as 
Power: Secularism and Religion as Guarantors of Cultural Convergence’, (2009) 30 Cardozo Law 
Review 2629, 2642. 
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accommodations such as tax exemptions,45 and for conscientious objection to military 
service.46  In India religious identity is important in applying personal laws for various 
communities relating to marriage and transfer of property, for applying positive 
discriminatory laws to address inequalities in employment and other areas for minority 
religious groups and for the administration of certain religious properties.47 
 
Where some religious identities are seen to be preferred by the state, there can be 
communal or civil difficulties.  In the USA for example an establishment or favour 
attached to one religious persuasion can lead to “turmoil, civil strife, and persecutions” 
as Black J argued in Everson v Board of Education48 when describing why the religion 
clauses of their constitution were drafted.49  Those who advocate for a greater place 
for religion in the public sphere argue that the fears of communalism attached to a 
form of religious establishment (in a secular state) are unwarranted in a modern 
context, and that they do not occur in modern states with established religions such as 
England or Scotland.50  Yet, even England or Scotland have communities that request 
accommodation for their particular practices in schools and employment, a request for 
some space in the public sphere.51 
 
Just the same, some inequality in setting up a state position of neutrality is still created.  
As Robert Audi has noted: 52 
 
Any governmental religious preference … creates some tendency for greater power to accrue 
to the preferred religion.  … [Even if this does not directly restrict anyone’s liberty], 
concentration of power in a religious group as such easily impairs democracy, in which citizens 
should have equal opportunities to exercise political power on a fair basis.  … Moreover, where 
a state establishes or prefers a given religion, we may anticipate (though it is perhaps not 
inevitable) that certain laws will significantly reflect the world view associated with that 
religion. 
 
More pessimistically, it has been argued that ‘if neutrality can never translate to 
equality, then the public square as a space equally open and accessible to all citizens 
is also a theoretical (as well as practical) impossibility’.53 
 
If religious identity was not important in the public sphere, and one identity preferred 
over another, then its insistent presence would in all likelihood, not be so strident.  
These cases in many countries cover a wide range of issues.  Often it is necessary in 
many jurisdictions to identify oneself or one’s organisation as religious in order to 
gain taxation concessions.  Identifying as a member of certain caste in India for 
                                                 
45 See Walz v Tax Commission of the City of New York (1970) 397 US 664 (1970), where the US 
Supreme Court held that taxation benefits derived from donations to religious organisations did not 
violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the US Constitution. 
46 See for example United States v Seeger, 380 US 163 (1965). 
47 Marc Galanter, ‘Hinduism, Secularism, and the Indian Judiciary’, (1971) 21(4) Philosophy East & 
West 466, 468. 
48 Everson v Board of Education, 330 US 1 (1947), 8-9. 
49 A similar view more contemporaneous with the drafting of the US Constitution occurs in 
Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance, §11. 
50 Anthony Ellis, ‘What is Special about Religion?’ (2006) 25(2) Law and Philosophy 219, 223. 
51 See generally T. Modood, ‘Anti-Essentialism, Multiculturalism and the Recognition' of Religious 
Groups’, (1998) 6(4) Journal of Political Philosophy 378. 
52 Robert Audi, Religion in the Public Square (Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, 1996), 6. 
53 Meira L. Levinson, ‘Liberalism versus Democracy? Schooling Private Citizens in the Public 
Square’ (1997) 27 British Journal of Political Science 333, 343 note 27. 
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example gains positive benefits in employment, if one belongs to a Scheduled Caste 
or Tribe.54  The loss of that benefit through religious conversion brings a range of 
cases, as the individual no longer meets the criterion for the benefit.55  In the United 
States religious identity brought a range of cases seeking what is an essential feature 
of religion that would permit exemption from military service.56 
 
As a result of globalism and large-scale migration, a number of issues have arisen in 
recent years where the nature of the relationship between the state and religion has 
changed markedly.  Holyoake allowed for a greater role for religion in the public 
sphere and many secular states are addressing the issues that arise when this happens, 
often creating novel issues that have not previously been dealt with.  Utilitarian 
principles are being increasingly applied by the state, determining how freely 
individuals or communities may express their religious views publicly by considering 
the possible harm to the rest of society.  The state similarly is being curtailed in its 
expression of majoritarian religious views or its support through legislation of 
religious practices. 
 
Steven Smith sees the changing paradigm in these terms: 
 
The principal historical justification for our constitutional commitment to religious freedom 
was a religious rationale. The justification relied upon religious premises and worked within a 
religious world view. Moreover, quite apart from its historical significance, the religious 
justification is also the most satisfying, and perhaps the only adequate justification for a special 
constitutional commitment to religious liberty. Today, however, religious freedom, at least as 
it has come to be understood, forbids governmental reliance upon religious justifications as a 
basis for public policies or decisions.57 
 
Smith does not negate a place for religion in the public sphere, nor suggest that its 
views are now irrelevant.  However, he points out that religion cannot now depend, as 
it has in the past, on having a prima facie right to accommodation or having the ear of 
government in the formulation of public policy.  Often, it must make its case anew, 
and these overtures have been the content of a number of cases considered in supreme 
courts in a number of countries. 
 
In conclusion, this chapter has sought to examine broadly and introduce in overview 
the issues that challenge the modern secular state, and the responses by the supreme 
courts that often change their societies - if only to re-examine how they see their 
response to religious pluralism in this new century.  Contemporary issues testing the 
modern secular state include the need to limit religious expression in the public sphere, 
the perception by the citizens of some states that legislation is being passed that 
                                                 
54 A policy known as ‘Reservation’, authorised under Article 16 of the Indian Constitution: ‘Equality 
of opportunity in matters of public employment’.  See generally Hemlata Rao, Scheduled Castes and 
Tribes, Socio-economic Upliftment Programmes (APH Publishing, New Delhi, 1994). 
55 Marc Galanter and Jayanth Krishnan, ‘Personal Law Systems and Religious Conflict: A 
Comparison of India and Israel’ in Gerald James Larson, Religion and Personal Law in Secular 
India: A Call to Judgment (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2001), 277. 
56 Particularly in Gillette v United States, 401 US 437 (1971).  See also United States v Schwimmer 
279 US 644 (1929), United States v Macintosh, 283 US 605 (1931), Hamilton v Regents of the 
University of California, 293 US 245 (1934), Girouard v United States, 380 US 163 (1965), United 
States v Seeger, 380 US 163 (1965) and Welsh v United States, 398 US 333 (1970). 
57 Steven D. Smith, ‘The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse’ (1991) 
140(1) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 149, 149. 
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favours religion due to political influence and, with more increasingly pluralistic 
societies, the state response to those who which to make overt by wearing symbols 
their cultural and community identity.  Holyoake advocated a place for religion in the 
secular state. However, there are some who feel that their religious identity is being 
lost in the plurality and the neutral public sphere. 
 
The next chapter, Chapter 5, is the first to look at these issues in depth.  It will consider 
the claimed right for religious freedom, to believe and to practise, and the limits that 
are applied by various jurisdictions to that freedom and why.  This is a complex area 
of jurisprudence for this thesis because, following Holyoake I advocate a place for 
religion in the public sphere.  To limit its presence to any significant extent would be 
no freedom at all. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
SECULARISM AND THE LIMITS TO RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION 
 
I LIMITS ON EXPRESS FREEDOMS 
 
Holyoake did not seek to limit religion in the public sphere.  He saw the concept of 
limitation as having negative connotations.1   He did, however, acknowledge that 
religion should have a place in the public sphere.  Indeed he encouraged free exchange 
of views when he stated that "where debate is forbidden the charlatan is king."2 
 
It appears at first sight that limiting any basic claimed freedom is counter-intuitive.  A 
freedom is generally understood as an unfettered ability to do or say something.  Isaiah 
Berlin explained that freedom can be both positive and negative.  Positive liberty or 
freedom "is involved in the answer to the question, 'What, or who, is the source of 
control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, this rather than that?'"3  
He argued further, "liberty in the negative sense involves an answer to the question: 
'What is the area within which the subject — a person or group of persons — is or 
should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other 
persons'."4   
 
Hence the general understanding of liberty is in Berlin’s positive sense.  However, 
limitation of a freedom is in the context of Berlin’s Negative Liberty, considering the 
answer to who can determine how and when you act.  In the context of constitutional 
law, that limitation is in the hands of the state.  One may operate freely, limited only 
by yourself, unless the state determines you may not.  Such limitations upon the state 
should however be in the public interest. 
 
The Utilitarian views of Bentham and Mill led to the concept of maximising utility, 
usually through the maximising of happiness and the reduction of suffering.  The 
greatest happiness is applying these principles to society as a whole.  Permitting 
religion a role in the public sphere meets this ideal because religion, like other views, 
adds to the pool of views contributing to public policy.  Holyoake said on that:  
 
Free expression involves consideration for others, on principle. Democracy without personal 
deference becomes a nuisance; so free speech without courtesy is repulsive, as free publicity 
would be, if not mainly limited to reasoned truth. Otherwise every blatant impulse would have 
the same right of utterance as verified ideas. Even truth can only claim priority of utterance, 
when its utility is manifest. As the number and length of hairs on a man's head is less important 
to know, than the number and quality of the ideas in his brain.5 
                                                 
1 Joseph McCabe, Life and Letters of George Jacob Holyoake, Vol. 1 (London, Watts & Co., 1908), 
208. 
2 George Jacob Holyoake, The Jubilee History of the Leeds Industrial Co-op Society (Leeds, Central 
Co-operative Offices, 1897), 183. 
3 Isaiah Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, in Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1969), 121-2. 
4 Isaiah Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, in Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1969), 121-2. 
5 George Jacob Holyoake, English Secularism: A Confession of Belief (The Open Court Publishing 
Company, Chicago, 1896), 15. 
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There is clearly a utility to society in free speech, which includes not only the 
utterances and expressions of individuals, but also the views of organisations and 
organised religion.  Without considering others though, as Holyoake pointed out, 
democracy is the less for it.  In order to do so in a liberal democracy, free expression 
which would include religious activity and views in the public sphere, requires some 
consideration or limitation in order to maximise the utility of everyone’s contributions 
- including that of religion. 
 
Often it is not clear to the casual observer where the limits to religious expression and 
practice may be found or applied.  Nor is it often clear how the need for these limits, 
if at all, is perceived by the average citizen or the state.  For example, in January and 
February 2013 a dispute arose in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) Legislative 
Assembly between Government and Opposition benches when the Speaker of the 
ACT Assembly insisted that all members of the Assembly attend a religious service 
to precede the first day of the sitting of the Assembly for the year.  The Territory 
Government tabled the motion to ban the Assembly from being affiliated with 
religious services in order to put an end to the controversy caused by the Speaker’s 
actions.6   
 
The clear concern of the ACT Government was any link between religion and the 
Assembly in the public sphere.  It was not explained what detriment such a link would 
cause, or whether there was any formal policy of the Territory Government on such 
matters.  What is curious about the event was the lack of any authority by the ACT 
Government to support the assertion that any link would actually be drawn with the 
Government, whether something similar had happened before to justify such a 
response, or indeed what harm could come of it.  Yet, a number of secular states in 
recent years have interpreted their religious freedom provisions to require intervention 
by the state in a similar fashion, such as France and Germany.7 
 
This chapter will examine many such incidents where the state has indicated some sort 
of overt or incidental acknowledgement of religion and has found a limitation of 
religious freedoms to be in the best interests of the state.  Often though, as with the 
ACT Assembly, there is little evidence of the harm to the state by religion in the public 
sphere that the actions purport to address.  If there is some publicly proven utility to 
limiting religion by the state, such as public safety, then such activity meets the 
principles advocated by the Utilitarians and Holyoake.  This must apply similarly to 
the state.  What harm there is in religious contributions to the public sphere must be 
weighed up against the harm to society in allowing it unfettered.   
 
A The Harm Principle 
 
John Stuart Mill first considered in his treatise On Liberty that it was necessary at 
times to limit the rights of individuals with respect to the state and to each other, in 
                                                 
6 Lisa Mosley, ‘Assembly church services banned’, ABC News, 14 February 2013 < 
http://www.canberratimes.com.au/act-news/assembly-church-services-to-get-axe-20130213-
2edne.html>. 
7 These would include the Islamic headscarf cases in France and Germany, where the governments 
concerned have limited their use without proof of perception of offence to secular values. 
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what he termed the ‘harm principle’.8  This principle considered that the rights and 
freedoms of an individual or group may freely extend until they infringe the rights of 
others.  This has been the basis for modern rights discourse in the Western world. 
 
Mill discussed the question of religious freedom in his essay On Liberty, more than a 
century ago discussing the liberty of individuals.  Yet, in respect of religious freedoms, 
in surprisingly contemporary language, he stated that 
 
minorities, seeing that they had no chance of becoming majorities, were under the necessity of 
pleading to those whom they could not convert, for permission to differ. It is accordingly on 
this battle-field, almost solely, that the rights of the individual against society have been 
asserted on broad grounds of principle, and the claim of society to exercise authority over 
dissentients openly controverted. The great writers to whom the world owes what religious 
liberty it possesses, have mostly asserted freedom of conscience as an indefeasible right, and 
denied absolutely that a human being is accountable to others for his religious belief. Yet so 
natural to mankind is intolerance in whatever they really care about, that religious freedom has 
hardly anywhere been practically realized, except where religious indifference, which dislikes 
to have its peace disturbed by theological quarrels, has added its weight to the scale. In the 
minds of almost all religious persons, even in the most tolerant countries, the duty of toleration 
is admitted with tacit reserves.
9
 
 
Here then is where secular government intersects with religious freedom.  In the same 
essay he noted that, “[t]he only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised 
over any member of a civilised community against his will is to prevent harm to 
others.” 10  His argument was based on what government is well placed to do, and what 
limits should be applied to it and its powers.  In this context, harm is not merely the 
impediment to the individual’s ability to pursue the good unmolested, but harm is also 
actions that are injurious to others.11 
 
So, should the state interfere in religious affairs, to infringe on what religious people 
feel they wish, or often feel obligated, to do?  As a principle, Mill’s thoughts provide 
only a guide, not an obligation, upon government.  That guide also does not extend to 
when it is best for the state to intervene.12  The only guide for the state is that society 
should only interfere with a harmful action, if doing so is in the general interest. 
 
In November 1933, Mahatma Gandhi argued that there were many situations in which 
it was necessary for the state to interfere with religion.13  On when these limitations 
may be applied, Mill in On Liberty says that only self-protection permits society to 
                                                 
8 As noted in Chapter 2 
9 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Longmans, Green, and Company, London, 1865), Chapter 1. 
10 Ibid. 
11 ‘Encroachment on their rights; infliction on them of any loss or damage not justified by his own 
rights; falsehood or duplicity in dealing with them; unfair or ungenerous use of advantages over them; 
even selfish abstinence from defending them against injury—these are fit objects of moral 
reprobation, and, in grave cases, of moral retribution and punishment. And not only these acts, but the 
dispositions which lead to them, are properly immoral, and fit subjects of disapprobation which may 
rise to abhorrence’ (John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Longmans, Green, and Company, London, 1865), 
Chapter 4, 46.) 
12 "Mill does certainly not pretend that the [harm] principle is a sufficient condition for legitimate use 
of coercion against individuals; it specifies only a necessary condition .... It tells us when we may 
restrict liberty, not when we ought to." Jorge Menezes Oliveira, "Harm and Offence in Mill's 
Conception of Liberty," <http://www.trinitinture.com/documents/oliveira.pdf>, 3 
13 Anil Nauriya, “Gandhi on secular law and state”, The Hindu, Wednesday, Oct 22, 2003. 
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restrict liberty, and hence for only the probable harm to others is adequate grounds for 
coercion.14  This has been acknowledged judicially, in Adelaide Company of Jehovah's 
Witnesses Inc v Commonwealth,15 where Australian Chief Justice Latham discussed 
Mill and the state’s right to limit liberty in certain circumstances16 in relation to the 
question whether the state had the power to dissolve the Jehovah’s Witnesses.  He 
said:   
 
John Stuart Mill in his Essay on Liberty critically examines the idea of liberty, and his 
discussion of the subject is widely accepted as a weighty exposition of principle. The author 
had to make the distinction which is often made in words between liberty and licence, but 
which it is sometimes very difficult to apply in practice. He recognized that liberty did not 
mean the licence of individuals to do just what they pleased, because such liberty would mean 
the absence of law and of order, and ultimately the destruction of liberty. … I think it must be 
conceded that the protection of any form of liberty as a social right within a society necessarily 
involves the continued existence of that society as a society. Otherwise the protection of liberty 
would be meaningless and ineffective. It is consistent with the maintenance of religious liberty 
for the State to restrain actions and courses of conduct which are inconsistent with the 
maintenance of civil government or prejudicial to the continued existence of the community.  
 
Jurisprudence in jurisdictions such as India and the USA has attempted to determine 
how, if at all, there can be a limit to religious freedoms where such limits have political 
repercussions.  The state has great difficulty in implementing programs of general 
application such as public safety, education and health whilst at the same time 
attempting to respect the religious rights permitted in their constitutions.  The state 
will often limit rights in general, and religious rights in particular, if they conflict with 
the rights of others.  One such conflict is when religious activity in the public sphere 
impacts upon the state’s administration of public order or public safety. 
 
There are three general reasons why the state may seek to limit religious freedoms.  
The first is strict control of state institutions such as prisons, the military, and courts.  
Here such limitations are deemed necessary in order not to impair the administration 
of state functions.  The second is more incidental, where the offered reason for 
interference is a general state policy, usually for the general benefit of the population, 
such as health, safety and civil order.  The third limitation occurs when the overt 
manifestation of religious beliefs is considered to be identifying with the state, which 
would cause public policy problems of claims of favouritism, sponsorship or 
unbalanced treatment of one religious persuasion over another.  The first two of these 
are recognised under Article 18(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
                                                 
14 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Longmans, Green, and Company, London, 1865), Chapter 1. 
15 Adelaide Company of Jehovah's Witnesses Inc v Commonwealth (1943) 67 CLR 116. 
16 This case was brought by the Jehovah's Witnesses, who applied to the Australian High Court for an 
injunction to restrain the Australian government from acting on their property under National Security 
(Subversive Organisations) Regulations 1940. Although the actions of the government were to act 
(during the Second World War) upon an organisation deemed subversive, the Jehovah’s Witnesses 
argued that the regulations contravened the express constitutional protections for freedom from 
religious discrimination contained in section 116 (which provide for religious freedom) of the 
Australian Constitution.    
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Rights17 as permissible grounds of limitation.18  The last is the most controversial and 
often inexplicable. 
 
It is not sufficient for an individual to act contrary to general laws based purely on 
religious objections.  Where such objections are raised in opposition to law, the state 
must consider whether such limitation of religious activity is warranted.  In the United 
States, Frankfurter J in a statement in the first flag salute case, Minersville School 
District v Gobitis19 observed that  
 
Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for religious toleration, 
relieved the individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion of 
restriction of religious beliefs. The mere possession of religious convictions which contradict 
the relevant concerns of a political society does not relieve the citizens from the discharge of 
political responsibilities.20 
 
Religious people must therefore still recognise the laws of the state.  Scalia J, 
expanding on the opinion at the head of this chapter in Oregon v Smith21 noted that  
 
The government's ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful 
conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of public policy, ‘cannot depend on 
measuring the effects of a governmental action of a religious objector's spiritual 
development.’22 
 
However, although personal freedoms may be limited, so may the reach of the state.  
Richard Fallon observed that constitutional rights are intended to limit the power of 
government.  Government should “provide for the common defense, care for the 
needy, promote a thriving economy, and protect the environment.”23  In doing so, 
however, rights become subordinate to these ideals in the striving to maximise utility.   
 
II LIMITS ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOMS FOR THE PURPOSES OF PUBLIC ORDER 
 
When may the state interfere with society for the public good?  Louis Henkin24 
observed that  
 
Governments, and students of government, frequently confront "private rights" with the 
"public good," implying tension between them that requires choice or accommodation. That 
implication might well be modified by a footnote that: 
-the promotion, protection, and enjoyment of private rights are also a public good; 
                                                 
17 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A.  “Freedom to manifest 
one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are 
necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of 
others.” 
18 Peter G. Danchin, ‘Suspect symbols: Value Pluralism as a Theory of Religious Freedom in 
International Law’, (2008) 33(1) Yale Journal of International Law 1, 5. 
19 310 US 586, 594-95 (1940), overruled by West Virginia Board of Education v Barnette, 319 US 
624 (1943). 
20 Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v Smith 494 US 872, 879 (1990) 
(quoting Minersville School District v Gobitis, 310 US 586, 594-95 (1940)). 
21 Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v Smith 494 US 872. 
22  Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v Smith 494 US. 872, 879 
(1990) (quoting Lyng v Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 485 US 439, 451 (1988)). 
23 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., ‘Individual Rights and the Powers of Government’, (1992-93) 27(2) Georgia 
Law Review 343, 343. 
24 Louis Henkin, ‘Privacy and Autonomy’, (1974) 74(8) Colombia Law Review 1410. 
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- often the public good is an accommodation or choice between private rights, as 
when a society decides whether someone has the right to publish about me what I 
assert a right to suppress; 
-the public good may be seen as the sum of private goods to which the individual 
has a right; for example, some have asserted the right to live in a secure, healthful, 
attractive environment, or in a world at peace. 
 
That the tension is often, perhaps always, essentially between two or more private rights, or 
between two or more public goods, helps explain the accommodations and the choices which 
good societies make, and helps render difficult resolutions acceptable. 
 
In addressing this tension, how are these competing ‘rights’ to be addressed when 
limiting them for the public good for the purposes of public order?  How is public 
order defined, and is the problem addressed pre-emptively or after the fact?  Some of 
the issues discussed below are of both forms, with the state for example addressing 
problems in India relating to aggressive proselytism after communal disturbances have 
arisen,25 or in the United States the state attempting to remove symbols of religion 
from the public space before perceived issues of state support of religion (and hence 
accusations of establishment or undue religious influence upon the state) arise.26 
 
Holyoake stated that “[s]ecularism purposes to regulate human affairs by 
considerations purely human.”27  Secularism therefore plays a part in constitutionalism 
by regulating the state and its players using means and reasoning not influenced 
directly by reference to the supernatural.  Religious members of the community are 
regulated, as are all others, by secular considerations.  Utilitarian thought, and 
Holyoake’s views on secularism, would suggest that religious freedoms should enable 
a large liberty of individual religious expression, but be regulated so as to meet the 
Utilitarian ideal of maximising happiness in society.  Mill’s views on the state 
interfering only if in the general interest to prevent harm become difficult to apply.  
Those who are religious will naturally believe that their actions are beneficial to 
society.  So where will the public interest lie? 
 
A difficulty in this area is that many religious practitioners see religion in all facets of 
their daily lives, and hence their activity in the public sphere is a natural extension of 
their private practice.28  Rex Ahdar and Ian Leigh have observed that in this regard, 
“Given that religious practice can take so many forms and that, indeed, all of life can 
be invested with a sacred quality (and be seen to derive from a religious motivation), 
some limitation may seem obvious.”29  Yet others would argue that limitation is 
inimical to the concept of a freedom to practise religion in the public space because 
religion has priority over the state, and that “the essence of religious liberty, 
understood as a natural law right … is not a right that human authorities confer on 
those whom they rule - a dispensation.”30  Eugene Volokh notes the flaw in this 
                                                 
25 Rev. Stainislaus v State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors, 1977 AIR 908, 1977 SCR (2) 611. 
26 Chaplinsky v New Hampshire, 319 US 624 (1943). 
27 George Jacob Holyoake, The Principles of Secularism Illustrated, London Book Store (1871), 28. 
28 Rex Ahdar and Ian Leigh, Religious Freedom in the Liberal State (2nd Ed. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2013), 344. 
29 Rex Ahdar and Ian Leigh, Religious Freedom in the Liberal State ((2nd Ed. Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2013), 347. 
30 Michael Stokes Paulsen, ‘The Priority of God: A Theory of Religious Liberty’ (2013) 39 
Pepperdine Law Review 1159, 1160.  He observes further that “Religious freedom only makes entire 
sense as a social and constitutional arrangement on the supposition that God exists (or very likely 
exists); that God makes claims on the loyalty and conduct of human beings; and that such claims, 
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argument by observing that “If most citizens doubt that God commands us to do 
anything, then they can't well act based on the supposed priority of God's commands 
… religious liberty makes no sense in a mostly irreligious country.”31   
 
The United States Supreme Court acknowledged that such regulation could limit 
actions but not belief.  Waite CJ, regarding federal territorial laws in Reynolds v United 
States,32 said: 
 
Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere 
religious belief and opinions, they may with practices. Suppose one believed that human 
sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship, would it be seriously contended that the 
civil government under which he lived could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice? Or if a wife 
religiously believed it was her duty to burn herself upon the funeral pile of her dead husband, 
would it be beyond the power of the civil government to prevent her carrying her belief into 
practice?33 
 
In the major secular democracies, the state has sought to address the limitation of 
religious freedoms in a number of ways, mainly under the rubric of concerns of the 
expressions of such freedoms impacting upon public safety.  It is of course hard to 
define where the limitation needs be applied. 
 
The state, however, usually has a constitutional obligation for ensuring peace and 
order within the state.  On this, in Grace Bible Church Inc. v Reedman,34 a South 
Australian case involving state regulation of education, White J observed “[t]here is 
nothing in [the] common law which inhibits or is capable of inhibiting the power of 
the Parliament of the State to make laws for the peace, welfare and good government 
of this state, including laws that affect the freedom of religious worship and religious 
expression.”35   
                                                 
rightly perceived and understood, are prior to, and superior to, the claims of any human authority.” 
and that “The state-conferred-dispensation view, which I think is the dominant view today, is not 
really religious liberty, in the sense of freedom of religious exercise from ultimate state control. It is a 
cipher, shadow, or parody of religious liberty. At bottom, what justifies religious liberty - the only 
thing that makes it at all sensible as a liberty distinct from other liberties - is some shared sense that 
true religious obligation is more important than civil obligation and that, consequently, civil society 
must recognize this truth. Religious liberty is the legal duty of civil society to defer to the plausibly 
true free exercise of genuine religious faith.”   In response to this, Eugene Volokh asked, “Would it 
really advance religious freedom in a multidenominational society for courts to decide which 
practices have "plausible claims to religious truth," and what the "clear, universal moral command of 
God" might be? I don't think so. The Court has rightly refused to get into the business of judging 
religious truth, or interpreting religious doctrine. Both religious believers and the Justices, I think, are 
better off that way.” (Eugene Volokh, ‘The Priority of Law: A Response to Michael Stokes Paulsen’, 
(2013) 39 Pepperdine Law Review 1223, 1224).   
31 Eugene Volokh, ‘The Priority of Law: A Response to Michael Stokes Paulsen’, (2013) 39 
Pepperdine Law Review 1223, 1223. 
32 Reynolds v United States, 98 US 145 (1878). 
33 Reynolds v United States, 98 US 145 (1878), paragraph 5, in response to a question regarding the 
defence of religious belief or duty. 
34 Grace Bible Church Inc. v Reedman, (1984) 36 S.A. ST. R. 376. 
35 This view was tested in another Australian state some twenty years later in Evans v State of New 
South Wales (2008) 168 FCR 576 when regulations were made under the World Youth Day Act 2006 
(NSW).  Police were permitted under Clause 7 of the regulation to direct people near World Youth 
Day  (a youth-oriented event organized by the Catholic Church) areas to cease conduct that caused 
“annoyance or inconvenience to participants in a World Youth Day event”.  The Full Federal Court 
examined the meaning of the word “conduct” in the regulations, and took the view that if the New 
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Peace, welfare and good government were uppermost in the considerations of India 
when it sought to address these issues from the time of independence more than sixty 
years ago.  Prior to independence the Indian national movement had a strong 
commitment to secularism, and defined secularism at that time to mean a separation 
of religion from politics, state neutrality toward or equal respect for all religions and, 
most particularly for the Indian context, an opposition to communalism.36  These 
principles were examined shortly after independence in State of Bombay v Narasu 
Appa Mali, where Chagla CJ explained that  
 
A sharp distinction must be drawn between religious faith and belief and religious practices.  
What the state protects is religious faith and belief.  If religious practices run counter to public 
order, morality or health or a policy of social welfare upon which the state has embarked, then 
the religious practices must give way before the good of the people of the state as a whole …37 
 
This view offered by Chagla CJ is clearly in line with utilitarian thinking and the views 
of the role of religion in the thinking of Holyoake.  There is clearly a public utility 
inherent here in ensuring that limitations are only applied when there is a breach in 
public order.  Utilitarianism, as outlined in Chapter 2, is a normative view that 
emphasises the maximising of utility, usually in a way that maximises happiness and 
reduces suffering.  India set its public policy in this direction from early on in the 
republic’s life, commencing with the national reformist agenda that began shortly after 
Independence.  Even before Independence the national movement was committed to 
the creation of an egalitarian society, opposing all forms of inequality.38  
 
In 1955 the Hindu Code Bill39 was enacted with the intent to change Hindu personal 
law, seen by many as an attempt by the state to alter practices and traditions protected 
by the right to religious freedom.40  The single code of personal law for all Hindu 
citizens removed the complications inherited from interpretations of the colonial 
courts and replaced them with a code that “legalized inter-caste marriage; it legalized 
divorce and prohibited polygamy; it gave to the daughters the same rights of 
inheritance as the son, and permitted the adoption of daughters as well as of sons.”.41   
 
                                                 
South Wales Parliament intended to interfere with fundamental rights and freedoms, it must do so in 
the clearest of language. (Evans v State of New South Wales, (2008) FCR 576, 593. 
36 Bipan Chandra et al, India after Independence 1947-2000, (Penguin Books India, New Delhi, 
2000), 26. 
37 MANU/MH/0040/1952 at paragraph 5.  A case addressing the validity of the Bombay prevention of 
Hindu Bigamous Marriages Act, 1946. 
38 Bipan Chandra et al, India after Independence 1947-2000 (Penguin Books India, New Delhi, 2000), 
26. 
39 This was a series of laws called the Hindu Marriage Bill, the Hindu Succession Bill, the Hindu 
Minority and Guardianship Bill, and the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Bill. 
40 B.R.Ambedkar (Law Minister and chief architect of the Indian constitution) addressed these 
objections stating that, “The religious conceptions in this country are so vast that they cover every 
aspect of life from birth to death. There is nothing which is not religion and if personal law is to be 
saved I am sure about it that in social matters we will come to a standstill…There is nothing 
extraordinary in saying that we ought to strive hereafter to limit the definition of religion in such a 
manner that we shall not extend it beyond beliefs and such rituals as may be connected with 
ceremonials which are essentially religious.”  Cited in Partha Chatterjee, ‘Secularism and tolerance’ 
in Rajeev Bhargava (ed), Secularism and its Critics (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 356.   
41 Partha Chatterjee, ‘Secularism and tolerance’ in Rajeev Bhargava (ed), Secularism and its Critics 
(Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 356-7. 
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So where do religion and the state meet?  In India, religious freedoms assured under 
Articles 25 and 26 of the Indian Constitution are subject to limitations to preserve 
public order, and are not absolute, subject to Articles 25(2) and 19(2)42.  These limits 
were addressed in Ramji Lal Modi v State of UP43 in 1957 and reinforced in Gulam 
Abbas v State of UP44 in 1984.  In Ramji Lal Modi’s Case the constitutionality of 
Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code, 186045 was queried, in a matter relating to a 
law punishing statements deliberately intended to hurt the religious feelings of any 
class.  The law was held to be valid as it is a reasonable restriction aimed to 
maintaining the public order.  The Supreme Court held that the section was valid and 
reasonable and was covered under the head of public order.   
 
III PUBLIC SAFETY – LIMITS ON PROSELYTISM AND CONVERSION 
 
International human rights conventions are unclear on the issue of proselytism in the 
context of religious freedoms.  Article 9 of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 195346 provides that freedom 
of thought, conscience and religion including a right to change those and to practise 
and manifest such, limited only by state provisions for public safety and order.47   
 
Yet whilst providing for the right to change religion, within the convention 
proselytism is addressed only indirectly, leaving a consistent view unclear.  Within 
some jurisdictions, notably India, active proselytism causes a great deal of domestic 
conflict.  On this Stahnke observes that: 
 
[T]he effect of international human rights obligations on conflicts engendered by proselytism 
has been minimal. International bodies have either not dealt extensively with the problem or 
have not been particularly aggressive in defining the parameters of the freedom to engage in 
proselytism. This silence, or reluctance to deal with proselytism issues, may be the result of 
the widely divergent practices of states, ranging from severe limitations on the activity in all 
of its forms to broad freedom to engage in the activity regardless of the effect it may have on 
the target. 48 
 
                                                 
42“Nothing … shall … prevent the State from making any law … in so far as such law imposes 
reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred … in the interests of … the security of 
the State, friendly relations with Foreign States, public order, decency or morality …” 
43 AIR 1957 SC 620: 1957 SCR 860. 
44 (1984) 1 SCC 81. 
45 Chapter XV (Sections 295-298 of the Indian Penal Code) relate to offences relating to religion. 
46 < http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=005&CL=ENG.> 
47 Article 9 – Freedom of thought, conscience and religion  
 
 1 Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes 
freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others 
and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and 
observance. 
 
 2 Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for 
the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others. 
 
48 Tad Stahnke, ‘Proselytism and the Freedom to Change Religion in International Human Rights 
Law’[1999] Brigham Young University Law Review 251, 339. 
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While limits upon society by the state upon proselytism and conversion for the 
purposes of utilitarian ideal of maximising happiness can be rationalised for the 
purposes of public safety, what particular safety threats can be perceived by the state?  
The practices of some religions such as Christianity and Islam which have a strong 
conversion ethic have been seen as a threat to public order.49   
 
Less commonly seen as a limitation on religious freedoms in secular states is the 
limitation upon those who wish to convert others to their world view.  In countries 
where this activity is often seen as unwelcome or threatening, the state will step in, 
using the rationale that proselytising by its nature will upset those who do not wish to 
be subject to the entreaties of others to change.50  The state must, however, consider 
the implications of limiting such activity as “the limits of proselytism are dictated by 
a reasonable need to avoid intrusion into the privacy of religious communities, 
collectivities, or congregations eager to preserve their identity.  This is especially true 
in those cases where the religious element is combined with ethnic and cultural 
characteristics consolidated over the course of centuries.”51 
 
In South Asia, proselytism and attempts at conversion create a great deal of civil strife 
and jurisprudence.  In India, the issues of state limitations to religious practices extend 
to the practice of some religions to proselytism or propagation of their religion through 
conversion of others, usually Hindus. Although British India had no anti-conversion 
laws, many Princely States had enacted anti-conversion legislation before 
Independence.52   
 
Freedom of religion in India was made explicitly subordinate to the state’s need for 
public order.  Although the right to propagate one’s religion is permissible under 
Article 25 of the Indian Constitution, it is not without limits.53  In Ramjilal Modi v 
                                                 
49 Natan Lerner, ‘Proselytism, Change of Religion, and International Human Rights’ (1998) 12 Emory 
International Law Review 477, 477. 
50 John Gray notes Singapore’s solution, which does not solve the issue: “In Singapore there is full 
freedom of religious practice and belief, but proselytism is forbidden.  In prohibiting missionary activity 
Singapore does not protect what in liberal societies is regarded as the unfettered exercise of the right to 
religious freedom.  Yet, perhaps partly for that reason, Singapore has in recent times avoided religious 
strife better than have some liberal regimes.” (John Gray, Two Faces of Liberalism (Polity Press, 
Cambridge, 2000), 112). 
51 Natan Lerner, ‘Proselytism, Change of Religion, and International Human Rights’ (1998) 12 Emory 
International Law Review 477, 557-558. 
52 The Raigarh State Conversion Act 1936, the Patna Freedom of Religion Act of 1942, the Sarguja 
State Apostasy Act 1945 and the Udaipur State Anti-Conversion Act 1946. In the Indian Parliament in 
1954 the Indian Conversion (Regulation and Registration) Bill and in 1960 the Backward 
Communities (Religious Protection) Bill, were withdrawn for lack of support. The proposed Freedom 
of Religion Bill of 1979 was opposed by the Minorities Commission due to the apparent bias. 
However, in 1967-68, Orissa and Madhya Pradesh enacted the Orissa Freedom of Religion Act 1967 
and the Madhya Pradesh Dharma Swatantraya Adhiniyam 1968. (Arpita, Anant, ‘Anti-conversion 
laws’, The Hindu,  Tuesday, Dec 17, 2002 (17 June 2009 
(http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/op/2002/12/17/stories/2002121700110200.htm)) 
53 The nature of this limitation was explored in Rev. Stainislaus v State of Madhya Pradesh where the 
Orissa and Madhya Pradesh Acts prohibited forcible conversion.  Rev. Stainislaus was prosecuted 
under sections 3, 4 and 5(2) of the Madhya Pradesh Swatantraya Adhinivam 1968.  Stainislaus 
challenged the constitutional validity of the Madhya Pradesh Act in the High Court of Madhya 
Pradesh and the constitutional validity of the Orissa Freedom of Religion Act, 1967 was challenged in 
the High Court of Orissa.  In the Madhya Pradesh High Court Stainislaus argued that the Madhya 
Pradesh Act violated his rights under Article 25(1) of the Constitution, and that the legislation was 
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State of Uttar Pradesh,54 just a decade after Independence, the Indian Supreme Court 
held that as rights to freedom of religion are guaranteed by Articles 25 and 26 ‘it cannot 
be predicated that freedom of religion can have no bearing whatever on the 
maintenance of public order or that a law creating an offence relating to religion cannot 
under any circumstances be said to have been enacted in the interests of public 
order’”.55  Accordingly, these Articles, while guaranteeing freedom of religion, were 
expressly made subject to public order. 
 
The reason for state concern regarding proselytism in India was explained by A.N. 
Ray CJ for the court in Rev. Stainislaus v State of Madhya Pradesh56 in terms of “[i]f 
an attempt is made to raise communal passions, e.g. on the ground that someone has 
been forcibly converted to another religion it would in all probability give rise to an 
apprehension of a breach of the public order affecting the community at large”.57 In 
examining the Madhya Pradesh Dharma Swatantraya Adhiniyam, 196858 the Court 
observed that: 
 
What is penalised is conversion by force, fraud or by allurement. The other element is that 
every person has a right to profess his own religion and to act according to it. Any interference 
with that right of the other person by resorting to conversion by force, fraud or allurement 
cannot, in our opinion, be said to contravene Article 25(1) of the Constitution of India, as the 
Article guarantees religious freedom subject to public health. As such, we do not find that the 
provisions of sections 3, 4 and 5 of the M.P. Dharma Swatantraya Adhiniyam, 1968 are 
violative of Article 25(1) of the Constitution of India. On the other hand, it guarantees that 
religious freedom to one and all including those who might be amenable to conversion by 
force, fraud or allurement. As such, the Act, in our opinion, guarantees equality of religious 
freedom to all, much less can it be said to encroach upon the religious freedom of any particular 
individual 
 
The Indian Supreme Court held that, while Article 25 guarantees the right to propagate 
one’s religion, it does not give the unfettered right to convert others to one’s own 
religion.  Propagation was held to be conversion by the exposition of a religion’s 
tenets, and not conversion by way of force, or allurement by fraudulent means, as this 
practice works towards a breach of the public order.  There was no constitutional right 
to convert people by these means as it would infringe the “’freedom of conscience’ 
guaranteed to all citizens of the country alike.”59 
 
A similar public law concern about conversions also occurs in Sri Lanka.  The Sri 
Lanka Constitution is distinguishable from that of India as “[i]n Sri Lanka the 
Constitution does not guarantee a fundamental right to ‘propagate’ religion as in 
Article 25 (1) of the Indian Constitution. What is guaranteed here to every citizen by 
Article 14(1) (e) is the fundamental right to manifest, worship, observe, practice that 
citizen’s religion or teaching.”60 
 
                                                 
ultra vires the powers of the State legislature, and that sections of the Madhya Pradesh Act violated 
Article 20(3) of the Indian Constitution. 
54 Ramjilal Modi v State of Uttar Pradesh (1957) S.C.R. 860. 
55 Ramjilal Modi v State of Uttar Pradesh (1957) S.C.R. 860, 866 (S Ranjan Das CJ). 
56 Rev. Stainislaus v State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors, 1977 AIR 908, 1977 SCR (2) 611. 
57 Rev. Stainislaus v State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors, 1977 AIR 908, 1977 SCR (2) 611, 611. (A.N. 
Ray CJ). 
58 Freedom of Religion Act.   
59 2 SCR 616 (1971), 618, 
60 Supreme Court Determination No. 2/2001. 
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It had been claimed that some Christian groups have engaged in aggressive methods 
of religious conversion, which in turn provoked sometimes a violent response from 
some quarters. Several times, it was also attempted to enact legislation prohibiting 
conversions that were done through forcible methods, economic inducement or some 
other such unethical manner.   
 
This matter first came to the attention of the courts when three Private Members’ Bills 
seeking to incorporate Christian organisations were challenged in the Sri Lanka 
Supreme Court in 2001.61  In the Christian Sahanaye Doratuwa Prayer Centre 
(Incorporation) case, the Supreme Court held that the articles and powers of the body 
to be incorporated involved economic and commercial activities and included the 
provision of assistance of an economic nature. In these circumstances, there was in the 
Court’s opinion a ‘likelihood’ that persons attending the prayer centre would be 
allured by economic incentives to convert. This, the court held, was inconsistent with 
the Free Exercise of the freedom of religion guaranteed by Articles 10 and 14 (1) (e),62 
because the provision of any allurement would distort and infringe the Free Exercise 
of those rights. 
 
In the New Wine Harvest Ministries (Incorporation) case,63 the objects of the proposed 
corporation included the conduct of a broad range of activities aimed at the raising the 
‘socio-economic conditions of people of Sri Lanka.’ In this instance, the court held 
that mixing religious activities with those that involved in uplifting the socio-
economic conditions of the people of Sri Lanka in general would ‘necessarily’ infringe 
the Free Exercise of the rights guaranteed by Articles 10 and 14 (1) (e) of the 
Constitution.  In a similar case the Teaching Sisters of the Holy Cross of the Third 
Order of Saint Francis in Menzingen of Sri Lanka (Incorporation) case,64 the Supreme 
Court reaffirmed the decisions discussed above in respect of Article 10, and also went 
on to hold that the propagation of the Christian faith in the manner proposed by the 
incorporation bill would infringe the Buddhism clause in Article 9.65  The Court 
emphasised that the freedom to worship did not include the right to propagate.66  The 
petitioners in this case challenged a Private Member’s Bill allowing a Christian group 
to “propagate a religion while taking advantage of the vulnerability of certain 
persons”.67 
 
These cases in India (and to a lesser extent Sri Lanka) are important for a number of 
reasons: 
 
                                                 
61 S.C. Determination No. 2/2001. 
62 Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka 1978. 
63 S.C. Determination No. 2/2003. 
64 S.C. Determination No. 19/2003. 
65 On October 21, 2005, the United Nations Human Rights Committee found the Sri Lankan Supreme 
Court's decision in the Sisters of the Holy Cross in Menzingen to be in violation of Articles 18 and 26 
of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, stating that: “differential treatment in the 
conferral of a benefit by the State … amounts to a violation of the right in Article 26 (ICCPR) to be 
free from discrimination on the basis of religious belief” (CCPR /C/85/D/1249/2004 31 October 
2005.. 
66 Provincial of the Teaching Sisters of the Holy Cross of the Third Order of Saint Francis in 
Menzingen of Sri Lanka (S.C: 19/2003). 
67 Menzingen, S.C. Determination No. 19/2003, at 4. 
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 Whilst in most secular democracies, arguments or suspicions about 
‘separation of church and state’, or undue influence of religion and the state 
upon one another are largely speculative it is not so in the subcontinent.  
They show clearly that unlimited religious freedom and heavy handed state 
treatment of religion can lead to communal conflict.  Only a model like 
India’s, which is quite compatible with Holyoake’s principles, that has 
general acceptance serves as a means of guiding religion-state interactions. 
 
 They are matters not arising in the West.  Secularism in the subcontinent is of 
a different character to that in Europe, North America and Australia. 
Secularism in India is treated with a great deal of suspicion as a Western 
import and not a local solution to local issues.68  Only a model of secularism 
as advocated by Holyoake, that is not particular to one religion and does not 
control the state, works in India.     
 
There have been some cases in the United States on this issue but not for some 
years.69  Most cases have been protected as forms of free speech protected under the 
First Amendment to the US Constitution.  Limitations have been made only when 
there is a disturbance of the peace or threat to security and, distinct from the cases 
mentioned above, the nature of the proselytism was generally not in issue, and the 
subject matter was not considered and was incidental.  Rather, the nature of the 
delivery has been at issue and cases such as Lovell v Griffin,70 Cox v New 
Hampshire,71 and Heffron v International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. 
(ISKCON)72 which involved breaches of local ordinances for public order served a 
legitimate government interest. 
 
As noted earlier, the ability of the state to intervene in matters involving public 
proselytism depends upon local regulations.  Generally the state intervenes when the 
message excites civil disturbance, such as in India, but in the US the message is 
largely irrelevant.  In either case, Holyoakean thought would support the free 
dissemination of any message without arbitrary limitation by the state. 
 
IV LIMITATIONS ON MINORITY RELIGIOUS SECTS BASED ON PUBLIC ORDER 
 
A number of cases have arisen where the activities of religious groups in public have 
been not related to proselytism or forced conversion, but for other reasons usually 
                                                 
68 See particularly the writings and views of Triloki Nath Madan, Partha Chatterjee and Ashis Nandy, 
such as T.N. Madan, ‘Secularism in its Place’ and Ashis Nandy, ‘The Politics of Secularism and the 
Recovery of Religious Toleration’, and Partha Chatterjee, ‘Secularism and Tolerance’ in Rajeev 
Bhargava (ed.) Secularism and its Critics (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
69 See generally Howard O. Hunter and Polly J. Price, ‘Regulation of Religious Proselytism in the 
United States’ [2001] Brigham Young University Law Review 537. 
70 303 US 444 (1938) (failure to obtain permit to distribute "circulars, handbooks, advertising, or 
literature of any kind"). 
71 312 US 569 (1941) (convicted for violating a state law that prohibited parades or processions on 
public streets without a permit and without paying a fee.). 
72 452 US 640 (1981). (The annual Minnesota State Fair had rules that required that anyone who 
wanted to distribute or sell merchandise of any kind, including pamphlets, tracts, or other documents, 
had to do so from a designated booth. The booths were available on a non-discriminatory, first-come, 
first-serve basis. The Supreme Court found the rule to be a reasonable exercise of the police power to 
maintain public order and safety at the state fair.) 
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involving a lack of conformity with popular culture, perceived as a threat to the state.  
A number of religious groups have been considered, usually through the espousing of 
their particular doctrines, to be disruptive to the state and public order.  Accordingly 
the state has sought to limit their activity.   
 
Some states that have a commitment to ensuring that a pluralistic community has 
religious-ethical freedoms, and will not prevent their belief, will also often have 
regulations where the state requires its citizens to perform acts that may be contrary to 
religious beliefs, with the intent of binding the community together with sanctions 
against non-conformism drawing.  Such compulsions, although celebrating values and 
achievements of the state in a positive way, may nonetheless creating conflict.73   
 
Prominent among such groups have been the Christian sect of Jehovah’s Witnesses, 
primarily because of the international spread of cases and the usually successful 
defences in the various national supreme courts to efforts to limit them.  Most cases 
have related to their doctrines which have been considered to be against state interests, 
such as the Australian Jehovah’s Witnesses case,74 or their refusal to participate in the 
displays of patriotism or military service in certain countries.75 
 
In Australia, during the early part of the twentieth century, the Jehovah’s Witnesses 
were a fringe Christian group not understood by the mainstream and hence persecuted 
by many.  This led in the early part of the Second World War to the sect being banned76 
because it was accused of being “involved in radio station broadcasts which were 
suspected of relaying information to the ‘enemy’” and “of attempting to destroy 
national morale and the war effort by refusing to acknowledge King George VI as their 
King, refusing to fight for their country and, interestingly, for being ‘in, but not of, the 
community’ (Sydney Morning Herald, 18 January 1941).”77  The Australian 
Government sought to occupy and seize their property and ban their association with 
each other.  Following the occupation of their property the sect sought an injunction 
from the Australian High Court.78  
 
The Witnesses argued that the regulations contravened the freedom of religion 
provisions contained in section 116 of the Australian Constitution.  The Court held 
that the regulations were ultra vires the defence power of the Constitution and did not 
                                                 
73 Darryn Jensen, ‘Classifying church-state arrangements: beyond religious versus secular’ in 
Nadirsyah Hosen and Richard Mohr (eds), Law and Religion in Public Life: The Contemporary 
Debate (Routledge, Oxford, 2011), 28. 
74 Adelaide Company of Jehovah's Witnesses Inc v Commonwealth (1943) 67 CLR 116. 
75 Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court, BVerfG, 1 BvR 618/93 vom 2.8.2001, 
Absatz-Nr. (1 - 30) and in the Case of Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow and ors. v Russia 
((Application no. 302/02) in 2010.  There are a number of cases also on their views on blood 
transfusion.  These cases lie outside the scope of this thesis as not being constitutional matters. 
76 Under the National Security (Subversive Organisations) Regulations 1940, the Australian 
government declared the organisation to be "prejudicial to the defence of the Commonwealth" and to 
the "efficient prosecution of the war". Police immediately occupied premises of the organisation. 
77 Jayne Persian, ‘The Banning of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Australia in 1941’, TASA Conference 
2005, University of Tasmania, 6-8 December 2005, 2. 
78 The court unanimously held that the National Security (Subversive Organisations) Regulations 
1940 did not infringe against section 116, but that the government had exceeded the scope of the 
Commonwealth's "defence power" in section 51(vi) of the Constitution. 
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therefore have to conclude whether they contravened the freedom of religion 
provisions contained in section 116 of the Australian Constitution.79   
 
Under different circumstances, however, in India in 1985, in the state of Kerala, some 
of Jehovah's Witnesses' children were expelled from school under the instructions of 
Deputy Inspector of Schools for having refused to sing the national anthem. A parent, 
V J Emmanuel, appealed to the Supreme Court of India for legal remedy. On August 
11, 1986, the Supreme Court overruled the Kerala High Court, and directed the 
respondent authorities to re-admit the children into the school.80  
 
In 1993, the Supreme Court of the Philippines held that exemption may be accorded 
to the Jehovah's Witnesses with regard to the observance of the flag ceremony out of 
respect for their religious beliefs.81   
 
In the USA there has been many cases involving Jehovah's Witnesses.  Between 1938 
and 1946 Jehovah's Witnesses brought nearly two dozen separate actions before the 
US Supreme Court relating to the First Amendment.82  In a recent case, Jehovah's 
Witnesses refused to get government permits to solicit door-to-door in Stratton, Ohio. 
In 2002, the case was heard in the US Supreme Court.83  The Court ruled in favour of 
the Jehovah's Witnesses, holding that making it a misdemeanour to engage in door-to-
door advocacy without first registering with the mayor and receiving a permit violated 
the First Amendment as it applies to religious proselytizing, anonymous political 
speech, and the distribution of handbills. 
 
The most important decision was in West Virginia State Board of Education v 
Barnette,84 in which the court ruled that school children could not be forced to pledge 
allegiance to or salute their national flag. The Barnette decision overturned an earlier 
case, Minersville School District v Gobitis,85 in which the court had held that Jehovah's 
Witnesses could be forced against their will to pay homage to the flag.  The nature of 
these cases is interesting in the sense that the state has considered that a 
constitutionally protected First Amendment right, that of freedom of religion, could 
                                                 
79 Although Williams J did hold a violation of s116. 
80 Bijoe Emmanuel & Ors v State Of Kerala & Ors 
81 Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court G.R. No. 95770 March 1, 1993.  
(http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1993/mar1993/gr_95770_1993.html).  Retrieved 26 July 2011. 
82 Shawn Francis Peters, Judging Jehovah's Witnesses: Religious Persecution and the Dawn of the 
Rights Revolution (University Press of Kansas, 2002).  Notable cases include: 
 Cantwell v Connecticut, 310 US 296 (1940) 
 Minersville School District v Gobitis, 310 US 586 (1940) 
 Cox v New Hampshire, 312 US 569 (1941) 
  Jones v Opelika I, 316 US 584 (1942)  
 Jones v Opelika II, 319 US 103 (1943) 
  Douglas v City of Jeannette, 319 US 157 (1943) 
 Murdock v Pennsylvania, 319 US 105 (1943) 
 West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette, 319 US 624 (1943) 
 Follett v Town of McCormick, 321 US 573 (1944) 
 Prince v Massachusetts, 321 US 158 (1944) 
 Watchtower Society v Village of Stratton, 536 US 150 (2002). 
83 Watchtower Society v Village of Stratton, 536 US 150 (2002). 
84 319 US 624 (1943). 
85 310 US 586 (1940). 
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be trumped or limited by the state using a higher obligation, but ultimately failed to 
trump religious freedom.86 
 
Similarly, in Chaplinsky v New Hampshire,87 a Jehovah's Witness had reportedly told 
a New Hampshire town marshal who was attempting to prevent him from preaching 
"You are a damned racketeer" and "a damned fascist" and was arrested. The court 
upheld the arrest, thus establishing that “‘insulting’ or 'fighting words', those that by 
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace" 
are among the "well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech [which] the 
prevention and punishment of ... have never been thought to raise any constitutional 
problem."  The case established the ‘fighting words doctrine’, which limits of the US 
Constitution’s First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech. 
 
V THE NEED FOR CONSTITUTIONAL BALANCING OF CONFLICTING INTERESTS 
 
A pluralistically committed state may well consider that prohibiting religiously 
inspired activity should be secondary to legislation that provides for the peace and 
good government of the state.88  While the state may not limit the right of an individual 
to believe what they will, this class of cases differs to those which have resulted in an 
incidental infringement on religious freedom by legislation furthering the aims of the 
state.89   
 
This conflict between religious and state ideals is often inevitable.  Religious practice 
to some can impact upon all As McLachlin CJ of the Supreme Court of Canada 
observed in Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, in the context of the state 
requirement for photos to be displayed on driver’s licences: 
 
Because religion touches so many facets of daily life, and because a host of different religions 
with different rites and practices co-exist in our society, it is inevitable that some religious 
practices will come into conflict with laws and regulatory systems of general application.90   
 
A Need for balance 
 
This issue has been analysed for many years, considering and contrasting the concept 
‘balancing’ in the United States with that of ‘proportionality’ in Europe.91 Balancing 
                                                 
86 Jackson J in West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnett argued “The very purpose of a Bill 
of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place 
them beyond the reach of majorities and officials.  …  One’s right to life, liberty and property, to free 
speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly and other Fundamental Rights may not be 
submitted to vote: they depend on the outcome of no elections.” (319 US 624 (1943), 638). 
87 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
88 See generally Iddo Porat, ‘On the Jehovah Witnesses Cases, Balancing Tests, Indirect Infringement 
of Rights and Multiculturalism:  A Proposed Model for Three Kinds of Multicultural Claims’ (2007) 
1 Law and Ethics of Human Rights 429. 
89 An early case applying these principles to free speech jurisprudence was Schneider v State of New 
Jersey, 308 US 147 (1939), in which a municipal ban on the distribution of handbills was attacked as 
unconstitutional, the Supreme Court balanced the right of free speech against the municipal interest in 
clean streets and held that in the circumstances of the case the ban violated the right to free speech.  
90 Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony [2009] 2 SCR. 567 
91 Moshe Cohen-Eliya and Iddo Porat, ‘American Balancing and German Proportionality: The 
Historical Origins’ (2010) 8(2) International Journal of Constitutional Law 263. 
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involves a consideration of utilitarian principles, balancing the requirements of the 
state against those of the individual.   
 
Balancing is said to be “a decision-making process, which divides any given decision 
into considerations for and against a course of action, and then attempts to assess the 
relative weight of each consideration and balance the considerations one against the 
other.”92 
 
This constitutional balancing goes back some decades in the US.  The concept looks 
at a form of legal cost-benefit analysis.93  Most constitutional cases in the United States 
involving a question of procedural regularity refer to the Mathews test,94 derived from 
the decision in Mathews v Eldridge,95 a case involving constitutional requirements for 
due process of law.  The utilitarian approach in this case was examined at length by 
Jerry Mashaw where he observed that  
 
The Supreme Court's analysis in Eldridge is not informed by systematic attention to any theory 
of the values underlying due process review. The approach is implicitly utilitarian but 
incomplete, and the Court overlooks alternative theories that might have yielded fruitful 
inquiry.   …     Utility theory suggests that the purpose of decisional procedures-like that of 
social action generally - is to maximize social welfare. Indeed, the three-factor analysis 
enunciated in Eldridge appears to be a type of utilitarian, social welfare function. That function 
first takes into account the social value at stake in a legitimate private claim; it discounts that 
value by the probability that it will be preserved through the available administrative 
procedures, and it then subtracts from that discounted value the social cost of introducing 
additional procedures. When combined with the institutional posture of judicial self-restraint, 
utility theory can be said to yield the following plausible decision-rule: "Void procedures for 
lack of due process only when alternative procedures would so substantially increase social 
welfare that their rejection seems irrational."96     
 
In conclusion, the advent of Holyoake’s secularism created a public space where all 
including the religious were welcome.  In such a space however, the religious 
expressions of individuals and the state need to be tempered by an appreciation that 
some such expressions may be disruptive to the general community and may require 
limitations on those freedoms for the purposes of public safety and order.  Rights of 
all sorts seek to be expressed in the public sphere and are generally encouraged, but at 
times the secular state must seek constitutional solutions to balance the conflicting 
interests. 
 
Holyoake made it clear that the maximum utility, the maximum happiness of society, 
would occur when the state, religion, and other players in the public sphere all were 
                                                 
92 Iddo Porat, ‘Why All Attempts to Make Judicial Review Balancing Principled Fail?’ (Paper 
presented at the VIIth World Congress of the International Association of Constitutional Law, Athens, 
14 June 2007), 1. 
93 For a critical review of cost benefit balancing, see Henry S. Richardson, ‘The Stupidity of Cost 
Benefit Analysis’, (2000) 29 Journal of Legal Studies 971  
94 “First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of 
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the 
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 
requisites would entail.” (Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319 (1976), 335.) 
95 Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319 (1976). 
96 Jerry L. Mashaw, ‘The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication: 
Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value’ (1976) 44 University of Chicago Law Review 28, 49-
51. 
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respected for the value that their contribution could make.  Since his time the public 
space is now a very crowded place, with many who were previously disenfranchised 
(such as women) now are having a voice.  Modern technology allows everyone of any 
age and strata of society to express a view. What Holyoake did not anticipate was that 
this complexity would make it much more difficult to determine what limits would be 
placed on each, and under what circumstances.  The balancing act is now much more 
difficult.  However, the principles remain the same.  The utilitarian view that society 
is best off when all are allowed a voice, and Holyoake’s that religion should be neither 
endorsed and encouraged, nor denigrated and disrespected.   
 
Where this chapter has considered issues where the state has determinedly attempted 
at times to keep religion from influencing the public sphere, the next chapter looks at 
where the secular state has actively worked against its brief in aiding religion to apply 
its views through the authority of the state.  
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CHAPTER 6 
RELIGIOUS SYMBOLISM IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
I THE NATURE OF RELIGIOUS SYMBOLISM 
 
Holyoake advocated a public place where religion and the state could express 
themselves freely.  Much of the analysis in this thesis to this point has considered 
traditional and overt forms of public expression such as speech and writings, but a 
number of cases have come to the attention of the courts where individuals, formal 
organisations, and even the state have sought to express religious views mutely.  
 
The cases in this chapter are particularly interesting.  A number of them relate to 
circumstances where the symbol has been in place for some time, but changing society 
has found different views, that the implied social agreement for their placement is 
perhaps no longer share by the whole community.1 This chapter will look at the 
circumstances where these cases arise, and consider whether they are compatible with 
Holyoake’s principles of secularism.   
 
Religious symbols in the public sphere are polarising in many secular jurisdictions and 
promote strong views.  The symbols that have often created controversy have been 
overt symbols such as clothing and jewellery worn by individuals, or larger items 
placed in public areas that are identifiable with religious traditions.2  Symbols by their 
nature have a different meaning to each person, and in a society can change over time. 
 
No symbol (no event, thing, representation, relationship, activity) has meaning apart from 
use. Correlatively, a religious symbol, like any symbol, may have one set of meanings at one 
time, in one place or for one group, and other sets of meanings elsewhere or for other people. 
Religious symbols may have other, nonreligious referents.  Whether the primary meaning of 
a symbol is religious or not will depend on context and may shift over time. A symbol that 
has religious meanings in one context may have little or nothing to do with religion when 
used in another context; for example, the cross of the Red Cross. Similarly, a symbol with 
religious meanings may bear some of those meanings for some people, even if used in a 
nonreligious context; for example, Santa Claus in the local department store. 
Religious symbols, as such, tend almost by definition to be particularistic and sectarian. They 
signal identification with a group, whatever their concrete and specific message.3 
 
These symbols, either worn by individuals or found in public buildings, also excite 
widely varying responses by government.  Ioanna Tourkochoriti sees these 
differences based on completely different approaches by the state.  With respect to 
France and the US for example, there is 
                                                 
1 See for example Van Orden v Perry, 545 US 677 (2005), regarding a display of a religious text on a 
monument on a courthouse in place for more than 40 years, and Lautsi and Others v Italy [GC] - 
30814/06 Judgment 18.3.2011 [GC] (18 March 2011), where placing crucifixes on public school 
walls had been a long standing practice in Italy. 
2 See generally Laura Barnette, ‘Freedom of religion and religious symbols in the public sphere’ 
(Government of Canada Publications, 2004). 
3 Janet L. Dolgin, ‘Religious Symbols and the Establishment of a ‘National Religion’, (1987-88) 39 
Mercer Law Review 495, 497-8. 
 
91 
 
In France, a paternalistic vision of the state, together with a conception of a secularism 
imposed from top-to-bottom [which] legitimizes state intervention for banning religious 
symbols.  In the United States, a conception of secularism founded upon the need to 
accommodate religious differences leads to a more tolerant attitude towards religious 
symbols even if they seem incomprehensible to the majority of the population.4 
 
Symbols are now one front in a larger cultural war,5 part of a debate about the 
relationship between religion and liberal democracy.  Horwitz sees that the insistence 
of religion to have symbols in the public sphere may be related to questions on whether 
God exists.  On that latter thought, he reasonably observes that “we should try to arrive 
at a reasonable lawyerly way of addressing conflicts between law and religion, and 
leave the deep thoughts about God to our colleagues in religious studies departments, 
or to the individual conscience”.6 
 
Susan Mancini7 tends to agree, and goes so far as to say that religious symbols create 
conflicts in the public sphere that  
 
do not only reflect most of the dilemmas that liberal democracies face in the attempt to 
reconcile constitutionalism and religion through adherence to secularism in the public place – 
they actually challenge the very legitimacy of the dominant conception of constitutionalism 
and its nexus to the principle of secularism. 
 
These cases have often been controversial.  While decisions and cases are often 
couched in neutral terms some such as Mancini have been critical of European 
decisions concerning religious symbols.  In the school crucifix cases discussed later in 
this thesis,8 she feels that the decisions, although couched in neutral terms, are critical 
of non-Christian practices while accepting of Christian practices as being culturally 
neutral.9 In respect of the Italian and German crucifix cases she argues that  
 
[i]n both cases the courts made a choice among the various possible meanings of the crucifix 
and picked the one which was most congenial to their argument, i.e. the crucifix may be 
legitimately displayed in state schools because it does not clash with the principle of 
secularism.  As a consequence, all other meanings – including the ones that are most central 
to religion – are left in the limbo of an interpretive no-man’s land, devoid of constitutional 
protection. 
 
Significantly, she notes that although these two cases involved a comparison between 
Christianity and Islam, neither of the parties challenging the school practices were 
Muslims.  The courts had concluded that Christianity had its roots in the state’s 
democratic values, while the second was incompatible with those values.  She finds 
particularly that the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), 
                                                 
4 Ioanna Tourkochoriti, ‘The Burka Ban: Divergent Approaches to Freedom of Religion in France and 
the USA’ (2012) 20 William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 791, 850. 
5 The concept of a culture war is discussed in more detail in Chapter 9. 
6 Paul Horwitz, The Agnostic Age: Law, Religion, and the Constitution (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2011), xvi-xviii. 
7 Susanna Mancini, ‘Religious Symbols in the Public Space: The Power of Symbols and Symbols as 
Power: Secularism and Religion as Guarantors of Cultural Convergence’ (2009) 30 Cardozo Law 
Review 2629. 
8 In Chapter 8. 
9 Susanna Mancini, ‘Religious Symbols in the Public Space: The Power of Symbols and Symbols as 
Power: Secularism and Religion as Guarantors of Cultural Convergence’ (2009) 30 Cardozo Law 
Review 2629, 2632. 
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although required to strike a balance between the 47 nations (that have very different 
constitutional traditions) that constitute its jurisdiction, have almost always a 
construction of the dichotomy between Christianity and Islam, which is projected in 
Christianity as a central component of Western civilization, while Islam is cast as the 
“other”.  In short, a culturally homogeneous European society perceived as threatened 
by pluralism and globalisation.10 
 
Issues relating to religious symbolism in some states go back more than a century.  For 
example, in France the official secularisation of the state began with the 1905 Law.11  
On the basis of the law discrimination on the basis of religion was prohibited, and 
crucifixes were removed from classrooms.  Religious symbols in the public sphere 
cause most jurisprudence in places of particular importance to most citizens – those of 
justice and of education.  These symbols create two types of conflict.  The first is that 
of the wearing of religious symbols, such as headscarves and crucifixes by public 
employees in environments owned or controlled by the state, and generally by those 
affiliated with minority religions.  The second occurs when a religious symbol is 
associated with identity of the state.  This latter symbolism usually represents the 
dominant religion in that state.12 
 
In Europe (particularly France, Germany, and Italy) much of the jurisprudence has 
related to public educational institutions, including the wearing of religious garb by 
teachers of minority religions, or the open display of religious symbols in ostensibly 
secular public schools.  In the USA the conflict has been of the second type, usually 
displays of religious symbols in and around courthouses, or in public buildings, and 
the latter particularly around religious holidays.   
 
Arguably much of this conflict has arisen with the increasing growth of non-religious 
or other-religious viewpoints of citizens in recent times as people withdraw from the 
religion of their parents or have brought other views into a country through migration, 
where not so long ago the population was homogenous in its religious views.   
 
Often states have shed their official religious positions in favour of secular 
constitutions to prevent religious conflicts in times of increasingly pluralistic societies, 
particularly in Europe.  Some states, such as India, were made constitutionally secular 
ab initio in order to maintain what went before. 
 
                                                 
10 Susanna Mancini, ‘Religious Symbols in the Public Space: The Power of Symbols and Symbols as 
Power: Secularism and Religion as Guarantors of Cultural Convergence’ (2009) 30 Cardozo Law 
Review 2629, 2631. 
11 Secularisation of France can be traced back to the revolution of 1789, before which France had had 
Catholicism as the state religion.  However, Napoleon re-established the Catholic Church in 1801 
with the Concordat of 1801.  Thereafter the French state funded and built religious buildings for 
Roman Catholicism, Calvinism, Lutheran Protestantism and Judaism. Efforts were made in the 1870s 
to suppress the Concordat of 1801, after which a gradual secularisation of began with the removal of 
priests and nuns from roles in public hospitals in 1879-80, and the establishment of secular education 
with the Jules Ferry laws in 1881-82.  See generally Jean Bauberot, ‘The Evolution of Secularism in 
France: Between Two Civil Religions’ in Linell E. Cady and Elizabeth Shakman Hurd (eds.), 
Comparative Secularisms in a Global Age (Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire,2010), 57.  
12 Susanna Mancini, ‘Religious Symbols in the Public Space: The Power of Symbols and Symbols as 
Power: Secularism and Religion as Guarantors of Cultural Convergence’ (2009) 30 Cardozo Law 
Review 2629.  I disagree with Mancini as she feels this description relates only to public schools.  I 
consider the analysis can be cast much wider. 
 
93 
Mancini13 considers there are only two religious symbolism events that test the limits 
of secularism: those of religious dress; and public symbols like crucifixes. She notes 
that the latter are a form of ‘public language’ by state authorities, and generally of the 
majority religion.  Mancini also indicates her view that “neutral character of 
secularism and its ability to solve religious conflicts in pluralistic societies is 
increasingly contested.”14   
 
Dieter Grimm supports this argument attributing the increasing debate to having its 
“source in the growing multiculturalism of European societies, caused by the 
immigration of members of non-Christian beliefs.”15   He considers that these changes 
in European society are causing stress upon existing paradigms of the role of religion 
in the state, noting that  
 
Since religious freedom means equal freedom, the state may neither privilege nor discriminate 
against certain religious groups. This is also true with regard to those religious communities 
that are traditionally supported by the native society - the state is not entitled to treat them 
preferentially. Yet, preferential treatment of a religion as such must be distinguished from 
protection of the values, traditions, and customs that, although originally rooted in a country's 
predominant religion, have lost their religious connotations and are no longer viewed as 
specific expressions of a religion but rather have become a part of the country's general culture 
that includes believers and non-believers.
16 
 
Grimm’s view offers again assumptions that are Eurocentric and unsupported.  The 
assertion that religious freedom equates with equal freedom is not supported.  The 
principles that Holyoake derived propose an equal opportunity to contribute to the 
public space.  This does not mean that laws must necessarily apply equally, as the 
issue may only apply to less than the whole religious polity.  For example, a state 
support of all schools will apply equally to all religious schools, but it is erroneous to 
suggest that because a religious organisation has more schools, that the state is 
attempting to favour that organisation more than another. 
 
A  Symbols of a ‘civil religion’ 
 
Often the line between religion and the state can become very blurred.  Consider the 
outcry and case law related to flag burning, especially in the USA, where “the United 
States flag is treated as an almost sacred symbol.”17  In comparing the history of flag 
burning in the US and Germany, Ute Krüdewagen observes that “the [US] flag forms 
part of the American civil religion: ‘[C]urious liturgical forms have been devised for 
“saluting” the flag, for “dipping” the flag, for “lowering” the flag, and for “hoisting” 
                                                 
13 Susanna Mancini, ‘Religious Symbols in the Public Space: The Power of Symbols and Symbols as 
Power: Secularism and Religion as Guarantors of Cultural Convergence’ (2009) 30 Cardozo Law 
Review 2629. 
14 Susanna Mancini, ‘Religious Symbols in the Public Space: The Power of Symbols and Symbols as 
Power: Secularism and Religion as Guarantors of Cultural Convergence’ (2009) 30 Cardozo Law 
Review 2629, 2630. 
15 Dieter Grimm, ‘Conflicts between general laws and religious norms’, (2009) 30 Cardozo Law 
Review 2369, 2370. 
16 Dieter Grimm, ‘Conflicts between general laws and religious norms’ (2009) 30 Cardozo Law 
Review 2369, 2370, 2374. 
17 Ute Krüdewagen, ‘Political Symbols in Two Constitutional Orders: The Flag Desecration Decisions 
of the United States Supreme Court and the German Federal Constitutional Court’ (2002) 19(2) 
Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 679, 680. 
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the flag. Men bare their heads when the flag passes by; and in praise of the flag poets 
write odes and children sing hymns’”18 
 
This burning of the flag in the US is generally described as flag ‘desecration’, a term 
indicating the removal of something’s sacred nature. Michael Welch observed19 that  
 
given the deep emotional – virtually religious – attachment of most citizens to the nation’s 
most cherished emblem, flag burning has been known to incite a full-fledged moral panic, a 
phenomenon marked by a turbulent and exaggerated reaction to a putative threat. …  Although 
moral panic over flag desecration aroused considerable anxiety among citizens, the campaign 
to criminalize that expression of protest triggered resistance by First Amendment advocates 
committed to preserving the constitutional right to free speech.   
 
The US Supreme Court in Texas v Johnson20 (reaffirmed in US v Eichman)21 ruled 
that it was unconstitutional for a government (whether federal, state, or municipality) 
to prohibit the desecration of a flag, due to its status as ‘symbolic speech’ under the 
free speech provisions of the US Constitution’s First Amendment.  Similar cases have 
occurred in Germany.22  On the different treatments of flag burning in the US and 
Germany, Ute Krüdewagen interestingly notes the different roles symbols play in 
these two countries:23 
 
The language of the statutory provisions concerned with the attack on the flag illustrates the 
contrast between the role that the flag occupies in the German society and the role of its 
American counterpart in American society. In United States law, the misdemeanour or crime 
of burning a flag is called ‘flag desecration.’   Section 90(a) StGB, on the other hand, is entitled 
‘Verunglimpfung des Staates und seiner Symbole.’ The term ‘Verunglimpfung’ has no 
religious connotations, it simply stands for an act of defamation or denigration.  As nobody 
has consecrated the German flag, nobody can desecrate it. 
 
These cases in Europe and the United States show clearly that symbolism retains an 
important place in these societies.   
 
It is difficult to separate a society from its symbols.  They are not like trademarks with 
clearly defined associations.  They can have no meaning, or sacred associations, to 
different people.  Many of them have a longstanding association with communities so 
that it can be difficult to separate the religious representation of the symbol from the 
state, if the latter has appropriated it as a symbol also of the national community.24    
 
 
                                                 
18 Citing Carlton J. Hayes, Essays on Nationalism  (Macmillan, New York, 1926) 107-08 
19 Michael Welch, Flag Burning: Moral Panic and the Criminalization of Protest (Transaction 
Publishers, 2000), 5. 
20 491 US 397 (1989). 
21 496 US 310 (1990). 
22 On March 7, 1990, three months before the US Supreme Court handed down the Eichman 
decision, the Bundesverfassungsgericht (German Federal Constitutional Court) reversed the 
conviction of the manager of a book distribution company charged with defiling the federal flag. 
23 Ute Krüdewagen, ‘Political Symbols in Two Constitutional Orders: The Flag Desecration Decisions 
of the United States Supreme Court and the German Federal Constitutional Court’ (2002) 19(2) 
Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 679, 687. 
24 Such as in Lautsi and Others v Italy [GC] - 30814/06 Judgment 18.3.2011 [GC] (18 March 2011). 
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II GOVERNMENT SPONSORED RELIGIOUS DISPLAYS 
 
The issue of government displays of religiosity in the public sphere has been 
controversial for many years.  It has been described as ‘[t]he debate that won’t go 
away’.25  Most cases in this part relate to static displays of a religious nature that are 
either assembled by the state on religious holidays such as Christmas, or have been 
erected many years ago, and only in recent times following successful litigation have 
some people or organisations found the confidence to dispute them.  The static nature 
of these displays, these symbols, does not attract the attention of the public quite so 
much as religious speech which allows the hearer to form a judgment as to its 
constitutionality much more immediately.   
 
Public displays of religious symbols would seem on the surface to be harmless.  They 
are signs of popular and dominant culture as much as advertising of new products and 
contemporary television.  Is there harm in doing so by the government, to put religious 
displays in public areas where the only message appears to be that the government 
shares the same cultural and historical ties as the majority of the state?  Is it possible 
to argue that such displays would cause the uncritical or immature mind to change 
religious habits, or to infer that the government favours the dominant religion only? 
 
The view of Thomas C. Berg26 comes to mind when he observed in the American First 
Amendment context: 
 
My first, gut reaction to Establishment Clause cases about religious displays is that they are 
unimportant and it is irritating to see so much effort, emotion, and paper spent on them.  From 
the standpoint of serious religion, it is hard to imagine that any display of the Ten 
Commandments does anything to make this a more Christian or religious nation, more inclined 
to live according to biblical values, or indeed that such a display affects anyone’s behaviour. 
 
He observes that the context is important.  In public schools where impressionable 
children may be subtly pressured into religious activity such as prayers,27 such 
coercion will usually be seen as unconstitutional.  He asks though whether non-
coercive public religious symbolism displays by the state should be taken as seriously 
and be made the constant subject of litigation, often by interest groups such as the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU).  He recalls Frankfurter J’s remark that “[w]e 
live by symbols”28 and that although “[s]ymbols sometimes distract people from real 
issues and challenges … sometimes they embody those issues and challenges.  In the 
latter cases, we ignore symbols at our peril.”29 
 
Berg offers a view that is consistent with Holyoake’s principles: 
 
Official religious displays should not be invalidated on the basis that religion is a private 
matter and the public sphere must be secular.  Displays can be invalidated in many cases on 
the basis of the voluntarist approach. Although religion may be highly relevant to public life, 
                                                 
25 Joseph HH Weiler, ‘State and Nation; Church, Mosque and Synagogue—the trailer’ (2010) 8 ICON 
157, 157. 
26 Thomas C. Berg, ‘Religious Displays and the Voluntary Approach to Church and State’ (2010) 63 
Oklahoma Law Review 47. 
27 This will be addressed in more detail in Chapter 8 of this thesis. 
28 Minersville School District v Gobitis, 310 US 586 (1940), 596 quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes. 
29 Thomas C. Berg, ‘Religious Displays and the Voluntary Approach to Church and State’ (2010) 63 
Oklahoma Law Review 47, 48. 
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its influence should normally operate through independent, private religious institutions and 
through individuals who bring their values to bear on political questions—not through 
explicit government assertion of religious truths.   
 
This view clearly expresses the view that religion has a place in the public sphere, and 
should express its views publicly and privately as do other players there.  He feels 
however that it should draw a line at having the state extol its virtues and doctrines.30   
This is an important point.  Religion can be recognised and respected for its role in the 
public sphere.  However, where the state asserts “religious truths” with the ability to 
do so unable to be matched by any individual or organisation, then such activity not 
only detracts from the state’s traditional roles in government, it makes it difficult for 
the state to assert neutrality in other contexts.31   
 
Many religious display cases have involved education in particular.  This is because 
this a medium by which the state can exercise some control over culture and public 
opinion.32  There a number of important and recent cases to be examined on this issue 
in greater depth in the next chapter.  The following cases relate to the state’s control 
of other public space and cultural resources. 
 
Many such cases have occurred in the United States and Europe in the last few 
decades.  The first of the major cases in this area was Lynch v Donnelly.33  This case 
was the first of many which had the state objecting not to religious speech in the streets 
or published polemics, but rather mute displays of religious origin with well 
understood connotations in public spaces by public authorities.  There was no overt 
message attached saying that the state put its might behind an endorsement of the 
religion, in the same way that a footballer might endorse a sports drink.  Instead, 
religious symbols, often associated with traditional religious (and usually state 
promulgated) holidays, where their presence had caused little or no offence in the past, 
began to have suggestions that their presence had always been unconstitutional. 
 
Paul Horwitz reflects that the US was once widely religiously observant,34 and the 
disputes in the courts were largely internecine disputes about state distributions of 
income to religion.  He sees that the funding issues were effectively resolved in 
Zelman v Simmons-Harris35 and Mitchell v Helms,36 cases which involved funding 
of religious schools.  In what he sees is an age of religious contestability, the 
skirmishes in the public sphere are not on where government spends its money, but 
over what the government says about religion.  In the United States context religious 
symbolism is seen as a result of a wider issue. There, “the Supreme Court is engaged 
in a profound reshaping of the ground on which issues of religious establishment are 
                                                 
30 Thomas C. Berg, ‘Religious Displays and the Voluntary Approach to Church and State’ (2010) 63 
Oklahoma Law Review 47, 66. 
31 See for example the activities of Alabama Chief Justice Roy Moore’s installation of the Decalogue 
in 2001 (removed in 2003, in the form of a 2.5 ton granite block) in the Alabama State Judicial 
Building, removed at the insistence of the 11th Circuit Court.  (Jeffrey Gettleman, ‘Monument is now 
out of sight, but not out of mind’, The New York Times, 28 August, 2003.  
<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/28/us/monument-is-now-out-of-sight-but-not-out-of-mind.html>.    
32 Michael McConnell et al, Religion and the Constitution (Aspen Law & Business, New York, 2006), 
704. 
33 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
34 More than it is now. 
35 536 US 639 (2002). 
36 530 US 793 (2000). 
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fought. To put the matter simply, the emerging trend is away from concern over 
government transfers of wealth to religious institutions, and toward interdiction of 
religiously partisan government speech.”37  Government speech can also be mute. 
 
In Lynch, an annual Christmas display in the Pawtucket, Rhode Island's shopping 
district, consisting of a Santa Clause house, a Christmas tree, a banner reading 
"Seasons Greetings" and a crèche,38 was challenged in court. The crèche had been a 
part of the display since at least 1943.  The plaintiffs alleged that the display violated 
the Establishment Clause.  They ruled that the crèche was a passive representation of 
religion and that there was "insufficient evidence to establish that the inclusion of the 
crèche was a purposeful or surreptitious effort to express some kind of subtle 
governmental advocacy of a particular religious" view.39  
 
This may well have been the case, and is the argument proffered by plaintiffs in similar 
case, but there is often little evidence offered in its support.  There may well be some 
form of government advocacy of religion, but often the argument is a form of reverse 
logic: why would the government display the symbols if not to endorse them?  The 
Court held that the state was celebrating a religious holiday in the way the greater 
Western culture had done so for some time.         
 
Several years later after the decision in Lynch the Supreme Court addressed a religious 
holiday display issue in County of Allegheny v ACLU.40  The Court considered the 
constitutionality of two recurring holiday displays located on public property in 
Pittsburgh.41  The majority held that the County of Allegheny violated the 
Establishment Clause by displaying a crèche in the county courthouse, because the 
"principal or primary effect" of the display was to advance religion within the test 
parameters outlined in Lemon v Kurtzman42 when viewed in its overall context.  
Moreover, in contrast to Lynch v Donnelly, nothing in the crèche’s setting detracted 
from that message. 
 
In more recent times, two cases, Van Orden v Perry43 and McCreary County v ACLU,44 
although decided at the same time, appear to be contrary in their reasoning and offer 
                                                 
37 Ira C. Lupu, ‘Government message and government money: Santa Fe, Mitchell v Helms and the 
Arc of the Establishment Clause’ (2001) 42 William and Mary Law Review 771, 771. 
38 Also known as a nativity scene, has artistic representation of the birth of Jesus Christ. 
39 Interestingly, the Court also stated that the Constitution "affirmatively mandates accommodation, 
not merely tolerance of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any."  The Court ruled that the 
crèche had a legitimate secular purpose within a larger holiday display to celebrate the season and the 
origins of Christmas which has long been a part of Western culture. The Federal "Government has 
long recognized - indeed it has subsidized - holidays with religious significance." 
40 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
41 The first, a nativity scene, was placed on the grand staircase of the Allegheny County Courthouse. 
The second of the holiday displays in question was an 18-foot Hanukkah menorah, which was placed 
just outside the City-County Building next to the city's 45-foot decorated Christmas tree. The legality 
of the Christmas tree display was not considered in this case. 
42 Known as the ‘Lemon Test’: ‘Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the 
cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many years.  Three such tests may be gleaned from 
our cases. First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary 
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, Board of Education v Allen, 392 US 
236, 243 (1968); [403 U.S. 602, 613] finally, the statute must not foster ’an excessive government 
entanglement with religion.’ ” 403 U.S. 602 (1971).  
43 545 US 677 (2005). 
44 545 US 844 (2005). 
 
98 
little in guidance on the contemporary stance of the Supreme Court on public religious 
displays.  The Court in Van Orden held a six-foot monument displaying the Ten 
Commandments donated by a private group and placed with other monuments next to 
the Texas State Capitol had a secular purpose and would not lead an observer to 
conclude that the state endorsed the religious message, and therefore did not violate 
the Establishment Clause.  Yet, in McCreary County, the Court held that two large, 
framed copies of the Ten Commandments in Kentucky courthouses lacked a secular 
purpose and were not religiously neutral, and therefore violated the Establishment 
Clause.45 
 
So, where does American jurisprudence lie at the moment on the matter of public 
religious displays by government officials and institutions?  Authors such as Colby46 
and Muñoz47 are critical of the split decisions in each, resulting in a divided court and 
inconsistent reasoning.  Colby is most critical of the reasoning of Scalia J in both cases, 
and to a lesser extent, that of Breyer J.  Inconsistent decision making by the Supreme 
Court has resulted in decisions like Lynch v Donnelly48 (nativity scene displayed 
alongside “secular” symbols of Christmas), and a Jewish Menorah next to a Christmas 
tree49 in Allegheny, as well as the Van Orden and McCreary County cases which were 
decided in the same year.   
 
Most recently, in April 2010 the case of Salazar v Buono was decided.50  In 1934 
members of the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) placed a Latin Cross (a crucifix) on 
federal land in the Mojave National Preserve, a National Park.  Buono, a regular visitor 
to the Preserve filed a suit alleging a violation of the US Constitution’s First 
Amendment’s Establishment Clause, and sought an injunction requiring the US 
Federal Government to remove the cross.  The case ultimately reached the United 
States Supreme Court through an appeal from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.51 
                                                 
45 545 US 844 (2005) (Souter J). 
46 Thomas Colby, ‘A Constitutional Hierarchy of Religions?  Justice Scalia, ‘The Ten 
Commandments, and the Future of the Establishment Clause’, (2006) 100(3) Northwestern University 
Law Review 1097. 
47 Vincent Phillip Muñoz, ‘The Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause and the Impossibility 
of its Incorporation’, (2006) 8 University of Philadelphia Journal of Constitutional Law 591. 
48 Lynch v Donnelly, 465 US 668 (1984) 
49 County of Allegheny v American Civil Liberties Union, 492 US 573 (1989). 
50 Salazar v Buono, 559 U.S. 700 (2010). 
51 In the first stage, known as Buono I (Buono v Norton, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (CD Cal. 2002)), the 
District Court found that Buono had standing to sue, and granted Buono’s request for injunctive relief.  
While the Government’s appeal was waiting to be heard, the US Congress passed the Defense 
Appropriations Act, 2004, §8121(a), which had within it a direction to the Secretary of the Interior to 
transfer the cross and surrounding land to the VFW.  Subsequently the appeal was heard in the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals (Buono v Norton, 371 F. 3d 543 (CA9 2004)) (Buono II) affirmed the 
District Court’s judgment, but which did not address the land transfer issue raised by the 
Appropriations Act.    The US Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower court.  The issue 
relating to the Establishment Clause, and to government endorsement of the religious nature of the 
crucifix.  The Court was split between those who believed that the cross on the memorial had a 
broader meaning, and those who considered the religious message was clear.  In an opinion by 
Kennedy J, joined by Roberts CJ and Alito J, the majority held that the minority decision of Stevens J, 
joined by Ginsburg and Sotomayor JJ (with Breyer J writing a separate dissent), argued that the land 
transfer ordered by Congress would perpetuate the Establishment Clause violation at issue in the 2002 
injunction and that it would be “a clear Establishment Clause violation of Congress had simply 
directed that a solitary Latin cross be erected … to serve as a World War I memorial.  Congress did 
not erect this cross, but it commanded that the cross remain in place, and it gave the cross the 
imprimatur of Government.” (Salazar v Buono, 559 US 700 (2010), 759. 
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The decision in Salazar v Buono52 is typical of recent decisions, with what the New 
York Times considered was “a badly fractured Supreme Court”.53  In this case Kennedy 
J discussed at length the secular purpose behind the cross memorial.  He claimed that 
“the cross and the cause it commemorated [became] entwined in the public 
consciousness”54 He explained further that 
 
[a] Latin cross is not merely a reaffirmation of Christian beliefs.  It evokes thousands of small 
crosses in foreign fields marking the graves of Americans who fell in battles, battles whose 
tragedies would be compounded if the fallen are forgotten.55   
 
However, on this Ian Bartrum56 makes an important point.  He notes that Kennedy J 
in his comments regarding the cross at the centre of the Salazar case considered that 
the lower court did not appreciate the complex nature of the cross as a symbol “that 
has complex meaning beyond the expression of religious views”.57   
 
However, in an opinion that has echoes in decisions made by the European Court of 
Human Rights discussed in the next chapter, Bartrum asks whether Kennedy J’s view 
that “a Latin cross is not merely a reaffirmation of Christian beliefs [but] a symbol 
often used to honor and respect those whose heroic acts, noble contributions and 
patient striving help secure an honored place in history for this Nation and its 
people”.58  This would mean that the association of the cross used in such public ways 
by the state has lost much of its original meaning by association with the state and its 
objectives.   
 
What was particularly notable about this case was the following: during those hearings 
Scalia J had argued that Counsel for the respondent, Peter Eliasberg, in arguments 
heard in October 2009 had argued that many Jewish war veterans would not want to 
be honoured by “the predominant symbol of Christianity”.  During those hearings 
Scalia J had argued that “the cross is the most common symbol of the resting place of 
the dead” to which Eliasberg responded, “There is never a cross on the tombstone of 
a Jew”.59 This is an example of what can happen when the state identifies the majority 
religion with itself.  Other religious viewpoints (or none) become marginalised, and 
views such as Scalia J’s show that such identification excludes any insight on how that 
identification has happened.60    
 
                                                 
52 Salazar v Buono, 559 US 700 (2010). 
53 Adam Liptak, ‘Justices’ Ruling Blocks Cross Removal’, The New York Times, April 28, 2010, 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/29/us/29cross.html?_r=0>. 
54 Salazar v Buono, 559 US 700 (2010). 
55 (Supreme Court of the United States, Oral Argument Transcript, 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-472.pdf, 38-39). 
56 Ian Bartrum, ‘Salazar v Buono: Sacred Symbolism and the Secular State’ (2010) 105 Northwestern 
University Law Review Colloquy 31, 39. 
57 Salazar v Buono, 559 US 700 (2010). 
58 Salazar v Buono, 559 US 700 (2010). 
59 (Supreme Court of the United States, Oral Argument Transcript, 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-472.pdf, 38-39). 
60 This issue has been revisited recently in Jewish War Veterans v City of San Diego. (US Court of 
Appeals Ninth Circuit 4 January 2011 No 08-56415, 223.)  McKeown J for the court stated: ‘The use 
of such a distinctively Christian symbol to honor all veterans . . .suggests that the government is so 
connected to a particular religion that it treats that religion’s symbolism as its own, as universal. To 
many non-Christian veterans, this claim of universality is alienating.’ 
 
100 
The New York Times commented that “[i]t is one of the ironies of the sequence of 
cases dealing with religious symbols on public land that those who argue for their 
lawful presence must first deny them the significance that provokes the desire to put 
them there in the first place.”61  In the wake of Salazar v Buono,62 the New York Times 
introduced the topic as “the latest chapter of this odd project of saving religion by 
emptying it of its content” and asked when is a cross a cross?   
… also, when is a menorah a menorah, and when is a crèche a crèche, and when are the Ten 
Commandments directives given to the Jews by God on Mt. Sinai? These questions, which 
might seem peculiar in the real world, are perfectly ordinary in the wild and wacky world of 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, where in one case (Lynch v Donnelly, 1984)63 the 
Supreme Court declared, with a straight judicial face, that a display featuring the baby Jesus, 
Mary, Joseph and the wise men conveyed a secular, not a religious message.
64
 
John Witte, Jr and Nina-Louisa Arold recently considered the long line of religious 
symbolism cases in the US in the context of symbolism cases in Europe.  They find a 
number of contemporary parallels.65   They observed that older displays and practices 
fare better than newer ones, even if the older displays were much more religious in 
nature.  The US Supreme Court’s view is that such displays have become merged into 
American culture, society and democracy, and that therefore their time has passed to 
influence contemporary discourse on religious establishment.  They have now lost 
their religious content or have become a symbol of ceremonial deism.66  They note 
also how the symbol is characterised by the court.67   
 
Stone and McCreary County characterized the Decalogue as a religious symbol and struck it 
down; Van Orden and Pleasant Grove City characterized it as an historical marker and let it 
stand.  Lynch labeled the crèche a mere holiday display with commercial value, and let it stand; 
County of Allegheny labeled the crèche a depiction of the Christmas story, and struck it down.  
Pinette called the Latin cross a form of private expression protected by the free speech clause; 
Pleasant Grove City called the Decalogue a form of government speech immune from the Free 
Speech Clause. Lynch labeled the secular decorations around the crèche an effective buffer; 
McCreary County regarded the secular documents around the Decalogue as fraudulent 
camouflage.  For Stone, labeling the Decalogue as a moral code was viewed as a subterfuge 
belied by the very imperative tone of the Commandments.  For County of Allegheny, labeling 
a forty-five-foot county Christmas tree as “A Salute to Liberty” was sufficient Constitutional 
cover for placement of a menorah. … Characterization of the symbol or practice can be key to 
its Constitutional fate. 
 
                                                 
61 Stanley Fish, “When is a Cross a Cross?” New York Times Opinionator (May 3, 2010), 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/03/when-is-a-cross-a-cross/?_r=0 cited in Ian Bartrum, 
‘Salazar v Buono: Sacred Symbolism and the Secular State’, (2010) 105 Northwestern University 
Law Review Colloquy 31, 39. 
62 Salazar v Buono, 559 US 700 (2010). 
63 Lynch v Donnelly, 465 US 668 (1984). 
64 Stanley Fish, “When is a Cross a Cross?” New York Times Opinionator (May 3, 2010), 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/03/when-is-a-cross-a-cross/?_r=0.  
65 John Witte, Jr. and Nina-Louisa Arold, ‘Lift High the Cross?: Contrasting the New European and 
American Cases on Religious Symbols on Government Property’ (2011) 25 Emory International Law 
Review 5, 48-52. 
66 This latter concept will be explored in greater depth in Chapter 9. 
67 John Witte, Jr. and Nina-Louisa Arnold, ‘Lift High the Cross?: Contrasting the New European and 
American Cases on Religious Symbols on Government Property’ (2011) 25 Emory International Law 
Review 5, 49-50. 
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The above cases show that in a number of jurisdictions, and in the United States and 
Europe particularly, the role of symbols whether placed by the state or worn by 
individuals remains a strongly contested issue.  As Mark Movsesian observes: 
 
The fact that cases like Salazar and Lautsi continue to arise reveals something important about 
the state of religion at the start of the 21st century. Long past the point when it was supposed 
to have disappeared as a public concern, religion remains a vital, even growing force. 
Governments continue to place religious symbols in courtrooms, classrooms, city halls and 
parks. And citizens continue to consider such symbols worth a fight. Even in Western Europe, 
perhaps the most secular place on the planet, millions of people object to removing religious 
symbols from public places. Other millions consider such symbols an affront to pluralism and 
a throwback to an unenlightened time.68 
 
Religious symbols, where the symbols relate to a long standing religious community, 
are difficult to separate from the prevailing constitutional identity, especially in states 
such as Italy where the association goes back centuries.  Within the national context it 
is understandable that it is difficult for some states to perceive of religious symbols as 
not being representative of the state, as was asserted by Italy in the Lautsi v Italy69 
case.  This is particularly so where religious influences upon the state are particularly 
strong.70  
 
However, in the context of secularism as considered by Holyoake, these symbols are 
not necessarily illegitimate.  Italy is constitutionally secular71 as is the United States.72  
Yet the cases of Lautsi and Salazar excite much controversy, and the decisions in each 
are complex, where the courts are attempting to reconcile secular principles with 
strong community support of religion.  In their considerations of secularism, each state 
follows the general principle of the state being neutral with respect to religion.73  Each 
has a different perspective,74 but are the distinctions important?   
                                                 
68 Mark L. Movsesian, ‘Crosses and Culture: State-Sponsored Religious Displays in the US and 
Europe’ (2012) Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 1, 2.  See also John Witte, Jr. and Nina-Louisa 
Arold, ‘Religious Symbols on Government Property: Lift high the Cross?:  Contrasting the New 
European and American Cases on Religious Symbols on Government property’ (2011) 25 Emory 
International Law Review 5. 
69 Lautsi and Others v Italy [GC] - 30814/06 Judgment 18.3.2011 [GC] (18 March 2011). 
70  Alessandro Ferrari and Silvio Ferrari, ‘Religion and the Secular State: The Italian Case’ in Javier 
Martínez-Torrón and W C Durham Jr (eds), Religion and the Secular State: National Reports (ICLRS 
2010) 431, 432. 
71 The Italian Constitution provides that ‘[t]he State and the Catholic Church are independent and 
sovereign, each within its own sphere’ (Italian Constitution Art. 7) and that ‘religious denominations 
are equally free before the law’. (Italian Constitution Art. 8) 
72 First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
73 Michel Rosenfeld, ‘Can Constitutionalism, Secularism and Religion be Reconciled in an Era of 
Globalization and Religious Revival Symposium: Constitutionalism and Secularism in an Age of 
Religious Revival: The Challenge of Global and Local Fundamentalisms: Introduction.’ (2008-09) 30 
Cardozo Law Review 2333, 2333, “from a constitutional standpoint, the modem state steeped in the 
normative order dictated by the Enlightenment should at once be both neutral with respect to religion, 
by neither favoring it nor disfavoring it within its (public) sphere of legitimate action, and also equally 
protective of its citizens' freedom of and from religion within the private sphere.” 
74 “For the Supreme Court, neutrality means, at a minimum, that government may not proselytize, in 
the sense of pressuring people to join a religion. Neutrality goes beyond that narrow conception, 
however. The Justices have also indicated that government may not display symbols in a way that 
suggests preference for a particular sect. Indeed, the Court sometimes says that government may not 
endorse religion even generally, though the Court’s decisions do not consistently support that view. 
For the ECtHR, in contrast, neutrality means only that the state must avoid proselytism, understood as 
active religious indoctrination—classroom catechism or prayers, for example. Giving ‘preponderant 
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Holyoake sought to have a role for all, including religion, in the public sphere.  
Secularism also meant that religion would not directly control the policy and 
legislative decisions of the state.   Cases such as Lautsi and Salazar have caused 
concerns that overt religious symbols overtly or impliedly supported by the state 
suggest an influence upon the deliberations of the state that are contrary the ideals of 
secularism, that there is control of government by religion.  Lautsi and Salazar are 
recent examples of where there is smoke but no fire: that the courts have not accepted 
that there is any evidence that religious symbolism sponsored, endorsed or incidentally 
related to by the state has any deliberate intent to further the interests of religion, 
contrary to the secular ideal. 
 
Holyoake’s views would have seen these symbols as part of the plurality of the 
community, that they are part of the local culture. Public symbols such as flags,75 
crosses and the like are imbued with meaning, a mythos, of the community,76 and have 
varying meaning to others, with no consistent view even within countries.77  Removing 
these symbols would remove manifestations of how a community sees itself, but there 
is little evidence it influences its constitutional identity; that there is any real influence 
of these symbols upon non-believers, or intent of the state to manifest that religion has 
influenced it.  In the spirit of Holyoake’s views that all positions have a role to play in 
the polity, and all contribute to a state’s cultural identity, then the symbols do no harm. 
Susanna Mancini considers that religious symbols have the capacity for harm: 
 
Religious symbols, however, can easily turn into catalysts of aggression because they express 
and generate a primitive intellectual and relational level of human development - the level of 
blind fixations and belongings. Religious symbols unite, but at the same time they strengthen 
division and support the building of barriers between one's self and the other. Majorities and 
minorities seek shelter in religious symbols as a reflex of the increasing difficulty they 
experience in finding a common core of shared civic values.
 78 
 
However, this capacity should not be removed until the state considers that the harm 
to society outweighs the good.  Outside of France’s ‘hard secularism’ there are no 
                                                 
visibility’ to the symbols of a particular sect does not qualify, to say nothing of endorsing religion 
generally.” (Mark L. Movsesian, ‘Crosses and Culture: State-Sponsored Religious Displays in the US 
and Europe’ (2012) 1 (2) Oxford Journal of Law and Religion338). 
75 Susanna Mancini makes a distinction between flags and other public symbols by arguing that “in a 
pluralistic society, both for majorities as well as for minorities, religious symbols play a peculiar role 
in identity related dynamics. Their role cannot be compared with that of official State symbols such as 
the national flag, which do not represent any "official truth" but rather testify to the existence of a 
political community that shares a (limited) set of common political values.”  (Susanna Mancini, ‘The 
Power of Symbols and Symbols as Power: Secularism and Religion as Guarantors of Cultural 
Convergence’, (2008-09) 30 Cardozo Law Review 2629, 2630.) 
76 Susanna Mancini, ‘The Power of Symbols and Symbols as Power: Secularism and Religion as 
Guarantors of Cultural Convergence’, (2008-09) 30 Cardozo Law Review 2629, 2629, “religious 
symbol, such as the crucifix, or the crèche, is used as a ‘public language’ of identity by State 
authorities.” 
77 Isabelle Rorive, ‘Religious Symbols in the Public Space: In Search of a European Answer’ (2008-
09) 30 Cardozo Law Review 2669, 2670.  “The acceptance of religious symbols in the public sphere 
greatly varies from State to State. National political cultures and social histories weight heavily on the 
construction of concepts framing the scope of freedom of religion, such as secularism or public 
order.” 
78 Susanna Mancini, ‘The Power of Symbols and Symbols as Power: Secularism and Religion as 
Guarantors of Cultural Convergence’, (2008-09) 30 Cardozo Law Review 2629, 2630. 
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strong state views on this, and indeed France has not shown that there is harm to 
society from such symbols. 
 
III STATE FEAR OF BEING IDENTIFIED WITH RELIGION - RELIGIOUSLY IDENTIFIABLE 
CLOTHING 
 
This matter of religious symbols being endorsed by the state in public places is even 
more controversial in the public school environment where again the state attempts to 
associate a religious symbol with a secular purpose.  The most obvious symbols are 
those worn by students and teachers to publicly show their affiliation with a religious 
viewpoint. 
 
One of the most prominent issues in the media in the last ten to fifteen years has been 
the profoundly negative response of some secular states - notably France but also 
elsewhere in Europe - to overt personal displays of religious affiliation.  Most notably, 
the state has found that those who are of minority religious persuasions have been 
asserting their rights to act as their religion has obligated them (in most cases), through 
the wearing of conspicuous religious garb or jewellery.   
 
These cases cover a number of jurisdictions, and appear in most mainstream secular 
democracies to be anomalous to their general treatment of religious freedoms.79  The 
previous section of this chapter looked at the curious treatment of some jurisdictions 
to religious symbols, which on their face value had been in place for some time and 
were not being overtly used to endorse religion.  This section looks at old religious 
symbols in new contexts, where the state has had to consider new policy responses to 
the new circumstances, such as Islamic headdress in Europe, or Jewish symbols in 
Christian North America.  Holyoake’s principles would consider that all these symbols 
have little to do with secularism.  These symbols are not proselytising by themselves, 
but yet are being judged for what might be implied by their presence in the public 
sphere.  It is not clear at all what harm these symbols create in their respective 
jurisdictions.  The cases outline potential harms of passive proselytising.  If that were 
all that was required, then the state would have to remove all buildings and religious 
dress that are impliedly accepted and therefore endorsed by the state.    
 
As for other symbols mentioned in this thesis, I would argue that passive symbols are 
consistent with Holyoake’s principles.  They do not act to remove religion from having 
its place in the public sphere; indeed they are in the public sphere but do not say 
anything.  Their presence does not pressure the state into decisions that favour their 
religions.   Each of these cases are however slightly different in their context, and are 
worth discussion below. 
 
In most modern liberal secular democracies, those who are of the Christian tradition 
tend not to attract the enmity of the secular state for a number of reasons.80  The first 
is that states with a significant Christian history are unlikely to have laws successfully 
                                                 
79 As will be discussed below in the context of Canada, Switzerland and Turkey. 
80 However, recent cases have held that prohibitions against the wearing of religious symbols in the 
workplace, such as Chaplin v Royal Devon & Exeter Hospital NHS Foundation Trust [2010] ET 
1702886/2009 and Eweida v British Airways [2010] EWCA Civ 80 (holding that prohibitions 
regarding wearing crucifixes were not discriminatory). 
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passed that identify those who are members of the majority religious grouping.  
Second, in Christianity the wearing of crucifixes and similar are usually small and are 
worn as a sign of religious conviction and tend to be unobtrusive.  The state with such 
traditions therefore rarely has reason to consider the impact of Christian symbol worn 
by adherents.81   
 
However, the wearing of the Islamic Hijab, the Jewish Yarmulke and the Sikh Turban 
are seen by wearers as a religious duty or social obligation in the countries where these 
obligations are long accepted.  As with Christians, there is little issue with their 
wearing by states where these are traditional garb.82  However, in recent years there 
has been a large movement of people from areas of traditional acceptance of overt 
religious symbols worn by individuals, to lands where traditions have been to have 
minimal or no symbolism, such as migration of Muslims to Europe.83 
 
Many countries meeting unaccustomed religious diversity have approached the issue 
differently.  Some like the United Kingdom have seen little difficulty in 
accommodating change, where for example school children wearing religiously 
required clothing are common and unremarkable.84  France has banned such things 
unequivocally.85  Often the proffered argument for clothing bans have been that the 
clothing is associated with religious behaviours deemed to contradict the values that 
the workplace or school promotes.  
 
Many cases across the world have involved women wearing recognisable religious 
items as clothing, and usually Islamic headdress, in the public square as teachers or 
public employees.  Whilst many of these cases have originated in Europe, it has not 
been unknown in other jurisdictions such as the USA or Canada.86    
 
Government departments and schools in secular states commonly have within them 
individuals as employees or students who represent the multi-cultural and multi-
religious breadth of the general population.  A number of these will feel an obligation 
to wear items of religious garb that may challenge public policy or legislation.  Such 
individuals may feel that public policy against religious dress in a public place may 
breach their right to religious expression.  Often this clash of ideals ends up as 
litigation. 
 
                                                 
81 Susanna Mancini, ‘Religious Symbols in the Public Space: The Power of Symbols and Symbols as 
Power: Secularism and Religion as Guarantors of Cultural Convergence’ (2009) 30 Cardozo Law 
Review 2629, 2629. 
82 Peter G. Danchin, ‘Suspect Symbols: Value Pluralism as a Theory of Religious Freedom in 
International Law’ (2008) 33(1) Yale Journal of International Law 1, 3. 
83 Timothy M. Savage, 27(3) The Washington Quarterly, Summer 2004, 25, 25.  “Internally, Europe 
must integrate a ghettoized but rapidly growing Muslim minority that many Europeans view as 
encroaching upon the collective identity and public values of European society.” 
84 Matthias Koenig, ‘Incorporating Muslim migrants in western nation states – a comparison of the 
United Kingdom, France, and Germany’ (2005) 6(2) Journal of International Migration and 
Integration 219, 224. 
85 See generally Carolyn Evans, ‘The Islamic Scarf in the European Court of Human Rights’ (2006) 7 
Melbourne Journal of International Law 52; Christian Joppke, State Neutrality and Islamic headscarf 
laws in France and Germany (2007) 36(4) Theory and Society 313; Mohammad Mazher Idriss, 
‘Laïcité and the banning of the ‘hijab’ in France’ (2005) 25(2) Legal Studies 260.  
86 Bloomberg Businessweek, NY Sikh, Muslim workers allowed religious headwear, May 30 2012, 
<http://www.businessweek.com/ap/2012-05/D9V3C5L80.htm>. 
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The United States is generally seen as more tolerant than most states with respect to 
religiously inspired clothing.  Ioanna Tourkochoriti argues that this because in “in the 
United States the widespread religiosity makes the American legal order more 
respectful to religious differences.” Accordingly, “this religiosity makes the American 
legal order more open to accepting manifestations of religion in the public sphere.”87 
 
There are few cases as a consequence in the United States relating to issues between 
the state and wearers of distinctive religious dress.   The leading case in this area is 
Goldman v Weinberger.88  In Goldman the US Supreme Court rejected a Free Exercise 
Clause challenge to a US Air Force regulation which required Air Force officers not 
wear headgear whilst indoors.  
 
The Supreme Court was required to determine whether the Free Exercise Clause of 
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution required the military to 
accommodate religion by providing an exemption to military regulations regarding 
authorised clothing while on duty.  Captain Goldman was a doctor in the US Air Force, 
serving as a clinical psychologist.  He was also an orthodox Jew and an ordained 
Rabbi.  Contrary to military regulations he wore his yarmulke (skullcap) whilst on 
duty.   
 
Following an obligation to attend a court martial as a defence witness in 1981, the 
prosecution attorney complained that Goldman had breached Air Force regulations.  
When requested to cease breaching regulations by wearing the yarmulke, Captain 
Goldman sued - arguing that the state should permit an accommodation to him under 
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.  The U.S. Supreme Court held that 
no such accommodation was required.  Goldman argued in the Supreme Court that the 
defence had to pass the Sherbert89 test by demonstrating a "compelling interest" for 
the violation, which he argued could not be made out as wearing a yarmulke did not 
threaten military discipline.  The Court did not accept this, holding that the Sherbert 
test did not apply to the military as there was a need to "foster instinctive obedience, 
unity, commitment, and esprit de corps."90  Congress later permitted the wearing of 
religious dress by the military.91 
 
Goldman is concerned with a religious symbol in the form of clothing, in particular 
clothing that makes identifiable a religion that is not mainstream and is a symbol of 
difference.92  The Air Force regulation in question93 actually permitted military 
                                                 
87 Ioanna Tourkochoriti, ‘The Burka Ban: Divergent Approaches to Freedom of Religion in France 
and the USA’, (2012) 20 William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 791, 851-2. 
88 Goldman v Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986). 
89 The Sherbert test is a test used by the courts in the United States when considering cases involving 
unemployment compensation. The government is required to show a compelling state interest when 
such compensation is denied to a person who in some way was dismissed from employment due to 
the conditions of that employment not agreeing with the observed tenets of the employee’s religion. 
The test derives from the case of Sherbert v Verner, 374 US 398 (1963), and requires the 
demonstration of the state’s compelling interest in denying the compensation.  
90 Goldman v Weinberger, 475 US 503 (1986), 507. 
91 Proposals in Congress to amend the regulations finally succeeded in 1988 in the annual National 
Defense Authorization Act, providing for a general rule that "a member of the armed forces may wear 
an item of religious apparel while wearing the uniform of the member's armed force." 
92 Janet L. Dolgin, ‘Religious Symbols and the Establishment of a ‘National Religion’, (1987-88) 39 
Mercer Law Review 495, 506. 
93 Department of Defense Directive 1300.17 (June 18, 1985). 
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personnel to wear religious clothing.94  Brennan J in his dissent in that case observed 
that the Air Force Standard “only individuals whose outer garments and grooming 
are indistinguishable from those of mainstream Christians to fulfil their religious 
duties."95   
 
Brennan J therefore highlighted the possible problems of the state identifying itself 
with religion.  By having partisan policies favouring religion, it encouraged 
unbalanced treatment of other religious positions.  As Dolgin noted regarding the 
Lynch and Goldman decisions: 
 
Lynch establishes a national 'Christian' religion that combines the power of the state with the 
power of the insider. Goldman suggests the consequences for those who continue to display 
particularity. In the end, the civil religion supported in Lynch and reaffirmed in Goldman is 
neither civil nor a religion. Rather, it is a state ideology grounded in Christian forms but not 
in Christian theology. These cases combine the myths of the nation with Christian symbolic 
forms, unite the collective interests of the 'insider' with those of the state, and preclude all 
who disagree.96 
 
There have since been no comparable religious clothing cases in the US.  These cases 
do, however, make clear the reasonable concerns of the state in supporting, even for 
solidarity reasons, religion publicly through symbols.  To be consistent with 
Holyoakean secularism, the state need not overtly support religion or be limited in 
what it may do.  Rather it should not distinguish between religions and give a balanced 
treatment.97   
 
A case involving religious clothing in the form headscarves first occurred in Canada 
in an immigration case.  In Kaya v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration),98 Nurcan Kaya99 sought to remain in Canada as a refugee.  She lost her 
job in Turkey because she would not remove her Hijab whilst she taught in a public 
school.  The material before the initial Board of enquiry indicated that the European 
Human Rights Commission supported the decision of the Turkish Constitutional Court 
to the extent that it maintained the right of a secular state to restrict religious practice 
in line with the rights of citizens to equal treatment and religious freedoms.  The 
                                                 
94 Brennan J in that case, in dissent observed that “the Air Force cannot logically defend the content 
of its rule by insisting that discipline depends upon absolute adherence to whatever rule is established. 
If, as General Usher admitted at trial, App. 52, the dress code codified religious exemptions from the 
"no-headgear-indoors" regulation, then the wearing of a yarmulke would be sanctioned by the code, 
and could not be considered an unauthorized deviation from the rules” (Goldman v Weinberger, 475 
US 503 (1986), 517) 
95 Goldman v Weinberger, 475 US 503 (1986), 520. 
96 Janet L. Dolgin, ‘Religious Symbols and the Establishment of a ‘National Religion’, (1987-88) 39 
Mercer Law Review 495, 516. 
97 This does not mean placing symbols of every religion in public spaces, which would be 
unworkable.  
98 2004 FC 45 
99 Her status in Canada is determined under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001 
c27 as a person who by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution for reason of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion is unwilling or unable to avail 
himself or herself of the protection of the country of nationality.  A person may also be given refugee 
status in Canada if in need of protection because removal to the country of nationality could lead to 
subjection to torture, a risk to life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.  Mrs 
Kaya was found in the first instance not to be a refugee or a person in need of protection, on the 
grounds that the banning of the wearing of head scarves in public places reflected a government 
policy designed to protect the secular state, and was not discriminatory or persecutory.   
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Federal Court agreed.  Accordingly her removal to Turkey would not put her in danger 
of any form of maltreatment by the Turkish state. 
 
Mrs Kaya cited the 1984 Canadian case of Rajuden v Canada (Minister of Employment 
and Immigration)100 where it was held that there was persecution in Turkey in the form 
of punishment due to particular opinions or adherence to a particular creed or mode of 
worship.  This was not applied, as Mrs Kaya advised that her own Imam never 
encouraged women to wear the Hijab in the workplace, and she was not being harassed 
because of her adherence to any form of Islam or indeed any religion. 
 
The case was also distinguished from the 1994 case of Fosu v Canada (Minister of 
Employment and Immigration),101 where Jehovah’s Witnesses in Ghana had their 
public practice of religion prohibited.  In Turkey Mrs Kaya was permitted to practise 
her religion, and wear her Hijab in public.  Two other 1994 cases were also cited 
Namitabar v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)102 and Fathi-Rad v 
Canada (Secretary of State).103  These cases both dealt with Iranian women who were 
required by law to wear a Chador.  These cases were also distinguished, as there was 
no legal compulsion for Mrs Kaya to wear the Hijab in Turkey.   Canada, like the 
United States, continues to have debates on whether its constitution continues to reflect 
the views of the majority in supporting their religious rights.104 
 
Most of the cases involving religious dress in Canada have involved Sikh practices.105  
More recently, a religious dress in Canada related to a school student’s wearing of a 
kirpan, a knife-like weapon worn as a religious obligation by Sikhs.  In 2006 the 
Canadian Supreme Court held in Multani v Commission scolaire 
Marguerite-Bourgeoys106 that involved a 12 year old Sikh boy wearing one to school.  
The Court held that the banning of the kirpan in a school environment went against 
the freedom of religion principles within Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 
and was not considered to fall within the limitations clause of the Charter that allows 
reasonable limitations on rights and freedoms through legislation if it can be 
“demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” 107  The banning of kirpans 
in schools as a public safety reason for limitation of a constitutional rights was not a 
proportional response to the perceived threat.108 
 
                                                 
100 (1984), 55 N.R. 129 (F.C.A.) 
101 (1994), 90 FTR 182 
102 [1994] 2 FC 42, 78 FTR. 
103 (1994) 77 FTR 41 
104 “Just When you thought the Church and the State were Separated ...” Centre for Constitutional 
Studies < http://www.law.ualberta.ca/centres/ccs/news/?id=146>. 
105 Bhinder v CN [1985 2 S.C.R. 561] (railway employee required to wear a hard hat), Peel Board of 
Education v Ontario Human Rights Commission, Court File #1170/89 (Supreme Court of Ontario - 
Divisional Court) (Sikh teacher in a school with a weapon). 
106 [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256, 2006 SCC 6 
107 “1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it 
subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society.” 
108 Anthony Gray, ‘Comparative Religious Freedom: The Right to Wear Religious Dress” in Meg 
Wilkes Karraker, The Other People: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Migration (Palgrave 
Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2013), 175 
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In Canada, religion does not have its rights protected absolutely, and must be 
prioritised against other public interests.109  However, religious rights limitations are 
not applied readily and “the narrow conception of any limiting measures taken to 
protect safety and security is essential.”110  The cases in Canada have mainly involved, 
not altogether unreasonably, the obligation of the state to ensure public safety through 
concern about weapons in public spaces for which they have responsibility.  This has 
clashed with the wish of Sikhs to have their inflexible obligation111 to wear the kirpan 
acknowledged and respected.   
 
Again, there has been little evidence that there has been an identifiable threat to the 
state by a religious practice.  In the Holyoakean ideal, there is room for a practice that 
has no threat to the state, either through its nature as a religious symbol, or as an object 
that has the perceived capacity for harm.112   The 2006 case of Multani v Commission 
scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys113 has caused Canadians to review their national 
identity and forced them to reconcile religious traditions outside mainstream values.  
Non-Sikhs have had to re-evaluate the purpose of secularism in relation to national 
identity.114 Where the state has failed to make a case for a threat to its constitutional 
and secular identity, a new perception of national identity is forming, accepting in the 
Holyoakean mode that religious practices can have a place in the public sphere.   
 
Some have found it curious that there has been on balance less concern about religious 
weapons in Canada than there has been regarding religious headdress in France.115   
 
France has a long history on this issue.  Similarly to Canada, the cases examined in 
the supreme courts involved Islamic dress.  However, the emphasis there has been on 
school students.  In 1989 France was focused upon three girls who insisted on having 
their heads covered up in public.116  The girls were expelled from their school for 
wearing sign of their religion that treated as an attack on the public secularism of 
France, Laïcité.  The refusing by the headmasters to admit these girls to school created 
a great deal of media attention, which had to be addressed by the Ministry of 
Education.  They referred the matter to the Conseil d’Etat, the French Court of Final 
Instance on administrative matters, which held that the wearing of clothing that 
indicated a religious affiliation was not of itself incompatible with secularism.117   
                                                 
109 See for example Children’s Aid Society [1995] 1 SCR. 315, where the Canadian Supreme Court 
held that  the interest in administering a life-saving blood transfusion to a child to outweigh the rights 
of the child’s parents to prevent the transfusion on religious grounds. 
110 Michael Baker, ‘Security and the Sacred: Examining Canada’s Legal Response to the Clash of 
Public Safety and Religious Freedom’ (2010) 13 Touro International Law Review 1, 58. 
111 See ‘Understanding the Kirpan’, World Sikh Organization of Canada 
<http://worldsikh.ca/page/understanding-kirpan >. 
112 See ‘Understanding the Kirpan’, World Sikh Organization of Canada 
<http://worldsikh.ca/page/understanding-kirpan >.  “The idea of a Sikh attacking someone with a 
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113Multani v Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256, 2006 SCC 6 
114 See generally Valerie Stoker, ‘Zero Tolerance? Sikh Swords, School Safety, and Secularism in 
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In 1996,118 the Conseil d’Etat determined three cases involving the expulsion of girls 
wearing headscarves.  These cases were notable in that by this time references to the 
principle of secularism were missing, and replaced with a view that the freedom to 
express a religious view cannot be limited by reference to secularism.  The 1996 
decisions meant that the headscarves by themselves could not be used to argue an act 
of pressure or proselytism.  Dealing with this issue became less subjective, limiting 
freedom of religious expression in this way to the protection of public order, or the 
continuity of the public service provided by the school, and the regular attendance at 
classes.  Pupils could not use the more pragmatic decisions of this sort to wear 
distinctive religious signs in order to avoid course attendance or to avoid sport or 
technical classes.119 
  
The French Senate approved by a significant margin the bill put to it to ban the Hijab 
and other religious insignia in state schools on 3 March 2004.  The French Prime 
Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin insisted before the vote that the law was not intended to 
discriminate between religions, but to “send a powerful and quick signal”, and that the 
law was needed to contain the spread of “Muslim fundamentalism”, and by doing so 
ensure the integrity of the French principle of secularism.   
 
This interpretation of the ‘hard’ secularism exemplified in France is clearly not 
consistent with Holyoake’s principles.  There is no appeal to inclusive views 
compatible with Holyoakean ideals, or indeed to any philosophical view.  The 
legislation appeals politically to the French Republic’s long history of enmity with 
religion, and a wish not to return to the times before the 1789 Revolution.120  
 
At the same time as the introduction of the ban on religious dress, three Sikh boys121 
were expelled from French schools for wearing turbans.  Jasvir Singh had appealed to 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), which had held that the ban on turbans 
was a proportionate response to the aims of protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others and the protection of public order.  However Bikramjit Singh went further.  
Only recently, in 2013 he succeeded in Bikramjit Singh v France,122 when the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee found that France’s restrictions on the wearing of 
overt religious symbols breached a student’s religious freedoms under the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.123   
                                                 
 the pupil cannot refuse attendance in a course on the basis that the course would be against 
the student’s religious convictions; 
 the wearing of those signs would acts of pressure, provocation, propaganda or proselytism, 
and must not be ostentatious; and  
 the wearing of religious signs must not interfere with the aims or mission of the public 
service or utility. 
118 Conseil d’Etat, 27 novembre 1996, Ligue islamique du Nord et autres; M. et mme Wissaadane et 
autres; M. et mme Jeouit. 
119 Claire Saas, “Muslim Headscarf and Secularism in France” (2001) 3 European Journal of 
Migration and Law 453, 455. 
120 See generally Tony Meacham, Master’s dissertation: Secularism and the Right to Freedom of 
Religion: The Banning of Headscarves in France (University of New England, 2005). 
121 Jasvir Singh, Bikramjit Singh and Ranjit Singh. 
122 UN Doc CCPR/C/106/D/1852/2008. 
123 The French legislation  (Act No. 2004-228) that was the subject of the complaint relates to the 
wearing of religious symbols or clothing within the state school system. France’s Education Code 
provided that “[i]n public primary schools, secondary schools and lycées, the wearing of symbols or 
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The complainant, Bikramjit Singh, was in 2004 an Indian national attending a lycée in 
France.  He had attended school at the beginning of the school year wearing a keski, 
which is a light piece of dark material worn by adult Sikhs men to cover and protect 
their hair as a religious obligation.  The school asked Mr Singh to remove the keski, a 
request with which he did not comply.  The school initially suspended the student, and 
then later restricted his learning activities.  He appealed to an administrative tribunal 
which had him expelled, forcing him to study by correspondence.  He had no 
difficulties on this issue when he entered university.  On appeal to the Committee, 
which handed down its decision in February 2013, he succeeded on the grounds of 
religious discrimination under Article 18124 of the ICCPR.125  The headscarf and 
similar head covering issues remains a conflict between wearers and the French 
state.126   
 
Some ten years after the introduction of the French law banning conspicuous religious 
symbols in schools was introduced,127 the debate remains based on a perspective of 
the state being paternalistic.  The French state is seen as having a normative ideal of 
the French Republic as promoting individual autonomy, in the sense of Isaiah Berlin’s 
ideal of ‘positive liberty’.  Policies relating to the banning of the hijab are therefore 
not intended to prevent harm in the sense that the Utilitarians posited, but rather have 
been for the purpose individual emancipation, a continuation of policies that go back 
to the 1789 Revolution and its reaction against the Catholic Church.128   
 
In such a ‘hard secularist’ environment, the French state is being paternalistic, and is 
denying views contrary to that of the state having a contribution to the public sphere.  
This may even be understandably the response of Laïcité to public symbols, as the 
                                                 
clothing by which pupils manifest their religious affiliation in a conspicuous manner is forbidden. 
Under the rules of procedure, disciplinary procedures shall be preceded by a dialogue with the pupil.” 
124 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 
125 The Committee considered that there was no evidence that the wearing of the keski posed any 
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126 Sydney Morning Herald, Sikhs fight to wear turban to school, 24 September 2013 
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127 loi no 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le port de signes 
ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, collèges et lycées publics" 
("Law #2004-228 of March 15, 2004 concerning, as an application of the principle of the separation 
of church and state, the wearing of symbols or garb which show religious affiliation in public primary 
and secondary schools").  The author goes on to argue that the subsequent ‘burqa ban’ in France in 
2010 continues such state paternalism to adult women instead of just school children (Article 1 
declaring that “it is forbidden to wear in public places any garment designed to hide 
the face”  (Loi 2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l’espace 
public (1) [Law 2010-1192 of October 11, 2010 banning face covering in public spaces (1)]). 
128 Cécile Laborde, ‘State paternalism and religious dress code’ (2011) 10(2) International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 398, 399 
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prevailing political context has been closer to antipathy rather than sympathy.129  Such 
paternalism is antithetical to Holyoake’s wish for all viewpoints to be treated equally 
in the public sphere, not tolerated and treated as a threat to the status quo.   
 
However, the treatment of Islamic headdress has not been limited in Europe to France.  
Other secular states, such as Germany, have been adjudicating on this issue in their 
constitutional court on matters originating in the Länder.  The German cases have 
addressed more clearly their concerns on these issues.    These cases, similar to a 
number of religious symbol cases mentioned above, show that the state argues that the 
religious dress cases somehow infringe the religious neutrality of the state.  How it 
does so is not made very clear, but can generally be categorised with cases identified 
in the previous section relating to religious symbols as matters where the threat to the 
state is not made very clear by the symbol.  The nature of these symbols, as with others, 
appears to involve context as well as time.130 
 
Islamic headscarf at the federal level in Germany has been seen in two cases at the 
Federal Constitutional Court in recent times.  The first case, the “teacher-headscarf” 
decision131 in 2003, involved a Muslim woman who had applied for a teaching position 
at a German school. She was a German citizen, born in Afghanistan.  A condition of 
that employment was that she was qualified for the position, as a civil servant of one 
of the Länder.  The question arose as to whether a woman applying for a teaching 
position in a German school who is otherwise qualified for the position, is failing to 
meet that qualification if she is not prepared to remove that headscarf.  The woman 
argued that the headscarf was integral to her religious identity, and that a requirement 
to remove it would infringe132 the German Basic Law.133 
 
It would follow naturally from that that it would be permissible to wear a headscarf at 
work.  However, if the wearing of that headscarf is related to a requirement of religious 
faith, the question arises as to whether the headscarf becomes a form of religious 
indoctrination and militates against any right of students not to be so indoctrinated, 
and not to believe in the faith being displayed.134  By displaying her faith, such a 
                                                 
129 See generally T. Jeremy Gunn, ‘Religious Freedom and Laïcité: A Comparison of the United States 
and France’, 2004 Brigham Young University Law Review 419, 456-457 (“the headscarf is increasingly 
seen as the symbol of a foreign people--with a foreign religion--who have come to France, but who do 
not wish to integrate themselves fully into French life or accept French values,” and that “just before 
the events in 2003 that raised the headscarf to a sensational media issue, some leading French legal 
scholars suggested the possibility that the real concern regarding the Islamic headscarf may not be 
related to high principles of a neutral republican education in public schools, but a deeper unease about 
Islam.”); Adrien Katherine Wing and Monica Nigh Smith, ‘Critical Race Feminism Lifts the Veil: 
Muslim Women, France, and the Headscarf Ban’ (2005-2006) 39 University of California Davis Law 
Review 743, 745 (“While this law affected Jewish yarmulkes, Sikh turbans, and large Christian crosses, 
its main effect was to ban the wearing of headscarves, or hijabs, by young Muslim girls.”). 
130 There have been few of these cases relating to Islamic dress in North American or European 
jurisdictions since the immediate period after late 2001. 
131 BVerfG, 2 BvR 1436/02. 
132 Articles 4(1) and 4(2), and 33(3). 
133 Christine Langenfeld and Sarah Mohsen, “Germany: The teacher head scarf case” (2005) 3 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 86.  Such cases involve a number of issues that have been 
raised in German courts.  Articles 4.1 and 4.2 of the Basic law provide for freedom of religion.  
Article 33.3 of the Basic Law provides for equal access to public access irrespective of religion.   
134 Article 6.2 Sentence 1 provides for the right of a parent to determine the principles of their child’s 
education.  Article 7.1 provides for the responsibility of the state to supervise public education.   
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teacher may be infringing upon such a right.  The question was whether the teacher, 
by wearing the scarf infringed the religious neutrality of the state.135  
 
That Federal Constitutional Court to which she appealed acknowledged that the matter 
did touch upon freedom of religion rights, and that the appointment had to be 
considered irrespective of religion.136  The preservation of the neutrality of the state 
was considered a core limit to constitutional rights.   
 
The Court felt137 that the principle of neutrality in the public sphere had gained more 
importance due to the increased plurality of modern society.  Whilst looking at the 
rights to religious freedom of the applicant, the court balanced them against the 
infringement of the freedom of religion of the children whom she might teach, and the 
rights of the parents to determine the quality of that teaching.   The Court rejected the 
argument that, as a private statement, a headscarf did not infringe against the state’s 
neutrality.  Rather, the Court held the headscarf is a powerful symbol of religious 
affiliation.   
 
Whilst presently few in number, these cases suggest that the issue of religious freedom 
will soon enter public debate in Germany,138 including associated matters of state 
neutrality and the nature of a pluralistic state.139   
 
In Germany, Muslims have fought to have Mosques built, with arguments made that 
traditionally shaped mosques would disrupt the Berlin skyline, or that calls to prayer 
would disturb the peace.  Arguments have been made that the call to prayer is 
analogous to the sounds made by church bells.  Efforts have also been made to 
accommodate the special needs of students to adhere to the frequent requirements for 
prayer.  However, Muslims have been testing the limits of secular institutions, by 
challenging universal laws on polygamy or compulsory school attendance on religious 
grounds.140 
                                                 
135 Matthias Mahlmann, “Religious Tolerance, Pluralist Society and the Neutrality of the State: The 
Federal Constitutional Court’s Decision in the Headscarf Case” (2003) 4(11) German Law Journal, 
para 4.  More contentiously, the argument was also raised whether, if the scarf were a sign of a 
patriarchal society which is said by some to subjugate women, the condoning of the wearing of the 
scarf was also irreconcilable with the principle of equal treatment in Articles 3.2 and 3.3. 
136 The Court however did argue that her appointment was subject to limits to constitutional rights 
under Article 33.5 of the Basic Law, which enables the functioning of public administration.   
137 at 255. 
138 Whilst the headscarf has been arguably the initiator in a number of jurisdictions of laws designed 
to prevent overt signs of religious affiliation in the public sphere, there are some signs that the 
provisions are being applied more even-handedly.  An amended school law was adopted in 
Niedersachsen on April 29, 2004, which stipulated that a teacher’s outward appearance should leave 
no doubt as to his or her fitness to convey the state’s educational values.  State regulations continue to 
be considered to ban ostentatious displays of religious affiliation across Germany, particularly in 
Hesse and the Saarland, as well as Bavaria and Baden-Württemburg.  In general, the state regulations 
in place or presently being considered generally interpret headscarves as political statements that 
directly contradict values considered fundamental in the German constitution.  However, more 
disturbingly, overt Christian displays are considered by some commentators as unlikely to contravene 
the rule of neutrality, and indeed perhaps even conform to equality clauses of the Basic Law. (see also 
Christine Langenfeld and Sarah Mohsen, “Germany: The teacher head scarf case” (2005) 3 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 86, 92.) 
139 Matthias Mahlmann, op cit. 
140 Katherine Pratt Ewing, ‘Legislation Religious Freedom: Muslim Challenges to the Relationship 
between “Church” and “State” in Germany and France’ (2000) 129(4) Daedalus 31. 
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Gerstenberg141 has recently noted on this point that   
 
While a distinctive feature of the German approach is the emphasis on freedom of conscience 
as a principle, another feature of the German approach is the assumption that Christian culture 
occupies a privileged place in German public life and is, indeed, a postulate of German political 
identity and social cohesion.  Consequently its explicit affirmation in the public schools is a 
compelling state interest. 
 
The problem of religious garb being restricted by the state is not limited to France and 
Germany, but is a constitutional issue in many European countries.  Nine million 
Muslims live in Western Europe, which therefore has them constituting significantly 
large religious minorities in most of the countries in which they reside.142  The very 
name of the concept of “church-state relations” indicates that traditionally the issues 
have been Christianity-centric and applying current thinking on separating religious 
issues from the state have not until recently involved significant issues involving 
Muslims, who only in recent years have achieved significant numbers and proportions 
in a number of countries - including France.   Accommodating Islamic religious 
practices and philosophies into the strict separation of religion and state has varied in 
many countries.  
 
The headscarf in Turkey is also a complex issue.  The issue of women covering their 
heads is not seen just as a personal statement of religious affiliation.  Women are 
banned from wearing headscarves when working in state institutions, or attending 
school or university.  This is because the wearing of a headscarf is seen not so much 
as a personal choice or religious obligation, but rather as a political statement that 
clashes directly with the secular (or Kemalist) foundations of the state.143 
 
One such case taken to the European Court of Human Rights was Şahin v Turkey,144 
decided in 2004.  Mrs Şahin was a fifth-year medical student at Istanbul University.  
On 23 February 1998 the Istanbul University authorities issued a circular stating that 
students wearing a beard of an Islamic headscarf would not be admitted to classes, 
training or tutorials.  The next month the Higher Education Council published an 
information note on regulation dress in higher education establishments, stating that it 
was a disciplinary and criminal offence for students to wear Islamic headscarves in 
such establishments.  That month because of her headdress, Mrs Sahin was denied 
access to an examination, and subsequently impeded from attending lectures or 
enrolling in other courses.  She appealed to the European Court of Human Rights. 
 
The Court noted that Islamic headdresses were worn as a religious duty, and that her 
decision to wear hers was as a result of a religious belief.  Accordingly the regulations 
that forced her to remove her scarf constituted a restriction on her ability to manifest 
her religion.  The Court noted that regulations relating to wearing of headscarves were 
well posted prior to Miss Şahin’s enrolment at university, and that she could have been 
                                                 
141 Oliver Gerstenberg, “Germany: Freedom of Conscience in public schools” (2005) 3 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 94, 96. 
142 J. Christopher Soper and Joel S. Fetzer, “Explaining the Accommodation of Muslim Religious 
Practices in France, Britain, and Germany” (2003) 1 French Politics 39. 
143 Gareth Jenkins, “Muslim Democrats in Turkey?” (2003) 45(1) Survival 45, 48. 
144 44774/98 [2005] ECHR 819 (10 November 2005). 
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expected to be well aware of those prohibitions, and that the wearing of the headscarf 
at university was incompatible with the fundamental principles of the republic. 
 
The Court found that the measure which restricted the wearing of the headscarf was 
legitimate in meeting the objective of protecting the rights and freedoms of others and 
of protecting public order.  As to whether it was necessary, the Court found that the 
interference with her rights was based on the principles of secularism and equality 
which reinforced and complemented each other.  The Court went on to note that 
 
Secularism in Turkey was, among other things, the guarantor of: democratic values; the 
principle that freedom of religion was inviolable, to the extent that it stemmed from individual 
conscience; and, the principle that citizens were equal before the law.  Restrictions could be 
placed on freedom to manifest one’s religion in order to defend those values and principles.145 
 
The Court went on to say that the concept of secularism was consistent with the 
European Convention on Human Rights and noted that upholding that principle could 
be regarded as necessary for the protection of the democratic system in Turkey.  It 
noted that the in the Turkish context it had to be borne in mind the impact that wearing 
such an overt religious symbol could have on the remainder of the community which 
chose not to wear it.    
 
Unusually Switzerland too had a case involving Islamic headdress which was 
ultimately settled in the European Court of Human Rights.  In Switzerland in 2001, in 
the canton of Geneva, a school teacher was disqualified three years after commencing 
service for wearing a headscarf to class.  Geneva is considered to have a secular 
tradition comparable to that of France.  Despite no complaints being made regarding 
such wearing, the teacher wore it in contravention of school rules prohibiting its 
wearing in 1997.  That prohibition was based on a threat to the state’s neutrality.  The 
Swiss Federal Court rejected the complaint, as did the ECHR in Dahlab v 
Switzerland,146 which argued that the prohibition did not contravene Article 9 of the 
ECHR, and was proportionate.147 
 
The above cases show the diversity of cases and jurisdictions where the state, in 
attempting not to be seen to be identifying with religion, has created results not 
proportionate to the issues.  The state has in a number of cases endeavoured to 
maintain a public perception of neutrality in the public sphere.  That neutrality has 
been argued to be threatened by a belief on behalf of the state that should individuals 
employed by them, such as teachers, or under their responsibility, such as students, 
who openly wear religious symbols must be doing so in the full knowledge of the state, 
and by extension, must be being favoured to do so. 
 
There is, however, little evidence in such states that the disregarding of overt religious 
symbols in clothing in state controlled environments has had the effect of state 
endorsement or favouring of the religion in question relative to all others.  
Accordingly, the actions to quell the religious clothing in public areas appear to be an 
                                                 
145 European Court of Human Rights, “Chamber judgments in the cases of Leyla Şahin v Turkey and 
Zeynep Tekin v Turkey”.    <http://press.coe.int/cp/2004/330a(2004).htm.> 
146 Dahlab v Switzerland, February 15, 2001 – Application No. 42393/98. 
147 Christine Langenfeld and Sarah Mohsen, “Germany: The teacher head scarf case”, (2005) 3 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 86, 92. 
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attempt to maintain a neutral stance to religion where no overt threat to it appears.  
Accordingly, state action as noted above has often created litigation and community 
disharmony where none need have been.   
 
Carolyn Evans is critical of the approach taken by the International Court of Human 
Rights in these matters, particularly in the Swiss case of Dahlab, and the Turkish case 
of Şahin: 
 
The Court sided with the state against a student who was denied access to education and 
forced out of university. Such judgments, justified on the basis of equality, tolerance and 
human rights, do harm to the very notion of neutrality that the Court claims to be central to 
proper adjudication in these areas. When those who are not Christians but whose rights have 
been violated can gain no relief from the Court because the Court employs stereotypes and 
refuses to engage with the complexity of modern religious pluralism, then religious freedom 
and pluralism are undermined and the notion of human rights degraded.148 
 
As I have mentioned early in this chapter, the issue of religious symbols, and 
particularly religious dress in the public sphere brings up many inconsistent treatments 
with little by way of rationale for their treatment by the various states, or clear 
explanation of what danger these passive objects pose to the state.149 
IV IS THERE A LEGITIMATE BASIS FOR LIMITATIONS TO THE MANIFESTING OF 
RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS BY INDIVIDUALS OR THE STATE? 
 
The original views of Holyoake regarding Secularism did not insist that religion be 
removed from the public space, only that it not be perceived to be driving public 
policy.  Yet, in the case of overt religious symbolism in the public arena, religion, or 
the fear of being associated with it, has resulted in the state being driven by religious 
matters.   The opportunity for religion in the secular ideal advocated by Holyoake to 
have a place in the public sphere without driving it is lost. 
 
On the surface the response by the state on occasion to manifest religious symbols in 
the public sphere can seem to be disproportionate,150 and the solutions meted out by 
higher courts can sometimes be unhelpful and confusing as a guide to constitutional 
interpretation.151  However, as noted earlier in this thesis, the state may restrict 
freedoms in general and religious freedoms in particular in order to protect the rights 
                                                 
148 Carolyn Evans, ‘The “Islamic Scarf” in the European Court of Human Rights’ (2006) 7(1) 
Melbourne Journal of International Law 52, 73. 
149 I expect a deeper analysis of this is outside the scope of this thesis. 
150 Such as recently, where the United Nations Human Rights Committee has found that France’s 
restrictions on the wearing of religious symbols or clothing in state schools breached a student’s right 
to religious freedom under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  The Committee 
held that “The Committee accepted that the promotion and protection of secularism within the state 
education sector was a legitimate aim and one which served to protect the rights of others, particularly 
public order and safety. However, bearing in mind the particular circumstances of this case, the 
Committee ruled that France’s response had been unnecessary and disproportionate, as there was no 
evidence that Mr Singh’s wearing of the keski posed any actual threat to the rights and interests of 
others, or to public order.” 
151 Such as in 2005, where in the US, in McCreary County v ACLU of Kentucky, 545 US 844 (2005) 
the US Supreme Court found that the Christian Ten Commandments displayed inside a court house 
were held to be unconstitutional, yet in Van Orden v Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005), decided by the same 
court at the same time, the Ten Commandments displayed outside a court house on a monument on 
public grounds violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the US Constitution. 
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of the general community through reasons such as the protection of public order.  Can 
there be any legitimate reasons for limiting religious symbolism? 
 
States may wish to regulate religious symbols in order to control public institutions 
such as the military, prisons and similar where the maintenance of order is essential to 
the cohesion and administration of the public body.  Additionally the state’s interest 
in public health or safety may be impaired in the absence of such control such as in 
the insistence of public health authorities for motorcycle riders to wear helmets, or for 
women not to wear burqas in drivers licence pictures.   
 
A third interest of the state occurs when religious symbols in public settings may be 
symbolic of the state.152  While limitations on the first two grounds of behaviours 
permitted under Article 18 of the ICCPR have been arguably reasonably legitimate, a 
case for the last has been much more problematical as there is no clear public interest 
doctrine, no clear explanation of what it is that the state fears when symbols of religion 
share space in the public domain with symbols of the state. 
 
It is difficult to understand, at least when referencing against Holyoake’s principles, 
how passive symbols in schools can be inconsistent with secularism.  It has been 
suggested in some of the cases above that passive symbols may influence young minds 
to question their religious upbringing (or lack of it).  There is some case for religious 
doctrine introduced into public schools to be inconsistent with secular principles 
unless as part of a voluntary program run from outside, but these cases have largely 
been teased out, and decided some time ago to be inconsistent with secular principles 
when the doctrine is imparted by agents of the state directly. 
 
In conclusion, while Holyoake sought a public space that respected religious 
contributions, what he may have not anticipated was the wish of some to make 
symbolic gestures through displays and clothing that, in a neutral public environment, 
make a statement identifying them as members of a religious community.  Such 
displays have at times been contentious, especially in areas such as schools and 
courthouses where in some states such as France and the USA, where these displays 
make impermissible suggestions that the state supports such displays contrary to the 
state model of secularism.   
 
This and the previous chapter considered where the state has shied away from 
association with religion in the public sphere, or has actively championed it.  The next 
chapter looks at the grey area in between where the state has not endorsed religion, 
but has arguably used it to shape society with a secular purpose. 
 
  
                                                 
152 Peter G. Danchin, ‘Suspect symbols: Value Pluralism as a Theory of Religious Freedom in 
International Law’, (2008) 33(1) Yale Journal of International Law 1, 5-6. 
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CHAPTER 7 
SECULARISM AND RELIGIOUS EDUCATION 
 
Holyoake had clear views on education.  Consistent with his view of religion having 
a role in the public sphere, he felt also that there was a role for religion within 
education.  Education did not have to include religion, nor did it have to discount it.  
Secularism did not advocate the removal of religion from education; it simply did 
not mandate it.1 
 
The issues in this chapter involve the presence in some way of religion in the 
government owned, public school system in various countries.  Any involvement by 
the state in the public school system is subject to the inference that such involvement 
must not be at the behest of, or for the direct benefit of, religion. However, a 
relationship with religion in the school system, as is the case in the general public 
sphere, can often simply arise incidentally. Just the same, often the state will seek to 
distance itself to remove any such suggestion, or just dismiss any such linkage.  These 
cases have involved the funding of schools by the state, the presence of religious 
symbols in state schools, and the direction of students to comply with religious activity 
such as prayer, or to learn religious doctrine. 
 
The cases examined in this chapter have a relation to the previous two chapters in that 
they address the treatment of the state to circumstances in the public sphere that come 
within their purview.  Every secular liberal democratic state has responsibility for 
education overall.  None completely disregard education, and at minimum will 
regulate it in some way, if not actively fund it and establish standards that are 
consistent nationally.   
 
However, in some jurisdictions, the administration of education creates issues for the 
state when it is suggested that the intersection of law and religion in the public sphere 
means that the state in some way endorses the religious message of the schools within 
its responsibility.  The most common cases involve school funding and traditional 
religious displays in schools, neither of which are new concepts, but in recent years 
have come under scrutiny as being somehow inconsistent with secular principles.   
 
I SCHOOL FUNDING CASES 
 
Although some of the cases discussed subsequently in this chapter relate to issues 
resolved in the courts many years ago, the concern that the state may be imposing 
religious values beyond its secular charter remains today.  In California recently, some 
parents expressed concern that a uniform program for Yoga in infants’ schools is a 
form of covert religious instruction by the state.2 
 
                                                 
1 GJ Holyoake, The Principles of Secularism (Austin & Company, London, 3rd Ed., 1870), 27. 
2 Sydney Morning Herald, Parents sue schools over yoga program, 4 March 2013. 
<http://www.smh.com.au/world/parents-sue-schools-over-yoga-program-20130303-2feps.html >.   
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This has always been a difficult area of jurisprudence.  Laura Underkuffler3 
highlighted the difficulties when she observed that  
 
[i]n any society in which religious diversity and consequent hostilities exist, the balance that 
is struck among religious freedom, parental rights, and state educational objectives will 
necessarily be an uneasy one. The elevation of any one of these to absolutely protected status 
will threaten the others, and will jeopardise the complex and delicate social fabric of which all 
are a part. 
 
Holyoake was quite clear on this issue.  In the Principles of Secularism4 he stated that  
 
[t]he distinction between Secular instruction and Secularism is explained, in these words:—
‘Secular education is by some confounded with Secularism, whereas the distinction between 
them is very wide. Secular education simply means imparting Secular knowledge separately—
by itself, without admixture of Theology with it. The advocate of Secular education may be, 
and generally is, also an advocate of religion; but he would teach religion at another time and 
treat it as a distinct subject, too sacred for coercive admixture into the hard and vexatious 
routine of a school. He would confine the inculcation of religion to fitting seasons and chosen 
instruments. He holds also that one subject at a time is mental economy in learning. Secular 
education is the policy of a school—Secularism is the policy of life to those who do not accept 
Theology. 
 
The two issues he articulates are therefore clear.  The secular nature of the state is the 
means by which members of the state are governed through the nature of their 
constitution.  Secular education is the absence of religious elements in formal 
education.  If a government supports a school system for secular reasons - such as the 
provision of benefits available to all schools and students - then, if the religious 
mission of school is also supported by these means, it is purely incidental.   
 
The state often does not control entirely the education sector.  It is often more cost 
effective to have non-government providers set up schools and universities and 
subsidise them than to set up and pay for a school itself and duplicate the service.5  
When attempting to support the general school system to facilitate access to education, 
such as bus fares, it may be argued that such incidental support to a school and its 
students is a support of the underlying education provider, which is often a religious 
institution.6    
 
This of course becomes a difficult argument.  If the state were to withdraw general 
services to the community which are incidentally supportive of religious bodies, would 
that not, for example, be the same as withdrawing emergency services from the same 
groups?  Where can the line be drawn between direct support of religious institutions, 
and indirect support which saves the institution expending the same monies for the 
same purpose? In providing indirect support for religion, the state is often accused of 
favouring religion, and thereby establishing it.   
 
In Australia, the issue of state support of religious schools has also been examined by 
the Australian High Court.  This was considered in Attorney-General (Victoria); Ex 
                                                 
3 Laura S. Underkuffler, ‘Public Funding for Religious Schools: Difficulties and Dangers in a 
Pluralistic Society’ (2001) 27(4) Oxford Review of Education 577, 588. 
4 GJ Holyoake, The Principles of Secularism (Austin & Company, London, 3rd Ed., 1870), 27. 
5 OECD, Education at a Glance 2011 OECD Indicators: OECD Indicators, Chapter D, D5.    
6 For example school funding: McCollum v Board of Education, School District 71, 333 US 203 
(1948). 
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rel Black v Commonwealth,7 known as the ‘Defence of Government Schools’ or 
‘DOGS Case’.  Federal legislation providing for financial grants for state religious 
schools was challenged as breaching the provisions of section 1168 of the Australian 
Constitution.  The financial assistance legislation was provided to the states on the 
understanding that the funds were to be made available to state government and non-
government schools.  Most of the non-government providers in Australia are 
religiously based. 
 
It was held that the Acts were valid laws under ss 96 and 116 of the Australian 
Constitution.  Section 96 permits grants of Commonwealth funding through a State to 
third parties for a purpose beyond commonwealth power.  A law providing incidental 
support to a religious body and its schools was therefore not a law establishing a 
religion. 
 
The treatment of religion in Australia’s public sphere is generally uncontroversial.  
This is because of the generally weak guarantees within section 116 for religious 
freedoms.9  However, while some may see this provision as not providing for a strong 
separation of state and religious analogous to the religion clauses of the First 
Amendment to the US Constitution, this provision actually is quite consistent with 
Holyoake’s views.  Section 116 makes clear what the Australian government may not 
do; what is left is quite a deal of room for religion to contribute in the public sphere.  
Also, issues relating to this provision apply only to the Australian territories, and not 
to the several states.10  Although section 116 is relatively weak in preventing the 
Australian government from striking down legislation that would likely not pass 
muster in the United States Supreme Court, organised religion is also not as strong in 
Australia in its desire to direct the Australian Government agenda.  While often 
comparisons will be drawn with the Australian Constitution and its American 
counterpart, the Australian treatment of public religion is much closer to that of the 
United Kingdom.  The latter, although not being constitutionally secular, does not 
have a strong religious establishment driving through the national government 
legislation and policies that could further its ideals were it to be aggressively pursued 
-  as has sometimes been the case in the United States. 
 
In the United States, Everson v Board of Education11 was the first case there to 
examine school funding, involving a New Jersey law authorising school boards to 
reimburse bus fares for children to attend either public or catholic schools.  Here the 
court had to deal with the conflict between two groups.  The first were those who 
wished to introduce religious teachings into public school curricula and also those who 
wished to have public tax dollars fund private religious schools.  The others were those 
who considered that the Establishment Clause had a strict “wall of separation” 
between church and state. A divided court upheld funding for buses to parochial 
schools.  Everson was decided in 1947 upholding the funding because the assistance 
                                                 
7 (1981) 146 CLR 559. 
8 “The Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing any religion, or for imposing any 
religious observance, or for prohibiting the free exercise of any religion, and no religious test shall be 
required as a qualification for any office or public trust under the Commonwealth.” 
9 Luke Beck, ‘Clear and Emphatic: The Separation of Church and State under the Australian 
Constitution’ (2008) 27(2) University of Tasmania Law Review 161, 162. 
10 Luke Beck, ‘Clear and Emphatic: The Separation of Church and State under the Australian 
Constitution’ (2008) 27(2) University of Tasmania Law Review 161, 195. 
11 330 US 1 (1947). 
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went to the child, not the church.12  The Court, without dissent on this point, declared 
that the Establishment Clause forbids not only practices that “aid one religion” or 
“prefer one religion over another,” but as well those that “aid all religions.”  Whether 
the funding went to the parent or the student is largely immaterial.  A secular state in 
the Holyoakean mould would find these questions irrelevant.  Where a state supports 
education through bus subsidies and the like, then the issue is clearly overthought.  In 
ensuring that students could attend school their education was being facilitated.  The 
legislation bringing the program into effect would have no overt support of religion 
stated.  In a modern, complex and interconnected world, it is impossible not to act in 
the area of education and not have an incidental benefit for private education.   
 
The issues considered in Everson are seen as the first expression in modern American 
jurisprudence of the doctrine of the separation of religion and the state.  A number of 
commentators view the cases that followed Everson with some degree of 
disappointment.  Noah Feldman13 for example suggests that from the time of Everson, 
the Supreme Court had erred in transforming the Establishment Clause from a 
protector of religious freedom to a guarantor of equality for all religious practitioners.  
Conversely Gabriël Moens14 argues that government indifference and absence of aid 
to religion actually impedes the Free Exerciseof religion and that government 
assistance would address a perceived tension in the Religion Clauses created by 
Everson. 
 
In the Holyoakean perspective, there are private and public schools, each are valued 
for their contribution to childrens’ education, and students have been able to attend 
following the subsidy.  There has never been any proof in the US or any other liberal 
democracy that such programs and their analogues have ever been intended directly 
to benefit religion.  To do so overtly would breach the secular principles of the state. 
 
Some decades later Lemon v Kurtzman15 was decided, arguably the beginning of the 
contemporary Neutrality Principle16 and the source of the controversial ‘Lemon Test’.  
The US Supreme Court struck down a Pennsylvania law reimbursing religious schools 
for textbooks and teacher salaries.  The Court ruled that Pennsylvania's 
Non-Public Elementary and Secondary Education Act 1968, which allowed the state 
Superintendent of Public Instruction to reimburse non-public schools for teachers' 
salaries, textbooks and instructional materials, violated the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment.  The Court held that for a law to be considered constitutional 
under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, the law must have a 
legitimate secular purpose, must not have the primary effect of either advancing or 
inhibiting religion, and must not result in an excessive entanglement of government 
and religion.  These three principles became known as the Lemon Test.17   
 
                                                 
12 This case also applied the Establishment Clause to the actions of state governments via the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
13 Noah Feldman, ‘From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the Establishment Clause’, 
(2002) 90(3) California Law Review 673, 730. 
14 Gabriël Moens, ‘The Menace of Neutrality in Religion’ (2004) 2 Brigham Young University Law 
Review 535, 540. 
15 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
16 Gabriël Moens, 540. 
17 at 612-613. 
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Again Lemon is a case which is very similar to Everson.  To be consistent with 
Holyoakean principles, the Pennsylvania law would have the clear intent to ensure that 
students had textbooks.  It is impossible to ensure that a top down program designed 
to benefit all students does not incidentally benefit religion.  One might also try to see 
if children from various counties received more funding than another, or whether more 
girls were aided than boys.  Looking for incidental impacts of legislation, and then 
striking it down because such impacts were found, will find all legislation failing.  
Government programs are too diverse and complex to try to purge all unwanted 
implications from legislation meant to benefit a large part of society.  Again, any overt 
support of religion through legislation would be struck down readily.  In the US and 
Canadian contexts such transparent efforts have been found unconstitutional.18 
 
A number of decisions since Lemon have been overruled so that the leading case in 
this area in the USA is now Zelman v Simmons-Harris19 - which upheld that vouchers 
which draw on government funds could be used to pay for tuition at any school, public 
or private.  The Court has held that the vouchers are issued to be used at the school of 
choice, and that the school cannot be held responsible for any incidental benefit to 
religion. 
 
In Zelman v Simmons-Harris,20 the Supreme Court defined neutrality as even-
handedness in terms of who may receive aid.  The Court considered whether Ohio’s 
school voucher program under which parents may use government funds to pay for 
parochial school tuition violated the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause.  The 
Court upheld the constitutionality of an Ohio school voucher program, ruling for the 
first time that the government may give financial aid to parents so they can send their 
children to religious or private schools.  The Court considered although some of the 
money went to Catholic schools, because parents could decide how to use the 
vouchers, there was no establishment of religion.21 
 
A majority of the Court continues to find direct aid to religious institutions for use in 
religious activities unconstitutional following Zelman, but indirect aid to a religious 
group appears constitutional, as long as it is part of a neutrally applied program that 
directs the money through a parent or other third party that ultimately controls the 
destination of the funds.22  Such programs have included school tuition organisations 
(STOs) which provide scholarships to students attending private schools, including 
religious schools.23   Nicole Stelle Garnett has argued that in this area “much of the 
                                                 
18 See for example efforts by religious communities to introduce compulsory ‘days of rest’ along 
religious lines, such as R. v Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 SCR 295 in Canada.  This will be 
examined in detail in Chapter 8. 
19 536 US 639 (2002). 
20 536 US 639 (2002). 
21 536 US 639, 654-55 (2002). 
22 First Amendment Centre <www.firstamendmentcentre.org/rel_liberty/establishment/index.aspx> 
on 11 October 2004>. 
23 Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011) [n.b. there is not yet, 
at the time of writing, a final and official opinion in this case.  It will be in the form ‘563 U. S. ____ 
(2011).  See http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/boundvolumes.aspx].  In this case Arizona 
Revised Statute Section 43-1089 allowed tax credits for contributions to school tuition organizations 
(STOs). The taxpayers claimed that the STO tax credit violated the Establishment Clause. The 
Supreme Court held that the taxpayers lacked standing under Flast v Cohen, (1969) 392 US 83 
(exception to the no-taxpayer-standing rule.). The general rule against taxpayer standing applied, and 
the taxpayers failed to establish that they fell within the exception to the rule for claims of extraction 
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Supreme Court's Establishment Clause canon was developed in the context of - and 
was animated by anxiety about - programs extending public resources to religious 
schools, especially Catholic schools”.24  She observed that scholarship tax credits have 
emerged in recent years as an alternative to controversial school voucher programs as 
they would be both more politically palatable than vouchers and more likely to survive 
constitutional challenge.25 
 
She notes that the decision in Flast v Cohen26 which was the case on point relating to 
the standing of taxpayers in such cases up until Winn had a clear anti-Catholic 
sentiment, citing by way of example Douglas J’s concurring opinion in Flast warning 
that "[t]he mounting federal aid to sectarian schools is notorious, and the subterfuges 
numerous," and cited as support an explicitly anti-Catholic editorial describing how 
"clerics" and "priests" hoped to divert funds from facially neutral student aid programs 
for "sectarian" purposes.27  
 
Indeed, the contradictions in this area of public policy in the USA have confused for 
more than six decades.  Sarah Isgur28 on this has explained that the US Supreme Court 
 
has stated that “the common purpose of the Religion Clauses is ‘is to secure religious liberty.’29  
In 1952, the Court stated that when “[w]hen the state encourages religious instruction or 
cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian 
needs, it follows the best of our traditions … [by] respect[ing] the religious nature of our people 
and accommodate[ing] the public service to their spiritual needs.”30  At the same time, 
however, the “vast majority of Establishment Clause cases have either cited or relied upon 
Jefferson’s ‘wall of separation’ metaphor.  This contradiction has led to a Court that is 
“unwilling or unable to take a unified stand on what the Constitution really means when it 
comes to the relation between religion and government.”31 
 
This issue has also been addressed in Canada.  In Adler v Ontario,32 in the Canadian 
Supreme Court, the question was whether there was a constitutional obligation to fund 
private religious education. The case concerned whether, by not funding Jewish and 
certain Christian day schools, Ontario violated the Charter’s guarantees of freedom of 
conscience and religion (Section 2) and of equality without discrimination based on 
religion (Section 15).  It was held that government funding of Catholic schools but not 
of other religious schools does not infringe the constitution.  The Court found that 
                                                 
and spending of tax money in violation of the Establishment Clause. The tax credit under § 43-1089 
was not a governmental expenditure; contributors to STOs spent their own money, not money 
collected by the state from taxpayers. The tax credit was not tantamount to a religious tax or a tithe. 
24 Nicole Stelle Garnett, ‘A Winn for Educational Pluralism’ (2011) 121 Yale Law Journal Online 31, 
35-36. 
25 Nicole Stelle Garnett, ‘A Winn for Educational Pluralism’ (2011) 121 Yale Law Journal Online 31, 
37.  See also Bruce R. Van Baren, ‘Tuition Tax Credits and Winn: A Constitutional Blueprint for 
School Choice’ (2011-12) 24(2) Regent University Law Review 515. 
26 392 US 83 (1968).  In this case the plaintiffs challenged, on Establishment Clause grounds, the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 - a federal statute that funds educational services 
and materials for low-income children, including those enrolled in religious schools. 
27 Nicole Stelle Garnett, ‘A Winn for Educational Pluralism’ (2011) 121 Yale Law Journal Online 31.  
28 Sarah M. Isgur, ' ”Play in the joints”: the struggle to define permissive accommodation under the 
First Amendment’ (2008) 31(1) Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 371, 373-4. 
29 Citing McCreary County v ACLU of Kentucky, 545 US 844, 879 (2005). 
30 Citing Zorach v Clauson 343 US 306, 313-14 (1952). 
31 Citing Noah Feldman, ‘A Church-State Solution’, NY Times Magazine, July 3, 2005, at 28. 
32 [1996] 3 S.C.R. 609. 
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Ontario's Education Act did not violate sections 2(a) or 15(1) of the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms or section 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867.   
 
In India the support of public funding of religious institutions was addressed in 2002 
in Ms. Aruna Roy and Ors vs Union of India and Ors33 in the Supreme Court of India.  
Dharmadhikari J observed that 
Secularism is the basic structure of the Constitution. Clause (1) of Article 28 prohibits 
imparting of 'religious instructions' in educational institutions fully maintained out of State 
funds.  …  The words "religious instructions" have been held as not prohibiting education of 
religions dissociated from "tenets, the rituals, observances, ceremonies and modes of worship 
of a particular sect or denomination". The academic study of the teaching and the philosophy 
of any great Saint such as Kabir, Gurunanak and Mahabir was held to be not prohibited by 
Article 28 (1) of the Constitution. 
A distinction, thus, has been made between imparting "religious instructions" that is teaching 
of rituals, observances, customs and traditions and other non-essential observances or modes 
of worship in religions and teaching of philosophies of religions with more emphasis on study 
of essential moral and spiritual thoughts contained in various religions. There is a very thin 
dividing line between imparting of 'religious instructions' and 'study of religions.' Special care 
has to be taken of avoiding possibility of imparting 'religious instructions' in the name of 
'religious education' or 'Study of Religions'.34 
He held that the study of religions in National Education Policy 2002 did not run 
counter to the concept of secularism in the Indian Constitution. 
 
II RELIGIOUS DISPLAYS IN STATE SCHOOLS 
 
The display of religious symbols in public schools in secular democracies has been a 
subject of much debate in a number of jurisdictions across the world in recent years.  
Most of these cases have involved challenges that have been made as challenges to the 
dominant religious paradigm of the country, such as the Lautsi case in strongly 
Catholic Italy35 discussed below.36   
 
The display of Christian symbols in state schools has been challenged in federal courts 
in a number of jurisdictions, including the USA and Europe, the majority only in recent 
years.  The cases in Germany and Italy, for example, relating to the display of 
crucifixes in school rooms have had remarkable similarities in their decisions, 
particularly the conclusions that the crucifix does not contradict the state principle of 
secularism.  Modern Europe is increasingly having to address how a modern secular 
                                                 
33 Supreme Court of India, Writ Petition (civil) 98 of 2002. 
34 Dharmadhikari J observed interestingly here that “The English word 'religion' does not fully convey 
the Indian concept of religion. Hindus believe in Vedas. The word 'Dharma' has a very wide meaning. 
One meaning of it is the 'moral values or ethics' on which the life is naturally regulated. Dharma or 
righteousness is elemental and fundamental in all nations, periods and times. For example truth, love, 
compassion are human virtues. This is what Hindu call Sanatan Dharma meaning religion which is 
immutable, constant, living, permanent and ever in existence. Religion, in wide sense, therefore, is 
those fundamental principles which sustain life and without which the life will not survive.” 
35 Lautsi v Italy, European Court of Human Rights (Application No. 30814/06).  
36 The Court in that case argued that the pervasive crucifix in the country’s public institutions and 
schools is simply a cultural symbol devoid of religious meaning is not religious in its context.  This 
view is reminiscent of the view in the USA in Salazar v Buono 559 US 700 (2010) mentioned in the 
previous chapter, where the religious symbol was argued to have a secular purpose. 
 
124 
state should address "different viewpoints about the role of religion in a pluralistic 
society”.37 
 
A Italy 
 
Italy’s place in the European debate on the place of religion in the public space is 
complicated by the state’s long association with the Catholic Church.  That this debate 
remains unresolved in modern Europe can be seen in the list of contributors as Amicus 
Curiae in the Lautsi case.38   
 
The Italian Constitution does not explicitly acknowledge secularism, which may be 
compared to the French Constitution which does.  In Italy, secularism does not mean  
 
that the State should be indifferent to religions but that it should guarantee the protection of 
the freedom of religion in a context of confessional and cultural pluralism … an open and 
inclusive attitude, closer to equidistance, which respects the distinction and autonomy of 
spiritual and temporal areas, without privatising religion or excluding it from the public area.39  
 
However, the Italian Constitutional Court has declared that secularism must be 
regarded as a fundamental principle of the Italian legal system.  The Court has held40 
that the principle of secularism (laicità) is derived from a number of provisions within 
the Italian Constitution.41  The Court emphasised that this principle does not mean an 
indifference to religion by the state, but rather indifference and impartiality between 
different religions in order to permit freedom of religion within the state.42 
  
                                                 
37 Andrea Pin, ‘Public Schools, the Italian Crucifix, and the European Court of Human Rights: The 
Italian Separation of Church and State’ (2011) 25 Emory International Law Review 95, 99-100. 
38 At the inception of the case, 10 countries entered the Lautsi case as “third party Amicus Curiae”. 
Each of these countries, Armenia, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Lithuania, Malta, Monaco, Romania, the 
Russia Federation, and San Marino, submitted a brief to the Court inviting it to overturn its first 
decision.  Later, additional countries joined Italy. The Governments of Albania, Austria, Croatia, 
Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Serbia, Slovakia, and Ukraine petitioned that the Court remember that it 
must respect the national identities and religious traditions of each of the 47 member States. 
Altogether almost half of the Council of Europe.  See also ‘An alliance against secularism’, 
L’Osservatore Romano (Vatican City), July 22, 2010. 
39 Presentation of the Italian Government before the Grand Chamber (GC) of the ECtHR in the Lautsi 
Case , 30 June 2010, § 7 
40 Corte Costituzionale, Decision n. 203/1989. 
41 Article 2, which protects ‘the inviolable rights of man, both as an individual and as a member of the 
social groups in which his personality finds expression’; Article 3, which guarantees equality before 
the law; Article 7, according to which the ‘State and the Catholic Church are, each within their own 
sphere, independent and sovereign’; Article 8, according to which ‘All religious denominations are 
equally free’10 and Article 19, which protects the freedom to profess and promote religious beliefs, 
individually or collectively. (Susanna Mancini, ‘The Crucifix Rage: Supranational Constitutionalism 
Bumps Against the Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty’, (2010) 6 European Constitutional Law Review 
6, 8.  
42 Corte Costituzionale, Decisions n. 203/1989; n. 259/1990; n. 13/1991; n. 195/1993; n. 421/ 1993; n. 
334/1996; n. 329/1997; n. 508/2000; n. 327/2002. 
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1.  Lautsi v Italy 
 
In 2002 Mrs Soile Lautsi argued that the presence of crucifixes43 in the classrooms of 
the public school that her children attended infringed the principle of secularism 
according to which she sought to educate her children. Following her complaint the 
school’s governors decided to keep crucifixes in the classrooms, so she instituted 
proceedings in the Administrative Court.  
 
In 2004 the court granted her request and in 2005, the Italian Administrative Court in 
Veneto denied her request concluding, in a judgment that was confirmed by the Italian 
Supreme Administrative Court in 2006,44 in a frankly startling decision, that  
 
The crucifix may be legitimately displayed in the public schools because it does not clash with 
the principle of secularism, but, on the contrary, it actually affirms it. 
 
Mrs Lautsi took her case to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), where the 
Administrative Court decision was overturned in an appeal to a single judge in 2009, 
who decided that the display of crucifixes in a public school both violated the right of 
parents to educate their children and their religious freedom.45  One would have been 
forgiven for thinking that was the end of the matter.  However, somewhat unusually, 
Italy together with a number of other countries in the role of amicus curiae in support 
sought to have that decision reversed.  They succeeded in 2011, where the Full Court 
held that the crucifix displayed in public schools in Italy did not breach the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 
 
It was decided at the final appeal to the Grand Chamber46 of the ECtHR that the 
decision whether crucifixes should be present in state school classrooms was a matter 
falling within the margin of appreciation of the respondent State. The margin of 
appreciation is a doctrine developed by the ECtHR when considering whether a 
member state of the European Convention on Human Rights has breached the 
convention. The margin of appreciation doctrine allows the court to take into effect 
the fact that the Convention will be interpreted differently in different member states.  
Judges are obliged to take into account the cultural, historical and philosophical 
differences between the ECtHR and the appellant nation.47 
                                                 
43 The custom of displaying a crucifix in classrooms is a long standing tradition. The present civil 
obligation allegedly dates back to royal decree no. 4336 of 15 September 1860 of the Kingdom of 
Piedmont-Sardinia, which provided: “Each school must without fail be equipped with ... a crucifix”.  
See generally Grégor Puppinck, ‘The case of Lautsi v Italy: a synthesis’, Article presented at the 
Eighteenth Annual International Law and Religion Symposium, "Religious Freedom in a Pluralistic 
Age: Trends, Challenges, and Practices," 2-4 October 2011, International Center for Law and 
Religion Studies, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU University. 
44 TAR, Mar.17, 2005, n. 1110, para 16.1. 
45 ECtHR 2 Nov. 2009, Case No. 30814/06, Lautsi v Italy. 
46 The Grand Chamber is made up of 17 judges: the Court’s President and Vice-Presidents, the 
Section Presidents and the national judge, together with other judges selected by drawing of lots. 
47 See generally Dean Spielmann, ‘Allowing the Right Margin: The European Court of Human Rights 
and The National Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: Waiver or Subsidiarity of European Review?’ 
(2011-2012) 14 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 381; Giulio Itzcovich, ‘One, None 
and One Hundred Thousand Margins of Appreciations: The Lautsi Case’ (2013) 13(2) Human Rights 
Law Review 287. 
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The Grand Chamber did not agree with the approach of the Chamber, the previous 
level of appeal, which had found that the display of crucifixes in classrooms would 
have a significant impact on Ms Lautsi’s children.  It held that48  
[t]he effects of the greater visibility which the presence of the crucifix gave to Christianity in 
schools needed to be placed in perspective. Firstly, the presence of crucifixes was not 
associated with compulsory teaching about Christianity. Secondly, Italy opened up the school 
environment to other religions in parallel. In addition, the applicants had not asserted that the 
presence of the crucifix in classrooms had encouraged the development of teaching practices 
with a proselytising tendency; neither had they claimed that [children] had experienced a 
tendentious reference to that presence by a teacher in the exercise of his or her functions. 
Lastly, [Ms Lautsi] had retained in full her right as a parent to enlighten and advise her 
children, to exercise in their regard her natural functions as educator and to guide them on a 
path in line with her own philosophical convictions.  
The ECtHR considered in their reasoning that there was no European consensus on 
the question of the presence of religious symbols in State schools, and that prescribing 
the presence of crucifixes in State schools was not in itself sufficient, however, to 
indicate a process of indoctrination on the state’s part. The Court further considered 
that a crucifix on a wall was an essentially passive symbol that could not be deemed 
to have an influence on pupils comparable to that of didactic speech or participation 
in religious activities.   Specifically the decision of the ECtHR Grand Chamber49 
concluded that the Christian crucifix had become simply a cultural symbol devoid of 
religious meaning, and  
Moreover, with the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to identify in the constant central core of 
Christian faith … the principles of human dignity, tolerance and freedom, including religious 
freedom, and therefore, in the last analysis, the foundations of the secular State. 
By studying history carefully, from a suitable distance, not from up close, we can clearly 
perceive an affinity between (but not the identity of) the “hard core” of Christianity, which, 
placing charity above everything else, including faith, emphasises the acceptance of 
difference, and the “hard core” of the republican Constitution, which, in a spirit of solidarity, 
attaches value to the freedom of all, and therefore constitutes the legal guarantee of respect for 
others. … 
It can therefore be contended that in the present-day social reality the crucifix should be 
regarded not only as a symbol of a historical and cultural development, and therefore of the 
identity of our people, but also as a symbol of a value system: liberty, equality, human dignity 
and religious toleration, and accordingly also of the secular nature of the State – principles 
which underpin our Constitution. 
2 Germany 
 
Germany has had cases similar to Italy’s dealing with crucifixes in public schools.  It 
has no established religion.50  Germany is only now beginning to show some of the 
                                                 
48 Lautsi and Others v. Italy [GC] - 30814/06 Judgment 18.3.2011 [GC] (18 March 2011). 
49 Lautsi v Italy (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2012) E.H.R.R. 
50 According to Article 140 of the Basic Law, Article 137 of the Weimar Constitution is an integral 
part of the Basic Law and provides that there shall be no state church.  Article 140 of the Basic Law 
incorporates Articles 136, 137, 138, 139 and 141 of the Weimar Constitution. These articles of the 
Basic law and the Weimar Constitution loosely collected form the “free exercise of religion” and “no 
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internal stresses that the headscarf issue has been creating in France and some other 
parts of Europe.  Whilst there has been little involvement at the federal government 
level by the government, some issues have been addressed by the states and the Federal 
Constitutional Court.   
 
A number of German courts have addressed the headscarf issue in a similar manner.  
They have discussed the headscarf issue as a problem of balancing religious freedom, 
against the rights and freedoms of employers and public schools, and have not 
addressed the prohibition of the hijab as part of a dress code.51 
 
In Germany the freedom of religion principle is known as the ‘Freedom of Faith and 
Conscience’ (Glaubens- und Gewissensfreiheit).  This right,52 and the Freedom of 
Religious and Ideological Belief, are unrestricted.53  The State is required to exercise 
Weltanschaulich-religiöse Neutralität, a neutral position with respect to religion and 
ideological belief.  The constitution provides for a separation of church and state in its 
modern form.54  The constitution of modern Germany is known as the Grundgesetz, 
or ‘Basic Law’.55 
  
Under Germany Article 70 of the Basic Law, the constitutional responsibility for 
schools lies with the German states (Länder).  The Bavarian Supreme Court in 1991 
held56 that 
 
… with the representation of the cross as the icon of the suffering and Lordship of Jesus Christ 
…  the plaintiffs who reject such a representation are confronted with a religious  worldview 
in which the formative power of Christian beliefs is affirmed.  However, they are not thereby 
brought into a constitutionally unacceptable religious-philosophical conflict.  Representations 
of the cross confronted in this fashion … are …not the expression of a conviction of a belief 
bound to a specific confession.  They are an essential object of the general Christian-occidental 
tradition and common property of the Christian-occidental cultural circle. 
                                                 
establishment of official religion” provisions, reflecting broadly those provisions of the United States 
Constitution First Amendment to its constitution. 
51 Dagmar Schiek and Carl von Ossietzky, ’European Developments – Just a Piece of Cloth?  German 
Courts and Employees with Headscarves‘, (2004) 33(1) Industrial Law Journal 68. 
52 einheitliches Grundrecht (uniform basic right). 
53 Historically religious intolerance has been the norm in Germany until relatively recently.  The 
principle of cuius regis, cuius religio dictated religious life in Germany from the peace of Augsberg in 
1555 until the Napoleonic wars.  Intolerance peaked during the German enlightenment and on until 
the late nineteenth century.  The end of this period coincided with the end of Bismarck’s Kulturkampf 
against the Catholic Church.  For most of the nineteenth century and up until the Weimar Constitution 
of 1919, there were close ties between the church and state and there was significant religious 
discrimination.  Catholics as a religious minority, relative to the predominant Lutherans, were 
generally excluded from most Reich appointments, and Jews were barred from the public service and 
the military.  The church-state provisions of the German Constitution as they presently stand derive 
from a compromise between the inability of the framers of the constitution to agree on new proposals 
regarding that relationship. 
54 Anke Freckmann and Thomas Wegerich, The German Legal System (Sweet and Maxwell, Hebden 
Bridge, 1999), 92. 
55 The term does not actually mean “constitution” (Verfassung) as the original document, first drafted 
in August 1948, was so named to emphasise that it was only of a temporary nature, reflecting the 
intended nature of the German state occupied by the United States the United Kingdom and France 
after the defeat of Germany in May, 1945. Articles 1 to 19 of the Basic Law contain the main basic 
rights of the German constitution. 
56 Bayerischer Verwaltungsgerichthof [BayVBI] [Bavarian Higher Administrative Court] 751 (751-
54) (F.R.G.) 
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These decisions then argue that the placing of a crucifix or other religious symbol in 
the classrooms of state schools may be interpreted as a cultural symbol that may be 
held to be symbolic of the nation and greater than the numbers of citizens who identify 
with it purely religiously, helping to build a national identity.57  This argument is 
analogous to the Italian case in that this decision went to great pains to separate the 
religious from the cultural significance of the crucifix.  However, this argument causes 
its own problems in that 
 
Europeans are not sure whether European civilization is to be defined by the particular 
historical legacy of Western ‘civilization’, of which cultural Christianity, to be sure in an 
increasingly secularised form, remains a central component.  Or, alternatively, whether 
European civilisation ought to be defined by the cosmopolitan ‘civilization’ of secular 
modernity, which Europe itself claims to have produced.58 
 
Contrarily, these arguments by the state to protect religion have been found by some 
to actually be counterproductive.  In a 1995 case the German Federal Constitutional 
Court struck down a Bavarian law holding that the pressure to learn in a classroom 
under the cross was in conflict with the state in religious matters.   The Court 
considered that if the crucifix was not directly linked to a specific religion then the 
state doing so actually is less respectful of the religious symbol. 59  Susanna Mancini 
argues that in Italy and Bavaria, the religious and cultural significance of the crucifix 
are linked and cannot be uncoupled.  To insist that the crucifix in the public sphere is 
merely a cultural and historical symbol then weakens its religious significance.60 
 
Indeed this confusion is not limited to Europe.  Even in the USA these cases raise 
“troubling questions about the Court’s increasing desire to strip sacred symbols of 
their religious meaning and significance”61 leading to the loss of protection of religion 
by the state. 
 
III DIRECTED BEHAVIOUR IN SCHOOLS – PRAYER 
 
In these cases, particularly in the USA, the public expression of religious affiliation in 
schools has often been problematic.  As noted in the previous chapter, the state may 
often fear that such expressions imply that the state has endorsed such actions by not 
controlling them in some way.    However, in the following line of cases, the state has 
actually made it public policy for acknowledgement of religion.   
 
 
 
                                                 
57 Susanna Mancini, ‘Religious Symbols in the Public Space: The Power of Symbols and Symbols as 
Power: Secularism and Religion as Guarantors of Cultural Convergence’, (2009) 30 Cardozo Law 
Review 2629, 2635. 
58 Jose Casanova, ‘The Long, Difficult, and Tortuous Journey of Turkey into Europe and the 
Dilemmas of European Civilization’ (2006) 13 Constellations 234, 235-36. 
59 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] May 16, 1995 (Kruzifix-Urteil), 93 Entschiedungen des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfG] 1 (F.R.G.). 
60 Susanna Mancini, ‘Religious Symbols in the Public Space: The Power of Symbols and Symbols as 
Power: Secularism and Religion as Guarantors of Cultural Convergence’ (2009) 30 Cardozo Law 
Review 2629, 2634. 
61 Ian Bartrum, ‘Salazar v Buono: Sacred Symbolism and the Secular State’ (2010) 105 Northwestern 
University Law Review Colloquy 31, 33. 
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A United States of America 
 
The US Supreme Court’s decision in Engel v Vitale62 was the first of a number of 
landmark cases that determined that it is unconstitutional for state officials to compose 
an official school prayer and require its recitation in public schools.  The case was 
brought by the parents of public school students in New Hyde Park, New York who 
complained the prayer to "Almighty God" contradicted their religious beliefs. The 
plaintiffs argued that opening the school day with a prayer (even if students are not 
required to recite it) violates the Establishment Clause.   
 
Stewart J in his dissent63 in Engel v Vitale argued that the issue is whether the Board 
of Regents for the State of New York will prohibit those who want to begin their day 
at school with prayer from doing so. Also, he argued that phrases like "the wall of 
separation" are nowhere in the Constitution and Black J used them uncritically.  
Stewart J then listed the religious references present at the top of all three branches of 
the federal government and on American coins, in the National Anthem, in the Pledge 
of Allegiance, and in one of the court's recent decisions in Zorach v Clauson.64  He 
argued that neither these examples, nor the voluntary prayer in New York, established 
a religion.  On the Pledge of Allegiance, Steven Shiffrin65 comments that “I am sure 
that a pledge identifying the United States as subject to divine authority is asserting 
the existence and authority of the divine.” And he adds that “pretending [that this and 
similar expressions] are not religious is simply insulting.”  
 
                                                 
62 370 US 421 (1962). 
63 370 US 421, 444 (1962). 
64 “At the opening of each day's Session of this Court we stand, while one of our officials invokes the 
protection of God. Since the days of John Marshall, our Crier has said, "God save the United States 
and this Honorable Court."   Both the Senate and the House of Representatives open their daily 
Sessions with prayer.  Each of our Presidents, from George Washington to John F. Kennedy, has, 
upon assuming his Office, asked the protection and help of God.   
 
The Court today says that the state and federal governments are without constitutional power to 
prescribe any particular form of words to be recited by any group of the American people on any 
subject touching religion.  One of the stanzas of "The Star-Spangled Banner " made our National 
Anthem by Act of Congress in 1931,  contains these verses:  
Blest with victory and peace, may the heav'n rescued land 
Praise the Pow'r that hath made and preserved us a nation, 
Then conquer we must, when our cause it is just. 
 
And this be our motto "In God is our Trust." 
 
In 1954, Congress added a phrase to the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag so that it now contains the 
words "one Nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all."  In 1952, Congress enacted 
legislation calling upon the President each year to proclaim a National Day of Prayer.  Since 1865, the 
words "IN GOD WE TRUST" have been impressed on our coins. 
  
Countless similar examples could be listed, but there is no need to belabor the obvious.  It was all 
summed up by this Court just ten years ago in a single sentence: "We are a religious people whose 
institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." Zorach v. Clauson, 343 US. 306, 313.” (internal references 
removed) 
65 Steven H. Shiffrin, ‘The Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion Clauses’ (2004) 90 Cornell Law 
Review 9, 70-71 
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These cases appeared from time to time over the years.  In Lee v Weisman66 in similar 
circumstances, a school had invited a local clergyman to offer a benediction at a school 
graduation.  Students were not obligated to stand or participate in the prayer.  The 
prayer was said by the school district to be “non-sectarian”.67   Weisman, a student, 
had unsuccessfully sought an injunction before the invocation.  Following the 
graduation the litigation was taken ultimately to the US Supreme Court.   
 
The Court held that the prayers were unconstitutional.  On the argument that 
Weisman’s attendance was voluntary, Kennedy J for the court argued68 a position now 
known as the ‘coercion test’ that 
 
[a]s we have observed before, there are heightened concerns with protecting freedom of 
conscience from subtle coercive pressure in the elementary and secondary public schools. Our 
decisions in [Engel] and [Abington] recognize, among other things, that prayer exercises in 
public schools carry a particular risk of indirect coercion. The concern may not be limited to 
the context of schools, but it is most pronounced there. What to most believers may seem 
nothing more than a reasonable request that the nonbeliever respect their religious practices, 
in a school context may appear to the nonbeliever or dissenter to be an attempt to employ the 
machinery of the State to enforce a religious orthodoxy.  
 
The decision endorsed the court’s position in cases as Engel v Vitale69 and 
Abington v Schempp70 and which has more recently been endorsed in 
Santa Fe Independent School District v Doe.71 
 
The ultimate impact of the American prayer cases, Steven Smith has noted, is72  
 
not that they invalidated school prayer or even that they acted on a secularist conception of 
American government. The majority of public schools probably did not conduct prayer 
exercises anyway, and some state courts had ruled against school prayer almost a century 
earlier. Moreover, a secularist interpretation of America has been present in one form or 
another from the Republic's beginnings. The crucial, or perhaps fateful, achievement of the 
school prayer decisions is that they formally constitutionalized this interpretation. It is not an 
exaggeration to say that the decisions "established" political secularism as the nation's 
constitutional orthodoxy. 
 
                                                 
66 505 US 577 (1992). 
67 Whilst this was stated in mitigation by the school, it was still religious in nature.  Non-sectarian 
does not mean not religious.  Kennedy J who wrote the majority decision stated the nonsectarian 
nature of the prayer was no defence as the Establishment Clause forbade coerced prayers in public 
schools, not just those representing a specific religious tradition. On the issue of voluntariness, 
Kennedy J remarked that “To say a teenage student has a real choice not to attend her high school 
graduation is formalistic in the extreme. True, Deborah could elect not to attend commencement 
without renouncing her diploma; but we shall not allow the case to turn on this point. Everyone 
knows that, in our society and in our culture, high school graduation is one of life's most significant 
occasions. A school rule which excuses attendance is beside the point. Attendance may not be 
required by official decree, yet it is apparent that a student is not free to absent herself from the 
graduation exercise in any real sense of the term "voluntary," for absence would require forfeiture of 
those intangible benefits which have motivated the student through youth and all her high school 
years.”  
68 505 U.S. 577, 592 (citations omitted). 
69 370 US 421 (1962) 
70 324 US 203 (1963). 
71 530 US 290 (2000). 
72 Steven D. Smith, ‘Constitutional Divide: The Transformative Significance of the School Prayer 
Decisions’, (2011) 38 Pepperdine Law Review 945. 
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Not all public endorsement of religion by the state has been in the form of directed 
behaviour or public statement.  Sometimes such overt endorsement of religion may be 
muter but no less contrary to secular neutrality. 
 
In Canada, the first significant case was heard in 1988 in Zylberberg v Sudbury Board 
of Education (Director)73 by the Court of Appeal.   In Zylberberg, parents of children 
in elementary school74 challenged a regulation enacted under the Education Act, RSO 
1980, which provided that: 
 
28(1)   A public school shall be opened or closed each school day with religious exercises 
consisting of the reading of the Scriptures or other suitable readings and the repeating of the 
Lord’s Prayer or other suitable prayers. 
 
The Board of Education indicated that the daily opening exercises in its schools 
included the singing of the national anthem O Canada and the saying of the Lord’s 
Prayer.  Parents could be consulted in how a child could be excused from such 
exercises such as by leaving the classroom, or not participating.  The Court75 
acknowledged that the regulations did remove any element of compulsion to 
participate in religious exercises, but argued 
 
From the majoritarian standpoint, the respondent’s argument is understandable but, in our 
opinion, it does not reflect the reality of the situation faced by members of religious minorities.  
Whether or not there is pressure or compulsion must be assessed from their standpoint and, in 
particular, from the standpoint of pupils in the sensitive setting of a public school.  ... 
 
While the majoritarian view may be that s.28 confers freedom of choice on the minority, the 
reality is that it imposes on religious minorities a compulsion to conform to the religious 
practices of the majority.76 
 
Whilst the parents of the children concerned chose not to seek exemptions from the 
regulation, they felt that such an exemption would differentiate their children from 
others, and peer pressure would force their children to conform to the regulation.  The 
Court found this pressure to conform, despite the exemption to comply, to be “real and 
pervasive” and to “operate to compel members of religious minorities to conform with 
majority religious practices”.77  They held therefore that the right to be excused from 
class did not overcome the infringement of s2(a) of the Charter freedom of conscience 
and religion. 
 
The next of these cases in 1990, known as the Elgin County case,78 also looked at the 
same subject area of school religious exercises and the need for exemption as 
Zylberberg.  Elgin County was a challenge to the validity of the “religious instruction” 
provisions of the regulation79 which remained in force after Zylberberg. The Court 
held that “State-authorized religious indoctrination amounts to the imposition of 
majoritarian religious beliefs on minorities”. The Court went on to say that “state-
authorised religious indoctrination amounts to the imposition of majoritarian religious 
                                                 
73 (1988) 52 DLR (4th) 577; 65 OR (2 641 (CA). 
74 Comparable to primary school in Australia. 
75 Brooke, Blair, Goodman, and Robins JJA; (Lacoucière dissenting). 
76 (1988) 52 DLR (4th) 577, 654. 
77 (1988) 52 DLR (4th) 577, 655. 
78 Canadian Civil Liberties v. Ontario (Minister of Education), (1990) 71 O.R. (2d) 341. 
79 (ss. 28(4) – (16)). 
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beliefs on minorities.”80  It held therefore that there had been an infringement of s.2 
(a) of the Charter. 
 
B Germany 
 
In a 1979 case reminiscent of the US case noted above of Engel v Vitale, the Federal 
Constitutional Court81 in the ‘School prayer in state schools case’ heard two similar 
cases at the same time.  In the first case,82 the parents of pupils attending a rural 
primary school in Kirschhausen in the Land of Hesse objected to school prayer and 
sought to have it prohibited.   The prayer was usually conducted prior to the 
commencement of lessons.  Following application to the school,83 the prayer was 
temporarily suspended.  The complainants in this case (Complainant I) were parents 
of other children in the school who objected to this suspension.  They submitted an 
appeal to the Administrative District which rejected their complaint.  They appealed, 
and the decision on this case was suspended until the second case was heard in the 
Federal Constitutional Court.84 
 
In the second85 case the father (Complainant II) of a child attending an Evangelical 
primary school in Aachen asked for the cessation of school prayers in his daughter’s 
class.  As it was a religious private school the educational authorities did not accede 
to his request, as school prayer was an essential element of the school curriculum.  The 
complainant was unsuccessful so the matter was taken to the Administrative Court.86  
The Court upheld most of the complaint noting the negative freedom to profess a 
belief, the right to remain silent.  The respondent was ordered not to give religious 
instruction outside the times set aside for it.   
 
The Higher Administrative Court rejected the appeal.  Its basis for decision was that 
although the Christian schools of North-Rhine/Westphalia were said to have children 
brought up and taught on the basis of Christian cultural values which were bound and 
described in the Land constitution87 by the words “respect for God”, this did not mean 
that it was permissible to hold school prayers in lessons outside the times stipulated 
for religious instruction.  The school authority appealed to the Federal Administrative 
Court88 which held that it cannot be deduced from the Basic Law that school prayer 
outside religious instruction, or religious instruction outside the express permission of 
the student or parents, is unconstitutional in religious schools.   
 
The Court argued that the Länder were granted broad scope in ideological or religious 
matters by Article 789 of the Basic Law and could see to it that religious instruction 
                                                 
80 Canadian Civil Liberties v. Ontario (Minister of Education), (1990) 71 O.R. (2d) 341, 363. 
81 Bundesverfassungsgericht, or BVerfG. 
82 1 BvR 647/70. 
83 One of sixteen federated states constituting Germany (plural: Länder). 
84 Under the special circumstances of the case, the preconditions of the Federal Constitutional Court 
were met for a ruling prior to the exhaustion of the appeals. 
85 1 BvR 7/74. 
86 Verwaltungsgericht. 
87 Landesverfassung. 
88 Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts. 
89 Article 7  [School system] 
(1) The entire school system shall be under the supervision of the state. 
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and school prayer was conducted with the permission of the parents.  However, school 
prayer may not encroach upon the fundamental right of freedom of religion to profess 
a belief or to reject school prayer.  This right could not be said to be violated if 
alternative arrangements were available to students not to participate.  The Federal 
Constitutional Court held that Complainant I was successful in overturning the 
administrative acts, and Complainant II was unsuccessful. 
   
IV DIRECTED RELIGIOUS CURRICULUM IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
 
A Creationism and ‘intelligent design’ 
 
The issue of the teaching of creationism90 as an alternative to evolution in the school 
curriculum is almost exclusively an American phenomenon.  Cases of this nature have 
been common there for many years, despite an almost complete lack of success in the 
US Supreme Court. Those who advocate the teaching of creationism in schools 
generally do not wish the state to allow the concurrent teaching of the theory of 
evolution in the science curriculum. 
 
These cases raised a number of complex social issues at the time such as whether the 
absence of prayers was a deliberate government secularising of students, or whether 
allowing such prayers was any less objectionable than permitting a pro-religious 
government message,91 as well as the symbolism of a direct challenge to Christian 
orthodoxy.  Accordingly some states passed laws against teaching evolution in public 
schools, such as Tennessee’s 1925 Anti-Evolution Act, which was upheld by the 
Tennessee Supreme Court in Scopes v State.92  The teaching of evolution remained an 
uncomfortable and contentious issue in science education until the late 1950s.93 It was 
then brought to the fore in Epperson v Arkansas94 in 1968. 
 
In Epperson, the United States Supreme Court invalidated an Arkansas statute95 
adopted in 1928 that prohibited the teaching of evolution; namely, that humans 
evolved from other species. Susan Epperson was unable to teach the required science 
content at her local school because it was unclear whether such teaching would be 
hostile to religion, where being hostile to or advocating religion in a public school 
                                                 
(2) Parents and guardians shall have the right to decide whether children shall receive 
religious instruction. 
(3) Religious instruction shall form part of the regular curriculum in state schools, with the 
exception of non-denominational schools. Without prejudice to the state’s right of 
supervision, religious instruction shall be given in accordance with the tenets of the religious 
community concerned. Teachers may not be obliged against their will to give religious 
instruction. 
… 
90 This is a religious view that the Earth and the rest of the universe were created by a deity, often 
involving a literal interpretation of a religious text. 
91 Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, Thomas C. Berg, Religion and the Constitution (Aspen 
Law, New York, 2002), 656. 
92 Scopes v State, 154 Tenn. 105 (1927). 
93 Spurred on by the National Defense Education Act (1958) and the National Science Foundation’s 
Biological Science Curriculum Study (1959). 
94 (1968) 393 US 97. 
95 Tennessee Butler Act, Tennessee Code Annotated Title 49 (Education) Section 1922. 
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setting was understood to be contrary to the Religion Clauses of the US Constitution’s 
First Amendment.96   
 
Black J, in concurring with the opinion of the court delivered by Fortas J, explained 
that: 
The Court, not content to strike down this Arkansas Act on the unchallengeable ground of its 
plain vagueness, chooses rather to invalidate it as a violation of the Establishment of Religion 
Clause of the First Amendment. I would not decide this case on such a sweeping ground for 
the following reasons, among others.  
1. In the first place I find it difficult to agree with the Court's statement that "there can be no 
doubt that Arkansas has sought to prevent its teachers from discussing the theory of evolution 
because it is contrary to the belief of some that the Book of Genesis must be the exclusive 
source of doctrine as to the origin of man." … 
2. A second question that arises for me is whether this Court's decision forbidding a State to 
exclude the subject of evolution from its schools infringes the religious freedom of those who 
consider evolution an anti-religious doctrine.  
3. I am also not ready to hold that a person hired to teach school children takes with him into 
the classroom a constitutional right to teach sociological, economic, political, or religious 
subjects that the school's managers do not want discussed. … I question whether it is absolutely 
certain, as the Court's opinion indicates, that "academic freedom" permits a teacher to breach 
his contractual agreement to teach only the subjects designated by the school authorities who 
hired him.  
In a 1982 case, McLean v Arkansas Board of Education,97  - also from the same state 
as Epperson - legislation that required public schools to give “balanced treatment” to 
“creation science” and “evolution science” as competing science theories in the 
science curriculum was held to violate the Establishment Clause of the US 
Constitution’s First Amendment.  The Court held that the law did not have a secular 
purpose, and that “creation science” was not a science.  It was also held that the 
teaching of “creation science” created an excessive entanglement with religion 
because the teachers in the public schools were public officials. 
 
 In 1987 in Edwards v Aguillard98 in circumstances similar to McLean v Arkansas 
Board of Education, Louisiana's "Creationism Act"99 was held to be unconstitutional 
by the US Supreme Court. The Court explored whether creationism could be taught 
as an alternative theory to evolution, rather than instead of it.  The legislation 
prohibited the teaching of evolution in public schools, except when it was 
accompanied by instruction in "creation science".  
Brennan J, who delivered the court’s opinion, described the legislation by noting100 
that   
[t]he Creationism Act forbids the teaching of the theory of evolution in public schools unless 
accompanied by instruction in "creation science."  No school is required to teach evolution or 
                                                 
96 This test of not aiding or opposing religion was stated five years earlier where Justice Clark held 
that the state must be “neutral” toward religion, saying, “The test may be stated as follows: “what are 
the purpose and primary effect of the enactment?  If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion 
then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution.” 
(Abington School District v Schempp 374 US 203(1963), 222). 
97 McLean v Arkansas Board of Education, (1982) 529 F. Supp. 1255. 
98 (1987) 482 US 578. 
99 Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science Act (Act 590) (Arkansas). 
100 at 581. 
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creation science. If either is taught, however, the other must also be taught. The theories of 
evolution and creation science are statutorily defined as "the scientific evidences for [creation 
or evolution] and inferences from those scientific evidences." 
Louisiana argued that the purpose of the statute was secular, to protect academic 
freedom.  The Court held that the law was invalid, as an impermissible establishment 
of religion.   
The court used the three-pronged test developed in Lemon v Kurtzman101 in 1971 to 
consider possible breaches of the Establishment Clause, on which Brennan J argued 
that Louisiana's law failed on all three. The law was not enacted to further a clear 
secular purpose, the primary effect of the law was to advance the viewpoint that a 
"supernatural being created humankind," and the law significantly entangled the 
interests of church and state by seeking "the symbolic and financial support of 
government to achieve a religious purpose." 
 
Following the failure by creationists to succeed in establishing the concept of “creation 
science” as a viable alternate theory for the science curriculum in Edwards, some 
proponents of this view recognised that creationism was too directly linked to religion 
to be considered a science, and commenced with the concept of “intelligent design”,102 
a theory that offered an alternate view to evolution, to circumvent decisions such as 
Edwards, by removing direct reference to religion.   
 
The most recent significant case on this matter in the US has been Kitzmiller v 
Dover.103  In Kitzmiller in 2005 US District Court Judge John E. Jones III ordered the 
Dover Area School Board to refrain from maintaining an Intelligent Design (ID) 
curriculum within the district. The offending policy included a statement "students 
will be made aware of gaps/problems in Darwin's Theory and other theories of 
evolution including, but not limited to, intelligent design."104 In his ruling, Jones J 
wrote it was "abundantly clear that the Board's ID Policy violates the Establishment 
Clause” and that "ID cannot uncouple itself from its creationist, and thus religious, 
antecedents".105  
 
Creationism remains in the US education system, as the constitutional issues apply 
only to public schools, leaving the private sector to teach as and what it wishes.106  
This has however led to students who have studied science with a strongly creationist 
element of the biology curriculum being refused entry into state institutions of higher 
education.107  The debate however remains.108 
                                                 
101  Lemon v Kurtzman, 403 US 602 (1971), 612-613. 
102 Washington, D.C.: Center for Inquiry, Office of Public Policy. ‘Understanding the Intelligent 
Design Creationist Movement: Its True Nature and Goals’ (May 2007) 
<http://www.centerforinquiry.net/uploads/attachments/intelligent-design.pdf >. 
103 Tammy Kitzmiller, et al. v Dover Area School District, et al. (400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 
2005). 
104 Kitzmiller v Dover Area School District, Memorandum Opinion, December 20, 2005, 117. 
105 Kitzmiller v Dover Area School District, Memorandum Opinion, December 20, 2005, Conclusion, 
136. 
106 Where there is no state action there is no constitutional violation: Adickes v. S.H. Kress & C, 398 
US 144, 152 (1970). 
107 Association of Christian Schools International v Roman Stearns, 679 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1090. 
108 See generally Robert J. D'Agostino, ‘Selman and Kitzmiller and the Imposition of Darwinian 
Orthodoxy’ (2010) Brigham Young University Education and Law Journal 1; Charles Cowan, 
 
136 
 
In conclusion, the intersection of religion and public education has been replete with 
decisions of higher courts, often the United States Supreme Court or the European 
Court of Human Rights considering the meaning of religious symbols or religiously 
influenced curricula in schools generally considered secular.  The meaning of secular 
in these contexts has been hotly debated, particularly in Europe, where religious 
symbols are closely associated with, and difficult to separate from, the dominant 
cultural paradigm.  These practices would no doubt have been contrary to Holyoake’s 
ideals as efforts to remove religion from a public space where its contribution is 
welcomed and the harm suggested by the state for its presence is largely unproven. 
 
The next chapter follows on from this theme, examining the impact of the use or 
maintenance of religion by secular states to effect cultural change using secular 
arguments for their purpose, or to maintain long standing but increasingly 
controversial practices on the basis of tradition.    
                                                 
‘Creationism’s Public and Private Fronts: The Protection and Restriction of Religious Freedom’ 
(2013) 82 Mississippi Law Journal 223. 
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CHAPTER 8 
EFFORTS TO MOULD A PUBLIC CULTURE BASED ON 
RELIGION 
 
I  INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1846 Holyoake stated in English Secularism that “Secularism is a code of duty 
pertaining to this life founded on considerations purely human.”1  Constitutions based 
on this principle for the governing of society have generally removed religion as a 
dictating force from public policy.  Yet in a number of jurisdictions, states avowedly 
secular have sought to impose religious values2 or severely limit or abolish religious 
practices in the view that society is better for it,3 contrary to Holyoake’s original 
principles.  To round out this second part of the thesis this chapter will examine these 
and a number of related issues. 
 
The efforts of some states to attempt to impose religious principles through legislation 
has always been a contentious area of religious freedom.  The issues related to a state 
imposing the religious values of the majority often have a dubious constitutional 
authority, and controversy often arise suggesting that religion has had an unreasonable 
influence upon government.  Some cases in this chapter also consider whether religion 
may be excessively limited (relative to non-religious players in the public space) due 
to over-regulation of its activities.   Some changes or interferences may not always be 
beneficial and well-received by the affected community or the community in general.    
 
II CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS TO BENEFIT RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES 
 
A Abolition of ‘untouchability’ – Temple entry cases 
 
Holyoakean principles advocate that secular principles are open to critique and debate 
in the public sphere.4  This is generally understood to mean that religion should not 
seek to influence or coerce government.5  While a number of cases have involved the 
suggestion that religion has influenced government - such as through religious 
                                                 
1 George Jacob Holyoake, English Secularism: A Confession of Belief (The Open Court Publishing 
Company, Chicago, 1896), 34. 
2 R v Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 SCR 295, 18 DLR (4th) 321; McGowan v Maryland, 366 US 420 
(1961). 
3 Such as in India through the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. 
4 “The universal fair and open discussion of opinion is the highest guarantee of public truth—only that 
theory which is submitted to that ordeal is to be regarded, since only that which endures it can be 
trusted. Secularism encourages men to trust reason throughout, and to trust nothing that reason does 
not establish”. (The Principles of Secularism Illustrated (Austin & Co., London, 1871), 15). 
5 See generally David E. Campbell and Robert D. Putnam, ‘God and Caesar in America: Why Mixing 
Religion and Politics is Bad for Both’ (2012) 91(2) Foreign Affairs 34; Robert Audi, ‘Religion, 
Politics and the Secular State’, (2014) 64 (1) The Philosopher’s Magazine 73. 
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displays,6 or through school prayers7 and directed curriculum8 - there are also cases of 
government working directly against Holyoakean principles by not only limiting 
religious activity9 but actively prohibiting religious institutions from undertaking 
long-standing practices.   
 
The policy of the British Government in India in the nineteenth century was not to 
interfere with religion, and in particular long-standing religious practices.  Lord 
William Bentick, between 1833 and 1835 made some exceptions and abolished 
religious practices such sati10 and thuggee,11 although they had a long history.  This 
interference in religious practices however was done with the declared intent of 
redefining public culture and religious practice along definitions set by the state.  Such 
interference is consistent with a long held view, back to the time of Locke, that groups 
whose beliefs could potentially undermine the maintenance of civil society are not to 
be tolerated.12 In more recent times, India has sought to abolish other long standing 
practices, a process which began in 1947.13 
 
The Temple Entry cases are examples of government imposing a ‘secular’ vision upon 
religion, bolstered by constitutional provisions designed to achieve social change, such 
as the abolition of untouchability in Article 17 of the Indian Constitution.14  The 
Temple Entry cases arose from the abolition of the concept of untouchability in the 
new constitution, and the enforcement of public religious acceptance of Dalits15 within 
the greater Hindu community.16   
 
The contentious issue of temple entry is a uniquely subcontinent matter, with most 
cases occurring in India.17  These resulted from the Indian state’s wish to remove 
                                                 
6 See for example Lynch v Donnelly, 465 US 668 (1984). 
7 See for example BVerfGE 52, 223 in Germany. 
8 See for example Abington School District v Schempp, 374 US 203(1963). 
9 As examined in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
10 Also known as suttee.  A woman devoted to her husband in life who, upon his death, immolated 
herself on his funeral pyre.  Considered to date back to 400 BCE the practice came to acquire the 
approval of most devout Hindus.   
11 Also known as Thuggee; practised by ‘thugs’.  In the nineteenth century these were a class of 
professional thieves and assassins who were Hindus or Muslims claiming the support of the goddess 
Kali, Durga or Bhabani who allegedly consecrated their weapons. 
12 John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration (trans. William Popple, Merchant Books, USA, 2011), 
78.  See also Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
13 One such was the institution of dedicating young girls to temple deities (which was abolished by 
the Madras Devadasis (Prevention of Dedication) Act, 1947, another the limiting of temple entry 
(removed by the Madras Temple Entry Authorization Act 1947).  Devadasis were those women 
‘married’ to the deity, dedicated for their lifetime to service in the temple.  Initially these women had 
wealthy patrons and were held in high regard for skills such as dancing.  Colonial times saw these 
women left without support and reformists sought to abolish the practice that they saw as a form of 
prostitution. 
14 17. Abolition of Untouchability.—“Untouchability” is abolished and its practice in any form is 
forbidden. The enforcement of any disability arising out of “Untouchability” shall be an offence 
punishable in accordance with law. 
15 also known as “untouchables” or Harijans, but now more commonly known as Dalits. 
16 Marc Galanter, ‘Hinduism, Secularism, and the Indian Judiciary’ (1971) 21(4) Philosophy East & 
West 466, 469. 
17 Some cases also occurred in Sri Lanka.  See generally Bryan Pfaffenberger, ‘The Political 
Construction of Defensive Nationalism: The 1968 Temple-Entry Crisis in Northern Sri Lanka’ (1990) 
49 The Journal of Asian Studies 78.   
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discrimination imposed upon those of a low caste,18 together with a rise in political 
consciousness among Dalits in the middle of the last century.19 Shabnum Tejani argues 
that Indian secularism relates more to considerations of caste, than to traditional 
religion.  Accordingly secularism in the Indian context is not 
  
a separation of political from religious institutions or creating a particularly Indian ethics of 
tolerance. Rather, it represented a formulation of nationalism that involved dovetailing liberal 
discourses around individual representation with definitions of majority and minority 
populations that were defined communally. Secularism in the Indian context thus took on quite 
specific historical meanings: it was not distinct from caste, communalism and democracy but 
a relational category that emerged at their nexus.  …  Indian secularism emerged in the 
transition from nationalism to independence at the fault lines of where minority communities, 
Muslims and Sikhs, as well as the Untouchables, asserted their right to be recognized in the 
new state.20  
 
New laws following independence regarding temple entry were perceived by religious 
institutions as an imposition upon their right to determine their own internal policies.21   
 
Temples have been a vexed problem for a number of reasons.  The public control over 
temples has been perceived to be a flaw in Indian secularism as it either violates the 
integrity of religious premises or interferes with the internal affairs of religious 
bodies.22  As the abolition of the practice of Devadasis,23 another long standing 
religious practice, could be said to be made for secular reasons - for the protection of 
the women concerned - it was argued that another Hindu practice, that of preventing 
access to temples on the grounds of untouchability24 was also unlawful and 
inequitable.25  A number of cases reached the Indian Supreme Court contesting these 
provisions, arguing that the freedom of religion provisions of the constitution should 
prevail over the temple entry laws. 
 
                                                 
18 Imposed by those of higher castes. 
19 Shabnum Tejani, ‘Untouchable Demands for Justice or the Problem of Religious “Non-
Interference”: The case of temple entry movements in late-colonial India’ (2013) 14(3) Journal of 
Colonialism and Colonial History. Project MUSE. Web. 8 Feb. 2014. <http://muse.jhu.edu/>.  The 
concept of temple entry was inclusive of access to public space - tanks, temples and bathing ghats. A 
ghat is series of steps leading down to a body of water, often a holy river, or a lesser body of water. 
20 Shabnum Tejani, ‘Untouchable Demands for Justice or the Problem of Religious “Non-
Interference”: The case of temple entry movements in late-colonial India’ (2013) 14(3) Journal of 
Colonialism and Colonial History. Project MUSE. Web. 8 Feb. 2014. <http://muse.jhu.edu/>.   
21 Marc Galanter, ‘Hinduism, Secularism, and the Indian Judiciary’ (1971) 21(4) Philosophy East and 
West 467, 469. 
22 Donald.E. Smith, India as a Secular State (Oxford University Press, London, 1963), 241-243. 
23 The institution of dedicating young girls to temple deities (which was abolished by the Madras 
Devadasis (Prevention of Dedication) Act, 1947.  Devadasis were women ‘married’ to the deity, 
dedicated for their lifetime to service in the temple.  Initially these women had wealthy patrons and 
were held in high regard for skills such as dancing.  Colonial times saw these women left without 
support and reformists sought to abolish the practice that they saw as a form of prostitution. 
24 Untouchability was made illegal under Article 17 of the 1950 Constitution which abolishes the 
practice. The Untouchability Offences Act of 1955 (renamed to Protection of Civil Rights Act in 1976) 
made it illegal to prevent a person from entering a place of worship or from taking water from a tank 
or well.  See generally Hillary Mayell, “India's "Untouchables" Face Violence, Discrimination”, 
National Geographic News, 2 June 2003. 
<http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2003/06/0602_030602_untouchables.html>. 
25Partha Chatterjee, ‘Secularism and tolerance’ in Rajeev Bhargava (ed), Secularism and its Critics 
(Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 353. 
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The Indian constitution provides for the access to all of Hindu religious institutions of 
a public character to all classes of Hindus.26  Notable in this area was the decision in 
1958 in Sri Venkataramana Devaru v State of Mysore,27 known as the Temple Entry 
case.  The trustees of the Temple of Sri Venkataramana Devaru at Mulki challenged 
the Madras Temple Entry Authorisation Act, 1947.28  This Act provided for the 
removal of the disability of Harijans from entering Hindu temples otherwise accessible 
to Hindus generally.  The temple trustees argued that they were private, which was 
rejected by the High Court of Mysore, but the Court allowed that they had the right to 
prevent entry to the general public on certain ceremonial occasions.   
 
In a democracy the state naturally is inclined to pass laws and regulations that support 
the views of the majority.  This proposition is not inconsistent with the published views 
of Holyoake.  However, when the state is inclined to enforce religious precepts upon 
the general population, such as in the “day of rest” cases, then religion begins to cease 
being an objective presence in the public sphere, and begins to direct public policy, 
moving away from Holyoake’s paradigm.  The “temple entry” cases however show 
that the state can interfere with matters that are religious in nature, not so much as to 
impose religious doctrine, but rather to apply limits for the betterment of the whole 
community under the general precepts of peace, order and good government.   
 
These cases, and many like it29 in the early years post-Independence, chronicled a 
struggle between established tradition and new constitutional principles.  Those new 
principles took some time to be adapted, and even some decades later were still not 
well understood.30  Indian secularism remains unlike most Western concepts.  Rajeev 
Bhargava has observed, it “is different from, and provides an alternative to, both the 
idealized American and French conceptions of secularism.”31  Yet, it retains the 
essential elements of Holyoake’s principles of not permitting dominance of religion 
over the state, and allowing religion a place in the public sphere.  Indeed, religion 
                                                 
26 Article 25(2)(b):  
27 AIR 1958 SC 895. 
28 This was an appeal by the trustees of the temple of Sri Venkataramana of Moolky Petta, who were 
managing the temple on behalf of the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins in accordance with a Scheme 
framed in a suit under s. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
29 Such as Raja Bira Kishore v State of Orissa, AIR 1964 SC 1501; Shastri Yagnapurushdasji v 
Muldas AIR 1966 SC 1119; and Durgah Committee, Ajmer v Syed Hussain Ali AIR 1962 SC 1402. 
30 “There is disagreement about what this secular state implies - whether it implies a severe aloofness 
from religion, a benign impartiality toward religion, a corrective oversight of it, or a fond and equal 
indulgence of all religions”: Marc Galanter, ‘Hinduism, Secularism, and the Indian Judiciary’ (1971) 
21(4) Philosophy East and West 467, 467. 
31 Rajeev Bhargava, ‘The “Secular Ideal” before Secularism” in Linell E. Cady and Elizabeth 
Shakman Hurd (eds.), Comparative Secularisms in a Global Age (Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire, 
2010), 161.  Bhargava goes on to argue that: “Both these conceptions separate the state from religion 
for the sake of individualistically conceived moral and ethical values.  The idealized American model 
interprets separation to mean mutual exclusion (wall of separation).  The state has no neither a 
positive relationship with religion, for example, there is no policy of granting aid to religious 
institutions, nor a negative relationship with it; it is not within the scope of state activity to interfere in 
religious matters even when the values professed by the state are violated within the religious domain. 
…  In contrast, the idealized French model interprets disconnection to mean one-sided exclusion.  
Here the state may interfere in the affairs of religion, but religion must not interfere in the affairs of 
the state. …  Such states exclude religion to control or regulate them and sometimes even to destroy 
them. They encourage an active disrespect for religion and are concerned solely with the prevention 
of the religious order dominating the secular.” 
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plays more of a part in the public sphere in India than does the familiar European or 
North American experience.   
 
It is different, but it remains consistent with Holyoake’s principles.  The limitations of 
religion’s ability to preclude individuals from accessing temples and other places held 
to be holy to them, together with the outlawing of untouchability, are laws that are 
reasonable restrictions aimed at maintaining the public order.  These traditions can 
also be reasonably limited for the purposes of public order and safety.32  In Holyoakean 
terms, the limitation upon the temple administrators to remove restrictions on public 
access, facilitates a balancing of conflicting interests, permitting the utilitarian 
principle of the greatest good to the greatest number in society to prevail. 
 
III ENCOURAGEMENT OF PATRIOTISM 
 
An encouragement of patriotism would seem to most on the surface to be an agreeable 
thing, a value for the common good.  Such encouragement, manifested almost as a 
civil religion the values of which are almost universally shared within a state, has a 
narrative of society that most can share.  Such values can be symbolised in a manner 
all can understand in the form of statues, flags and other mute symbols.  The meaning 
of these of course will often differ between observers. 
 
The quasi-religious aspect can be seen clearly when others of the community 
sometimes react when a non-conformist fails to observe its rituals, such as singing a 
national anthem or saluting a flag.  A profession of a civil religion is not uncommon.  
In the United States, in the context of the case of Lynch v Donnelly33 where religious 
symbols were placed by government authorities in a public place, it was observed that 
 
Every nation-state develops a set of myths about the meaning of the nation, its history, and 
its people, and a corresponding set of rituals. Although such myths and rituals may be recited 
and acted out at important, historic, or commemorative moments, they are not saved 
exclusively for these significant events. People appropriate and transform these myths and 
rituals into an integral part of everyday life that informs people about what it means to be an 
'American' (or a member of any other national group) and about who is marginal to that 
definition of self. 34  
  
An encouragement to profess patriotism, even if it must be compelled, is almost an 
insistence on a civil religion.35  The state in a number of countries has compelled such 
forced profession on a number of groups who feel that it is a breach of their religious 
freedoms to do so.36 
                                                 
32 In Chapter 5 limits to express freedoms were examined. 
33 Lynch v Donnelly, 465 US 668 (1984).   
34 Janet L. Dolgin, ‘Religious Symbols and the Establishment of a ‘National Religion’, (1987-88) 39 
Mercer Law Review 495, 502. 
35 Janet L. Dolgin, ‘Religious Symbols and the Establishment of a ‘National Religion’, (1987-88) 39 
Mercer Law Review 495, 505. “Those who refuse to applaud or appropriate the crèche in its public 
display risk being marked as pariahs or as refusing the American way of life. The real, almost 
unspeakable, danger of Lynch is that "being Christian,"- whether through birth or through the proper 
"code for conduct," including publicly accepting the crèche - can become synonymous with, or an 
essential aspect of, being American.” 
36 This includes the non-observance of civic rituals like saluting the flag in the US (Board of 
Education v Barnette, 319 US 624 (1943), singing the national anthem in India (Bijoe Emmanuel v 
State of Kerala (1986) 3 SCC 615) or contributing financially to the dominant religion (Premalal 
Perera v Weerasooriya (1985 (2) Sri LR, 177)). 
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Such an example is the Jehovah’s Witnesses Case37 in India, where three members of 
the Christian sect of Jehovah’s Witnesses refused to sing the National Anthem. The 
schools in Kerala had issued a directive that all students must do so. On the basis that 
such an act breached the tenets of their sect the students refused - citing that such 
insistence breached their religious freedoms under the Constitution.  As a result of 
their refusal, the children were expelled from the school.  An appeal against their 
expulsion to the High Court of Kerala failed.  An appeal to the Supreme Court 
succeeded, the Court setting aside the expulsion order of the Director of Public 
Instruction, Kerala.   
 
It was accepted that the appellants were not permitted to observe any ritual proscribed 
by their sect, and this included singing a national anthem or saluting a national flag.  
The Supreme Court held that their refusal was not in contravention of Section 3 of the 
Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971, and that the students’ refusal and 
subsequent expulsion was a violation of their rights under Article 25.  Chinnappa 
Reddy J and Dutt J noted the freedoms provided by Article 26 and observed 
 
We do endorse the view suggested by Davar J’s observation38 that the question is not whether 
a particular religious belief or practice appeals to our reason or sentiment but whether the belief 
is genuinely and conscientiously held as part of the profession or practice of religion.  Our 
personal views and reactions are irrelevant.  If belief is genuinely and conscientiously held it 
attracts the protection of Art. 25 but subject, of course, to the inhibitions contained therein.  
 
A similar case occurred in the USA in Board of Education v Barnette,39 known as the 
“flag salute” case.  The West Virginia Board of Education in 1942 adopted a resolution 
ordering that the salute to the flag be a regular part of public school programs, and that 
pupils “shall be required to participate in the salute honouring the Nation represented 
by the Flag; provided, however, that refusal to salute the Flag be regarded as an Act 
of insubordination, and shall be dealt with accordingly.”40  The appellants asked for 
an injunction in a federal court restraining enforcement of the laws which ran counter 
to the teaching of the Jehovah’s Witnesses of which the appellants were members.  
The Court agreed, and the state appealed. 
 
In considering the appeal the US Supreme Court in Barnette reviewed Minersville 
School District v Gobitis,41 decided three years before, also involving Jehovah’s 
Witness school children.  There the Court had reasoned that “National unity is the 
basis of national security”, and that authorities would have “the right to select 
appropriate means for its attainment”.42  Such measures were therefore constitutional.  
In Minersville the Court considered whether national unity by compulsion was 
                                                 
37 Bijoe Emmanuel v State of Kerala (1986) 3 SCC 615. 
38 “If this is the belief of the community – and it is proved undoubtedly to be the belief of the 
Zoroastrian community – a secular Judge is bound to accept that belief – it is not for him to sit in 
judgment on that belief – he has no right to interfere with the conscience of a donor who makes a gift 
in favour of what he believes to be the advancement of his religion and for the welfare of his 
community or of mankind …”  Jamshedji v Soonabai (1909)  (Davar J) 33 Bom. 122 
39 319 US 624 (1943). 
40 319 US 624 (1943), 627. 
41 310 US 586 (1940). 
42 310 US 586 (1940), 595. 
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constitutional.  It reviewed examples in history of futile examples to compel unity 
through compulsion and in Barnette reflected that43  
 
Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters.  
Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard.  It seems trite but 
necessary to say that the First Amendment to our Constitution was designed to avoid these ends by 
avoiding these beginnings.  …  Authority here is to be controlled by public opinion, not public 
opinion by authority …. 
 
Accordingly the Court held that Minersville was overruled, and that the judgment 
enjoining the West Virginia regulation was affirmed.   
 
A slightly different case occurred in Sri Lanka in Premalal Perera v Weerasooriya.44  
The petitioner was an employee of the Railways Department, who complained that an 
administrative circular infringed his rights under Articles 1045 and 14 (1) (e)46 of the 
Sri Lanka constitution. The circular directed that a day’s salary for the month of 
January 1985 would be deducted from all railway employees as a contribution to the 
National Security Fund, except for those who requested an exemption. The petitioner 
stated that as a Buddhist, he could not consent to the contribution, as the money would 
be used for purchasing weapons to be used for the destruction of human life. He 
claimed that informing the railway authorities of this fact as required by the circular 
would expose him to harassment. The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioner that 
his freedom of thought, conscience and religion was guaranteed and protected by the 
constitution, but nonetheless held that the circular did not expose him to the 
harassment he feared.  As stated by Ranasinghe J in that case 
 
Beliefs rooted in religion are protected. A religious belief need not be logical, acceptable, 
consistent or comprehensible in order to be protected. Unless the claim is bizarre and clearly 
non-religious in motivation, it is not within the judicial functions and judicial competence to 
inquire whether the person seeking protection has correctly perceived the commands of his 
particular faith. The Courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation and should not 
undertake to dissect religious beliefs. 
  
These cases of compliance with civic ritual does not make the whole of society 
stronger, but rather it is counterproductive, defeating the original intent of achieving a 
good for society.  As Jackson J in Barnette47  observed, “compulsory unification of 
opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard.”   Compulsorily enforced 
uniformity does society no good, and there is no true evidence that non-conformity 
does society harm.  It is consistent with Holyoake’s principles that civic religion, like 
all other religion, can have its dissenters with no harm to the rest of society.   
   
                                                 
43 West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette, 319 US 624 (1943), 641. (Jackson J). 
44 Premalal Perera v Weerasooriya (1985 (2) Sri LR, 177). 
45 Freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
46 (1) Every citizen is entitled to – 
(e) the freedom, either by himself or in association with others, and either in public or in 
private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice or teaching; 
47 West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette, 319 US 624 (1943), 641. (Jackson J). 
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IV THE CULTURAL HISTORY ARGUMENT 
 
In order to avoid political repercussions regarding state support of religious symbols, 
the courts recently in the United States,48  Germany,49 and Italy,50 have often made 
recourse to the ‘cultural history argument’.  These cases have been interesting in that 
they posit a legal history and identity retrospectively where jurisprudence had not 
sensed its presence before.   
 
The US cases for example, when explaining religious symbols and statements in 
public buildings, have been argued by plaintiffs that such symbols are clearly 
religious, and seem to send a message that the state endorses religion contrary the US 
Constitution’s First Amendment Religion Clauses.  Breyer J in one of these cases, Van 
Orden v Perry,51 observed that many of these cases were not that simple to decide, 
involving variables such as the specific facts of the case.52  In that case the fact that 
the monument in question had not been queried as being unconstitutional for the forty 
year it had been in place in front of the court house, was a deciding factor.53  Scalia J, 
in the minority in McCreary County v ACLU54 put the primary argument that the 
majority of the people are religious, and always have been, so the religious nature, 
especially Christian nature of the people should prevail over minority views, that the 
cultural history of the people is not be distinguished from the history of the state: 
 
The three most popular religions in the United States, Christianity, Judaism, and Islam–which 
combined account for 97.7% of all believers–are monotheistic . . .. All of them, moreover 
(Islam included), believe that the Ten Commandments were given by God to Moses, and are 
divine prescriptions for a virtuous life . . .. Publicly honoring the Ten Commandments is thus 
indistinguishable, insofar as discriminating against other religions is concerned, from publicly 
honoring God. Both practices are recognized across such a broad and diverse range of the 
population–from Christians to Muslims–that they cannot be reasonably understood as a 
government endorsement of a particular religious viewpoint. 
 
The cases considered in this section examine whether religious symbols and 
statements in the public sphere by the state are contrary to secular principles, or are 
simply part of the cultural history of the state, and as Breyer J noted, cannot be 
reasonably seen as an endorsement of a religious message. 
 
 
                                                 
48 Marsh v Chambers, 463 US 783 (1983). 
49 BVerfGE 52, 223 
50 Lautsi v Italy, European Court of Human Rights (Application No. 30814/06). 
51 Van Orden v Perry, 545 US 677 (2005). 
52 “The case before us is a borderline case. It concerns a large granite monument bearing the text of 
the Ten Commandments located on the grounds of the Texas State Capitol. On the one hand, the 
Commandments' text undeniably has a religious message, invoking, indeed emphasizing, the Deity. 
On the other hand, focusing on the text of the Commandments alone cannot conclusively resolve this 
case. Rather, to determine the message that the text here conveys, we must examine how the text is 
used. And that inquiry requires us to consider the context of the display.” Van Orden v Perry, 545 US 
677, 700-701 (2005). (Breyer J) 
53 Kathryn Page Camp, In God We Trust: How the Supreme Court's First Amendment Decisions 
Affect Organized Religion (FaithWalk Publishing, Lima, USA, 2006), 91-2. 
54 McCreary County v ACLU of Kentucky, 545 US 844 (2005). 
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A Ceremonial deism 
 
The use of cultural history to support the imposition of religion by the state into the 
public sphere includes terms such as ‘ceremonial deism’.  These terms have been 
suggested by their users to imply that their official use by the state over a long period, 
rather than being long-standing support by the state for religion in contravention of 
secular constitutional provisions to the contrary, are written off in contemporary usage 
as not being religious at all.  To those who do not subscribe to the majority religion, 
their usage is overtly religious.55  
 
The phrase ‘ceremonial deism’ was first used in 1962 by Eugene Rostow, who 
explained it to be “a class of public activity which . . . c[ould] be accepted as so 
conventional and uncontroversial as to be constitutional.”56  The concept has been 
considered in a number of US cases, including one which involved a nativity scene, 
and another which challenged the inclusion of “under God” in the US Pledge of 
Allegiance. 57   
 
Andrew Koppelman58 shares his confusion on this issue: 
 
Some kinds of official religion are clearly impermissible, such as official prayers and Bible 
reading in public schools.  Laws such as a ban on the teaching of evolution are struck down 
because they lack a secular purpose.  Yet at the same time, ‘In God We Trust’ appears on the 
currency, legislative sessions begin with prayers, judicial proceedings begin with ‘God save 
the United States and this Honourable Court’, Christmas is an official holiday, and of course, 
the words ‘under God’ appear in the Pledge of Allegiance. Old manifestations of official 
religion are tolerated, while new ones are enjoined by the courts: the Supreme Court held in 
2005 that an official Ten Commandments display is unconstitutional if it was erected recently, 
but not if it has been around for decades. 
 
Koppelman’s position on this confusion is that there must be a middle path between 
the extremes of “the complete eradication of religion from public life” and the 
traditional practice of “frank endorsement of religious propositions.” 59  Holyoake’s 
principles fit in this space that Koppelman envisages.  He has identified that ‘secular’ 
positions that advocate the complete removal or acceptance of religion in the public 
sphere are impossible to maintain.  As noted in earlier chapters of this thesis, religion 
is seen by many of its proponents as manifesting in all of society, both public and 
private.  At the same time, as noted in Chapter 5, the state has an interest in limiting 
religion in part, but not entirely.  The middle ground does not need defining or kept to 
an extreme, it needs only balance.   
 
                                                 
55 See for example Elk Grove Unified School District v Newdow, 542 US 1 (2004). 
56 Steven B. Epstein, ‘Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism’, (1996) 96(8) Columbia 
Law Review 2083, 2091. 
57 Lynch v Donnelly, 465 US 668 (1984) and Elk Grove Unified School District v Newdow, 542 US 1 
(2004). 
58 Andrew Koppelman, ‘And I Don’t Care What It Is: Religious Neutrality in American Law’ (2013) 
39 Pepperdine Law Review 1115, 1116-7. 
59 Chad Flanders, ‘Can We Please Stop Talking About Neutrality?  Koppelman between Scalia and 
Rawls’ (2013) 39 Pepperdine Law Review 1139, 1140. 
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Yet such overt displays by government of religious association, contrary to professed 
neutrality continue to cause controversy where and when they appear.60  Many have 
been, like the symbols mentioned in Chapter 6, in the public domain for some time 
without query as to their purpose.  In the United States this long standing use and 
practice of ceremonial deism or displays of official religion was first seen in Marsh v 
Chambers.61   
 
In Nebraska the legislature was opened by a chaplain selected by legislators and paid 
out of public funds.  Chambers, one of the legislators, challenged the practice as an 
establishment of religion, but the practice was upheld by the Supreme Court.  The 
Court held62 that  
 
The opening of sessions of legislative and other deliberative public bodies with prayer is 
deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this country. From colonial times through the 
founding of the Republic and ever since, the practice of legislative prayer has coexisted with 
the principles of disestablishment and religious freedom. In the very courtrooms in which the 
United States District Judge and later three Circuit Judges heard and decided this case, the 
proceedings opened with an announcement that concluded, "God save the United States and 
this Honorable Court." The same invocation occurs at all sessions of this Court. 
 
The Court cited in support the first Congress approving funds for house and senate 
chaplains in 1789.   Brennan J however dissented, arguing “I have no doubt that, if 
any group of law students were asked to apply the principles of Lemon to the question 
of legislative prayer, they would nearly unanimously find the practice 
unconstitutional.”63  He went on to say that it was “self-evident” that the purpose of 
such prayer was “pre-eminently religious”, and that its effect was religious by 
“explicitly link[ing] religious beliefs and observance to the power and prestige of the 
state”.64  Consequently such practices “involve[ed] precisely the sort of [entangling] 
supervision that agencies of government should if at all possible avoid.”  The next 
year in Brennan J’s dissenting opinion in Lynch v Donnelly65 he argued 
 
…  I would suggest that such practices as the designation of ‘In God We Trust’ as our national 
motto, or the references to God contained in the Pledge of Allegiance to the flag can best be 
understood, in Dean Rostow’s apt phrase, as a form of ‘ceremonial deism’66 protected from 
Establishment Clause scrutiny chiefly because they have lost through rote repetition any 
significant religious content. 
 
The amendment to the American Pledge of Allegiance nearly 60 years ago was a 
particularly overt effort to change public culture.  A bill was introduced into Congress 
in 1954 calling for the addition of the words “under God” to be added to the Pledge.  
                                                 
60 These issues are articulated on a regular basis in various jurisdictions.  For example, recently in 
Australia, there have been calls for the Australian Parliament to cease opening with a Christian prayer 
that has occurred since the creation of the Australian state in 1901: Judith Ireland, ‘Greens to move 
motion to remove Lord's Prayer in favour of “silent reflection”’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 
February 13, 2014.  <http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/greens-to-move-motion-
to-remove-lords-prayer-in-favour-of-silent-reflection-20140213-32j55.html.> 
61 Marsh v Chambers, 463 US 783 (1983). 
62 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 US 783, 786 (1983). 
63 Marsh v Chambers, 463 US 783, 800 (1983). 
64 Marsh v Chambers, 463 US 783, 798 (1983). 
65 465 US 668 (1984).   
66 A term created by the Dean of the Yale Law School, Eugene Rostow, in 1962, cited in Davison M. 
Douglas, ‘Ceremonial Deism’, in Paul Finkelman ed., Encyclopedia of American Civil Liberties 259 
(Taylor & Francis, Abingdon, 2006). 
 
147 
In June 1954, it was passed into law.  Although largely unchallenged until recently, 
some cases have begun since 2002.  The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 
Newdow v US Congress67 held that the 1954 statute was unconstitutional.  Newdow 
had complained about the policy of a California School district for his child and indeed 
all public school children in their district to do so.  Following political controversy the 
Ninth Circuit amended its decision.68   
 
O’Connor J in the appeal to the Supreme Court by the school district case in Elk Grove 
School District v Newdow69 used the ceremonial deism argument to dismiss 
Newdow’s appeal that the inclusion of the phrase “under God” in the American pledge 
of allegiance was ‘ceremonial deism’ and hence not innately religious.70  In a form of 
the cultural history viewpoint, Rehnquist CJ in the same case considered the same 
phrase was constitutionally permissible because the pledge had a ‘patriotic purpose’ 
(thereby invoking a common good to society argument).71  This view does not deny 
the religiosity of these issues, but simply considers that if the purpose was good, the 
content is irrelevant, and hence does not address the constitutionality of the matter at 
all. 
 
These arguments are innately circular and self-serving.  The long-standing usage of 
such phrases with religious content has been used by a population essentially 
religiously homogenous until late in the last century.   
 
It is only in recent times that society through secularisation and immigration has 
changed the demographics of a number of jurisdictions such as Australia, the UK, 
France and the USA which have welcomed and encouraged this change.72  This has 
created an environment where some now feel comfortable in questioning the 
assumptions underlying their state’s underlying constitutional identity, relating to the 
role of religion in the public sphere.73 
 
This cultural history argument for the dismissal of religious intent on the part of the 
state by associating it with traditional religious symbols and statements has analogues 
with decisions in Europe relating to similar displays in schools.74  There are some 
                                                 
67 Newdow v US Congress, 292 F. 3d 597.(9th Circuit, 2002).  Known as Newdow I. 
68 William Trunk, ‘The Scourge of Contextualism: Ceremonial Deism and the Establishment Clause’, 
(2008) 49 Boston College Law Review 571. 
69 Elk Grove School District v Newdow, 542 US 1 (2004), known as Newdow II. 
70 542 US 1, 36-37.  “There are no de minimis violations of the Constitution – no constitutional harms 
so slight that the courts are obliged to ignore them. Given the values that the Establishment Clause 
was meant to serve, however, I believe that government can, in a discrete category of cases, 
acknowledge or refer to the divine without offending the Constitution. This category of "ceremonial 
deism" most clearly encompasses such things as the national motto ("In God We Trust"), religious 
references in traditional patriotic songs such as "The Star-Spangled Banner", and the words with 
which the Marshal of this Court opens each of its sessions ("God save the United States and this 
honorable Court"). These references are not minor trespasses upon the Establishment Clause to which 
I turn a blind eye. Instead, their history, character, and context prevent them from being constitutional 
violations at all.” 
71 at 31. 
72 See generally Barry Kosmin, One Nation Under God: Religion in Contemporary American Society 
(Random House, New York, 2011); Peter L. Berger, Grace Davie, and Effie Fokas, Religious 
America, Secular Europe?: A Theme and Variation (Ashgate Publishing, Farnham, 2008). 
73 Such as in Elk Grove Unified School District v Newdow, 542 US 1 (2004). 
74 Lautsi v Italy, European Court of Human Rights (Application No. 30814/06); Bayerischer 
Verwaltungsgerichthof [BayVBI] [Bavarian Higher Administrative Court] 751 (751-54) (F.R.G.). 
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differences between the classes of cases however.  The arguments of the plaintiffs in 
the school decisions in Europe were basically that overt religious symbols in schools 
would have a compelling religious message, a proselytising that would have the power 
of the state behind the message, influencing the mind of the student who did not 
subscribe to the dominant religious view.   
 
The cases in the US are more technical.  Religious statements such as ‘In God We 
Trust’ in courts and legislatures are unlikely to affect a formative mind in that they 
would not attend these places much, if at all.  Such messages on currency are even 
more removed.  As few people pay much attention to what is written on a coin or note.   
 
As in Chapter 6, there is no demonstrable harm to society from these messages if there 
is little evidence that these messages and symbols cause the social harm anticipated.  
Then they are likely to be difficult to remove from the underlying culture, and unlikely 
to be associated with religion in any proselytising sense. Here, the element of coercion 
is missing, distinguishable from the flag salute cases of the previous section, and the 
‘day of rest’ cases in the next.  Accordingly such matters would not be inconsistent 
with Holyoakean principles. 
 
V THE ‘DAY OF REST’ PROPOSITION 
 
Since the 1850s laws passed by some jurisdictions to limit activity by people, 
particularly businesses, in public have been a controversial reform issue, limiting their 
ability to lawfully work or trade on the day.  The constitutional authority for such laws 
is generally drawn from the state’s powers for health and safety.  The controversies 
arose because the limitations applied arbitrarily to all citizens on one day of the week.  
As a recognised and enforced day of rest, these laws applied whether the rest was 
wanted on that day, or at all.75     
 
In England secularists sought to draw attention to petty examples of Sunday trading 
laws, such as the example of a Peter Kay of Preston in England who was a disabled 
seller of nettle beer on Sundays.  He was prosecuted under an old law from the times 
of Charles II, which limited the opening of inns on Sundays.76  Holyoake himself came 
across the case of a widow prosecuted for selling hot mutton pies a few minutes after 
midnight on a Saturday night.77  In July 1855 there were riots in London against Lord 
Robert Grosvenor’s Sunday Trading Bill, which was subsequently withdrawn.78  
Holyoake held that the bill was “a mere Church monopoly act, for the protection of 
religion from competition”.79 
                                                 
75 See generally Neil J. Dilloff, ‘Never on Sunday: the Blue Laws Controversy’, (1980) 39(4) 
Maryland Law Review 679. 
76 29 Charles II, c. 7 (1677). 
77 Edward Royle, Victorian Infidels (Manchester University Press, 1974), 260. 
78 “Mob Legislation”, The Spectator, 7 July 1855, 13.  The article noted that “The bill would not have 
enforced the observance of the Sabbath, "bitter" or otherwise; and it was supported by many who did 
not themselves sympathize with Sabbatical observance as a religious institution. The practice of 
trading on the Sunday in particular districts of London first attracted attention as a violation of public 
decency on religious grounds; and the Committee of the House of Commons that sat in 1832 obtained 
evidence which proved the wide extent of Sunday trading, and at the same time a very general desire 
on the part of traders to give up their business on the seventh day if they could be protected against 
the competition of each other.” 
79 The Reasoner, 8 July 1855. 
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A number of jurisdictions have attempted to pass legislation under the rationale of a 
universal worker’s day of rest with a secular purpose.  These have generally been 
found by supreme courts to be thinly veiled attempts by the state to impose religious 
values upon the community, including those which did not subscribe to the majority 
view.  Many of the cases brought involved those who had ‘days of rest’ other than the 
Christian Sunday. 
 
The first case that involved this area was R v Big M Drug Mart,80 a challenge to the 
Lord’s Day Act.81  That Act prohibited retail sales on Sundays in Canada, unless 
otherwise provided for in provincial law.  Canada's current freedom of religion 
principles currently lie in subsection 2(a)82 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.83   
 
In order for the Supreme Court to have jurisdiction to invalidate it, the Act had to be 
characterised as religious in nature.  However, this would then attract the protection 
of subsection 2(a) of the Canadian constitution if the freedom of religion provisions 
were read narrowly.84  However, Dickson J considered that a narrow reading would 
protect freedom of religious belief, but would also compel respect for the religion of 
others.  He stated: 
 
The essence of the concept of freedom of religion is the right to entertain such religious beliefs 
as a person chooses, the right to declare religious beliefs openly and without fear of hindrance 
or reprisal, and the right to manifest belief by worship and practice or by teaching and 
dissemination.85 
 
This freedom then included the freedom not to have to practise or adhere to another’s 
religion.  This protection from coercion: 
 
... means that, subject to such limitations as are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, 
or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others, no one is to be forced to act in any 
way contrary to his beliefs or his conscience.
86
 
 
The Court struck down the Lord’s Day Act for violating Section 2 of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
 
                                                 
80 R v Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 SCR 295, 18 DLR (4th) 321. 
81 Lord’s Day Act, 1906 (Can.), c. 27.; Lord’s Day Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. L-13, s. 4.; Lord’s Day 
(Ontario) Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 253.; Lord’s Day (Saskatchewan) Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. L-34. 
82 2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:  
(a) freedom of conscience and religion; 
83 The Charter is a bill of rights contained within the Canadian Constitution, forming the first part of 
the Constitution Act, 1982. 
84 Prior to 1982, religious freedom of expression rights in Canada were contained within three 
constitutional documents.  First, there was a clear mention of religion in section 93 of the Constitution 
Act, 1867.  Second, the criminal law power in section 91(27) permitted the federal government to 
legislate with respect to religious observance and to prevent profanation of the Christian Sabbath.  
Cases involving these provisions were of little value in religious freedom rights as they tended to be 
characterised in terms of a distribution of powers, rather than involving religious freedom rights.  
Third, the Canadian Bill of Rights contained a guarantee of freedom of religion but was of little value 
in upholding those rights, such as in R v Robertson in 1963, which upheld the Lords Day Act.   
85 R v Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 SCR 295, 353. 
86 R v Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 SCR, 354. 
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In the United States, a similar issue87 was addressed in McGowan v Maryland.88  The 
outcome was different, however.  The Supreme Court acknowledged that the origins 
of these laws were to encourage church attendance, and hence were religious in nature.  
However, the decision here focused on contemporary secular reasons for maintaining 
the tradition.  Although the laws coincided in part with religious provisions, the 
modern impact was to provide a common day of rest and “health, safety, recreation, 
and general well-being”.89   
 
Additionally, writing for the Court, Warren CJ noted that the plaintiffs had argued 
only economic loss for being forced to close on such a day, rather than an infringement 
of religious freedom, concluding 
 
[The] appellants allege only economic injury to themselves; they do not allege any 
infringement of their own religious freedoms due to Sunday closing. In fact, the record is silent 
as to what appellants' religious beliefs are. Since the general rule is that "a litigant may only 
assert his own constitutional rights or immunities," (United States v Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22) 
we hold that appellants have no standing to raise this contention.90 
 
The Court also held that the law did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Chief 
Justice Warren again stated: 
 
...the Court has [previously] held that the Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a wide 
scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens differently than 
others. The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds 
wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. State legislatures are presumed 
to have acted within their constitutional power [even when], in practice, their laws result in 
some inequality.91 
 
The element that again applies in this group of cases is that of coercion.  Legislation 
by the state forcing all of a community to comply with religiously based obligations 
as with other compulsory state activities to advance religious doctrine does not achieve 
a uniform desired outcome.   
 
If, as Holyoake insisted, that secular principles are open to critique and debate in the 
public sphere,92 then all parties in the public sphere may contribute to public policy.  
Such enacted legislation, if it is indeed for the safety, health and welfare of the society 
or other rationale, must have its true objective made transparent.  Religion may seek 
to influence the state to apply its values universally, or the state to regulate religion’s 
public activity, but each must seek to have in the public sphere “fair and open 
discussion of opinion”, without coercion.  Public culture based on religious ideals, no 
matter how well intended, cannot be imposed    
                                                 
87 Three other cases, of a similar type also occurred in 1961, Gallagher v Crown Kosher Super Market 
of Mass., Inc., 366 US 617 (1961); Braunfeld v Brown, 366 US 599 (1961); Two Guys from Harrison 
v McGinley, 366 US 582 (1961). 
88 McGowan v Maryland, 366 US 420 (1961).  
89 McGowan v Maryland, 366 US 420 (1961), 444. 
90 McGowan v Maryland, 366 US 420, 429 (1961). 
91 McGowan v Maryland, 366 US 420, 425 (1961). 
92 “The universal fair and open discussion of opinion is the highest guarantee of public truth—only 
that theory which is submitted to that ordeal is to be regarded, since only that which endures it can be 
trusted. Secularism encourages men to trust reason throughout, and to trust nothing that reason does 
not establish”. (The Principles of Secularism Illustrated (Austin & Co., London, 1871), 15). 
 
151 
In conclusion, this chapter considered the efforts of the state to maintain a presence of 
the majority religion in the public space not so much by way of establishment, or by 
an expounding of their principles, but rather by way of the state’s maintenance of 
religion’s link with the community.  This has often been done, not as an overt 
endorsement of religious practices, but rather as maintenance of long standing 
religious practices endorsed by the state rebadged as patriotism or cultural history 
which, it is argued, has long since lost its religious origins but binds citizens of all 
persuasions equally because of their common appeal as such.  These practices, 
however, in their more coercive forms such as enforced days of rest have been held 
by supreme courts as contrary to secular principles.   
 
The development of the theories of secularism developed by Holyoake were examined 
in Part I, through to an analysis of the contemporary secular state and its current 
relationship with religion in the public sphere, including its effectiveness in 
accommodating religion in the public sphere as Holyoake envisaged in Part II. The 
next part of this thesis moves through to a consideration of the future viability of 
Holyoakean secular principles, and the proposition of a way forward through a general 
theory of constitutional secularism. 
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PART III 
MODERN SECULARISM: THE REMOVAL OF THE 
WALL IN FAVOUR OF A NEIGHBOURHOOD FENCE 
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 CHAPTER 9 
 
HOLYOAKE’S VISION OF SECULARISM: THEN, NOW AND 
THE FUTURE 
 
 
The first Part of this thesis looked at where modern secularism originated, and how 
George Holyoake formulated his principles regarding secularism.  The second 
examined how a number of secular states interpreted the ideals of secularism and 
incorporated them into their own constitutional and political systems.  Cases were 
considered where issues examined by supreme courts were assessed in light of these 
principles, and their conformity with Holyoake’s principles formed more than a 
century ago.    
 
Part III of this thesis commences with this chapter.  The modern understanding of 
secularism will be outlined, especially those consistent with Holyoake’s principles.    
Particularly over the last half century, supreme courts have examined what their 
secular paradigms have meant in practice when examining the state’s treatment of 
intersections between the state and religion in the public square.  That period has given 
scholars an opportunity to look back and consider what trends have come out of those 
court decisions, and what public policy should be from now and reflect on what has 
been learned.   
 
This chapter will consider four issues.  The first will examine the views of those who, 
with the benefit of hindsight, have analysed states that have been secular for a 
significant period and consider that the purpose for which the state has been made 
secular has failed, and a revised model is needed.  The second will consider the views 
that secular constitutions and liberal democracies have evolved to adapt to modern 
challenges, and remains as a result an effective model of governance.  The third part 
of this chapter will look at how secularism may be improved, and perhaps be changed 
to address the critics’ perceptions of irrelevancy.  The last will look at issues that arise 
when the state becomes overzealous in its perception of how secular the state ought to 
be, particularly when the perceived paradigm is a strict separation of religion and state. 
 
I THE OFT CITED CRISIS OF SECULARISM: DID HOLYOAKE’S VISION FAIL?  
 
There are often statements in academic writings and even newspapers suggesting that 
secularism has failed,1 religiosity is on the ascendant,2 and that we should all 
acknowledge that secularism had a good try at changing the world but must now accept 
that that model must now be discarded.3 
 
                                                 
1 Bruce Ledewitz, Church, State and the Crisis in American Secularism (Indiana University Press, 
Bloomington, 2011), 171. 
2 “The world we contemplate at the dawning of the twentieth-first century remains vibrantly, 
energetically, even at times maniacally religious, in ways large and small, good and bad, superficial 
and profound, now as much as ever”. (Wilfred M. McClay, ‘Two Concepts of Secularism’, (2001) 
13(1) Journal of Policy History 47, 48. 
3 See generally H. Baker, The End of Secularism (Crossway, USA, 2009). 
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One such critic, William Connolly, has stated that “[t]he historical modus vivendi 
called secularism is coming apart at the seams.”4  Lorenzo Zucca agrees and says that 
“[t]he secular state is in a difficult position.  It barely copes with diversity and the fact 
of pluralism.”5   He sees the role of the secular state as the management of diversity, 
ergo the more diverse it becomes the more unmanageable it is.  Accordingly, he sees 
“the impossibility of satisfying [the demands of religion] only increases the gap 
between different segments of society, which is thus more and more polarised.” 6 
 
Recently Tariq Modood7 cited publications in this vein in the context of European 
secularism such as those by Olivier Roy, “The Crisis of the Secular State,”8 and Rajeev 
Bhargava writing on the “crisis of secular states in Europe.”9  Modood felt that the 
stream of such articles intimating such a crisis in Secularism is misleading.  He notes 
that in Europe that it is more a challenge for political secularism or multiculturalism 
to adjust to post-immigration multiculturalism, to adjust to significant numbers of 
migrants who challenge the status quo of residual privilege to the majority religion, 
such as tax concessions and grants, or simply a voice recognised and respected in the 
public sphere.  His view of secularism is that it comes in two forms: the first is that 
exemplified by French Laïcité, and the other what he terms “organized religion as a 
potential public good or national resource (not just a private benefit)”.10   
 
Rajeev Bhargava, in his response article to Modood, tended to agree, arguing that “we 
need not an alternative to but an alternative conception of secularism, one that is 
different from mainstream conceptions shaped by French Laïcité and the American 
wall of separation variant.” 11  He sees that contemporary secularism is inflexible, as 
are the politics and law associated with it.  Moderate, or accommodative, secularism 
in his view is not succeeding.  Bhargava sees a future for secularism in Europe only 
“[o]nce we have shifted away from these and start to focus on the normative, informal 
practices of a broader range of Western and non-Western states, we shall see that better 
forms of secular states and much more defensible versions of secularisms are 
available.” 12    
 
                                                 
4 William E. Connolly, Why I am not a Secularist (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 
1999), 19. 
5 Lorenzo Zucca, A Secular Europe: Law and Religion in the European Constitutional Landscape 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012), 30. 
6 Lorenzo Zucca, A Secular Europe: Law and Religion in the European Constitutional Landscape 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012), 30. 
7 Tariq Modood, ‘Is there a crisis of secularism in Western Europe?’, The Immanent Frame: 
Secularism, Religion and the Public Sphere, 24 August 2011.  <http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2011/08/24/is-
there-a-crisis-of-secularism-in-western-europe/ >. 
8 In Olivier Roy, Secularism confronts Islam, Columbia University Press, New York (2007). 
9 In Rajeev Bhargava, ‘States, Religious Diversity, and the Crisis of Secularism’, (2010) 12(3) The 
Hedgehog Review 8. 
10 Tariq Modood, ‘Is there a crisis of secularism in Western Europe?’, The Immanent Frame: 
Secularism, Religion and the Public Sphere, 24 August 2011.  <http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2011/08/24/is-
there-a-crisis-of-secularism-in-western-europe/ >. 
11 Rajeev Bhargava, “Beyond moderate secularism”, The Immanent Frame: Secularism, Religion and 
the Public Sphere, 16 September 2011. <http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2011/09/16/beyond-moderate-
secularism/.> 
12 Rajeev Bhargava, “Beyond moderate secularism”, The Immanent Frame: Secularism, Religion and 
the Public Sphere, 16 September 2011. <http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2011/09/16/beyond-moderate-
secularism/.> 
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Adding to the distrust of secularism by some, on occasions there has been a conflation 
of the term “secularization” with “secularism”.13  The arguments made by such 
individuals have therefore muddied the waters of discourse in this area and inflamed 
the views of those who see the first and create antipathy for the second.  One such is 
Jean Bethke Elshtain who argues that the “secularization hypothesis has failed, and 
failed spectacularly. We must now find a new paradigm that will help us to understand 
the complexities of the relationship between religion and democracy.”14  Another is 
T.N. Madan, whose writings are very assertively against secularism as a model of 
democratic government and sees secularism as a Western concept imposing colonial 
values inappropriate for the Indian context.15  He does however admit that he is 
“bedevilled by terminological confusion, ethnographic diversity and ideological 
dissension.” 16    
 
Madan illustrates his position with the views of the sociologist David Martin.  He notes 
Martin’s dissatisfaction with secularization in general, with what is believed to have a 
“counter religious impulse”.17  Madan argues that  
 
conservatives see secularization as a threat to their conceptions of the good, moral, life, 
robbing it of its ideas of sacredness and ultimate value, the secularists look upon it as an anti-
religious emancipator process.  The latter consider urbanization, industrialization and 
modernization as the causes and symptoms of the ‘secularizing fever’ that grips our societies 
today. 
 
Arguments such as Madan’s are typical of commentators18 who tend to see the process 
of secularization as an active process promoted and propelled by ‘secularists’ 
characterised as ‘the other’ to be opposed and countered by those who disagree with 
it.  He does not define ‘secularists’ as any particular group, but they appear to be 
personified and identified with the secularization process.  They and secularism are 
therefore seen as being aligned as a counter societal process without respect for local 
and traditional processes and practices.   
 
Madan’s conflation is articulated in a discussion on George Jacob Holyoake who 
“inherited from the Owenite and Utilitarian movements of England a naturalistic, 
ethical and social utopian rationalism.  From the French Revolution he derived 
republicanism, anticlericalism and an aversion to theology.”19  From this reasoning, 
Madan considers secularism to be “an anti-religious ideology” and indeed almost 
conflates it with the notion of a civil religion when he argues that  
 
                                                 
13 A popular anti-secular stance is propounded by Jean Bethke Elshtain who, associating secularism 
with anti-religious views, explains: “During the past few years, we have been treated to a spate of 
work blaming religion for every evil under the sun while conveniently ignoring that the greatest 
horrors of the twentieth century—the bloodiest of all centuries—were fueled by two antireligious 
totalitarian regimes, Nazi Germany and the officially atheistic Soviet empire.”  (Jean Bethke Elshtain, 
‘Religion and Democracy’, (2009) 20(2) Journal of Democracy 5, 8.) 
14 Jean Bethke Elshtain, ‘Religion and Democracy’, (2009) 20(2) Journal of Democracy 5, 8. 
15 T.N. Madan, ‘Whither Indian Secularism?’ (1993) 27(3) Modern Asian Studies 667, 668-9. 
16 T.N. Madan, ‘Whither Indian Secularism?’ (1993) 27(3) Modern Asian Studies 667, 668. 
17 Citing David Martin, ‘Towards Eliminating the Concept of Secularization’ in J. Gould (ed.), 
Penguin Survey of the Social Sciences (Penguin, London, 1965). 
18 Such as Partha Chatterjee and Ashis Nandy. 
19 T.N. Madan, ‘Whither Indian Secularism?’ (1993) 27(3) Modern Asian Studies 667, 670. 
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Secularism as the state ideology of India seeks to provide the moral basis of public life just as 
Islam supposedly does in Pakistan; the state in India is expected to protect and promote 
secularism in more or less the same manner in which the Sri Lankan state is expected to protect 
and promote Buddhism … 
 
This promotion of secularism as a state religion that must be pushed and defended by 
the state as if it were a religious establishment is a concerning argument.  It appeals to 
those who think in terms of formal religion and its ‘opponents’ and couches the 
argument in terms of an ideology that must be displaced as soon as those who advocate 
it may be identified and removed. Secularism as advocated by Holyoake was no such 
thing.  His secularism did not offer an alternative moral fabric for society nor did 
Holyoake seek to replace religious traditions with another as some form of established 
‘religion’.  However, such arguments by such as Madan and Nandy, couched in those 
terms, allow secularism to be perceived as the enemy of tradition and religion, to be a 
modernity to be denied. 
 
Secularism is more often now being widely seen as being in strife.  Samuel F. 
Huntington said in 1998 that20  
 
The increasing political power of religious fundamentalists is not confined to the Middle East.  
Rather, it is a virtually worldwide phenomenon. … Throughout the World, religious identities 
are increasing.  The power and salience of religion has increased.  There is more questioning 
of the secular state.  This could be called secularism or the revenge of God. 
 
… Since the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War, the identities of many 
nations have been increasingly based on religion, with governments using faith to define their 
legitimacy.  …  The rise of religious consciousness has generated an increase of conflict based 
on religion and on persecution. 
 
Historically, moderate secular thought as proposed by Holyoake has been consistently 
criticised as being associated with atheism, or those who are anti-religious.  This has 
naturally engendered a feeling of persecution by those who therefore see secularism 
as harmful to the religious institutions to which they hold allegiance.  Holyoake has 
been tarred with the same brush as Bradlaugh, who did not hide his anti-religious 
views.  Contrary to Bradlaugh, Holyoake was not interested in removing or replacing 
religion, and offered a place in the public sphere respecting religion’s right to do so.   
 
Like the squeaky wheel that makes the most noise, the ‘hard’ secular paradigms of the 
US and France have been those that have received the greatest attention, and have been 
seen as the face of modern secularism.  A cursory look at the breadth of scholarship 
on secularism will show that most of the writings on this topic have related to 
controversies in respect of these two states.  Those states which have secular principles 
consistent with Holyoake, such as Australia, Canada and much of Europe, have had 
few debates on this issue.  Without the hard edges to rub against, there have been few 
sparks. 
 
Those who feel that secularism is a faulty paradigm have been saying so for some 
time, and most not recently.  It will be instructive to consider the current state of 
secular government in liberal democracies. 
 
                                                 
20 Samuel F Huntington, “The Revenge of God: Secularism Retreats”, The Washington Report on 
Middle East Affairs, May-June1998, 68. 
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II CONTEMPORARY SECULARISM: DID HOLYOAKE’S VISION SIMPLY EVOLVE INTO 
A NEW FORM? 
 
The meaning of secularism has almost as many meanings as those one might ask for 
it.   Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India,21 once became particularly 
frustrated with the use and abuse of the term “Secularism”22  
 
Another word is thrown up a good deal, this secular state business.  May I beg with all humility 
those gentlemen who use this word often to consult some dictionary before they use it? 
 
Not much has changed since.  Indeed, as the concept has travelled, its meaning has 
varied.  As Bankim Chandra Chatterji noted in the nineteenth century, “You can 
translate a word by a word, but behind the word is an idea, the thing which the word 
denotes, and this idea you cannot translate if it does not exist among the people in 
whose language you are translating.”23  
 
So, where does the understanding of secularism currently stand, and is it still consistent 
with Holyoake’s principles?  In considering where secularism fits in the modern world, 
Robert Audi observed recently that  “[t]he history of the Western world has progressed 
from a time when the state was taken to represent the church to an age in which most 
governments are committed to at least some degree of secularity.”24    
 
Trying to determine what secularism means to the world today is like Segal's law.25 
Look to one jurisdiction for definition, there is usually some consensus.  Look at others 
and the answers are all different.  Maclure and Taylor see it in broad terms as the 
management of moral and religious diversity in contemporary society.  That diversity 
they note includes issues such as Sharia in family law and polygamous marriages in 
Canada, headscarves in France and Hindu nationalists in India.  They see however that 
secularism is an essential part of any liberal democracy that adheres “to a plurality of 
conceptions of the world and of the good …”26    Graeme Smith sees contemporary 
secularism as “the latest expression of the Christian religion.   …   Secularism is 
Christian ethics shorn of its doctrine. It is the ongoing commitment to do good, 
understood in traditional Christian terms, without a concern for the technicalities of 
the teachings of the Church.”27   
 
Secularism, however, has also touched the Eastern world, but has been adapted for 
local use.  Priya Kumar explains that, in the Indian context, secularism has “expanded 
from its traditional concern with emancipation from religion or the privatization of 
religion to a far more wide-ranging and heterogeneous agenda in postcolonial India. It 
has been called upon to resolve a number of thorny social and political issues, 
                                                 
21 15 August 1947 – 27 May 1964. 
22 Report 1967:401 Constituent assembly debates official reports, Vol. II.   
23 Quoted in T. N. Madan, ‘Secularism in its Place’, in Rajeev Bhargava (ed), Secularism and its 
Critics (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 308. 
24 Robert Audi, ‘Religion, Politics and the Secular State’ (2014) 64 (1) The Philosopher’s Magazine 
73, 73. 
25 An old saying that states: "A man with a watch knows what time it is. A man with two watches is 
never sure.”  (Arthur Bloch, Murphy’s Law (Perigee, New York, 2003). 
26 Jocelyn Maclure and Charles Taylor (trans. Jane Marie Todd) Secularism and Freedom of 
Conscience (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, USA, 2011), 1. 
27 Graeme Smith, Short History of Secularism (I.B.Taurus, London, 2007), 2. 
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including primarily (but not only) the possibility of multireligious and multicultural 
coexistence within the nation and the complex question of the place of religious 
minorities in a liberal democratic state.”28 
 
Many jurisdictions indeed have some degree of secularity, but more importantly, 
usually a different secularity, different often from their neighbours or their colonial 
predecessors.  On this Madhu Purnima Kishwar asked recently,29 “Do we want to 
create a world in which everyone thinks alike? A world in which there is no space for 
divergence of views or foolish people?”  Kishwar wrote in the context of a Hindu 
Temple insisting on the religious freedom to determine who may enter a temple.  She 
observes that translating an originally European concept into one that jurisdictions 
elsewhere can take on board as their own has proven to be difficult, but not impossible.  
However, the point she makes is that an overzealous ‘secularism’ carries with it 
intolerance for the unconventional and often an element of hypocrisy.30  On this latter 
point I expand further in part IV of this chapter.    
 
Holyoake did not envision secularism to be a tool to be used by individuals, 
organisations or the state bluntly against those who dissent against orthodoxy.  Rather, 
it was intended as a means for all participants in the public sphere to have their place.  
In particular it was not intended to be a political panacea for all ills nor an alternative 
orthodoxy used to supplant another. 
 
Holyoake spent much of his time related to Secularism defending it against 
accusations of hostility to religion in the public sphere, and in general.  Accordingly 
most of his speeches and writings are less polemical on his thoughts and more efforts 
to get across the idea that secularism is not anti-religious, or indeed seeking to limit 
religion.  The thrust of his views is that secularism gives equal access to all players in 
the public sphere, but not all need equal access and some may play a greater role in 
contributing to public policy, or none.   
 
Much of Holyoake’s moderate viewpoint was eclipsed in the later nineteenth century 
by the positions taken by a contemporary and erstwhile colleague, Charles Bradlaugh.  
As stated earlier in this thesis Bradlaugh’s view of secularism was strongly anti-
religion and anti-establishment of religion, and so he and Holyoake’s paths diverged.  
Holyoake considered that secularism and secular ethics should take no position on 
religion and its validity or truth.  Bradlaugh’s views however were in favour of strong 
freethought and atheism as a counter to religious thought, which split the movement 
they had supported.  Bradlaugh’s controversial views being so forcefully against 
conventional wisdom in a country where Anglicanism was established took on the 
public face of secularism, leaving Holyoake’s more moderate statements in their 
shadow. 
 
Accordingly, since then the common understanding of secularism as a constitutional 
and social policy philosophy has tended to err in favour of the more confronting views 
of Bradlaugh and his supporters.  Many academics have begun articles and books with 
                                                 
28 Priya Kumar, Limiting Secularism (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2008), 1. 
29 “Don’t like this temple?  Choose another.” The Hindu, January 17, 2013. 
<http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/dont-like-this-temple-choose-another/article4313507.ece >. 
30 “Don’t like this temple?  Choose another.” The Hindu, January 17, 2013. 
<http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/dont-like-this-temple-choose-another/article4313507.ece >. 
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unquestioned statements about the nature of secularism, as if it were stating the 
obvious as a common knowledge between reader and author.31  Such statements lead 
the reader to believe the statement to be unquestioned and promote the same 
perspective.  Some examples include Iain Benson who advised that “‘secularism’ 
describes an ideology that is, and has been since its inception, anti-religious.  As such, 
the ideology of secularism cannot be one of the principles upon which Canada, as a 
free and democratic country, is based.”   This statement forms the basis for his article 
and yet the assertion is unreferenced.32   
 
Some have spoken of secularism in terms of ‘strong’ or ‘weak’ secularism.33  These 
views tend to align with the anti-religious positions that do not permit a religious 
perspective in the public sphere, and those that accept it and do not seek to control it, 
respectively.  Current secular discourse explores the black and white perceptions of 
the US and France which brook little concession to religion, and the ‘softer’ Indian 
perspective which seeks to bind a multi-religious state with a populace which sees the 
role of secularism as a model of keeping the peace.  Today’s secular discussion looks 
at their constitutional identity anew, and considers the symbols around them and the 
communities in which they were raised or just joined, and sees them with new eyes.  
Supreme courts have considered headscarf cases in Europe, the ‘blue laws’ of North 
America and the temple entry cases in India.  These and others reviewed in this thesis 
have all caused the dominant groups in those societies to recognise that the last six 
decades have wrought social change through economic prosperity, education, and 
mass migration.   
 
A constitution is a mirror of a society and its values, and many such as those in this 
thesis are looking to see if the values stand, or perhaps need tweaking.  More than 
ever, when they discuss secularism, as seen in the views of the commentators 
considered, they go back to where their secular values originated, and many 
acknowledge the work and thoughts of George Holyoake as a man who could offer an 
alternative to the state or religion wresting control of the public space. 
 
III FUTURE SECULARISM: A NEED FOR MORE THAN TOLERANCE 
 
A modern definition of secularism cannot be made in terms of what secularism is not.  
Rather, we should move forward.  Some such as Simone Chambers see that we are 
already doing so.34 
 
                                                 
31 See generally Winifred Fallers Sullivan, ‘Varieties of Legal Secularism’ in Linelle E. Cady and 
Elizabeth Shakman Hurd (eds.), Comparative Secularisms in a Global Age (Palgrave Macmillan, 
Hampshire, 2010, 107).  Sullivan, while promising ‘varieties’ speaks almost exclusively about the 
US, and speaks of religion in opposition to secularism, rather than religion being an acknowledged 
part of the public sphere. 
32 Iain T. Benson, ‘Considering Secularism’ in Douglas Farrow (ed.), Recognizing Religion in a 
Secular Society: Essays in Pluralism, Religion, and Public Policy (McGill Queens Press, Montreal, 
2004), 83.  
33 Andras Sajo, ‘Constitutionalism and Secularism: The Need for Public Reason’ (2009) 30 Cardozo 
Law Review 2401, 2403-2404. 
34 “I see a growing number of open secularists and liberal theists converging on a center position. The 
core ... is an invitation to all religious citizens, indeed all citizens, complete with their deepest 
convictions, to participate in public life and debate within certain liberal/moral constraints governing 
appropriateness of public justifications.” (Simone Chambers, ‘Secularism Minus Exclusion: 
Developing a Religious –Friendly Idea of Public Reason’ (2010) 19(2) The Good Society 16, 16. 
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Much of the jurisprudence that I have discussed in this thesis has accepted a domestic 
norm of mainstream conceptions such as that found in France or the United States, and 
has not explored what secularism could be, and is slow to consider alternatives.  
Secularism in the modern world is now a much more complicated concept.  Most 
liberal democracies have a secular state peculiarly their own. In times past Secularism 
in Europe was a simple distinction between the state and a religion, the latter common 
to most if not all of the citizens of the state.  Now, the religion that attempts to share 
the public sphere with the state is not one but many, so now religion is now also 
seeking identity, to have its unique voice heard and respected distinct from the others.  
The public sphere is now much more complex, an increasingly pluralistic polity, 
shared now not only with the religious, but now also with the actively non-religious 
and even the anti-religious.  It may or may not be in crisis, but it needs a review. 
 
There are views varying from secularism being the only solution to a divided modern 
world, to secularism being liberalism gone amok and likely to tear modern society 
apart.  The philosopher John Rawls35 in his book Political Liberalism expounded his 
ideal of public reason in which “citizens are to conduct their fundamental discussions 
within the framework of what each regards as a political conception of justice based 
on values that others can reasonably be expected to endorse”.    
 
These latter views have caused some controversy,36 together with the similar views of 
others such as Kent Greenawalt and Robert Audi.  Greenawalt37 for example considers 
that religious arguments are acceptable in supporting political positions whenever 
secular arguments cannot resolve issues, such as abortion and animal rights issues.  
Audi38 argues that religious convictions should largely or completely be excluded 
from politics.  Jürgen Habermas has asked in respect of Rawls views regarding public 
reason  
 
How does the constitutional separation of state and church influence the role which religious 
traditions, communities and organizations are allowed to play in civil society and the political 
public sphere, above all in the political opinion and will formation of citizens themselves? 
Where should the dividing line be in the opinion of the revisionists? Are the opponents who 
are currently out on the warpath against the liberal standard version of an ethics of citizenship 
actually only championing the pro-religious meaning of a secular state held to be neutral, 
versus a narrow secularist notion of a pluralist society? Or are they more or less 
inconspicuously changing the liberal agenda from the bottom up—and thus already arguing 
from the background of a different self-understanding of Modernity? 
 
Habermas explains Rawls’ public reason argument as “‘natural’ reason, in other words 
solely on public arguments to which supposedly all persons have equal access. The 
assumption of a common human reason forms the basis of justification for a secular 
state that no longer depends on religious legitimation. And this in turn makes the 
                                                 
35 James P. Sterba, ‘Rawls and Religion’ in Victoria Davion and Clark Wolf (Eds.), The Idea of 
Political Liberalism: Essays on Rawls (2000), 34. 
36 Jürgen Habermas, “Religion in the Public Sphere”, (2006) 14(1) European Journal of Philosophy 1, 
3. 
37 Kent Greenawalt, ‘Religious Convictions and Political Choice: Some Further Thoughts’ (1990) 38 
DePaul Law Review 1019, 1022.   
38 Robert Audi, ‘The Place of Religious Argument in a Free and Democratic Society’ (1993) 30 San 
Diego Law Review 677. 
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separation of state and church possible at the institutional level in the first place.”  He 
feels that constitutional religious freedom is the solution to religious pluralism.39   
 
So, what must be done with secularism to make it less contentious and palatable to as 
many as possible?   
 
William Connolly argues that “I certainly do not suggest that a common religion needs 
to be reinstated in public life or that separation of church and state in some sense of 
that phrase needs to be reversed.  Such attempts would intensify cultural wars already 
in motion.  Secularism needs refashioning, not elimination”.40 Michael Rosenfeld feels 
that the public sphere must be shrunk to a minimum so as best to “achieve objectives 
over which there is unanimous consensus throughout the polity.”41  The difficulty with 
Rosenfeld’s view is that in order to find a public square small enough to find a space 
where all players agree, that space is likely to be miniscule or non-existent.  It is 
impossible to find a space where so many diverse interests may contribute, and still 
make those contributions meaningful.  The answer is likely to be that the public square 
is no smaller, and accessible to all, but that all players must accept that they must make 
concessions, find common ground and work with what they have.  Also, he discusses 
variants within each broad model such as France and Turkey, but does not consider 
any concept of secularism that may have taken seed elsewhere, particularly in 
jurisdictions where the constitution is secular but the majority of the population is non-
European.42   
 
Regarding models outlining the relations between the state and religion, Charles 
Taylor43 considers that 
[o]ne of our basic difficulties in dealing with these problems is that we have the wrong model, 
which has a continuing hold on our minds. We think that secularism (or laïcité) has to do with 
the relation of the state and religion, whereas in fact it has to do with the (correct) response of 
the democratic state to diversity. … There is no reason to single out religious (as against 
nonreligious), “secular” (in another widely used sense), or atheist viewpoints. Indeed, the point 
of state neutrality is precisely to avoid favoring or disfavoring not just religious positions, but 
any basic position, religious or nonreligious. We can’t favor Christianity over Islam, but also 
we can’t favor religion over against nonbelief in religion, or vice versa. 
The late-Rawlsian formulation for a secular state cleaves very strongly to certain political 
principles: human rights, equality, the rule of law, democracy. These are the very basis of the 
state, which must support them. But this political ethic can be and is shared by people of very 
different basic outlooks (what Rawls calls “comprehensive views of the good”). A Kantian 
will justify the rights to life and freedom by pointing to the dignity of rational agency; a 
Utilitarian will speak of the necessity to treat beings who can experience joy and suffering in 
such a way as to maximize the first and minimize the second … 
 
                                                 
39 Jürgen Habermas, “Religion in the Public Sphere” (2006) 14(1) European Journal of Philosophy 1, 
4. 
40 William E. Connolly, Why I am not a Secularist (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 
1999), 19. 
41 Michael Rosenfeld, Law, Justice, Democracy and the Clash of Cultures: A Pluralist Account 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011), 158. 
42 Michael Rosenfeld, Law, Justice, Democracy and the Clash of Cultures: A Pluralist Account 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011), 155. 
43 Charles Taylor, ‘The Meaning of Secularism’, The Hedgehog Review (Vol. 12 no. 3, 2010) 23, 25. 
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In a case relating to same-sex marriage, the South African Constitutional Court in their 
judgment, made a clear statement of the place for all non-majoritarian positions in the 
public sphere.  Views need not be merely tolerated, but rather should be valued as 
equal parts of the polity: 
 
As was said by this Court in Christian Education44 there are a number of constitutional 
provisions that underline the constitutional value of acknowledging diversity and pluralism in 
our society.  … Taken together, they affirm the right of people to self-expression without being 
forced to subordinate themselves to the cultural and religious norms of others, and highlight 
the importance of individuals and communities being able to enjoy what has been called the 
“right to be different”.  In each case, space has been found for members of communities to 
depart from a majoritarian norm.  The point was made in Christian Education that these 
provisions collectively and separately acknowledge the rich tapestry constituted by civil 
society, indicating in particular that language, culture and religion constitute a strong weave 
in the overall pattern.  …  The strength of the nation envisaged by the Constitution comes from 
its capacity to embrace all its members with dignity and respect.45 
 
Similarly the Supreme Court of Canada has held in Chamberlain v Surrey School 
District No. 3646 that: 
In my view, Saunders J. [the trial judge] below erred in her assumption that “secular” 
effectively meant “non-religious”.  This is incorrect since nothing in the Charter, political or 
democratic theory, or a proper understanding of pluralism demands that atheistically based 
moral positions trump religiously based moral positions on matters of public policy.  … To 
construe the “secular” as the realm of the “unbelief” is therefore erroneous.  Given this, why, 
then, should the religiously informed conscience be placed at a public disadvantage or 
disqualification?  To do so would be to distort liberal principles in an illiberal fashion and 
would provide only a feeble notion of pluralism.  The key is that people will disagree about 
important issues, and such disagreement, where it does not imperil community living, must be 
capable of being accommodated at the core of a modern pluralism.47 
 
The Court in Chamberlain v Surrey made clear that the public sphere in a secular 
democracy must not be deemed to exclude religion, and must include opinions based 
in religion as well as those based in other considerations.48   
 
                                                 
44 Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 (4) SA 757 (CC); 2000 (10) 1051 
(CC), [24]. 
45 Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie; Lesbian & Gay Equality Project & Others v Minister for Home 
Affairs 2006(1) SA 524 (CC) (South Africa Constitutional Court) Case CCT 60/04 (2005), [61-2] 
(Sachs J). 
46 [2002] 4 S.C.R. 710, 2002 SCC 86. 
47 [2002] 4 S.C.R. 710, 2002 SCC 86 [137] (Gonthier J for himself and Bastarache J (who would have 
upheld the British Columbia Court of Appeal's decision on all points, and therefore wrote in dissent 
on part of the decision). 
48 It is notable that Iain T. Benson has said on this case, based on a mischaracterisation of Holyoake’s 
principles (drawing a definition of secularism from the Encyclopedia Britannica) , that “While it was 
necessary to examine the term "secular," it was not necessary to discuss "secularism," and the 
definition of the latter was not argued before the court. … In equating "secular" with "secularism" the 
majority judges overlooked the fact that, at its historic origins, the intention of secularism was 
precisely to exclude religion from all public aspects of society - the very thing the court itself refused 
to do. Simply put: the Supreme Court of Canada failed to recognize that the term "secularism" 
describes an ideology that is, and has been since its inception, anti-religious. As such, the ideology of 
secularism cannot be one of the principles upon which Canada, as a free and democratic country, is 
based.” (Iain T. Benson, ‘Considering Secularism’ in Douglas Farrow (ed.), Recognizing Religion in a 
Secular Society: Essays in Pluralism, Religion, and Public Policy (McGill Queens Press, Montreal, 
2004), 85) 
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Considering the issue from an opposing perspective, the Indian anti-secularist Ashis 
Nandy said that 
 
It is time to recognize that, instead of trying to build religious tolerance on the good faith or 
the conscience of a small group of de-ethnicized, middle-class politicians, bureaucrats, and 
intellectuals, a far more serious venture would be to explore the philosophy, the symbolism, 
and the theology of tolerance in the faiths of the citizens and hope that the state systems in 
South Asia may learn something about religious tolerance from everyday Hinduism, Islam, 
Buddhism, or Sikhism rather than wish that ordinary Hindus, Muslims, Buddhists and Sikhs 
will learn tolerance from the various fashionable secular theories of statecraft. 
 
John Gray, the author of The Two Faces of Liberalism, contends that  
 
the liberal view of toleration contains an internal contradiction: on the one hand, liberalism 
tries to reach a rational consensus on the best way of life; yet on the other hand, liberalism 
believes that human beings can flourish through many different ways of life.
49 
 
Gray considers that the current view of toleration is internally contradictory as it tries 
to achieve a consensus on the best way to live, yet believes that people will flourish 
through many ways of life.  He contends that the homogeneity of contemporary society 
means that a consensus on values impossible.   
 
In the US in recent years the efforts of secular governments no longer to accommodate 
strong religious positions in public policy is being seen not as a neutral position of 
government, but rather a battle between religion and secular government for the public 
sphere, sometimes titled a ‘culture war’.  US Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia 
said that the Court “has taken sides in the culture war”, the Kulturkampf as the 
Germans have styled it.  The debate, the culture war, continues nonetheless in 
contemporary US society.   
 
Michael Hernandez maintains that contemporary law and government in the US are 
currently still affected by religious principles in the form of “civil religion”, which 
while he argues is “not grounded in the tenets of any particular faith” is then not 
sectarian, but is clearly Christian in nature. He cites Alexis de Toqueville in 1835 
saying “[t]here is no country in the whole world in which the Christian religion retains 
a greater influence over the souls of men than in America …”, and notes how far the 
court in is removed from the early Christian era in rejecting Judeo-Christian principles 
in its interpretations, but is himself of the view that Christianity is losing its influence 
on the development of contemporary American law. 50   
 
Then again, Jeremy Rabkin is more pragmatic, commenting on the so-called culture 
war: 
Having agitated and distracted our politics for more than a quarter of a century ... it still shows 
no signs of slackening.  It continues to rattle, like some Victorian ghost, haunting most of all 
those robed judicial worthies who are most intent on laying it to rest.51 
 
                                                 
49 David M. Brown, ‘Reconciling Equality and Other Rights: Paradigm Lost?’ (2004) 15 National 
Journal of Constitutional Law 1, 3. 
50 Michael V. Hernandez, “A Flawed Foundation: Christianity’s Loss of Pre-eminent Influence on 
American Law” (2004) 56 Rutgers Law Review 625, 626. 
51 Jeremy Rabkin, “The Supreme Court in the culture wars” (1996) 125 Public Interest 3, 25. 
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The reasons for so many perceptions on modern secular governance and secularism’s 
future have many bases.  Maclure and Taylor52 put it down to “the relationship 
between religious and nonreligious people [being] often characterized by 
incomprehension, distrust, and sometimes even mutual intolerance.”  They see that 
modern atheists and agnostics have difficulty in understanding individuals whose truth 
cannot be evaluated with the scientific approach.  The religious cannot understand why 
the non-religious cannot move beyond the material.  Their solution is that 
“contemporary societies must develop the ethical and political knowledge that will 
allow them to fairly and consistently manage the moral, spiritual, and cultural diversity 
at their heart.”53   
 
IV THE DOWNSIDE WHEN A STATE IS TOO SECULAR: NON-NEUTRAL NEUTRALITY 
 
If one considers that secularism is a neutrality of the state towards religion, can the 
wish of the state to appear neutral actually be counterproductive to secular ideals?  
There are some strong views on how secular a state need be in order to effectively 
meet the obligations of the state to the people and of religion to contribute to public 
discourse in matters that are of importance to it.  Veit Bader54 has observed in the US 
context that  
 
Most American liberal philosophers, among them Dworkin, Ackerman, Galston, Rawls, 
Macedo, and Audi, "believe that ... values of freedom, equality and toleration are best 
preserved if religion is removed from public affairs." They are virtually unanimous in their 
staunch advocacy of the "wall of separation." They believe that "both religious practice and 
pluralistic democracy are best preserved" by precluding religious argumentation within the 
public realm and by putting "the moral ideals that divide us off the conversational agenda of 
the liberal state 
 
This interpretation of secularism, according to some interpretations, is the complete 
absence of religion in the public sphere, in what is termed in the US ‘strict secularism’.   
In chapter 3 of this thesis these states were characterised as ‘militant secularist’.  The 
presumption, as has been explored earlier, is that if the state is not seen through actions 
of its institutions, policies or agents to be favouring religion in any way, then the 
general population will not believe that they are acting contrary to the constitutional 
paradigm that supports this model.  Examples of such were school funding of parochial 
schools or the employment by the state of those people who wear overt religious 
symbols.  Such were exemplified by the USA and France. 
 
Often such activities can be counterproductive.  The sacking of women who wear 
Islamic headscarves, for fear of their employment being seen as a tacit acceptance of 
a view that headscarves are worn only by women who are oppressed by their religion, 
does them no service.  The state’s hands are clean for not supporting a practice that is 
anathema to public policy, yet is overly simplistic because that person is now out of a 
job.  How is the state’s arguably additional pressure on such people advancing society 
as a whole? 
                                                 
52 Jocelyn Maclure and Charles Taylor (trans. Jane Marie Todd) Secularism and Freedom of 
Conscience (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, USA, 2011), 106. 
53 Jocelyn Maclure and Charles Taylor (trans. Jane Marie Todd) Secularism and Freedom of 
Conscience (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, USA, 2011), 110. 
54 Veit Bader, ‘Religious Pluralism: Secularism or Priority for Democracy?’ (1999) 27(5) Political 
Theory 597, 598. 
 
165 
 
Unintended consequences of a strict neutrality in court decisions have been recognised 
in the US in recent years.  Take for example Santa Fe Independent School District v 
Doe55 where the US Supreme Court observed that  
 
Even if the plain language of the [school invocation] policy were facially neutral, "the 
Establishment Clause forbids a State to hide behind the application of formally neutral criteria 
and remain studiously oblivious to the effects of its actions." (citing Capital Square Review 
and Advisory Bd. v Pinette, 515 US, at 777 (1995).56 
 
In a more recent case the same court held that “laws ‘neutral’ toward religion may 
burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious 
exercise.”57  Some US courts have considered that such adherence to strict neutrality 
can be seen as a bias, or hostility, to religion,58  or indeed even that “we do not apply 
an absolute rule of neutrality because doing so would evince hostility toward religion 
that the Establishment Clause forbids.”59 
 
In Chapter 2 it was noted that the Utilitarian thoughts of such as Jeremy Bentham and 
John Stuart Mill advocated social change and the removal of harm such that society 
altogether gained.  George Holyoake, building on their work, had advocated that 
secularism intended that society should find a role for both religion and the state in the 
public sphere.  Is the above an isolated example and are such state behaviours limited 
to the ‘militant secularist’ states? 
 
Patrick Parkinson highlighted some interesting cases outside this model from the 
United Kingdom in 2010.60  Two of these involved strongly religious individuals 
employed by government authorities who provided counselling to gay and lesbian 
couples.  
 
In the first, Islington London Borough Council v Ladele,61 Lord Neuberger MR held 
that the Council’s refusal to accommodate a marriage registrar’s religious objections 
to officiating at same-sex civil partnership ceremonies did not constitute religious 
discrimination.  Ladele claimed that her refusal to perform ceremonies for same-sex 
ceremonies caused her to suffer discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, 
after she was disciplined and threatened with dismissal for her refusal.  The Council 
                                                 
55 Santa Fe Independent School District v Doe, 530 US 290 (2000). 
56 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); see also Church of Lukumi Babalu 
Aye, Inc. v Hialeah, 508 US 520, 534-535 (1993) (making the same point in the Free Exercise 
context). 
57 Gonzales v O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 US 418, 439 (2006). 
58 Trunk v City of San Diego, 629 F. 3d 1099, 1105. 
59 Ibid, making reference to School District of Abington Township, Pennsylvania v Schempp, 374 US 
203, 206 (1963), where Goldberg J, with Harlan J concurring, noted that “the attitude of government 
toward religion must be one of neutrality. But untutored devotion to the concept of neutrality can lead 
to invocation or approval of results which partake not simply of that noninterference and 
noninvolvement with the religious which the Constitution commands, but of a brooding and pervasive 
devotion to the secular and a passive, or even active, hostility to the religious. Such results are not 
only not compelled by the Constitution, but, it seems to me, are prohibited by it.” 
60 Patrick Parkinson, ‘Accommodating Religious Belief in a Secular Age: The Issue of Conscientious 
Objection in the Workplace’ (2010) 34(1) University of New South Wales Law Journal 281. 
61 [2010] 1 WLR 955. 
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denied this claiming Ladele had not worked as directed, and was not disciplined for 
her beliefs.  Notably, Elias P for the Employment Appeals Tribunal observed that 
 
The claimant’s complaint on this score is not that she was treated differently when she ought 
to have been.  The council refused to make an exception of her because of her religious 
convictions.  That is a complaint about a failure to accommodate her difference, rather than 
a complaint that she is being discriminated against because of that difference.  The council 
has been blind to her religion, and she submits that that they ought not to have been.62 
 
The Court of Appeal found in favour of the Council, upholding the Employment 
Appeal Tribunal’s decision.  Ladele subsequently appealed to the European Court of 
Human Rights on freedom of religion grounds. However the Court rejected her 
complaint in January, 2013.63 
 
Similarly in McFarlane v Relate Avon Ltd64 the appellant65 was employed by a charity 
to provide relationship counselling services to singles, couples, families and young 
people.  The terms of his contract required him to affirm that he would comply with 
his employer’s equal opportunity policy "that no person... [receive] less favourable 
treatment on the basis of characteristics, such as... sexual orientation...".66 
 
On the concept of a specific accommodation for deeply held religious views Laws LJ 
was quite clear that "the conferment of any legal protection or preference upon a 
particular substantive moral position on the ground only that it is espoused by the 
adherents of a particular faith, however long its tradition, however rich its culture, is 
deeply unprincipled." He went on to note that the observers of such views would 
require the general community to follow a compulsory law which is not for the 
objective advancement of society generally, but rather to give effect to a subjective 
opinion.  The objective truth of the obligation cannot be ascertained, and it is only the 
believer who is alone bound by the obligation. He went on to state:67 
 
The promulgation of law for the protection of a position held purely on religious grounds 
cannot therefore be justified. It is irrational, as preferring the subjective over the objective. But 
it is also divisive, capricious and arbitrary. We do not live in a society where all the people 
share uniform religious beliefs. The precepts of any one religion – any belief system – cannot, 
by force of their religious origins, sound any louder in the general law than the precepts of any 
other. If they did, those out in the cold would be less than citizens; and our constitution would 
be on the way to a theocracy, which is of necessity autocratic. The law of a theocracy is dictated 
without option to the people, not made by their judges and governments. The individual 
conscience is free to accept such dictated law; but the State, if its people are to be free, has the 
burdensome duty of thinking for itself. 
 
The application was refused, and upon appeal to the European Court of Human Rights, 
again refused.68   
 
                                                 
62 [2009] ICR 387, 401 [51-52]. (my italics). 
63 ECtHR Chamber judgment in cases nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10.  
64  [2010] IRLR 872. 
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The difficulties inherent in cases such as the two cases above were outlined by Lord 
Neuberger MR.  He agreed with the tribunal that it would have been easy enough to 
reassign staff who had religious objections to certain duties.  The Council’s aim 
however had been to ensure that none of its staff acted in a way that discriminated 
against others, and the means to do so had been ensuring that all registrars celebrated 
civil partnerships.  He observed that Ms Ladele’s employment did not interfere with 
her religious beliefs and indeed “she remained free to hold those beliefs, and free to 
worship as she wished”69 and that “Islington’s requirement in no way prevented her 
from worshipping as she wished.”70 
 
Laws LJ summarised the contribution of Lord Carey to MacFarlane to be that “the 
courts ought to be more sympathetic to the substance of the Christian beliefs referred 
to than appears to be the case, and should be readier than they are to uphold and defend 
them”.71  Laws LJ acknowledged his view, but emphasised that the role of the law was 
to protect the right to manifest religion, and not to protecting the substance of the 
beliefs.  On this he explained72 that 
 
In a free constitution such as ours there is an important distinction to be drawn between the 
law's protection of the right to hold and express a belief and the law's protection of that belief's 
substance or content. The common law and ECHR Article 9 offer vigorous protection of the 
Christian's right (and every other person's right) to hold and express his or her beliefs. And so 
they should. By contrast they do not, and should not, offer any protection whatever of the 
substance or content of those beliefs on the ground only that they are based on religious 
precepts. These are twin conditions of a free society.  
 
On this Laws LJ made the important point that the general law may protect a particular 
social or moral position that is advocated by religion.  However, this is not because of 
a religious imprimatur, but because it commends itself on its own merits.73  Appeals 
to the European Court of Human Rights have been consistent on the treatment of these 
types of cases.  In R (SB) v Governors of Denbigh High School,74 a case involving 
refusal of a school to change its school uniform rules to accommodate an Islamic 
headdress, Lord Bingham stated that on appeal  
 
The Strasbourg institutions have not been at all ready to find an interference with the right to 
manifest religious belief in practice or observance where a person has voluntarily accepted an 
employment or role which does not accommodate that practice or observance and there are 
other means open to the person to practise or observe his or her religion without undue hardship 
or inconvenience. 
 
Russell Sandberg has characterised such cases in the UK as a tension between the old 
and the new.  The old laws are those that give Christianity and Christians a special 
degree of protection whilst tolerating other religions, where the legislature and 
judiciary had a stance of passive accommodation rather than proscriptive regulation.  
The new are laws that consider individual rights of religious freedom need be balanced 
against other rights.75  
                                                 
69 [2010] 1 WLR 955, 970 [51]. 
70  [2010] 1 WLR 955, 970 [52]. 
71 [2010] IRLR 872, [21]. 
72 [2010] IRLR 872, [22]. 
73 [2010] IRLR 872, [23]. 
74 [2007] 1 AC 100, 112 [22]. 
75 Russell Sandberg, Law and Religion (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011), 36, 202. 
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In the United States, it has been suggested that the apparent strict neutrality of the 
Supreme Court is actually working contrary to the best interests of religious 
minorities.  Shivakumar76 asks the question of whether the strict neutrality practice 
adds to the power and influence of mainstream religions, whilst minimising the rights 
of religious minorities because of their lesser political influence.  He cites the 
examples of Oregon v Smith,77 where the Free Exercise Clause does not provide 
religious adherents exemptions from neutral laws that impair their religious practice, 
and Rosenberger v Rector of the University of Virginia78 where in relation to religious 
neutrality a public institution of higher learning was required to subsidise evangelical 
religious speech.   
 
In the nearly quarter century since Oregon v Smith, the impact of the case on the 
privileged treatment of religion in the public sphere remains profound.  Academic 
commentators such as Frederick Gedicks79 have since argued that religious 
exemptions cannot be supported because they violate legal commitments to equality.  
Eisgruber and Sager80 have noted that the only the Free Speech element of the First 
Amendment to the US Constitution should remain privileged; religion like race should 
be protected only from discrimination. 
 
Ultimately, it may be impossible to maintain an objectively neutral stance in such 
cases.  Michael McConnell, recently a circuit judge on the US Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit,81 that in some contexts “departures from religious neutrality are 
either permissible or constitutionally required.”  McConnell goes on to note that no 
genuinely neutral governmental approach may be available.82  Gedicks has made the 
interesting observation that “[r]eligious neutrality presupposes that the purpose of the 
Free Exercise Clause is to prevent religious discrimination, rather than to protect 
freedom of action in a domain of religious liberty.” 
 
There can be a place for reasonable accommodation of religion in the public sphere 
where such accommodation aids in public discourse and does not detract from the 
state’s ideals of maintaining communal harmony and community safety and security.  
So, what is ‘reasonable’?  A series of apt questions was put by Robert Thiemann some 
years ago regarding accommodation of religious precepts in the public sphere:83  
 
What are the appropriate limits of governmental accommodation of majority religious belief 
and practice within a pluralistic democracy? At what point does proper accommodation of 
                                                 
76 Dhananjai Shivakumar, “Neutrality and the Religion Clauses”, 33 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil 
Liberties Law Review 505, 507. 
77 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
78 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
79 Frederick Mark Gedicks, ‘An Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable Indefensibility of Religious 
Exemptions’ (1998) 20 University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review 555, 560-66 cited in Angela 
C. Carmella, ‘Exemptions and the Establishment Clause’ (2011) 32 Cardozo Law Review 1731. 
80 Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, ‘The Vulnerability of Conscience: The 
Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct’ (1997) 61 University of Chicago Law Review 
1245, 1251-52, 1282 cited in Angela C. Carmella, ‘Exemptions and the Establishment Clause‘, (2011) 
32 Cardozo Law Review 1731. 
81 2002-2009. 
82 Michael W. McConnell, ‘Neutrality under the Religion Clauses’ (1986) 81 Northwestern University 
Law Review 146, 149, 151, 164. 
83 R.F. Thiemann, Religion in public life (Georgetown University Press, Washington, 1996), 53. 
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religion become improper aid or assistance to religion? When does accommodation of the 
majority religion become discriminatory toward religious minorities? 
 
Robert Thiemann concluded after a consideration of the US cases since Everson that 
the US separation metaphor should be “abandoned for four reasons: (1) it deflects 
attention from more fundamental principles (e.g., liberty, equality, tolerance) that 
undergird the two clauses, (2) it conceptualizes church-state relations in singular and 
monolithic terms, (3) it conceals the variety of ways in which they interact, and (4) it 
constrains our ability to imagine new possibilities for their relation.”84 
 
Dickson CJ in the Canadian case R v Big M Drug Mart observed that “[t]he equality 
necessary to support religious freedom does not require identical treatment of all 
religions.  In fact, the interests of true equality may well require differentiation in 
treatment.”85  This suggests a differential treatment based on the context.  Such a case, 
also Canadian, would be the much more recent Syndicat Northcrest v Anselem.   
 
In Anselem the appellants were Orthodox Jews who owned buildings in Montreal, 
attempting to meet religious obligations to reside in temporary huts during a 9-day 
religious festival of Succot.  They challenged by-laws which prohibited decorations, 
alterations and constructions on the balconies.  The Supreme Court held that the by-
laws imposed a trivial imposition and infringed their rights to observe the requirements 
of the religious festival.  This is one of many instances where, in order not to be seen 
endorsing religious practices and impliedly supporting them, the state is often cracking 
a walnut with a hammer, imposing inconveniences on the religious practitioner out of 
all proportion to the (often unproven) perception of bias by the state to religion. 
 
The scope of religious freedom in Anselem was held to be a  
 
Freedom to undertake practices and harbour beliefs, having a nexus with religion, in which an 
individual demonstrates he or she sincerely believes or is sincerely undertaking in order to 
connect with the divine or as a function of his or her spiritual faith, irrespective of whether a 
particular practice or belief is required by official religious dogma or is in conformity with the 
position of religious officials.86 
 
The Court has therefore established in Anselem the principle that a religious belief 
need not be reasonable, but if sincerely believed, should only have a non-trivial 
interference by the state applied in limitation if it would cause harm or interference 
with the rights of others in that particular context.   
 
This position was supported two years later in Multani87 where the administrators of 
a public school sought to prevent Multani from carrying a concealed kirpan88 in his 
clothing to school.  Following the principle established in Anselem the Court held that 
the burden of prevention upon Multani was non-trivial as his religious belief was 
sincerely held and hence his freedom of religion was unreasonably infringed.  In 
Canada at least the Court appears to be moving towards a more accommodating 
position and tolerance, with no evidence that the stance taken by the state is being 
                                                 
84 R.F. Thiemann, Religion in public life (Georgetown University Press, Washington, 1996), 43. 
85 R. v Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 SCR 295, para 362. 
86 Anselem, [46]. 
87 Multani v Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2006] 1 SCR 256, 264 DLR (4th) 577. 
88 A Sikh ceremonial dagger. 
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perceived negatively by any parties.  The decisions in Anselem and Multani have 
demonstrated a trend in Canadian jurisprudence away from an areligious secularism.  
Indeed, Gonthier J in Chamberlain argued that 
 
Nothing in the Charter, political or democratic theory, or a proper understanding of pluralism 
demands that atheistically based moral positions trump religiously based moral positions on 
matters of public policy.  … the key is that people will disagree about important issues, and 
such disagreement, where it does not imperil community living, must be capable of being 
accommodated at the core of modern pluralism.89 
 
Societies have become more pluralistic over the last half century or more.  States are 
now accepting of those who bring different views and values, but those values need to 
be added to the pool of experience of existing populations in order to create new 
constitutional identities that are inclusive, rather than the old being tolerant of the new.  
Holyoake’s principles continue to serve.  Ideals such as the accepting all viewpoints 
in the public sphere, including the religious, and to not seek to replace those views 
with another remain the most popular model for liberal democracies in increasingly 
pluralistic societies.  What we can derive as most effective from the cases supreme 
courts have struggled with in recent years will be the subject of the next and last 
chapter. 
  
In conclusion, it can be seen that secularism has been given accountability and 
characteristics quite unlike the principles Holyoake envisaged a century and a half 
ago.  The common understanding of a secular state has become one where, rather than 
the state not being controlled or strongly influenced by religion, it is seen as one that 
has no tolerance of association with religion.  In some cases secularism is seen as 
responsible for keeping pluralistic communities together.  This then results in the state 
acting not in a neutral fashion as advocated by Holyoake, but instead acting to meet 
those perceptions.  When secularism does not perform as expected it is considered to 
have either failed, or to be in a crisis.  While this chapter has explored these perceptions 
and expectations, these outliers that have been examined are not those practices 
advocated by Holyoake’s principles of secularism.  Rather, they represent a 
misunderstanding of those principles.    
 
The next and final chapter will examine how Holyoake’s principles still remain 
relevant in the modern world, and while various models of secular constitutional 
principles remain extant, a general theory of constitutional secularism based on 
Holyoake’s principles will be proposed. 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
89 Chamberlain v Surrey School District No. 36 (2002) SCC 86, [137]. 
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CHAPTER 10 
 
CONCLUSION: 200 YEARS OF AN AGITATOR’S INFLUENCE 
 
The purpose of this thesis has been, in part, to explore the contemporary relevance of 
the thoughts of George Jacob Holyoake, particularly as they pertain to his principles 
of secularism.  This thesis has examined the influences of Holyoake’s thought in 
modern times.  After his life, Holyoake’s thoughts influenced some who sought to 
create constitutions in pluralistic societies.   
 
In his seventies, Holyoake reflected on his life and work in Sixty Years of an Agitator’s 
Life.1  He acknowledged there that he was a man of his times, having lived and worked 
through most of the nineteenth century.  His writing in the books from which I have 
drawn the material for this thesis have indeed depicted the manner and practice of his 
time, for which his apology is unwarranted.2  Holyoake wrote on many things that 
caught his attention and intersected with his life, but his thoughts on secularism remain 
his enduring legacy. 
 
Edward Royle, who wrote at length on the life on Holyoake, remarked that “he 
managed to “thrust himself into the centre of contemporary debates about religion, 
politics and economics, as he uneasily straddled the social and intellectual gulf 
between the ‘common people’ and their masters.”  He concluded with the observation 
that “History has dealt harshly with Holyoake.  He was too typical of his age to leave 
remarked upon, save for the occasional reference to his autobiography, Sixty Years of 
an Agitator’s Life.”  The remarks on his work in this thesis bring Holyoake back just 
a little into the public view. 
 
Holyoake was a freethinker, a chartist, and a man who was attuned to the thoughts and 
ideals of the working class.  While some such as he would pursue advocacy of 
workers’ rights in opposition to those who employed them,3 Holyoake observed also 
that workers felt that established religion affected their ability to progress.4  Not 
surprisingly his first thoughts and actions were to argue for religion’s removal in the 
public sphere, which he did in his younger years.  Colleagues he met along this path 
such as Charles Bradlaugh supported his endeavours and echoed his frustrations with 
the perceived collusion of religion with the state. 
 
                                                 
1 Edward Royle, Selected Pamphlets by G.J. Holyoake, 1841-1904, Microform Academic Publishers 
<http://www.microform.co.uk/guides/R97234.pdf>, 1. 
2 George Jacob Holyoake, Sixty Years of an Agitators Life, Vol II (London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1892), 
Chap. CXII, APOLOGY TO THE READER. ‘Many books at their close need this: and he who has 
perused these chapters has probably thought some apology was due long ago.  The story of many 
persons and many events remain untold in them; should I ever tell them, as in those I have related, 
one characteristic will be found—that of depicting the manners, prejudices, and progress of my time, 
so far as, judging from my own experience, may be of use to others’. 
 
3 See generally Sidney Pollard, Labour history and the labour movement in Britain (Vol. 652). 
(Ashgate Publishing, Farnham, 1999). 
4 Noah Feldman, Divided by God: America's Church-State Problem - and What We Should Do About 
It (Macmillan, Hampshire, 2007), 114. 
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Mature reflection and years resulted in Holyoake adjusting his actions and thoughts 
into a more conciliatory mode.  The beliefs that he developed in his thirties on how 
society could best include all views - rather than banishing some - caused him to part 
from those with whom he had previously associated.  They, such as Bradlaugh, 
followed a different path,5 finding supporters for their own hard-line stance of a strict 
removal of religion from the public sphere.  Holyoake’s more moderate views on 
secularism have played a stronger role in modern constitutional discourse. 
 
Holyoake first explained secularism to “express the extension of freethought to 
ethics"6 and to be “the study of promoting human welfare by material means; 
measuring human welfare by the utilitarian rule, and making the service of others a 
duty of life ".7  He expanded on this by explaining that: 
 
Secularism is that … which selects as its methods of procedure the promotion of human 
improvement by material means, and proposes these positive agreements as the common bond 
of union, to all who would regulate life by reason and ennoble it by service. 
 
These thoughts make clear that Holyoake wished to provide a benefit to society in the 
utilitarian mode, but not at the detriment of religion in any form.  While Bradlaugh 
wished to remove religion as illogical and outdated, Holyoake considered testing and 
arguing the validity of religious ‘truths’ as being irrelevant to creating an open public 
sphere.  Holyoake expressed four rights:8 
 
1. The right to Think for one's self, which most Christians now admit, at least in theory.  
2. The right to Differ, without which the right to think is nothing worth.  
3. The right to Assert difference of opinion, without which the right to differ is of no practical 
use.  
4. The right to Debate all vital opinion, without which there is no intellectual equality—no 
defence against the errors of the state or the pulpit.  
 
These rights can be claimed by anyone at any time in a secular democracy.  They do 
not permit the censure or criticism of the state, nor that of religion, or indeed anyone 
who wishes to express a view in the public sphere.  These principles of secularism 
might readily apply to disputes regarding the best football code as much as they might 
apply to religious and state opinions about what is best for society.  In this sense 
Holyoake saw secularism apart from religion, not against it. 
 
In modern times secularism has taken on many shades of meaning, often creating 
confusion where the term is invoked.  The meaning is infused with its common 
application to politics rather than constitutional law, to religion as a synonym for 
                                                 
5 Bradlaugh went further than Holyoake.  While Holyoake accepted that all points of view were 
valuable and valid, Bradlaugh was more hard-line: "Although at present it may be perfectly true that 
all men who are Secularists are not Atheists, I put it that in my opinion the logical consequence of the 
acceptance of Secularism must be that the man gets to Atheism if he has brains enough to 
comprehend.” (Alex J. Harrison and Charles Bradlaugh, Secularism: Report of a public discussion 
between Alexander J. Harrison and Charles Bradlaugh, held in the New Town Hall, Newcastle-upon-
Tyne, on the evenings of Sept. 13 & 14, 1870 (Austin & Co., London, 1870)). 
6 George Jacob Holyoake, English Secularism: A Confession of Belief (The Open Court Publishing 
Company, Chicago, 1896), 34. 
7 George Jacob Holyoake, English Secularism: A Confession of Belief (The Open Court Publishing 
Company, Chicago, 1896), 60. 
8 GJ Holyoake, The Principles of Secularism (3rd Ed., Austin & Co. London, 1870), Chapter XIII. 
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atheism, and in the East as a solution to communal violence and a perceived remainder 
of colonial times incorrectly applied to new nations with new ideas. 
 
Modern constitutional law over a wide range of liberal democratic jurisdictions is 
trending towards the inclusion of secular principles in the administration of religious 
freedom in their constitutions consistent with Holyoake’s principles.  Some have gone 
so far as including the word ‘secular’ in the constitution’s text to make the intent clear.   
 
Yet, more than a century and a half after Holyoake offered his views on how politics 
and religion could work together in the public sphere to ensure that their mutual 
interests were addressed to the benefit of all, like a ‘Chinese whisper’ Holyoake’s 
message travelled the world and likely lost its original meaning even before it left 
Britain’s shores. 
 
The message that has come back, like in the childhood game, is a garbled and 
completely different one.  From most points of the world the inclusive view of 
Holyoake seems to have been re-developed into either the more strident and anti-
religious one of Charles Bradlaugh in England, or that of strict separation attributed to 
Thomas Jefferson in the USA.  While the latter predated Holyoake, serious 
consideration of what freedom of religion and secularism means did not begin to be 
considered there until the middle of the last century. 
 
Religion in the form of organised institutions and well-meaning public officials has 
attempted to occupy the public sphere with its symbols in order to remind the public 
of its relevance and message, and to keep it there through the imprimatur and support 
of the state.  This thesis has shown that these battles, such as in France to deny symbols 
worn by individuals, or in the USA to remove symbols endorsed by the state, 
eventually demean the efforts of the state to control the narrative of the place of 
religion in national discourse.  Efforts to control the narrative by the state often give 
these issues a status they do not warrant, and a message the state does not understand 
and control.   
 
In attempting to control the perspective held of the state in its dealings with organised 
religion by controlling its image, the state comes across as overbearing rather than 
disaffected.  In places such as the England and Scotland, the Netherlands and 
Denmark, where religion has some form of formal establishment, the state is not seen 
as a tool of organised religion. There was a fear and discontent in England during the 
times of Holyoake of religion controlling the state, but in these states the influence of 
organised religion upon the state is well understood and is known to have a voice, but 
by no means a controlling interest.   
 
I WORKING TOWARDS A WORKING AND PRACTICAL SECULARISM IN THE 
HOLYOAKE TRADITION 
 
The question I have sought an answer to in this thesis has been, as I put in Chapter 1, 
“how religion in a secular liberal democracy may be accommodated without impacting 
upon broader state public policy objectives, yet allowing a role for religious and non-
religious members of the community to make a contribution in the public space with 
minimal friction”.  In short, is it possible for religion and the state to co-exist 
amicably? 
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If that is possible, in what form would it be?  Amartya Sen9 described secularism as 
being broadly grouped into two predominant forms.  The first is that secularism 
requires that the state be equidistant from all religions, not supporting any religion, 
and being neutral with respect to all, the other requires that the state have no 
relationship with any religion, and be equally distanced from all religions. 
 
Sen explains that both interpretations do not give religion a privileged position in the 
activities of the state.  The first view is distinguished from the other because there is 
no requirement that the state stay clear of any association from religion.  What is 
needed he says is “a basic symmetry of treatment” rather than a “demand that the state 
must stay clear of any association with any religious matter whatsoever.” 10   The 
question that remains is what form that symmetry may take. 
 
This argument is, however, rather simplistic.  If religion could be identified 
organisationally, then its activities would perhaps be obvious, and its influences clear.  
In times past, the sovereign as a temporal authority would know of his religious 
counterpart.  Those days are gone.  Religions such as Hinduism do not have a 
centralised authority which seeks to influence government.  Some, such as Scientology 
struggle to be recognised as such.11  Religion and state interactions are now not so 
clear, as many of the cases cited in this thesis attest.  Religion is often involved in 
public charitable works and other public beneficial activity such as education,12 
helping disaffected youth13 and helping people find employment.14   
 
So, how can the state seriously be expected to separate itself entirely from people and 
organisations which operate in a spectrum from the purely religiously motivated, 
through to the formally religious?  Modern secularism cannot be reasonably 
characterised with the popular model of a separation of religious matters from the 
state. 15  Since around the time of the US case of Everson v Board of Education16 in 
the late 1940s, cases trying to make clear where the state starts and religion finishes 
has been extremely difficult.  The word ‘secular’ once had the meaning of ‘living in 
the world, not belonging to a religious order’ having a context of being outside a 
monastic environment.17  The ‘spiritual’ and ‘temporal’ worlds are no longer distinct, 
and the modern world has seen that the former no longer lives and operates separately 
from the latter.   
 
                                                 
9 Amartya Sen, The Argumentative Indian (Penguin UK, 2006), 296. 
10 Amartya Sen, The Argumentative Indian (Penguin UK, 2006), 296. 
11 Cases include Church of Scientology Moscow v Russia [2007] ECHR 258; see also ‘Parliament 
passes new rules on official recognition of religions’, Poltics.hu, 27 June, 2013 
<http://www.politics.hu/20130627/parliament-passes-new-rules-on-official-recognition-of-
religions/>. 
12 E.g. the Australian Catholic University. 
13 E.g. Youth off the Streets (http://www.youthoffthestreets.com.au/). 
14 E.g. Christian Jobs Australia (www.christianjobs.com.au). 
15 “The State and the Church are not like two distinct objects, which can be seen at a glance and 
estimated in a moment.  They are distinct enough it is true – they have an overwhelming palpableness 
when they are once discerned – but being entities of the mind, only those who think comprehend 
them.”  (George Jacob Holyoake, The Reasoner, Vol. 30 July, 1872, 276.) 
16 330 US 1 (1947).   
17 secular. (n.d.). Online Etymology Dictionary. Retrieved February 20, 2014, from Dictionary.com 
    website: http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/secular. 
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This thesis has examined cases such as a cross in the desert in the US,18 which to some 
is a religious symbol, and to others a representation honouring those who have died in 
wars.  Priests of minority religions in India,19 and schoolboys in Canada20 are seen as 
a danger to the state.  Stones in front of court houses21 and religious symbols on school 
walls,22 in place for decades, become controversial.  These and similar cases across 
the jurisdictions must separate issues which are multifaceted and complex into matters 
which supreme courts must tease out the constitutional issue from the merely 
pedestrian.    
 
The anthropologist Deepa Das Acevedo recently considered secularism from the 
perspective of India, but it has an application and perspective beyond India.23  While 
secularism in India is not necessarily different from another, her paper collates a 
number of different perspectives on secularism that fit well with the tradition of 
Holyoake, such as the views of Bhargava and Yildirim.  Rajeev Bhargava considers 
that secularism in India takes a “principled distance” that includes both 
nonestablishment but not strict separation of religion and state.  Seval Yildirim sees 
Indian secularism to be “a discourse to reconstruct the political space so that religion 
and the state can co-exist” and Pratap Bhanu Mehta together with others such as 
Rajeev Dhavan consider that in India secularism can have multiple meanings, and in 
practice has different forms according to local conditions.  Acedevo considers that 
secularism may only be understood if both “the nonestablishment of a state religion 
and the desire to keep religion and state separate” are referenced together.24   
 
Acedevo argues that India increasingly does not meet these definitions.  She is 
arguably incorrect in this regard.  Here the distinction is the concept of separation of 
religion and state.  It is difficult to see that any definition has been met if it is not well 
defined in the first instance.  This is not her fault, as those she cites are broad in their 
characterisation themselves.  She notes this vagueness when she observes that 
Yildirim considers the United States and Turkey are successful secular states. 
 
While the above formed the basis for a discussion on contemporary secularism in 
India, the distinction may serve equally well for consideration on the nature of 
secularism in secular democracies in general.  Much has been made of secular models 
that vary from the Holyoakean ideal, where the paradigm has been a strict separation 
of religion and state.  This is because this has been an ideal difficult to administer and 
impossible to police, and a jurisprudence unable to be applied consistently and 
equitably without the state arriving at outcomes that the media has delighted to often 
point out as absurd. 
 
On the question of the contemporary state of religious freedom in secular 
constitutional jurisdictions, in some secular states like India, the question of religious 
freedom is not on any recent agenda.  India has a relatively recent constitution, and 
                                                 
18 Salazar v Buono, 559 US 700 (2010) (Chapter 6). 
19 Rev. Stainislaus v State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors, 1977 AIR 908, 1977 SCR (2) 611 (Chapter 5). 
20 Multani v Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys [2006] 1 SCR. 256, 2006 SCC 6 (Chap 6). 
21 Van Orden v Perry, 545 US 677 (2005). 
22 Lautsi and Others v. Italy [GC] - 30814/06 Judgment 18.3.2011 [GC] (18 March 2011). 
23 Deepa Das Acevedo, ‘Secularism in the Indian Context’ (2013) 38(1) Law and Social Enquiry 138, 
140. 
24 Deepa Das Acevedo, ‘Secularism in the Indian Context’ (2013) 38(1) Law and Social Enquiry 138, 
140. 
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yet the provisions of its Constitution in this regard have received comparatively little 
debate in the Indian Supreme Court compared with some jurisdictions like the United 
States.  It is not that the issue of religion is of little importance in India, but rather that 
the religious freedom provisions of its Constitution appear, through the lack of recent 
significant issues on the matter, to be accepted by society and found satisfactory.  
 
However, in some jurisdictions like Canada and particularly the United States, the 
question of religious freedom continues to be tested in their highest courts without a 
firm position either being articulated by the court, or being accepted by large parts of 
the community.  Often the cases seem to arise to take advantage of conservative 
supreme courts that may be perceived to be sympathetic to religious views.  Rather 
than the supremacy of their highest court being accepted as final, the topic is constantly 
re-adjudicated.   
 
Secularism in liberal democracies is indeed being tested and often wavering.  It is 
being tested and eroded in less spectacular and slower means in other places, 
particularly in the United States and in Germany.  Some have suggested that the 
popular rhetoric of various countries may explain their views about religious freedom 
in terms of what might be called “founding myths”.  These myths exemplify the values 
they have articulated regarding freedom, neutrality and equality upon which they state 
they were founded.  However, it is the practice of those countries in modern times that 
determines how they put their founding myths into practice, to project their 
constitutional identity.25 
 
Secularism as a constitutional model continues to be a popular and agreed means to 
bring diverse interests and religions together so that all interests might be 
acknowledged, but have none prevail.  The recent religious symbol debates in France, 
and to a lesser extent Europe and beyond, have brought into focus for many 
jurisdictions the nature of their constitutional identity, and how it projects that identity 
when considering novel constitutional questions not considered when those 
constitutions were first drafted.  Many were drafted as solutions to address entirely 
different religious freedom issues to those currently presented to them.  Some 
jurisdictions continue at this time to review their legal traditions in this area.  Is it 
possible though to improve and make a one-size-fits-all model that would be able to 
adopt all that is consistent with what has been learned from Holyoake’s principles? 
 
II A GENERAL THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SECULARISM 
 
Additionally, as well as considering anew Holyoake’s principles of secularism, it is 
also appropriate to reflect upon whether his principles remain in currency in 
constitutional law, and whether the experiences of those jurisdictions which have 
adopted secular principles remain consistent with those principles some century and 
half distant from when they were first articulated by him. 
 
As I have demonstrated, at the present time there is not a strong normative theory of 
constitutional secularism.  Many of the cases examined in this thesis have sought to 
ensure that the basic principles of secularism are maintained, that is, that organised 
                                                 
25 T. Jeremy Gunn, ‘Under God but Not the Scarf: The Founding Myths of Religious Freedom in the 
United States and Laïcité in France’ 46(1) Journal of Church and State 1, 9. 
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religion does not dictate directly the policies and actions of government.  In doing so, 
many actions have been brought through concerns of the state impeding the practices 
of religion, or at the extreme through fear of the state working actively to marginalise 
religion so that its public presence is meaningless.  These thoughts were particularly 
uppermost in Holyoake’s time when he sought to differentiate his principles from 
those who saw a possibility in the immediate post Enlightenment period to remove 
religion through ridicule of its tenets by way of reason, or its place in influencing 
public policy.  Those efforts by extreme ‘secularists’ remain as the view of many as 
the true ideals of secularism.   
 
While the principles of anti-religious ‘secularism’ of Bradlaugh and his successors 
remain as the more public face of secularism, the quieter and more measured views 
expressed by George Holyoake have to some extent faded over time, as less 
sensational things do, so that his intentions to some extent have been forgotten.   
Although caught up in the enthusiasm of his contemporaries in his early years to 
convince his fellow members of society of the illogic of religion and its undue 
influence upon government, Holyoake’s later mature years were applied not to replace 
religion in society but rather to accept its place.   
 
What is not well remembered are his views that religion in the public sphere should 
not be actively sidelined, marginalised or disregarded.  While the fears of religion’s 
power and influence remain in France’s current polity centuries after the 1789 
Revolution, Holyoake did not see that such extreme responses were required.  His new 
paradigm of Secularism sought not to abolish religion, nor to embrace it, but rather to 
accept that it had a place in the public sphere, along with others who wish to have their 
views heard in public policy deliberation. 
 
Holyoake’s principles have effectively been incorporated into the constitutions of 
most modern liberal democracies or their practices.  Although most modern 
constitutions of this type remain consistent with Holyoake’s principles, some remain 
resolutely in battle with it.  Many of the cases cited above have involved issues that 
have arisen since Holyoake’s death.  As religion has ceased to have a less dominant 
place in politics and society through the twentieth century until now, public policy 
originating in its precepts have been progressively questioned.  Issues such as the right 
of the religious to proselytise in public, for children to learn under religious symbols 
and curricula in public schools, and for government to regulate religion’s activities 
have been considered in supreme courts to see whether they conform to a state’s 
modern constitutional and social identity.   
 
While many of these issues have been resolved and rarely resurrected in the courts, 
some jurisdictions continue to grapple with the competing obligations to meet both the 
aspirations of religion and the state in the public sphere and finding the limits that may 
apply to them so that both may co-exist.  Matters such as the meaning and purpose of 
religious symbols in public places in Europe and the United States, or paternalistic 
public policies in France and India to address state-religion interactions continue to 
cause friction in the communities concerned and litigation in the courts.  A number of 
jurisdictions share the same issues but have addressed them differently, or the 
problems have not arisen.  This thesis has also identified these.  Can those jurisdictions 
with ongoing issues with religion in the public sphere learn from those which have 
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addressed them successfully, or can those jurisdictions approach the conflicts in a 
different way?   
 
I suggest a new paradigm that draws from those jurisdictions I have addressed in this 
thesis that have succeeded to work effectively with religion in the post-Holyoake 
secular state:   
 
1. Secularism must be seen as a modern and effective paradigm that will not have 
the baggage associated with only one place or colonial power.  It needs to be 
seen as Holyoake first thought it, as of universal applicability. 
 
Rajeev Bhargava has argued that we must “start to focus on the normative, 
informal practices of a broader range of Western and non-Western states, we 
shall see that better forms of secular states and much more defensible versions 
of secularisms are available.” 26 
 
Bhargava’s views of a more ‘defensible’ secularism come close to the mark 
of a long term solution.  However, secularism as Holyoake envisaged it 
should be commonly accepted as a viable and effective constitutional model 
that works across all jurisdictions without need for local variation.  More 
importantly, it should be a priori accepted, not needing further argument and 
‘defence’.  This will come from incremental acceptance as it is seen as 
beneficial, and not counter to the interests of other views in the public space.  
It will be seen as being of contemporary constitutional relevance in all 
jurisdictions. 
 
2. Where it is proposed that a limit be applied to religion or the state, there should 
be a clearly identifiable and supportable public utility for that limit.  Limits 
must be seen to serve a practical need recognised by all. 
 
This is not the same proposition as the Lemon Test in the US suggesting that 
legislation must prove that it has a secular purpose.  Legislation should not 
need to demonstrate its secular or religious purpose.  Rather, the test should be 
“Who is demonstrably harmed?”  The level of harm should be at a level higher 
than merely inconvenienced.  All of us are inconvenienced at some level by 
the choices we make in interacting with the state.  We must slow our journeys 
because of road works, buy homes only in zoned areas fit to live in, or drive at 
posted speed limits.  If in such interactions of state with religion, where there 
is a clash, are there alternatives?  Is the objection merely philosophical?  Is the 
objection to pre-empt a future harm which may not arise, and is there any 
likelihood that it will arise?  Interactions between religion and the state need 
not be a battle of wills, or a culture war, each not giving ground until a supreme 
court is reached. Is the common good, the maximum happiness of us all, served 
by a secular state that loses its way in the details rather than addressing the 
realities? 
 
                                                 
26 Rajeev Bhargava, “Beyond moderate secularism”, The Immanent Frame: Secularism, Religion and 
the Public Sphere, 16 September 2011. <http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2011/09/16/beyond-moderate-
secularism/.> 
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One of the main criticisms of secularism is that it seeks to sideline or impair 
the ability of religion to operate publicly.  Not unsurprisingly this is often 
perceived to be an attempt to negate the message that religion wishes to 
promulgate in the public space, and that limitations on religion by the secular 
state must be in some way an attempt to criticise or replace the religious 
message.  Few people or organisations see that their free expressions of 
speech, activity or passage may at times impair the ability of others to do the 
same.  Yet, as Thomas Jefferson put it, “Of liberty I would say that, in the 
whole plenitude of its extent, it is unobstructed action according to our will. 
But rightful liberty is unobstructed action according to our will within limits 
drawn around us by the equal rights of others.”27 A limitation by the secular 
state upon the activities of the religious is not likely to be a denial of religious 
freedom, but rather a means to preserve the rights of others who have an 
equal right to a presence in the public arena.  In that sense, it must be 
abundantly clear that there is a demonstrable public utility to that limitation. 
 
3. Leave the state to pass laws, and individuals and organisations to act in the 
public space, without seeking to search all who enter it for dangerous intent to 
society.  The harm to society of actors in the public space needs to be tangible. 
 
Charles Taylor28 argued that the role of secularism as a principle is not to be 
interpreted in the light of ‘founding myths’ or to single out religious (as against 
nonreligious), “secular”, or atheist viewpoints to inform the response of the 
democratic state to diversity.  There are few or no proofs in the jurisprudence 
in this area that society truly sees the hand of religion controlling the state when 
it gives transport subsidies to school children and incidentally supports it 
financially, or uplifts the social standing of disadvantaged citizens who also 
happen to identify with a religious group.   
 
In the contemporary world, it is impractical to sift through legislative activity 
of the modern secular state for possible critiques or limitations upon religion.  
Consequently it must be accepted as a principle of a secular constitutionalism 
that legislation will be drafted that will have the purpose intended and will 
not intentionally impair religious freedom and activity.  The harm perceived 
to organised religion would need to be obvious and tangible to religion, not 
inferred.  Secular jurisdictions would not pass such legislation as it would 
clearly be unconstitutional.  Accordingly legislation passed by the secular 
state must be accepted as passed for the common good. 
 
The larger picture is that legislation drawn from constitutional principles, 
allowing the state to make such laws, permits the state to make laws to do so.  
Unless there is an overt provision that makes clear that the legislation is 
designed to abolish or meddle with religion for no good reason, then it should 
be accepted on its face.  There are always going to be those who are affected 
or inconvenienced by legislation.  Not everything that impacts on religion has 
its harm in mind.  Legislatures and appellate courts in modern times know that 
no action that has the harm of religion in mind would pass muster.  Those who 
                                                 
27 Thomas Jefferson to Isaac H. Tiffany, Monticello, 4 April 1819 
<http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/98-01-02-0303>. 
28 Charles Taylor, ‘The Meaning of Secularism’, (2010) 12(3) The Hedgehog Review 23, 25. 
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wish to claim otherwise should look to the overt purpose of laws.  Laws will 
always bother someone, but laws cannot be drafted to meet the ideals of 
everyone.  Holyoake’s secularism allows for all views.  Once acknowledged, 
and if reasonable, accommodated, government must govern. 
 
4. In the absence of any harm to society, accommodation is reasonable.  Where 
there is no strict separation of religion and state, no accommodation is 
necessary.  Give religion respect, but no special status. 
 
Religion plays a role in many states for its charitable and social works.  
However, so do many secular organisations.  Some states give religion benefits 
for its status as religion alone, the charitable aspect being presumed, leaving 
the secular to have to argue its compliance with beneficial legislation.  Let 
religion prove its charitable and social worth.  In doing so, provisions that 
required definitions of religion to gain tax exemption status or for landlords 
not to be subject to ant-discrimination laws when they cite religious reasons 
for precluding tenants, for example, would fall by the wayside. Religious 
individuals and organisations have long sought to be excluded from laws of 
general application when they clashed with religious scruples.   
 
Andrew Koppelman asked in recent times if it was fair to give religion special 
treatment.29  His conclusion is that: 
 
The decision whether to treat religion specially in any particular case requires the 
decision maker, whether it is a legislature or a court, to balance the good of religion 
against whatever good the generally applicable law seeks to pursue.  That balancing 
is a matter of context-specific judgement.  It is not reducible to any legal formula. 
 
Courts have spent many years trying to be proscriptive.  One rule, such as the 
US Lemon test, will not fit all circumstances.  Making accommodations for 
religion, as religion, when these traditions began made sense in the context 
extant at that time.  Religion was clearly understood, and often the state was 
expected to support religion in some way, if not overtly, then through 
concessional treatment.  However, in more modern times, such traditions have 
less support among the general population, overt support has become more 
difficult to justify, and the plurality of current citizens makes even the 
definition of the religion to be so favoured hard to define.   
 
Koppelman has asked, ‘Is it fair to give religion special treatment?”  Religion 
no longer holds the dominant position in modern secular democracies that it 
once held.  Favours once given to religion are now questioned relative to other 
priorities of the state.  Therefore the Holyoakean tradition would suggest that 
religion be respected as should all public players.  Fairness would then not be 
in question if all are treated equitably. 
 
In summary, what Holyoake set out to have others understand was that the public 
space could be populated, but it did not have to be adversarial.  Currently in many 
jurisdictions Secularism is seen by the religious as antithesis to religion, and 
                                                 
29 Andrew Koppelman, ‘Is it fair to give religion special treatment?’ (2006) 2006 University of Illinois 
Law Review 571, 602.   
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therefore to be spurned if religion is to have a place in the public arena.  It is this 
view that prevents it from having universal acceptance.  As has been examined in 
previous chapters, secularism is seen in each country through a local lens.  In the 
East it is seen as a colonial imposition, a carry-over from the days before 
independence.  In the West it has the perception of the intent to impose non-religious 
values through the constitution leaving no place in the public space for religion, or at 
worst, a plan to remove it entirely. 
 
What is required hereafter is a model of secularism that has the above elements.  
Secularism that has a forward focus, that respects religion in all its understood forms 
(and those that are not) equally, that gives due credit and hearing to religion as a 
traditional and continuing contributor to public discourse, and one that is seen as a 
constitutional model for all, not the new displacing the old. 
 
In closing I note a quote from Francoise Guizot who said “In order to become 
acquainted with an age or a people we must also know something of its second-rate 
and obscure men.   It is in the beliefs, sentiments, and lot of unimportant individuals 
and unknown families, that the lot, the sentiments, and the beliefs of the country are 
to be found."”.  The Spectator in London observed30 at the time of Holyoake’s 
publication of Sixty Years of an Agitator’s Life that: 
 
We feel that all interested in social progress should make the acquaintance of these volumes. 
They are not literature, though some striking thoughts are embedded in the book of one who 
has been a nervous and fertile writer, speaker, and organiser. They are not—as we have hinted 
before—to be read without particular allowances for the class, constitution, character, and 
general opportunities of an energetic, able, thoughtful, but almost self-taught man. 
 
Holyoake aimed to serve his society, and in particular the general society, and not just 
the subset of it that he belonged to.  He began by seeking to help the working class 
into which he was born by aiding and joining causes such as the chartists, but over 
time included society of all classes and states in the considered thoughts of his later 
years on a practical secularism.  He sought to gain the ear of society through speeches, 
brochures, books and debates.  Holyoake left a number of publications he contributed 
to or wrote entirely, from those he edited and contributed to, through some on diverse 
topics as co-operatives, biographies and guidebooks of America and Canada.31 
 
Holyoake also wrote a number of books where he was clearly seeking a way to allow 
society both religious and not to co-exist.  Although a man of England and the 
nineteenth century, he was also a quiet and thoughtful man who wanted society to be 
harmonious, but not through the removal of its social and philosophical makeup as 
some would do.  This accommodative and adaptive stance is why Holyoake’s views 
remain influential, and his principles of secularism remain persuasive nearly 200 years 
after his birth.    
                                                 
30 The Spectator, 26 November 1892, 24. 
31 For a selection available online see: 
http://onlinebooks.library.upenn.edu/webbin/book/lookupname?key=Holyoake%2C%20George%20J
acob%2C%201817-1906.  
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